NOTE

This report includes an explanatory Comment to each section of the recommended legislation. The Comments are written as if the legislation were already operative, since their primary purpose is to explain the law as it will exist to those who will have occasion to use it after it is operative. The Comments are legislative history and are entitled to substantial weight in construing the statutory provisions. For a discussion of cases addressing the use of Law Revision Commission materials in ascertaining legislative intent, see the Commission’s most recent Annual Report.

Cite this report as Financial Privacy, 34 Cal. L. Revision Comm’n Reports 401 (2004). This is publication #222.
September 17, 2004

To: The Honorable Arnold Schwarzenegger
   Governor of California, and
   The Legislature of California

   Resolution Chapter 167 of the Statutes of 2002 directs the California Law Revision Commission to study, report on, and prepare recommended legislation concerning the protection of personal information relating to, or arising out of, financial transactions. The report is due January 1, 2005.

   This report analyzes Senate Bill 1 (Speier) — the California Financial Information Privacy Act, operative July 1, 2004. The report concludes that the new law largely achieves the objectives of the Legislature. Although clarification or improvement is possible, the Law Revision Commission does not recommend revision of the new law before there is experience under it.

   The report notes that the preemptive effect of federal law on the California Financial Information Privacy Act is not yet clear. The Commission believes it is premature to amend the new law to accommodate federal preemption.

   The report recommends statutory revisions to integrate the California Financial Information Privacy Act with existing California privacy statutes. The recommendation addresses only major privacy statutes. Numerous other statutes may also require adjustment.
The report concludes that further legislative work is necessary with respect to federal preemption and coordination with existing state privacy statutes. An extension of the report deadline is necessary to enable the Commission to accomplish the additional work. The Commission would not commence the work for two years or such other time as litigation over federal preemption is adequately resolved. The work would be subject to availability of Commission resources at that time.

The Commission wishes to express its appreciation to Elizabeth Huber of the Consumer Financial Services Committee of the State Bar Business Law Section for her assistance on this project.

Respectfully submitted,

William E. Weinberger
Chairperson
FINANCIAL PRIVACY

INTRODUCTION

The Legislature has directed the California Law Revision Commission to study, report on, and prepare recommended legislation concerning the protection of personal information relating to, or arising out of, financial transactions.¹

The Legislature’s directive specifies that the proposed legislation should accomplish the following objectives:

(1) Provide consumers with notice and the opportunity to protect and control the dissemination of their personal information.

(2) Direct the preparation of regulations that recognize the inviolability and confidentiality of a consumer’s personal information and the legitimate needs of entities that lawfully use the information to engage in commerce.

(3) Assure that regulated entities will be treated in a manner so that, regardless of size, an individual business, holding company, or affiliate will not enjoy any greater advantage or suffer any burden that is greater than any other regulated entity.

(4) Be compatible with, and withstand any preemption by, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.

(5) Provide for civil remedies and administrative and civil penalties for a violation of the recommended legislation.

Since then the Legislature has enacted Senate Bill 1 (Speier) — the California Financial Information Privacy Act. The new law became operative July 1, 2004.

This report analyzes the new law in light of the specific objectives identified by the Legislature. The report concludes that the new law largely achieves those objectives. Although clarification or improvement is possible, the Commission does not recommend revision of the new law before there is experience under it.

The report notes that the preemptive effect of federal law on the California Financial Information Privacy Act is not yet clear. The Commission believes that amendment of the new law to accommodate federal preemption is premature.

The report recommends statutory revisions to integrate the new law with existing California privacy statutes. The recommendation addresses only major privacy statutes. Numerous other statutes may also require adjustment.

The report concludes that further legislative work is necessary with respect to federal preemption and coordination with existing state privacy statutes. An extension of the report deadline is necessary to enable the Commission to accomplish the additional work. The Commission would not commence the work for two years or such other time as litigation over federal preemption is adequately resolved. The work would be subject to availability of Commission resources at that time.

BACKGROUND

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

In 1999 Congress enacted the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (also known as the Financial Services Modernization Act of

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This statute overturned depression-era laws that had erected legal barriers between commercial banking, securities, and insurance industries. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act repealed essential elements of both the Banking Act of 1933 (Glass-Steagall Act), which had prevented banks from affiliating with securities companies, and the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, which had blocked a bank from controlling a nonbank company and from conducting insurance activities. For the first time since the depression a financial institution may now engage in banking, insurance, and securities businesses simultaneously.

The intention of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is to benefit consumers by enhancing competition in domestic financial services. It also is intended to strengthen the ability of domestic companies to compete internationally. In effect, it allows the establishment of financial supermarkets by means of financial holding companies created by merger of different types of financial service entities.

The possibility of such a concentration of financial power carries with it the potential for significant erosion of privacy. Congress dealt with the privacy concern by including in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act limitations on the extent to which a financial institution may transfer to a third party personal financial information that it has collected concerning a customer.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires a financial institution annually to send a notice to its customers describing its privacy policy and any nonpublic personal information it intends to disclose to an affiliate or

The law also requires a financial institution to provide a method for its customers to prevent, or opt out of, the disclosure of some types of information to some types of third parties in some circumstances. The law further requires a financial institution to develop policies to promote data security. In addition, the law creates a right of enforcement — not in individuals but in a number of governmental agencies, including the Federal Trade Commission, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and state insurance commissioners.

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act also allows a state to provide greater privacy protection for consumers.

Public Policy

This study stems from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act’s invitation to the states to provide greater privacy protection for consumers than that Act provides.

Financial institutions have pointed out the benefits of liberal information sharing in helping to create a more efficient and lower-cost financial marketplace and in directing the consumer to advantageous financial product opportunities.

These benefits are balanced by the strong public policy in favor of financial privacy. The legislative resolution directing this study makes the policy clear:

7. Id. § 6803.
8. Id. § 6802(b).
9. Id. § 6805.
10. Id. § 6807(b).
WHEREAS, The Financial Services Modernization Act, commonly known as the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, became law in 1999, and reformed the laws that define and regulate the structure of the financial services industry; and

WHEREAS, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act greatly liberalized the ways that financial institutions were permitted to share nonpublic personal information, and has, in turn, highlighted the extent to which various entities buy, sell, and use nonpublic personal information; and

WHEREAS, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not provide a comprehensive framework by which citizens may control access to their nonpublic personal information, but instead explicitly permits the states to enact laws that provide for greater protection of the privacy of nonpublic personal information; and

WHEREAS, The citizens of California have indicated their great concern with this issue, and have made clear their overwhelming desire to have control over the disclosure of their nonpublic personal information; now, therefore, be it

Resolved by the Assembly of the State of California, the Senate thereof concurring, That the Legislature authorizes and requests that the California Law Revision Commission study, report on, and prepare recommended legislation by January 1, 2005, if funding is provided in the 2002-03 Budget Act specifically for this purpose, concerning the protection of personal information relating to, or arising out of, financial transactions.

Privacy Practices of Financial Institutions

A picture of the nature and extent of information sharing practices of financial institutions is beginning to emerge.

The Education Foundation of the Consumer Federation of California has compiled a survey of the privacy practices of
55 of the largest financial institutions doing business in California.\textsuperscript{13} The survey indicates that, as of the date of the survey:\textsuperscript{14}

- All but a handful of the largest financial institutions shared customer information with their affiliates. The great majority gave their customers no opt out opportunity.
- Most of the largest financial institutions shared customer information with other financial institutions for joint marketing purposes. They did not typically offer their customers an opt out opportunity.
- Most of the largest financial institutions did not share information with unrelated third parties, although a substantial minority did. Of those that shared customer information with unrelated third parties, a few offered their customers an opt in opportunity; the remainder shared information unless the customer opted out.
- A few of the major financial institutions offered their customers significantly greater control over disclosure of nonpublic personal information than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act requires.

Pursuant to a mandate in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,\textsuperscript{15} the Secretary of the Treasury, in conjunction with the Federal Trade Commission and other federal regulators, has made a study and reported to Congress with findings and conclusions on information sharing practices of financial institutions, and

\begin{itemize}
  \item 14. The findings are generally consistent with those of an earlier and smaller survey conducted by the California Public Interest Research Group, focusing exclusively on banks. See CALPIRG, Privacy Denied: A Survey of Bank Privacy Policies (2002).
  \item 15. 15 U.S.C. § 6808(a).
\end{itemize}
the risks and benefits of those practices. The report is primarily a compilation of the views of interested persons and organizations on the issues. The report draws five general conclusions:

- Financial institutions and consumers have an interest in protecting the security of personal financial information.
- Financial information sharing has given consumers better access to financial products at lower cost.
- Identity theft is a problem.
- It is important to have national standards for information sharing.
- Consumers need to understand better the information sharing practices of financial institutions and how to exercise their rights.

LEGAL LANDSCAPE

Constitutional Considerations

The First Amendment to the United States Constitution is a fundamental source of consumer privacy protection. It has been argued that the First Amendment also protects the right of a financial institution to share customer information. Courts that have considered that argument to date have disagreed. Financial information sharing is commercial speech that entails reduced constitutional protection. The governmental interest in protecting the privacy of consumer credit information is substantial and governmental restrictions are warranted.

At the state level, Section 1 of Article I of the California Constitution protects the right of privacy. The Constitution

17. See, e.g., Trans Union LLC v. FTC, 295 F.3d 42, 52 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
declares that among the inalienable rights of all people is the right to pursue and obtain privacy. Courts have held that confidential information given to a financial institution is protected by the Constitution. “Thus, there is a right to privacy in confidential customer information whatever form it takes, whether that form be tax returns, checks, statements, or other account information.”

**State Statutes**

The California Financial Information Privacy Act is not California’s first major financial privacy statute. The Legislature has enacted a number of privacy laws affecting financial institutions over the course of many years. A significant objective of this report is to recommend legislation to integrate the new law with existing statutes.

**Local Ordinances**

A number of Bay Area cities and counties enacted ordinances that sought to regulate the information sharing practices of financial institutions operating within their

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18. Cal. Const. art. I, § 1 (“All people are by nature free and independent and have inalienable rights. Among these are enjoying and defending life and liberty, acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.”)


21. See Office of Privacy Protection Website, at www.privacy.ca.gov (listing major privacy statutes, both state and federal, along with other privacy information).

22. See “Relation of California Financial Information Privacy Act to Other California Statutes” infra.
jurisdictions. The ordinances were similar in character to the California Financial Information Privacy Act.

The ordinances were challenged in court on the basis of federal preemption. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California ruled that the local ordinances, to the extent that they sought to limit information sharing among affiliates, were preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, but were enforceable to the extent that they sought to control information sharing with nonaffiliated third parties. The decision was appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Meanwhile, the ordinances were invalidated in their entirety by the California Financial Information Privacy Act, effective July 1, 2004, and the federal appeals court dismissed the case as moot.

Federal Law

At the federal level, the key financial privacy statutes are the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act. Other major statutes that have an impact on state privacy law include (1) the USA PATRIOT Act and (2) the National Bank Act (and other functional regulatory regimes).

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23. Ordinances were adopted by the counties of Alameda, Contra Costa, Marin, San Francisco, San Mateo, and Santa Clara, as well as by the city of Daly City.


25. Docket No. 03-016689.


Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act was enacted in 1999.28 The provisions of that Act relating to disclosure of personal information29 are implemented by federal regulations.30

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act governs the activities of “financial institutions.” That term is broadly defined and includes, for example, a lender or broker, check casher, credit counselor, investment advisor, credit card issuer, collection agency, and a government agency that provides a financial product such as a student loan.31 The Federal Trade Commission has taken the position that an attorney significantly engaged in tax advice or estate planning is a financial institution within the meaning of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, but the United States District Court for the District of Columbia has disagreed.32

A financial institution’s customers are entitled to an annual privacy notice and a reasonable opportunity to opt out before their nonpublic personal information is shared with a nonaffiliated third party.33 The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act includes major exceptions to the notice and opt out provisions. A financial institution may share nonpublic personal information freely with its affiliates without notice or an opportunity to opt out. A financial institution may also disclose nonpublic personal information to a nonaffiliated third party in a number of circumstances where a consumer does not have the right to opt out of the sharing, including sharing with another financial institution with which it has a

28. See “Background” supra.
31. Id. § 313.3(k).
joint marketing agreement and sharing with another party whose involvement is necessary for transactional purposes.\textsuperscript{34}

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not override state financial privacy law except to the extent that the state law is inconsistent with federal law.\textsuperscript{35} For this purpose, a state law providing greater privacy protection for a consumer’s personal information than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act is not considered inconsistent with the Act.\textsuperscript{36}

\textit{Fair Credit Reporting Act}

The Fair Credit Reporting Act\textsuperscript{37} was enacted in 1970. Its purpose is to require credit bureaus to adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for credit information in a manner that is fair and equitable to the consumer with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper use of credit information.\textsuperscript{38}

To the extent that the Fair Credit Reporting Act authorizes financial institutions and credit bureaus to disclose personal financial information to each other, their affiliates, and third parties, it cuts across provisions of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. In case of a conflict between the two laws, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act defers to the Fair Credit Reporting Act.\textsuperscript{39}

In general terms, the Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates communication of information that bears on a consumer’s credit worthiness, credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal characteristics, or mode of living. A credit bureau may provide information about a consumer to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{id.} § 6802(b)(2), (c).
\item \textit{id.} § 6807(a).
\item \textit{id.} § 6807(b). See “Relation of California Financial Privacy Act to Federal Law” infra.
\item \textit{id.} § 1681(b).
\item \textit{id.} § 6806.
\end{itemize}
a person with a need recognized by the Act — usually to consider an application with a creditor, insurer, employer, landlord, or other business.\textsuperscript{40} The consumer’s consent is required before a credit bureau may provide information to an employer, or make a report that includes medical information to a creditor, insurer, or employer.\textsuperscript{41}

The Fair Credit Reporting Act regulates consumer reports — i.e., the communication of credit information about a consumer. The statute excludes from the definition of a consumer report the following types of communications:\textsuperscript{42}

- Any report containing information solely as to transactions or experiences between the consumer and the person making the report.
- Any communication of that information among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control.
- Any communication of other information among persons related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, if it is clearly and conspicuously disclosed to the consumer that the information may be communicated among such persons and the consumer is given the opportunity, before the time that the information is initially communicated, to direct that such information not be communicated among such persons.

To the extent the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act regulates those types of communications, there is no conflict between the two laws, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act controls.\textsuperscript{43}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{40} Id. § 1681b.
\textsuperscript{41} Id. § 1681b(b), (g).
\textsuperscript{42} Id. § 1681a(d)(2)(A).
\end{flushleft}
The newly enacted Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 adds provisions to the Fair Credit Reporting Act that augment consumer opt out rights for some aspects of information sharing among affiliates.\textsuperscript{44} The new legislation also more aggressively preempts state statutes with respect to matters covered by the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The potential preemptive effect of the new provisions on the California Financial Information Privacy Act is analyzed below.\textsuperscript{45}

\textit{USA PATRIOT Act}

The USA PATRIOT Act was enacted in the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks.\textsuperscript{46} The Act exempts banks from privacy laws in order to share information concerning terrorism and money laundering.\textsuperscript{47}

This is one of many laws that override privacy statutes for law enforcement and related purposes. The California Financial Information Privacy Act makes clear that release of nonpublic personal information is not prohibited if made pursuant to the USA PATRIOT Act, among others.\textsuperscript{48}

\textit{National Bank Act and Other Functional Regulatory Regimes}

Federal regulatory regimes govern all sectors of the financial services industry, including oversight by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{44} 15 U.S.C. § 1681.
\item \textsuperscript{45} See “Relation of California Financial Privacy Act to Federal Law” infra.
\item \textsuperscript{47} See, e.g., \textit{id.} § 314(b) (codified in the Historical and Statutory Notes to 31 U.S.C. § 5311).
\item \textsuperscript{48} Fin. Code § 4056((b)(12).
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. Whether any of these regulatory regimes will be read to preempt the field with respect to financial privacy issues is not yet determined. Each of the major regulatory statutes is complex and unique. Preemption of the California Financial Information Privacy Act by any of the governing federal statutes has the potential to create an uneven playing field, frustrating the contrary intention of the new law.

The National Bank Act, 49 for example, gives the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency broad supervisory jurisdiction over national banks, largely free of state control. 50 That Act is expansive in its grant of “incidental powers” that allow banks to market their services and to provide their subsidiaries the information necessary to operate competitively. 51 The potential preemptive effect of this Act on the California Financial Information Privacy Act is analyzed below. 52

CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT

Summary of Act

The California Financial Information Privacy Act 53 comprehensively governs the field of financial information privacy. 54 The new law became operative July 1, 2004.

50. Id. § 1.
51. Id. § 24(seventh).
52. See “Relation of California Financial Information Privacy Act to Federal Law” infra.
Under the new law, a consumer’s affirmative consent (opt in) is required before a financial institution may disclose nonpublic personal information to a third party, except that in the following circumstances information may be disclosed unless the consumer prohibits it (opt out), or regardless of the consumer’s wishes (no opt):

- Disclosure to affinity partner – opt out\textsuperscript{55}
- Disclosure to joint marketer – opt out\textsuperscript{56}
- Disclosure to affiliate – opt out\textsuperscript{57}
- Disclosure to wholly owned subsidiary in same line of business and with same brand and same functional regulator – no opt\textsuperscript{58}
- Disclosure between licensed insurance producers and between licensed securities sellers – no opt\textsuperscript{59}
- Disclosure for transactional, security, and law enforcement purposes – no opt\textsuperscript{60}

The financial institution must give the consumer a privacy notice that meets basic standards of clarity and conspicuousness.\textsuperscript{61} A statutory safe harbor form is provided.\textsuperscript{62} A financial institution that uses its own form\textsuperscript{63} may obtain a rebuttable presumption of compliance by approval of the functional regulator of the financial institution.

\textsuperscript{55} Fin. Code § 5054.6(b)-(c).
\textsuperscript{56} Id. § 4053(b)(2).
\textsuperscript{57} Id. § 4053(b)(1).
\textsuperscript{58} Id. § 4053(c).
\textsuperscript{59} Id. § 4056.5(a)(1)(A)-(B).
\textsuperscript{60} Id. § 4056(b).
\textsuperscript{61} Id. § 4053(a)(2).
\textsuperscript{62} Id. § 4053(d)(1).
\textsuperscript{63} See Office of Privacy Protection Website, at <www.privacy.ca.gov> (containing links to sui generis privacy notice forms of financial institutions).
Professionals who are prohibited from disclosing client information, and financial institutions that do not disclose nonpublic information to third parties, are not required to give the privacy notice to clients and customers.

The statutory remedy for disclosure in violation of the statute is a civil penalty, recoverable in an action in the name of the people of the State of California, brought by the Attorney General or the functional regulator of the financial institution.64 The civil penalty may not exceed $2,500 per incident for a negligent or willful violation, and if multiple names are involved in a negligent violation, a maximum of $500,000 per incident.65 Penalties are doubled if the violation results in identity theft.66

Legislative Mandate

Does the California Financial Information Privacy Act satisfy the goals set out in the Legislature’s mandate to the Law Revision Commission? The Legislature specified that proposed legislation should accomplish the following objectives:67

(1) Provide consumers with notice and the opportunity to protect and control the dissemination of their personal information.

(2) Direct the preparation of regulations that recognize the inviolability and confidentiality of a consumer’s personal information and the legitimate needs of entities that lawfully use the information to engage in commerce.

(3) Assure that regulated entities will be treated in a manner so that, regardless of size, an individual

64. Fin. Code § 4057(c).
65. Id. § 4057(a).
66. Id. § 4057(b).
business, holding company, or affiliate will not enjoy any greater advantage or suffer any burden that is greater than any other regulated entity.

(4) Be compatible with, and withstand any preemption by, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act.

(5) Provide for civil remedies and administrative and civil penalties for a violation of the recommended legislation.

Notice and Opportunity to Control Disclosure

The main thrust of the new law is to provide consumers notice and an opportunity to control dissemination of their personal information to a greater degree than is provided by federal law. Whereas federal law provides an opt out opportunity for information sharing with a nonaffiliated third party and no opt in other circumstances, the California statute requires an opt in for nonaffiliated third party sharing and allows an opt out for affiliate sharing and joint marketing. It satisfies the objective of the Legislature to provide notice and opportunity to control disclosure.

Preparation of Regulations

The new law does not require preparation of implementing regulations. It is more or less self-executing, with details spelled out by statute rather than by delegation to state regulatory authority for elaboration.

There is a role for functional regulators under the new law, specifically with respect to approval of a sui generis privacy notice of a financial institution and with respect to enforcing civil penalties for violation of the statute. The new law does not recognize rulemaking authority with respect to these matters.68

68. That authority might be implied under the agencies’ inherent powers.
The approach of the new law is at odds with the regulatory regime contemplated by the Legislature. The new law achieves a comparable result by incorporating bodily the substance of federal regulations adopted under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. The primary disadvantage of spelling out details in the statute rather than by regulation is that if fine tuning or interpretation is necessary, legislation or litigation, rather than a rule change, is required.

**Level Playing Field**

One of the expressed objectives of the California Financial Information Privacy Act is to maintain a level playing field among different types and sizes of financial institutions. Whether the new law actually achieves this goal is explored below.

*Sharing of information among divisions and wholly owned subsidiaries.* Under the new law, a financial institution may freely share personal information among its own divisions. It may also share personal information with its wholly owned subsidiaries in the same line of business. The financial institution is subject to an opt out scheme for other affiliates and for nonaffiliated joint marketers. This scheme appears to discriminate among financial institutions based on business structure.69

*Sharing of information among affiliates and joint marketers.* It has been argued that the new law may ultimately disadvantage a small community bank unable to offer a full range of financial products on its own that must use a joint marketing structure, unlike a large financial institution that can make use of an affiliate network. While the new law requires a financial institution to offer an opt out for affiliate

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sharing as well as for joint marketing, it is possible that the affiliate sharing requirement may be preempted by federal law. The net result would be that the new law effectively imposes an opt out requirement only for joint marketing and not for affiliate sharing, thereby disadvantaging a community bank. On the other hand, the Fair Credit Reporting Act provides its own limitations on the use to which an affiliate may put shared information. The practical effect of the California statute’s joint marketing restriction in conjunction with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s affiliate marketing restriction could in effect maintain a level playing field.

**Effect of severability clause.** If a provision of the California Financial Information Privacy Act is preempted by federal law, whether by the Fair Credit Reporting Act or another statute such as the National Bank Act, the potential for unequal treatment may be aggravated due to the California statute’s inclusion of a severability clause. If, for example, a provision of the California Financial Information Privacy Act is preempted as to national banks by the National Bank Act, the same provision will continue to apply to state banks, but national banks will be free from state regulation, yielding them a competitive advantage.

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70. See “Relation of California Financial Information Privacy Act to Federal Law” infra.

71. The Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits an affiliate from using “consumer report” type information for marketing purposes about its products or services unless the consumer is given an opt out opportunity. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3.


73. In *Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer*, 239 F. Supp. 2d 1000 (E.D. Cal. 2002), the court held that provisions of a California statute requiring a credit card issuer to provide a minimum payment warning and disclosures in monthly bills were preempted to varying degrees by the Home Owners’ Loan Act, the National Bank Act, and the Federal Credit Union Act. The court held that the minimum payment warning is unenforceable against federally chartered savings and loans, but could be enforceable against national banks and federal credit unions, if severable. Absent a clear indication of legislative intent, the court was reluctant
Whether that result is desirable or undesirable is a question of policy. The new law embodies the judgment that it is better to cover some financial institutions even if it turns out that the law cannot cover all of them. The new law recognizes in its statement of policy that there may be a conflict — the legislative intent is to provide a level playing field among types and sizes of businesses “to the maximum extent possible” consistent with the basic objective of providing consumers control over their nonpublic personal information.\(^74\)

**Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and Fair Credit Reporting Act Compatibility and Preemption**

The Legislature requests legislation that is compatible with, and withstands preemption by, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. The extent to which the new law achieves these goals is dealt with briefly here, and in greater depth below.\(^75\)

In determining whether federal preemption exists, the principal inquiry is the intention of Congress. State law may be preempted if it would stand as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the purposes and objectives of Congress, or if it conflicts with federal law such that compliance with both state and federal law is impossible.\(^76\)

**Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.** The California Financial Information Privacy Act is compatible with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act; the new law tracks the federal law and its

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74. Fin. Code § 4051.5(b)(4).
75. See “Relation of California Financial Information Privacy Act to Federal Law” infra.
implementing regulations with respect to scope and manner of regulation while providing greater protection to consumers. The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act refrains from preempting state law except to the extent that state law is inconsistent with it.\textsuperscript{77} A state law is not inconsistent if the protection the state law affords any person is greater than the protection provided under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.\textsuperscript{78}

While there is not yet a definitive court decision, it is likely that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not preempt the California statute. The California statute is consistent with the purposes and objectives of Congress to provide for protection of consumer privacy, and it is physically possible for a financial institution to comply with both laws by the simple device of following the state law and offering customers a more substantial opt in or opt out opportunity than is required under the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.\textsuperscript{79}

Some provisions of the new law are less protective of the privacy of consumer financial information than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. For example, the California statute includes a number of exemptions from its coverage.\textsuperscript{80} But that would not necessarily make the California statute inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, since an entity exempted from the California Financial Information Privacy Act would


\textsuperscript{78} Id. § 6807(b).

\textsuperscript{79} The Federal Trade Commission has adopted this sort of analysis in finding that neither North Dakota law nor Connecticut law is preempted by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act — it is physically possible for a financial institution to comply with both state and federal law. Letter to John P. Burke, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Banking for Conn., from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y of the FTC (June 7, 2002), at www.ftc.gov/privacy/glbact/conn020607.htm; Letter to Gary D. Preszle, Comm’r of the Dep’t of Banking and Financial Insts. for N.D., from Donald S. Clark, Sec’y of the FTC (June 28, 2001), at www.ftc.gov/os/2001/06/northdakotaletter.htm.

\textsuperscript{80} See, e.g., Fin. Code §§ 4056-4056.5.
nonetheless be able (and be required) to comply with federal law.

*Fair Credit Reporting Act.* The affiliate sharing preemption clause of the Fair Credit Reporting Act is sweeping.\(^{81}\) It is conceivable that Act will be determined to preempt the affiliate sharing provisions of the new law. The United States District Court for the Northern District of California has held that affiliate sharing provisions of local ordinances comparable in nature to the California statute are preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.\(^{82}\) The judgment in that case has been vacated on appeal as moot.\(^{83}\) On the other hand, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California has held that the affiliate sharing provisions of the California Financial Information Privacy Act are not preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act.\(^{84}\) That decision has been appealed.\(^{85}\)

**Civil Remedies and Administrative and Civil Penalties**

The Legislature has requested extensive civil and administrative remedies for privacy violations.\(^{86}\) The new law

\(^{81}\) 15 U.S.C. § 1681t (“No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common corporate control.”).

\(^{82}\) Bank of Am., N.A. v. City of Daly City, 279 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003).

\(^{83}\) Id.


\(^{85}\) United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (04-16334).

\(^{86}\) 2002 Cal. Stat. res. ch. 167 (“Provide for civil remedies and administrative and civil penalties for a violation of the recommended legislation, including, but not limited to, attorney’s fees, costs, actual and compensatory damages, and exemplary damages, including, but not limited to, relief as provided pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 3294) of Chapter 1 of Title 2 of Part 1 of Division 4 of the Civil Code, and as provided in unfair business practices actions brought under Article 1 (commencing with Section..."
provides only one remedy for its violation — a civil penalty not exceeding $2,500 per violation, recoverable in an action by the Attorney General or by the financial institution’s functional regulator, in the name of the People of the State.87

Assessment

The California Financial Information Privacy Act is a carefully articulated statute. Its complexity is the result of a policy decision to track the scope and manner of regulation of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and to make accommodation for varying circumstances of different financial services and products in an effort to achieve a satisfactory resolution of issues among stakeholders. The new law achieves many of the major objectives of the Legislature’s referral of the financial privacy study to the Law Revision Commission.

That is not to suggest that the new law is free of problems. This is a complex, detailed, and sweeping enactment, and there are questions concerning its implementation and operation.88 However, the Commission believes practical experience under the operation of the new law is necessary before the Commission would be in a position to recommend corrections, clarifications, or revisions of the new law.

The Commission has identified two general areas that require further attention. These are the interrelation of the California Financial Privacy Act with federal law and its


88. See, e.g., Dayanim & Togni, supra note 87; Huber & Tortarolo, New Privacy Rights for Californians, Bus. Law News, No. 4 2003, at 9.
interrelation with other California statutes. These matters are addressed in the balance of this report.

RELATION OF CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT TO FEDERAL LAW

The principal federal laws that have an impact on the California Financial Information Privacy Act are the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act,89 the Fair Credit Reporting Act,90 and the National Bank Act.91

Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act

The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act includes a comprehensive scheme of protection of nonpublic personal information in the hands of a financial institution.92 The policy expressed in the Act is that “each financial institution has an affirmative and continuing obligation to respect the privacy of its customers and to protect the security and confidentiality of those customers’ nonpublic personal information.”93

In furtherance of this policy, the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not preempt any statute in effect in any state, except to the extent that the statute is inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.94 State law is not inconsistent if the protection

92. See “Legal Landscape” supra.
94. Id. § 6807(a). A preliminary question is whether this provision is intended to save only a state law “in effect” at the time of enactment of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, or whether it is also intended to save future enactments. While the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act could be read narrowly, the Commission believes it will be read more broadly to apply to subsequently enacted statutes such as the California Financial Information Privacy Act. There is no apparent reason why
afforded a person by state law is greater than the protection provided by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as determined by the Federal Trade Commission.95

Federal Trade Commission determinations pursuant to the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act have construed this standard so as to avoid preemption of state financial privacy statutes. To date, the Federal Trade Commission has ruled on preemption determination petitions concerning financial privacy laws of North Dakota and Connecticut.96 Neither statute was found to be inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.97

The Federal Trade Commission’s analysis of the Connecticut statute is instructive.98 Connecticut requires a customer’s opt in for disclosure of certain financial records by certain financial institutions.99 The Federal Trade Commission reasoned that this law does not frustrate the purpose of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act to protect consumer financial privacy. Moreover, it is not physically impossible to comply with both Connecticut law and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act since a Connecticut financial institution could comply with both by not disclosing a consumer’s nonpublic personal information. Therefore the Connecticut law is not

95. Privacy of Consumer Financial Information, 16 C.F.R. § 313.17(b) (2004).

96. See Letter to Conn., supra note 79; Letter to N.D., supra note 79. Petitions concerning Illinois and Vermont law are pending before the Federal Trade Commission.

97. The North Dakota ruling does not provide a good test since the North Dakota statute had been amended to exempt from state law any financial institution that complies with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. Letter to N.D., supra note 79.


inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, and it is unnecessary to engage in a “greater protection” analysis.

The California Financial Information Privacy Act is not inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act if it is physically possible for a financial institution to comply with both. The Law Revision Commission believes the greater privacy protections of the California statute would not be viewed as inconsistent with the federal law because it is physically possible for a financial institution to comply with both — the financial institution could follow the state statute and offer customers a more substantial opt in or opt out opportunity than is required under federal law.

A few provisions of the California statute are less protective of the privacy of consumer financial information than the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act. For example, the California statute includes a number of exemptions from its coverage. That does not necessarily render the California statute inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, since an entity exempted from the California statute would nonetheless still be able (and be required) to comply with federal law.100

The Commission believes that the California Financial Information Privacy Act is not inconsistent with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and therefore not preempted by it. There is no need to petition the Federal Trade Commission for a determination whether the California statute provides greater privacy protection than the federal law.

100. The fact that a state law is free of federal preemption does not mean that state law controls the field to the exclusion of federal law. Just the opposite — in ordinary circumstances both will apply, absent a clear federal statutory provision stating otherwise. Thus an exemption from California Financial Information Privacy Act coverage does not necessarily carry with it an exemption from Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act coverage. It is likely that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act does not intend to give a state the option of entirely taking over the field of privacy law. A financial institution governed by the California statute would also have to comply with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, as would a financial institution exempted from the California statute.
Fair Credit Reporting Act

Like the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not preempt a state statute governing collection, distribution, or use of information about consumers, except to the extent the state statute is inconsistent with the Act.\(^{101}\) Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act, preemption is not determined by the Federal Trade Commission; inconsistency of a state law is tested in court.\(^{102}\)

The Fair Credit Reporting Act expressly preempts a state statute that governs exchange of information among affiliates, regardless of whether the state statute is “consistent” with the federal law.\(^{103}\) The affiliate sharing preemption provision was due to sunset on January 1, 2004, but the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 makes affiliate sharing preemption permanent.\(^{104}\)

The Fair Credit Reporting Act’s preemption of state law affecting affiliate sharing is broadly phrased: “No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common

\[^{101}\text{15 U.S.C. § 1681t(a).}\]

\[^{102}\text{For examples of decisions from various courts on this issue, see Cline v. Hawke, No. 02-2100, 2002 WL 31557392 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2002) (Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts state law requiring customer’s separate written consent to bank’s disclosure of insurance information to affiliated agent or broker); Credit Data of Ariz. v. State of Ariz., 602 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 1979) (state law that prohibits credit bureau from charging fee for disclosing credit denial to consumer not preempted by provision of Fair Credit Reporting Act that allows credit bureau to charge reasonable fee — “[t]he philosophy behind both statutes is the protection of the consumer and it is clear that the Federal Act permits Arizona to go further than the Federal Act does to protect consumers as long as the Arizona Act is not inconsistent with the Federal Act”); Retail Credit Co. v. Dade County, 393 F. Supp. 577 (S.D. Fla. 1975) (local ordinance requirement that sources of consumer credit report information be disclosed inconsistent with Fair Credit Reporting Act and therefore preempted by it).}\]

\[^{103}\text{15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(2).}\]

\[^{104}\text{Id.}\]
corporate control.” The extent to which federal law may override the affiliate sharing provisions of the California Financial Information Privacy Act is not clear.

Statutory Construction

The Fair Credit Reporting Act defines none of the operative terms of the affiliate sharing preemption clause. Nor does the law include a general scope provision that restricts its application. On its face, the preemption clause is so broadly phrased that it could invalidate every California law that affects exchange of information of any type among affiliated business or nonbusiness entities of every type. Other provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act distinguish among types of information. The failure to discriminate among types of information with respect to state preemption suggests an inference that no limitation is intended.

Other preemption provisions within the Fair Credit Reporting Act are more narrowly focused. The Act preempts a state statute that imposes a requirement or prohibition with

105. Id.

106. The statute does define “state” (“any State, the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, the District of Columbia, and any territory or possession of the United States”) and “person” (“any individual, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, cooperative, association, government or governmental subdivision or agency, or other entity”). Id. § 1681a(b), (n).

107. There is general purpose language in the Fair Credit Reporting Act that could be read to imply a narrow intent:

It is the purpose of this title to require that consumer reporting agencies adopt reasonable procedures for meeting the needs of commerce for consumer credit, personnel, insurance, and other information in a manner which is fair and equitable to the consumer, with regard to the confidentiality, accuracy, relevancy, and proper utilization of such information in accordance with the requirements of this title.

Id. § 1681.

108. For example, differential treatment is provided for consumer reporting information, transaction or experience information, and non-experience information.
respect to exchange and use of information to make a solicitation for marketing purposes.\textsuperscript{109} The Act also makes clear that a state statute relating to any use of information that has been shared among affiliates is preempted.\textsuperscript{110} These provisions likewise suggest that the general affiliate sharing preemption clause may be broadly construed.\textsuperscript{111}

\textit{Federal Regulations}

The Fair Credit Reporting Act now requires various federal regulatory authorities to prescribe regulations as necessary to carry out the purposes of the Act.\textsuperscript{112} The Federal Trade Commission and Federal Reserve Board have acted jointly to adopt regulations that make Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption of state affiliate sharing laws permanent effective December 31, 2003.\textsuperscript{113}

There is no direct authority for a federal agency to adopt regulations that interpret the meaning of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s affiliate sharing preemption clause. However, the Fair Credit Reporting Act now restricts use of information

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{110} \textit{Id.} § 1681s-3(c):

Requirements with respect to the use by a person of information received from another person related to it by common ownership or affiliated by corporate control, such as the requirements of this section, constitute requirements with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common corporate control, within the meaning of section 1681t(b)(2) of this title.

\textsuperscript{111} There is scant evidence in the record of congressional intent on the matter. Remarks of California’s congressional delegation seeking to save the affiliate sharing restrictions of the California Financial Information Privacy Act from federal preemption suggest that the California delegation, at least, views the Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption expansively. See, e.g., 149 Cong. Rec. S13,848-2 (Nov. 4, 2003) (statement of Sen. Feinstein).

\textsuperscript{112} 15 U.S.C. § 1681s(e).

\textsuperscript{113} Fair Credit Reporting (Regulation V), 12 C.F.R. § 222.1 (2004); Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, 16 C.F.R. § 602.1 (2004).
\end{flushleft}
shared among affiliates for marketing purposes.114 The Federal Trade Commission has issued proposed implementing regulations.115 The proposed regulations indicate the Federal Trade Commission’s broad reading of the affiliate information sharing provisions of the act; they are not limited to affiliates within the credit reporting industry.

Judicial Interpretations

There are a few cases that interpret the affiliate sharing preemption clause of the Fair Credit Reporting Act. The most recent case and the one most directly on point is American Bankers Association v. Lockyer.116 In that case, financial institution trade groups had brought suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to preclude the affiliate sharing provisions of the California Financial Information Privacy Act from becoming operative on July 1, 2004. The court held that the Fair Credit Reporting Act does not preempt the affiliate information sharing limitations of California law. The court read the federal preemption clause as narrowly limited to the credit reporting context, and granted summary judgment for the state. The court explained:117

[T]he only reasonable reading of the FCRA preemption provision is that it prevents states from enacting laws that prohibit or restrict the sharing of consumer reports among affiliates. This comports with the stated purpose of the FCRA as regulating consumer reporting agencies to ensure the accuracy and fairness of credit reports. Contrary to the position espoused by Plaintiffs, the FCRA preemption provision does not broadly preempt all state laws regulating

117. Id. at *4 (emphasis in original) (citations omitted).
information sharing by affiliates, whatever the purpose or context.

The financial organizations have appealed the decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.118

The American Bankers Association decision is in the federal district court for the Eastern District of California. It conflicts with the decision of the federal district court for the Northern District of California in Bank of America, N.A. v. City of Daly City.119 That case addressed application of the affiliate sharing preemption clause to local privacy ordinances that included provisions similar to those contained in the California Financial Information Privacy Act.120 Local entities argued that the clause must be read narrowly to preempt only local laws that seek to regulate affiliate sharing within the consumer reporting industry. The court disagreed. “States and local governments are free to enact law affording some protection to consumer privacy greater than that provided by federal law, but not with regard to the disclosure of information to affiliates.”121 The court allayed the concern of amicus Attorney General of California that such a broad construction would improperly preempt a large number of the state’s tort and criminal laws relating to trade secrets, conspiracy, and other issues in situations involving information sharing among affiliates. The court limited its holding to information related to a consumer.122 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the

118. Docket #04-16344.
119. 279 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
120. “The question the Court must resolve is the breadth of this preemption provision and whether it encompasses the ordinances at issue in this case.” Id. at 1122.
121. Id. at 1126.
122. “The Court discerns no intent by Congress that the FCRA preempt State tort and criminal laws unrelated to consumer information.” Id. at 1124 n.5.
appellate court vacated the judgment and dismissed the appeal as moot.\textsuperscript{123}

An unpublished Fourth Circuit decision concludes that Fair Credit Reporting Act affiliate information sharing preemption is broad. \textit{Cline v. Hawke}\textsuperscript{124} involved the West Virginia Insurance Sales Consumer Protection Act. That Act limits the ability of a financial institution that acquires personal information in the course of a loan transaction to share the information with its affiliates for the purpose of soliciting or offering insurance.\textsuperscript{125} The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency made a determination that the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the West Virginia affiliate sharing provision.\textsuperscript{126} The preemption letter notes:\textsuperscript{127}

The FCRA preemption provision ensures that affiliated entities may share customer information without interference from State law and subject only to the FCRA notice and opt-out requirements if applicable. The preemption is broad and extends beyond state information sharing statutes to preempt any State statute that affects the ability of an entity to share any information with its affiliates.

\begin{footnotes}
\item[123] Docket No. 03-016689.
\item[124] No. 02-2100, 2002 WL 31557392 (4th Cir. Nov. 19, 2002).
\item[125] W. Va. Code \S 33-11A-10(a) (2000).
\item[126] Preemption Op., Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (Sept. 24, 2001), available at <www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2001-86a.pdf> (“It is our opinion that Federal law does preempt the following provisions of the West Virginia Act with respect to national banks: . . . the Act’s restrictions on sharing with bank affiliates information acquired by a financial institution in the course of a loan transaction to solicit or offer insurance.”)
\end{footnotes}
The Court of Appeals denied the state’s challenge to the preemption letter, finding the reasoning of the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency valid.128

Conclusion

The California Financial Information Privacy Act requires a financial institution to offer a consumer an opt out opportunity before the financial institution shares information with an affiliate.129 The provision appears on its face to be a “requirement or prohibition . . . with respect to the exchange of information among persons affiliated by common ownership or common corporate control” within the meaning of the Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption clause.130

Case law interpreting the preemption clause to date is mixed. If the preemption clause is ultimately read broadly, it could completely swallow the affiliate sharing limitations of the California statute.

A major purpose of the Legislature in enacting the new law was to provide “to the maximum extent possible” a level playing field among types and sizes of businesses.131 Elimination of the statute’s affiliate sharing restrictions could favor larger financial institutions (with affiliate structures) over smaller financial institutions (which must rely on joint marketing arrangements). On the other hand, the Fair Credit Reporting Act provides its own limitations on the use to which an affiliate may put shared information.132 The practical effect of the California statute’s joint marketing

129. Fin. Code. § 4053(b)(1).
132. The Fair Credit Reporting Act prohibits an affiliate from using “consumer report” type information for marketing purposes about its products or services unless the consumer is given an opt out opportunity. 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-3(a).
restriction in conjunction with the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s affiliate marketing restriction could in effect maintain a level playing field.

The Law Revision Commission believes it is premature to make adjustments to the California statute for possible federal preemption. The Commission believes a more definitive determination of the scope of federal preemption is necessary before formulation of any conforming adjustments to the California statute.

**National Bank Act and Other Federal Functional Regulatory Laws**

Federal regulatory regimes govern all sectors of the financial services industry, including oversight by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, the Office of Thrift Supervision, the National Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Trade Commission. Whether any of these regulatory regimes will be read to preempt the field with respect to financial privacy issues is not yet determined. Each of the major regulatory statutes is complex and unique. Preemption of the California Financial Information Privacy Act by any of the governing federal statutes has the potential to create an uneven playing field, frustrating the contrary intention of the California Financial Information Privacy Act.

The National Bank Act,133 for example, gives the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency broad supervisory jurisdiction over national banks, largely free of state control.134 That Act is expansive in its grant of “incidental powers” that allow banks to market their services and to

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134. Id. § 1.
provide their subsidiaries the information necessary to operate competitively.135

The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency has emphasized its “exclusive visitorial powers” over national banks, has issued rules under the National Bank Act that broadly preempt state law seeking to control activities of a national bank, and has alerted national banks to consult with the Office if a state authority seeks to exercise enforcement powers over them.136 The preemption rules are addressed to state law that obstructs, impairs, or conditions a national bank’s ability to conduct activity authorized under federal law.137 However, the rules neither expressly preempt nor

135. *Id.* § 24(seventh).


137. Section 7.4009 provides:

§ 7.4009. Applicability of state law to national bank operations

(a) Authority of national banks. A national bank may exercise all powers authorized to it under Federal law, including conducting any activity that is part of, or incidental to, the business of banking, subject to such terms, conditions, and limitations prescribed by the Comptroller of the Currency and any applicable Federal law.

(b) Applicability of state law. Except where made applicable by Federal law, state laws that obstruct, impair, or condition a national bank’s ability to fully exercise its powers to conduct activities authorized under Federal law do not apply to national banks.

(c) Applicability of state law to particular national bank activities.

(1) The provisions of this section govern with respect to any national bank power or aspect of a national bank’s operations that is not covered by another OCC regulation specifically addressing the applicability of state law.

(2) State laws on the following subjects are not inconsistent with the powers of national banks and apply to national banks to the extent that they only incidentally affect the exercise of national bank powers:

(i) Contracts;

(ii) Torts;

(iii) Criminal law;
expressly exempt a state law governing information sharing by a national bank with its affiliates or others.\textsuperscript{138}

National Bank Act preemption of state law is not absolute, and a state retains power to regulate national banks in areas such as contracts, debt collection, acquisition and transfer of property, taxation, zoning, criminal, and tort law. Whether financial privacy regulation falls within this spectrum is yet to be determined.\textsuperscript{139} Recent cases have found National Bank Act preemption of various California consumer protection laws.\textsuperscript{140}

(iv) Rights to collect debts;
(v) Acquisition and transfer of property;
(vi) Taxation;
(vii) Zoning; and
(viii) Any other law the effect of which the OCC determines to be incidental to the exercise of national bank powers or otherwise consistent with the powers set out in paragraph (a) of this section.

\textsuperscript{138} Both the deposit taking regulation and the lending regulation specifically preempt a state limitation concerning “disclosure requirements.” On the other hand, both those regulations, as well as the general authorized activity regulation, specifically exempt state law governing “torts” and “acquisition and transfer of property.” See id. §§ 7.4007-7.4009.

\textsuperscript{139} In \textit{Bank of Am., N.A. v. City of Daly City}, the court held that affiliate information sharing restrictions in local agency financial privacy ordinances are preempted by the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and it was therefore unnecessary to reach the issue of National Bank Act preemption. 279 F. Sup. 2d 1118 (N.D. Cal. 2003). The court upheld local ordinance restrictions on information sharing with nonaffiliated third parties without discussing the effect of the National Bank Act. On appeal, the judgment was vacated and the case dismissed as moot.


In another unpublished case, a federal circuit court upheld an OCC determination that West Virginia’s regulation of insurance sales by banks is preempted by federal law. The West Virginia regulatory scheme includes a requirement that a customer give separate written consent to a bank’s disclosure of insurance information to an agent or broker affiliated with the bank. W. Va. Ins. Sales Consumer Prot. Act § 13, W. Va. Code § 33-11A-13. The court observed:

In making its findings, the OCC reasoned that the West Virginia provisions at issue are disruptive to bank operations, increase bank
In response, the California Legislature has adopted Senate Joint Resolution 20 (Florez). The resolution takes issue with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency’s position, noting that it would prevent the application of state consumer protections to federally chartered financial institutions and frustrate the efforts of state regulators and legislators to extend those protections to all citizens. The resolution requests Congress to disapprove the OCC rule and if necessary consider legislation that will prevent unilateral expansion of jurisdiction over financial institutions by federal regulators without the specific endorsement of Congress.

It is too speculative for the Law Revision Commission to predict whether the California Financial Information Privacy Act will be determined to be preempted by the National Bank Act or another federal functional regulatory regime. The state
should continue to monitor the situation. If federal preemption effectively renders the California statute a patchwork of enforceability, the Legislature should revisit the policy behind the California statute to determine whether it in fact creates an uneven playing field.

RELATION OF CALIFORNIA FINANCIAL INFORMATION PRIVACY ACT TO OTHER CALIFORNIA STATUTES

The California Financial Information Privacy Act comprehensively treats financial privacy, but it is not the first effort in California to protect consumer financial information. Other statutes narrowly protect specific types of personal information in the hands of various types of financial institutions. Some of the statutes are more protective of consumer privacy than the new law, some less.

The California Financial Information Privacy Act does not include conforming revisions to or repeals of other statutes. It does include provisions that prescribe its relationship with other statutes to some extent. The new law provides narrowly that:

- An insurer may combine the California opt-out form with the form required pursuant to the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act.142
- A financial institution may release nonpublic personal information pursuant to the Elder Abuse and Dependent Adult Civil Protection Act.143

The new law provides more broadly that:

- A financial institution may release nonpublic personal information to the extent specifically required or

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143. Id. § 4056(b)(8).
specifically permitted under other provisions of law and in accordance with the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978.144

- A financial institution may release nonpublic personal information to comply with federal, state, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements.145

- The statute does not affect existing law relating to access by law enforcement agencies to information held by a financial institution.146

These provisions do not appear to address a multitude of statutory conflicts under state law. The law should provide clear guidance to financial institutions and consumers concerning their rights and obligations. The Law Revision Commission recommends further revision of the California statutes to clarify their interrelation with the new law.

General Presumption

The Commission does not have the resources to identify and address all statutes that may conflict with the California Financial Information Privacy Act.147 In addition to facial conflicts among the statutes, more recondite conflicts will surface over time.

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144. Id. § 4056(b)(5). The meaning of this provision is uncertain. It is likely that it is intended only to allow release of information by a financial institution to a federal agency pursuant to federal law.

145. Id. § 4056(b)(7).

146. Id. § 4056(c).

147. For example, about 1350 statutes contain the word “confidential.” Thousands of others deal with “personal information,” “privacy,” or another relevant concept.
General principles of statutory construction provide a mixed message as to which statute will prevail in case of a conflict. The pertinent principles are:148

- If statutes appear to conflict, they must be construed, if possible, to give effect to each.
- An earlier enacted specific, special, or local statute prevails over a later enacted general statute unless the context of the later enacted statute indicates otherwise.
- If a statute is a comprehensive revision of the law on a subject, it prevails over previous statutes on the subject, regardless of whether the revision and the previous statutes conflict irreconcilably.

The Commission recommends that, as a matter of principle, in case of a conflict between the California Financial Information Privacy Act and a specific statute, the statute that provides greater privacy protection should prevail. This approach will avoid inadvertent destruction of an important privacy protection in an area that may be particularly sensitive.

The policy favoring greater privacy protection should be implemented by a “weak presumption.”149 Under this approach, the law would declare the public policy in favor of application of the statute that provides greater protection from disclosure of the consumer’s nonpublic personal information, but would not mandate strict adherence to the rule, allowing

148. See Nat’l Conference of Comm’rs on Unif. State Laws, Uniform Statute and Rule Construction Act § 10 (1995), available at <www.law.upenn.edu/bll/alc/finact99/1990s/usrca95.htm>. The Comment to the Uniform Act notes that “This section addresses the difficult problem presented where the legislature fails to make clear the relationship of a later enacted statute or rule to an earlier one. Express amendment or repeal of the earlier by the later would avoid the problem.”

149. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.3 infra.
the courts leeway to consider countervailing policies in the circumstances of a particular case.\footnote{150}

A disadvantage of this approach is that it does not provide an absolute rule as guidance to a business or a consumer faced with a conflict. Moreover, even in a case where it is appropriate to apply the general policy, it is not necessarily obvious which of the conflicting statutes provides the greater protection of privacy.\footnote{151} The Commission believes that, despite potential problems in applying the standard, some guidance is better than none.

**Major Privacy Statutes Applicable to Private Entities**

Innumerable statutes govern disclosure of personal information by a private entity in varying contexts. In each case, it is necessary to determine whether it is intended that the particular statute supersede or be superseded by the California Financial Information Privacy Act, or whether the two supplement each other.

Due to the broad coverage of the new law, two statutes that on the surface do not appear to overlap may in fact conflict. For example, a statute governing medical privacy may overlap the financial privacy statute to the extent that an issue of medical insurance and coverage is involved.

In some cases, either statute would provide adequate privacy protection to consumers. It simply needs to be made clear what rule applies, so that financial institutions and consumers can act accordingly.

\footnote{150}{There may be good reason to maintain the less restrictive statute in place. For example, the less restrictive statute may be part of a comprehensive scheme that provides consistent rules throughout an industry, and injection of the stronger financial privacy requirements would unduly complicate operations.}

\footnote{151}{For example, one statute may provide greater protection from disclosure of a consumer’s personal information, but also include a greater number of exceptions.}
Professional-Client Relationships (Bus. & Prof. Code § 5000 et seq.)

The California Financial Information Privacy Act exempts from its coverage “any provider of professional services . . . that is prohibited by rules of professional ethics and applicable law from voluntarily disclosing confidential client information without the consent of the client.”152 That would include, for example, an attorney.153

The law governing a profession may provide some privacy protection for clients, but not to a degree that qualifies that profession for an exemption from the new law. Such a statute should supplement the new law.154

Provisions such as this are too numerous to itemize in a statute, and they are constantly changing. The Commission recommends that a provision be added to the California Financial Information Privacy Act to make clear that it supplements and does not limit the application of a statute protecting the confidentiality of records or other information concerning a client of the practitioner of a licensed or otherwise regulated profession or vocation.155

Disclosure of Tax Return Information (Bus. & Prof. Code § 17530.5)

It is a crime for a person to disclose information obtained in the business of preparing or assisting the preparation of income tax returns without the express written consent of the

152. Fin. Code § 4052(c).
153. See Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(e)(1) (listing among an attorney’s duties the duty to maintain inviolate the confidence and at every personal peril to preserve the secrets of the client).
154. See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 5037 (no statement, record, schedule, working paper, or memorandum made by a CPA incident to or in the course of rendering services to a client may be sold, transferred or bequeathed to a third party without the consent of the client). The general opt in and out choices of the new law should apply to the CPA as to any other “financial institution,” but in case of a conflict with the special opt in rule of Section 5037, the special rule should continue to apply.
155. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(a) infra.
The prohibition extends to internal disclosure within the tax preparation entity, as well as to affiliates, for any purpose other than tax preparation.

It is likewise a crime for a sales and use tax return preparer to disclose return information, or for any other person or agency, or its employees or officers, to disclose information collected for the purpose of administering the sales and use tax laws or for any purpose other than tax administration or enforcement.\textsuperscript{157}

These statutes are more protective of consumer privacy than the California Financial Information Privacy Act. They represent a legislative policy determination that tax information is particularly sensitive and deserves the strongest protection. The new law should not override them.

Nor should they override the new law. They are criminal statutes; the new law provides a civil penalty. The Commission recommends adding a general provision that would preserve a statute that imposes a criminal penalty for disclosure of records or other information concerning a consumer without the consent of the consumer.\textsuperscript{158}

The extent to which the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s preemption of state affiliate sharing statutes may affect these provisions is unknown. The provisions explicitly prohibit disclosure of information by an entity to any of its subsidiaries or affiliates.\textsuperscript{159} If the Fair Credit Reporting Act is construed broadly, the affiliate sharing prohibitions of these statutes may fall.\textsuperscript{160} That issue is beyond the scope of this report.\textsuperscript{161}

\textsuperscript{156} Bus. & Prof. Code \S 17530.5.

\textsuperscript{157} Rev. & Tax. Code \S\S 7056.5(a), 7056.6(a).

\textsuperscript{158} See proposed Fin. Code \S 4058.2(b) \emph{infra}.

\textsuperscript{159} See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code \S 17530.5(c)-(d).

\textsuperscript{160} It should be noted that the court in \textit{Bank of Am. v. City of Daly City} seems to distinguish criminal laws, but only if the criminal law does not relate to
Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (Civ. Code §§ 56-56.37)

No provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor may disclose medical information about a patient or an enrollee or subscriber of a plan without prior authorization by the patient, enrollee, or subscriber.¹⁶² This limitation is qualified by narrowly drawn exceptions.¹⁶³ The statute specifically overrides some provisions of the Information Practices Act of 1977, supplements some provisions of that Act, and is qualified by provisions of the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act.¹⁶⁴

The Confidentiality of Medical Information Act thus provides greater protection and more specifically tailored provisions than the California Financial Information Privacy Act. It should apply notwithstanding the general provisions of the new law. The Commission recommends addition of clarifying language to the new law that it does not apply to a provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor, within the meaning of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Part 2.6 (commencing with Section 56) of Division 1 of the Civil Code, with respect to medical information covered by that act.¹⁶⁵

It should be noted that exemption of an entity from the California Financial Information Privacy Act is not an exemption from the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, or any other federal or state law. Thus a health care provider or plan is likely to be subjected to one or more

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¹⁶¹. The Commission recommends further study of the matter. See “Conclusion” infra.


¹⁶³. Id. §§ 56.10(b)-56.16, 56.30.

¹⁶⁴. Id. §§ 56.27, 56.29.

¹⁶⁵. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.1(a) infra.
bodies of conflicting privacy law, at state and federal levels. That issue is beyond the scope of this report.\textsuperscript{166}

\textit{Areias Credit Card Full Disclosure Act of 1986 (Civ. Code §§ 1748.10-1748.14)}

The Areias Credit Card Full Disclosure Act of 1986 limits a credit card issuer’s right to disclose marketing information (shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity) about a cardholder.\textsuperscript{167} The law requires the card issuer to give the cardholder notice and an opt out opportunity.

The type of information disclosure covered by the Areias Act, while narrow in focus, is also the type of information disclosure covered by the California Financial Information Privacy Act. To the extent the Areias Act includes special rules governing the privacy notice to cardholders and the timing for opting out, it is redundant to but somewhat different than the new law. Moreover, the Areias Act is less protective of consumer privacy than the new law, which precludes disclosure to a nonaffiliated third party unless the consumer opts in.\textsuperscript{168}

The Commission believes the new law should supersede this special statute. The special statute should be repealed in reliance on the new law.

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item[166.] The Commission recommends further study of the matter. See “Conclusion” infra.
\item[167.] Civ. Code § 1748.12.
\item[168.] The Areias Act also acknowledges the preemptive effect of the Fair Credit Reporting Act with respect to affiliate sharing. See id. § 1748.12(e)(3):
\begin{quote}
To the extent that the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the requirements of this section as to communication by a credit card issuer to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate, the credit card issuer may communicate information about a cardholder to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate to the extent and in the manner permitted under that act.
\end{quote}
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
Identity Theft (Civ. Code § 1748.95; Fin. Code §§ 4002, 22470; Pen. Code § 530.8)

Various identity theft statutes allow law enforcement and victim access to records in the hands of a financial institution.169 These provisions should override the California Financial Information Privacy Act.170

Given the broad exemptions already in the new law that cover identity theft, the Commission does not believe there is a need to refer to individual identity theft statutes. Such a reference could actually be counterproductive. A reference to a specific identity theft statute might be read impliedly to exclude other identity theft statutes not referenced.

The California identity theft disclosure statutes could also run afoul of Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption. That Act includes provisions for release of information by a financial institution for identity theft investigation.171 The Act specifically preempts state law governing this matter.172 It is possible that the California identity theft statutes are

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169. See, e.g., Pen. Code § 530.8 (giving victims of identity theft right to receive information, where unauthorized account has been established); Fin. Code § 4002 (establishing right of identity theft victims to receive information from supervised financial organizations regarding unauthorized forms and applications filed with those organizations); Fin. Code § 22470 (giving same rights with respect to information from finance lenders of consumer loans); Civ. Code § 1748.95 (establishing same rights with respect to information from credit card issuers). See also Coombs & Milner, New California Identity Theft Legislation, Los Angeles Lawyer, July-Aug. 2004, at 21.

170. The new law exempts from its coverage, among other matters:

- Release of information to protect against or prevent actual or potential identity theft. Fin. Code § 4056(b)(3)(B).
- Release of information to comply with a properly authorized civil or criminal investigation. Fin. Code § 4056(b)(7).

171. 15 U.S.C. § 1681g(e).

172. 15 U.S.C. § 1681t(b)(G) (”No requirement or prohibition may be imposed under the laws of any State . . . with respect to any subject matter regulated under . . . section 1681g(e), relating to information available to victims under section 1681g(e).”).
preempted in whole or part by federal law. However, that
determination is beyond the scope of this project.\textsuperscript{173}

\textit{Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act (Civ. Code §§ 1785.1-
1785.36)}

The transfer of information to and from a consumer credit
reporting agency is highly regulated under state law,\textsuperscript{174} as it is
under federal law.\textsuperscript{175} The state regulatory scheme should
operate independently of, and be unaffected by, the California
Financial Information Privacy Act. The Commission
recommends addition of a provision stating explicitly that the
new law supplements and does not limit the application of the
Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act.\textsuperscript{176}

\textit{Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act (Civ. Code §§ 1786-
1786.60)}

An investigative consumer reporting agency compiles
information about consumers for potential employment,
insurance, leasing, licensure, and other purposes. The transfer
of information to and from an investigative consumer
reporting agency is subject to strict state and federal controls.
While it is not clear that an investigative consumer
reporting agency is a financial institution within the meaning
of the California Financial Information Privacy Act, the
Commission believes such an interpretation is likely. The

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{173} The Commission recommends further study of the matter. See
        “Conclusion” infra.
  \item \textsuperscript{174} See Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Civ. Code §§ 1785.1-
        1785.36.
  \item \textsuperscript{175} Surprisingly, although the Fair Credit Reporting Act appears to preempt
        aspects of California law in many areas unrelated to credit reporting, it appears
        specifically to allow California law to stand on many core issues relating to
  \item \textsuperscript{176} See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(c) infra.
\end{itemize}
regulatory scheme governing such entities\textsuperscript{177} should operate independently of, and be unaffected by, the new law. The Commission recommends addition of a provision stating explicitly that the new law supplements and does not limit the application of the Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act.\textsuperscript{178}

\textit{Fair Debt Collection Practices (Civ. Code §§ 1788-1788.33)}

The Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act has as its purpose to prohibit a debt collector from engaging in unfair or deceptive acts or practices in the collection of a consumer debt and to require a debtor to act fairly in entering into and honoring a debt. Among the practices prohibited by the Act is communication of information about the debtor and debt with various persons.\textsuperscript{179}

The disclosure of personal information prohibited by this statute is specifically tailored to the circumstances of debt collection. The statute should continue to apply notwithstanding the general disclosure provisions of the California Financial Information Privacy Act. The Commission recommends that the law make clear that new law does not override the debt collection provisions.\textsuperscript{180}

\textit{Confidentiality of Social Security Numbers (Civ. Code §§ 1798.85-1798.86)}

Statutes restricting public posting or display of social security numbers appear to operate in a different realm from the California Financial Information Privacy Act. Under the social security number privacy statutes, a financial institution

\textsuperscript{177}. Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, Civ. Code §§ 1786-1786.60.

\textsuperscript{178}. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(d) \textit{infra}.

\textsuperscript{179}. Civ. Code § 1788.12.

\textsuperscript{180}. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(e) \textit{infra}.
that has a consumer’s social security number is prohibited from intentionally communicating or otherwise making the number available to the “general public.” It is not clear whether the statutes are more protective of privacy than the California Financial Information Privacy Act or less protective. Given the uncertainty of interpretation, the Commission recommends that it be made clear that the California Financial Information Privacy Act does not affect the social security number statutes.

Bookkeeping Services, Income Tax Returns, Video Cassette Sales and Rentals (Civ. Code §§ 1799-1799.3)

Civil Code Sections 1799 to 1799.3 are grouped together under the Title heading “Business Records.” The statutes deal disparately with disclosure of information derived by a bookkeeping service, by a person with access to income tax returns, and by a video sale or rental establishment. The one feature they have in common is that each requires the affirmative consent of the person whose information is at issue before that information may be disclosed to a third party.

These provisions intersect with the California Financial Information Privacy Act in different ways. The overlap with respect to bookkeeping service providers is complete, since such a provider would be considered a financial institution. The income tax return provisions involve a substantial overlap with the new law’s coverage. The income tax return provisions apply to any person that has obtained a copy

182. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(f) infra.
184. Income tax returns are also protected from disclosure by other statutory provisions and by the California Constitution. See, e.g., Fortunato v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 475, 480-81, 8 Cal. Rptr. 3d 82 (2003).
of a consumer’s income tax return.\footnote{See Civ. Code § 1799.1a.} Often that will be a financial institution, but not necessarily. It may be a local merchant seeking assurance of financial security before extending credit, or a landlord before executing a lease.

The video cassette sale or rental provisions operate in a different arena entirely.\footnote{See \textit{id.} § 1799.3.} A merchant engaged in that business would not ordinarily be deemed a financial institution within the meaning of the new law.

Because these provisions have a broader scope of coverage than the new law, they should continue to operate independently of it. In addition, because of the greater level of protection provided by the bookkeeping services statute and the sensitivity of information involved, that statute should continue in effect. The Commission would make clear that the entire set of provisions is unaffected by the California Financial Information Privacy Act.\footnote{See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(g) \textit{infra}.}

It should be noted that the information sharing restrictions in these statutes require the consumer’s opt in. In the case of income tax return information, the restriction applies specifically to affiliate sharing.\footnote{\textit{Cf.} Civ. Code § 1799.1a(c)(1)(A) (‘‘Affiliate’ means any entity that, directly or indirectly, through one or more intermediaries, controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with, another entity.’’)} The extent of Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption of these provisions, particularly as it relates to disclosure of video shop sales and rental information, is beyond the scope of this study.\footnote{The Commission recommends further study of the matter. See \textquote{Conclusion} \textit{infra}.}
Abstract of Judgment (Code Civ. Proc. § 674)

The statute governing the content of an abstract of judgment requires a significant amount of personal information, such as the name and last known address of the judgment debtor, the social security number and driver’s license of the judgment debtor if known to the judgment creditor, and other names by which the judgment debtor is also known.\footnote{190} The abstract may be recorded to establish a judgment lien.\footnote{191}

A number of potential conflicts between the statutes governing recordation of an abstract of judgment and the California Financial Information Privacy Act could be resolved by exemptions found in the new law:

- The Act protects only “nonpublic” personal information. All information required in the abstract of judgment might be publicly available from one or another source.\footnote{192}
- Disclosure is “necessary to effect, administer, or enforce” the transaction.\footnote{193}
- Disclosure is authorized as a “securitization” of the transaction.\footnote{194}
- Disclosure is “to comply with federal, state, or local laws, rules, and other applicable legal requirements.”\footnote{195}

The Commission believes that the new law’s exemption for disclosure of information “necessary to effect, administer, or enforce” a financial institution’s rights against a consumer is adequate to allow recordation of the kinds of information

\footnotetext[190]{190. Code Civ. Proc. § 674.}
\footnotetext[191]{191. Id.; Code Civ. Proc. §§ 697.310-697.410.}
\footnotetext[192]{192. Cf. Fin. Code § 4052(a) (“nonpublic personal information” defined).}
\footnotetext[193]{193. Id. § 4052(h).}
\footnotetext[194]{194. Id. § 4056(b)(1).}
\footnotetext[195]{195. Id. § 4056(b)(7).}
required by the abstract of judgment law. Further amendment of the new law is unnecessary.

Subpoena Duces Tecum for Production of Personal Records (Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.3)

A litigant may subpoena a financial institution for production of the financial records of a consumer. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1985.3, the subpoenaing party must serve on the consumer a copy of the subpoena and notice to the consumer of the opportunity to protect the consumer’s privacy rights. The consumer may move to quash or modify the subpoena or otherwise file a written objection. Although the statute does not specify the standard for determining in what circumstances the consumer’s personal information is entitled to protection from disclosure pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, case law makes clear that the constitutional privacy right is at stake and a court must balance the consumer’s interest in privacy against a demonstrably compelling need for discovery.

It is unclear whether the California Financial Information Privacy Act protects a consumer’s personal information from discovery under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1985.3. It is likewise unclear whether a consumer’s opt in to third party

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196. See id. §§ 4056(b)(1) (exemption for disclosure necessary to effect, administer, or enforce rights of financial institution), 4052(h)(2) (“necessary to effect, administer, or enforce” includes disclosure that is required or is one of the lawful or appropriate methods to enforce the rights of the financial institution).

197. It is arguable that the current abstract of judgment statute requires more information than is reasonably necessary to identify the property of the judgment debtor for judgment lien purposes. It is also possible that another approach is called for to ensure the privacy of a judgment debtor’s personal information. But that is beyond the scope of this endeavor to integrate the new law with existing statutes. It should be noted that the Information Practices Act of 1977 specifically exempts an abstract of judgment from its coverage. Civ. Code § 1798.67.

sharing under the new law would constitute a waiver of privacy rights for purposes of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1985.3.

The Commission does not believe a consumer’s exercise of privacy rights under the new law should immunize the consumer’s financial records from discovery in court proceedings. Nor should a consumer’s waiver of rights under the new law for other purposes have the effect of a general waiver of privacy rights to the extent that a private litigant may obtain the consumer’s personal information without restraint.

The new law permits disclosure of nonpublic personal information to comply with a “subpoena or summons by federal, state, or local authorities.”¹⁹⁹ This provision is sufficiently specific with respect to a government subpoena. Comparable protection is also necessary to safeguard personal records from an undue invasion of the right to privacy by a private litigation subpoena.²⁰⁰

**California Right to Financial Privacy Act (Gov’t Code §§ 7460-7493)**

The California Right to Financial Privacy Act was enacted in 1976. Its purpose is to “clarify and protect the confidential relationship between financial institutions and their customers and to balance a citizen’s right of privacy with the governmental interest in obtaining information for specific purposes and by specified procedures.”²⁰¹

The statute prohibits a financial institution from disclosing a customer’s financial records to a governmental entity or officer in connection with a civil or criminal investigation, except (1) with the customer’s consent or (2) pursuant to an

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¹⁹⁹. Fin. Code § 4056(b)(7).
²⁰¹. Gov’t Code § 7461(c).
administrative subpoena or summons, search warrant, or judicial subpoena that meets specified standards.202 These requirements are not waivable and they override all other statutes except those that make specific reference to them.203

The statute does not prohibit a financial institution from disclosing financial records of a customer incidental to a transaction in the normal course of business if the financial institution has no reasonable cause to believe that the information will be used in connection with an investigation of the customer.204

Unlike the California Financial Information Privacy Act, this statute affects only one segment of the financial institution spectrum — banks, savings associations, trust companies, industrial loan companies, and credit unions.205 It dovetails with the new law’s exemption for compliance with a “properly authorized” civil, criminal, administrative, or regulatory investigation or subpoena or summons by federal, state, or local authorities.206

The Commission believes no statutory adjustment is necessary to allow both the California Financial Information Privacy Act and the special requirements of the California Right to Financial Privacy Act to coexist. There is perhaps some confusion in the similarity of their short titles. A cross reference in the new law to the special statute would be informative.207

202. Id. § 7470.
203. Id. §§ 7490-7491.
204. Id. § 7471(b).
205. Id. § 7465(a) (defining the term “financial institution” to include “state and national banks, state and federal savings associations, trust companies, industrial loan companies, and state and federal credit unions”).
207. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.2(h) infra.
**Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act (Ins. Code §§ 791-791.27)**

The Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act was enacted in 1980 for the purpose of establishing standards for the collection, use, and disclosure of information gathered in connection with insurance transactions.\(^208\) The disclosure limitations are extensive and detailed.\(^209\)

In general, the Act requires an opt in for information sharing.\(^210\) Lesser standards apply for specified purposes enumerated in the statute. Those provisions are either consistent with the new law or unique to the insurance context.\(^211\) The remedy for violation of the Act is actual damages sustained as a result of the violation, plus costs and reasonable attorney’s fees to the prevailing party. There is a two year limitation period from the date the violation was, or could have been, discovered. No other remedies are allowed.\(^212\)

The Insurance Commissioner has made an effort to reconcile this statute with the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in regulations promulgated in 2002.\(^213\) The regulations focus on the privacy notice and information security procedures. The basic disclosure regulation does not attempt any significant reconciliation.\(^214\)

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208. See Ins. Code §§ 791-791.27.

209. See *id.*, § 791.13.

210. *Id.*, § 791.13(a).

211. Particularly noteworthy is Section 791.13(k), which provides an opt out scheme for third party information sharing for marketing purposes.

212. *Id.*, §§ 791.20-791.21.


214. *Id.*, § 2689.3. ("Nonpublic personal information shall not be disclosed in a manner not permitted by California law or these regulations.")
The Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act is supplemented by numerous statutes in the Insurance Code imposing confidentiality requirements on insurers, interinsurance exchanges, ratings organizations, and others. Under the California Financial Information Privacy Act an insurer may combine the opt-out form with the form required pursuant to the Insurance Information and Privacy Protection Act.\(^\text{215}\)

The Commission proposes no further revisions in this area. The new law already includes integrative provisions for insurance regulations. Unlike the banking and securities industries where federal agencies are the primary regulatory authorities, in the insurance industry the California Insurance Commissioner is the functional regulator. The Insurance Commissioner is in a position to promulgate any necessary regulations or propose any necessary conforming legislation.

**Accounting of Guardian or Conservator (Prob. Code § 2620)**

A guardian or conservator of property would qualify as a financial institution within the meaning of the California Financial Information Privacy Act.\(^\text{216}\) These fiduciaries must file periodic accountings with the superior court. The filings are a public record. The Probate Code seeks to protect the confidentiality of these public records to some extent.\(^\text{217}\)

\(^{215}\) See Fin. Code § 4058.7.

\(^{216}\) There may be a question whether the new law is intended to cover an individual fiduciary, as opposed to a corporate fiduciary, due to the statute’s use of the term financial “institution.” This does not appear to be a serious concern — the new law expressly states its intent to track Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act definitions, and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act makes clear that its coverage extends to individuals as well as artificial persons. See Fin. Code § 4051.5(b)(5) (declaring legislative intent to adopt definitions consistent with federal law); 16 C.F.R. 313.3(k) (2004) (“financial institution” defined).

\(^{217}\) Prob. Code § 2620(d).
A number of the new law’s exceptions could come into play with respect to this filing. The fiduciary should be able to make the statutorily required filing without obtaining the ward’s or conservatee’s opt in. The Commission does not believe any statutory adjustment is required.

**Financial Institution Match System (Rev. & Tax. Code § 19271.6)**

The Financial Institution Match System is a method by which the Franchise Tax Board issues orders to financial institutions to withhold amounts due from accounts of past due child support obligors. The system involves transmission by a financial institution to the Franchise Tax Board of the name, record address, social security number, and other identifying information concerning an account holder with the financial institution. A financial institution is immunized from liability for furnishing the required information to the Franchise Tax Board.

The statute makes clear that the California Right to Financial Privacy Act (which restrains a financial institution from transmitting customer information to a governmental agency in connection with a civil or criminal investigation of the customer) does not preclude a transfer of information pursuant to the child support match system. The statute should be amended to include a parallel provision to the effect that enactment of the California Financial Information Privacy Act does not affect the match system.

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218. See, e.g., Fin. Code §§ 4052(h) (“necessary to effect, administer, or enforce” defined), 4056(b)(3)(B) (allowing release of nonpublic personal information to protect against or prevent actual or potential fraud, etc.), 4056(b)(7) (compliance with state law).


220. See proposed amendment to Rev. & Tax. Code § 19271.6(b) infra. This would supplement the new law’s general exception for compliance with state laws. Fin. Code § 4056(b)(7).
Privacy Statutes Applicable to Public Entities

A number of the major California privacy statutes protect citizens from disclosure of personal information in the hands of a public entity. The key California statutes are the Public Records Act (making records in the possession of a public entity open to inspection, subject to some privacy limitations) and the Information Practices Act of 1977 (limiting state agency collection and dissemination of personal information). There are other more narrowly crafted statutes affecting disclosure of information by public entities that are of some relevance for present purposes.

The California Financial Information Privacy Act regulates disclosure of nonpublic personal information by a “financial institution.” It appears the new law could conflict with laws that regulate disclosure of personal information by a public entity.

The definition of a financial institution is broad under the new law — any institution the business of which is engaging in financial activities as described in the Bank Holding Company Act. While most public entities would not qualify as a financial institution under this definition, a number are significantly engaged in financial activities to the extent that they could readily fall within the terms of the definition.

221. See Fin. Code § 4052(c).
223. For example, the Franchise Tax Board, State Controller, State Lottery Commission, California Earthquake Authority, and various student loan and student aid entities are all significantly engaged in financial activities and collect personal information relating to California consumers.

The new law expressly states its intent to track the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act definitions. See Fin. Code § 4051.5(b)(5) (legislative findings). The Federal Trade Commission has given as an example of a financial institution for purposes of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act, “Government entities that provide financial products such as student loans or mortgages.” Fed. Trade Comm’n,
The new law limits disclosure of “nonpublic” personal information.\textsuperscript{224} It is arguable that information in the possession of a public entity is necessarily “public” information.\textsuperscript{225}

\textit{California Public Records Act (Gov’t Code §§ 6250-6276.48)}

The California Public Records Act is the key statute regulating the extent to which information in the hands of a state or local public entity in California may be disclosed. The statute is liberal in providing public access to information in the hands of a public entity. In enacting the statute, the Legislature, “mindful of the right of individuals to privacy, finds and declares that access to information concerning the conduct of the people’s business is a fundamental and necessary right of every person in this state.”\textsuperscript{226} To this end the law requires that each state or local agency must make public records available on request, except with respect to a public record exempt from disclosure by an express provision.\textsuperscript{227}

The Public Records Act includes a number of significant exceptions that have relevance for the California Financial Information Privacy Act, such as:

- Personnel, medical, or similar files, the disclosure of which would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.\textsuperscript{228}

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\textsuperscript{224} Fin. Code § 4052(a) (“nonpublic personal information” defined).

\textsuperscript{225} Under the new law’s definition, publicly available information is that which a financial institution has a reasonable basis to believe is lawfully made available to the general public from various sources, including government records.

\textsuperscript{226} Gov’t Code § 6250.

\textsuperscript{227} \textit{Id.} § 6253(b).

\textsuperscript{228} \textit{Id.} § 6254(c).
Information contained in an application filed with a state agency responsible for regulation or supervision of the issuance of securities or of financial institutions.229

Information required from a taxpayer in connection with collection of local taxes that is received in confidence and the disclosure of which to other persons would result in unfair competitive disadvantage to the person supplying the information.230

Records the disclosure of which is exempted or prohibited pursuant to federal or state law.231

Where the public interest served by not disclosing the record clearly outweighs the public interest served by disclosure of the record.232


The Information Practices Act of 1977 limits the maintenance and dissemination of personal information by state government in order to protect the privacy of individuals. Its interaction with the Public Records Act is complex and defies ready explanation.233

A significant feature of the Information Practices Act is its similarity in operation to the California Financial Information Privacy Act — it would preclude a state agency from disclosing personal information in its possession without the consent of the person, subject to various exceptions.234

229. Id. § 6254(d)(1).
230. Id. § 6254(i).
231. Id. § 6254(k).
232. Id. § 6255(a).
233. See, e.g., Civ. Code §§ 1798.24(g) (no disclosure of personal information subject to various exceptions, including pursuant to Public Records Act), 1798.70 (statute supersedes Public Records Act exemptions), 1798.75 (statute does not supersede Public Records Act except as to certain provisions).
234. Id. § 1798.24.
Act contains numerous exceptions including, in addition to the Public Records Act, mandates of state and federal laws, law enforcement and regulatory requirements, and judicial and administrative discovery practice. An individual’s name and address may not be distributed for commercial purposes, sold, or rented by an agency unless that action is specifically authorized by law.235

A state agency may not distribute or sell any electronically collected personal information about an individual who communicates with the agency electronically without prior written permission from the individual, except as authorized by the Information Practices Act of 1977.236

Other State Agency Confidentiality Requirements

State law is peppered with special statutes that protect the confidentiality of personal information collected by a governmental agency. For example,

- The Secretary of State maintains a registry of distinguished women and minorities available to serve on corporate boards of directors. The directory includes extensive personal information on each registrant. The governing statute includes strict controls on disclosure of information by the Secretary of State for appropriate purposes.237

- The county tax assessor is subject to strict controls on public disclosure of information in the assessor’s possession relating to property ownership, homeowner’s exemptions, assessments, etc.238 A private contractor who does appraisal work for the county assessor is subject to the same constraints on

235. Id. § 1798.60.
236. Gov’t Code § 11015.5(b).
238. See, e.g., Rev. & Tax. Code § 408.
confidentiality of assessment information and records as the assessor.239

• Similar confidentiality controls apply to the State Board of Equalization tax assessment information240 and to sales and use tax return information.241

Exemption for State Agency

The statutes governing disclosure of personal information by a state agency are extensive and appear to be at least as protective of privacy rights as the California Financial Information Privacy Act. Although it is not certain that the new law will be construed to cover disclosure of financial information by a state agency, there is a reasonable likelihood that it will be.

The Commission recommends that the matter be settled by adding to the new law a provision exempting the state from its application.242

CONCLUSION

The Legislature has directed the Law Revision Commission to study, report on, and prepare recommended legislation concerning the protection of personal information relating to or arising out of financial transactions. The Commission believes that the enactment of the California Financial Information Privacy Act fulfills the major objectives of the Legislature’s charge. It provides consumers with notice and an opportunity to protect their personal information; it seeks to provide a level playing field for financial institution competition; it is compatible with and seeks to avoid

240. Id. § 833.
241. Id. § 7056.
242. See proposed Fin. Code § 4058.1(b) infra.
preemption by the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act and the Fair Credit Reporting Act to the extent practical; and it provides civil penalties for its violation. The new law does not satisfy all aspects of the legislative directive, but to a great extent that appears to be the result of compromises necessary to obtain its enactment.

While there are clarifications and improvements that could be made, the Commission does not at this time recommend revision of the new law. Experience under it will demonstrate any real problems that need to be addressed.

The most significant threat to the viability of the new law is the potential for federal preemption of some or all of its provisions. That could occur as a result of congressional action to preempt the field, such as the Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption, or by interpretation of an existing regulatory statute such as the National Bank Act.

There is little the state can do to affect federal preemption of the California statute, since that is controlled by federal rather than state law. If federal preemption occurs, the new law should be revised so that it is not in conflict with federal law. However, as of the date of issuance of this report, the extent of federal preemption remains unclear.

The Commission believes that Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act preemption is probably minimal, and no significant adjustment to the California statute is necessary. Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption could be more substantial, potentially impacting the affiliate sharing provisions of the California statute. However, because of the breadth and ambiguity of the Fair Credit Reporting Act’s preemption clause, this interpretation is subject to a high degree of uncertainty. The Commission also believes that there is a potential for significant preemptive effect from the National Bank Act and other federal functional regulatory regimes. That, too, is unclear at present.
The Commission believes that the new law should not be adjusted for federal preemption until the full scope of preemption is clear. At that time, the Legislature should review the consequences of federal preemption and make a determination whether further changes to the California statute are required in order to maintain a level playing field. This approach is not wholly satisfactory, since in the interim the financial services industry will be uncertain whether it must comply with suspect provisions of the California statute.\(^{243}\) However, the Commission does not recommend adjustment for possible federal preemption at this time.

The Commission does recommend clarification of the interrelation of the California Financial Information Privacy Act with existing state laws affecting financial privacy. It should be clear whether the new law is intended to override those laws, or whether those laws are intended to remain in effect. Both financial institutions and consumers should know what their rights and duties are in case of a conflict; it should not be necessary to resort to litigation to resolve the matter.

The Commission in this recommendation proposes a number of clarifying revisions. However, due to the broad scope of the new law, the extensive body of existing statutes, and limitations on the Commission’s resources, it is not possible to identify and address more than a fraction of the potential conflicts. The Commission has limited this recommendation to the most obvious matters that have come to its attention.

Nearly every statutory conflict is the result of variant privacy standards between the new law and a special statute

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\(^{243}\) The practical options available to a financial institution will be either to challenge the new law in court and get a definitive ruling on preemption, or to comply with the new law even though perhaps not required. The appeal in *Am. Bankers Ass’n v. Lockyer*, No. CIV.S 04-0778 MCE KJ, 2004 WL 1490432 (E.D. Cal. June 30, 2004), may resolve some of the questions within a reasonable time.
relating to privacy in a particular sector of the financial industry. The Commission proposes enactment of a rule of construction favoring greater privacy protection in case of a conflict that is not otherwise specifically resolved.

The deadline for this report is January 1, 2005. The Commission’s authority to study and report on this subject terminates at that time. This report identifies a number of tasks that need to be done after that date:

- The implementation and operation of the new law should be monitored, and any necessary clarifying or corrective adjustments made.
- The preemptive effect of federal laws should be monitored, and the new law and other affected state statutes adjusted for conformity.244
- The body of California statutes should be reviewed for conflicts with the new law and conforming revisions made.245

The Commission recommends that its authority be extended beyond January 1, 2005, in order to carry out these tasks. There should be no deadline for completion of these tasks due to the uncertainty of timing on the federal issues.246 The Commission would not engage in further work on this matter before January 1, 2007, or such other time that litigation over the extent of federal preemption has been adequately

244. In this connection, the Commission notes that many California statutes may be subject to Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption, particularly with respect to such matters as credit reporting and identity theft. The Commission has not attempted to analyze and propose conforming revisions to those statutes, primarily because that lies outside the scope of this inquiry. Some statutory cleanup ultimately will need to be done.

245. The Commission in this report addresses some conflicts directly. See “Proposed Legislation” infra.

246. In addition to the pending appeal in the United States Court of Appeal for the Ninth Circuit with respect to Fair Credit Reporting Act preemption, there may well be writ petitions to the United States Supreme Court on the matter.
resolved. This recommendation is subject to the adequacy of the Commission’s resources for this purpose.\textsuperscript{247}

\textsuperscript{247} The Commission has suffered a major funding and resource reduction over the past several years, and a simultaneous increase in workload, which have hindered the Commission’s ability to take on additional projects such as this. The Legislature’s original assignment of this project to the Commission was made contingent on provision of adequate funding for it in the state budget. 2002 Cal. Stat. res. ch. 167.
PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Civ. Code § 1748.12 (repealed). Disclosure of marketing information
SEC. ___. Section 1748.12 of the Civil Code is repealed.
1748.12. (a) For purposes of this section:
(1) “Cardholder” means any consumer to whom a credit card is issued, provided that, when more than one credit card has been issued for the same account, all persons holding those credit cards may be treated as a single cardholder.
(2) “Credit card” means any card, plate, coupon book, or other single credit device existing for the purpose of being used from time to time upon presentation to obtain money, property, labor, or services on credit. “Credit card” does not mean any of the following:
(A) Any single credit device used to obtain telephone property, labor, or services in any transaction under public utility tariffs.
(B) Any device that may be used to obtain credit pursuant to an electronic fund transfer but only if the credit is obtained under an agreement between a consumer and a financial institution to extend credit when the consumer’s asset account is overdrawn or to maintain a specified minimum balance in the consumer’s asset account.
(C) Any key or card key used at an automated dispensing outlet to obtain or purchase petroleum products, as defined in subdivision (c) of Section 13401 of the Business and Professions Code, which will be used primarily for business rather than personal or family purposes.
(3) “Marketing information” means the categorization of cardholders compiled by a credit card issuer, based on a cardholder’s shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity which is provided to a marketer of goods or services or a subsidiary
or affiliate organization of the company that collects the information for consideration. “Marketing information” does not include aggregate data that does not identify a cardholder based on the cardholder’s shopping patterns, spending history, or behavioral characteristics derived from account activity or any communications to any person in connection with any transfer, processing, billing, collection, chargeback, fraud prevention, credit card recovery, or acquisition of or for credit card accounts.

(b) If the credit card issuer discloses marketing information concerning a cardholder to any person, the credit card issuer shall provide a written notice to the cardholder that clearly and conspicuously describes the cardholder’s right to prohibit the disclosure of marketing information concerning the cardholder which discloses the cardholder’s identity. The notice shall be in 10-point type and shall advise the cardholder of his or her ability to respond either by completing a preprinted form or a toll free telephone number that the cardholder may call to exercise this right.

(c) The requirements of subdivision (b) shall be satisfied by furnishing the notice to the cardholder:

(1) At least 60 days prior to the initial disclosure of marketing information concerning the cardholder by the credit card issuer.

(2) For all new credit cards issued on or after April 1, 2002, on the form containing the new credit card when the credit card is delivered to the cardholder.

(3) At least once per calendar year, to every cardholder entitled to receive an annual statement of billings rights pursuant to 12 C.F.R. 226.9 (Regulation Z). The notice required by this paragraph may be included on or with any periodic statement or with the delivery of the renewal card.

(d) The cardholder’s election to prohibit disclosure of marketing information shall be effective only with respect to
marketing information that is disclosed to any party beginning 30 days after the credit card issuer has received, at the designated address on the form containing the new credit card or on the preprinted form, or by telephone, the cardholder’s election to prohibit disclosure. This does not apply to the disclosure of marketing information prior to the cardholder’s notification to the credit card issuer of the cardholder’s election.

(2) An election to prohibit disclosure of marketing information shall terminate upon receipt by the credit card issuer of notice from the cardholder that the cardholder’s election to prohibit disclosure is no longer effective.

(e) The requirements of this section do not apply to any of the following communications of marketing information by a credit card issuer:

(1) Communications to any party to, or merchant specified in, the credit card agreement, or to any person whose name appears on the credit card or on whose behalf the credit card is issued.

(2) Communications to consumer credit reporting agencies, as defined in subdivision (d) of Section 1785.3.

(3) To the extent that the Fair Credit Reporting Act preempts the requirements of this section as to communication by a credit card issuer to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate, the credit card issuer may communicate information about a cardholder to a corporate subsidiary or affiliate to the extent and in the manner permitted under that act.

(4) Communications to a third party when the third party is responsible for conveying information from the card issuer to any of its cardholders.

(f) If the laws of the United States require disclosure to cardholders regarding the use of personal information,
compliance with the federal requirements shall be deemed to be compliance with this section.

(g) This section shall become operative on April 1, 2002.

Comment. Former Section 1748.12 is superseded by the California Financial Information Privacy Act. See, e.g., Fin. Code §§ 4052(c) (“financial institution” defined), 4050(a) (“nonpublic personal information” defined), 4053 (consent to disclosure), 4052.5 (limitation on disclosure to nonaffiliated third party).


SEC. ___. Section 1985.4 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

1985.4. The procedures set forth in Section 1985.3 are applicable to a subpoena duces tecum for records containing "personal:

(a) “Personal information,” as defined in Section 1798.3 of the Civil Code which are otherwise exempt from public disclosure under Section 6254 of the Government Code which are maintained by a state or local agency as defined in Section 6252 of the Government Code. For the purposes of this section application of Section 1985.3 to this subdivision, “witness” means a state or local agency as defined in Section 6252 of the Government Code and “consumer” means any employee of any state or local agency as defined in Section 6252 of the Government Code, or any other natural person. Nothing in this section subdivision shall pertain to personnel records as defined in Section 832.8 of the Penal Code.

(b) Nonpublic personal information otherwise protected from disclosure under the California Financial Information Privacy Act, Division 1.2 (commencing with Section 4050) of the Financial Code. A consumer’s exercise or nonexercise of rights under the California Financial Information Privacy Act does not affect the grounds for a motion to quash, modify, or condition a subpoena duces tecum, or for a written objection
to production of personal records, under Section 1985.3 as an undue invasion of the right to privacy.

Comment. Section 1985.4 is amended to make clear that the procedures of Section 1985.3 are applicable to a subpoena duces tecum for financial information that would otherwise be protected from disclosure under the California Financial Information Privacy Act, Division 1.2 (commencing with Section 4050) of the Financial Code. See also Fin. Code § 4056(b)(7) (consumer may not preclude disclosure of nonpublic personal information pursuant to a subpoena by federal, state, or local authorities). Moreover, a consumer’s actions under that Act should not be construed as a waiver of the consumer’s privacy rights granted under California’s discovery statutes. See, e.g., Section 1987.1 (protective orders, including protection against unreasonable violation of privacy rights).

Fin. Code § 4058.1 (added). Exemption of financial institutions covered by other privacy laws

SEC. ___. Section 4058.1 is added to the Financial Code, to read:

4058.1. This division does not apply to any of the following financial institutions:

(a) A provider of health care, health care service plan, or contractor, within the meaning of the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act, Part 2.6 (commencing with Section 56) of Division 1 of the Civil Code, with respect to medical information covered by that act.

(b) An agency of the state. As used in this subdivision, “agency of the state” includes an officer, employee, or other agent of the state acting in that capacity.

Comment. The financial institutions identified in Section 4058.1 are exempted from coverage of this division due to the more specific privacy provisions applicable to them under other statutes. Cf. Section 4052(c) (“financial institution” defined).

Even though the definition of “financial institution” under Section 4052(c) is potentially broad enough to include a state agency substantially involved in financial activities, subdivision (b) makes clear that such an agency is exempted from coverage of this division. Specific limitations on disclosure of information by a state agency may be found in other statutes, including the Public Records Act (Gov’t Code §§ 6250-
the Information Practices Act of 1977 (Civ. Code §§ 1798-1798.78), and statutes governing electronically collected personal information (e.g., Gov’t Code § 11015.5).

**Fin Code § 4058.2 (added). Effect on other statutes**

SEC. ___. Section 4058.2 is added to the Financial Code, to read:

4058.2. This division supplements and does not limit the application of any of the following provisions:

(a) A statute protecting the confidentiality of records or other information concerning a client of the practitioner of a licensed or otherwise regulated profession or vocation.

(b) A statute imposing a criminal penalty for disclosure of records or other information concerning a consumer without the consent of the consumer.

(c) The Consumer Credit Reporting Agencies Act, Title 1.6 (commencing with Section 1785.1) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.

(d) The Investigative Consumer Reporting Agencies Act, Title 1.6A (commencing with Section 1786) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.

(e) The Rosenthal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, Title 1.6C (commencing with Section 1788) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code.

(f) Title 1.81.1 (commencing with Section 1798.85) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, relating to confidentiality of social security numbers.

(g) Title 1.82 (commencing with Section 1799) of Part 4 of Division 3 of the Civil Code, relating to confidentiality of business records.

(h) The California Right to Financial Privacy Act, Chapter 20 (commencing with Section 7460) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

**Comment.** Section 4058.2 lists major privacy laws whose operation is not affected by this division. The omission of a law from this section
should not be read to imply that this division is intended to supersede that law. The listing in this section is necessarily incomplete, and is intended to provide guidance to the extent practicable. Whether a privacy law not listed in this section is superseded by this division is determined by standard principles of statutory construction. See also Section 4058.3 (conflicting statutes).

For example, a financial institution may include in a recorded abstract of judgment pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 674 nonpublic personal information that would otherwise be protected from disclosure by this division. See Fin. Code § 4056(b)(1) (financial institution may release financial information necessary to effect, administer, or enforce transaction, service, or account).

Likewise, a financial institution must comply with provisions of identity theft statutes relating to disclosure of information to victims and to law enforcement authorities to the extent not preempted by federal law. See, e.g., Pen. Code § 530.8; Fin. Code § 4002 (identity theft). See also Section 4056 (transactional exemptions).

A guardian or conservator may include in court filings required financial information relating to a ward or conservatee. See Fin. Code § 4056(b)(7) (financial institution may release financial information necessary to comply with state law). In that case, other privacy protections may apply. See, e.g., Prob. Code § 2620(d) (confidentiality of financial information in court filing).

Subdivision (a) makes clear that individual confidentiality statutes applicable to professionals neither supersede nor are superseded by this division. However, this division does exempt from its application a professional who is prohibited by rules of professional ethics and applicable law from voluntarily disclosing confidential client information without the consent of the client. See Fin. Code § 4052(c) (“financial institution” defined).

Subdivision (b) makes clear that this division does not supersede a statute making it a crime to disclose nonpublic personal information. See, e.g., Bus. & Prof. Code § 17530.5, Rev. & Tax. Code § 7056.6 (disclosure of tax return information); cf. Rev. & Tax. Code § 7056.5 (Taxpayer Browsing Protection Act).

Fin. Code § 4058.3 (added). Conflicting statutes

SEC. 4058.3. Section 4058.3 is added to the Financial Code, to read:

4058.3. (a) If this division conflicts with another statute that limits or prohibits disclosure by a financial institution of
nonpublic personal information of a consumer, public policy generally favors application of the statute that provides greater protection from disclosure of the consumer’s nonpublic personal information.

(b) This section applies only to a statute enacted before enactment of this division.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 4058.3 expresses the general legislative intent to favor privacy of consumer nonpublic personal information in the event of conflicting statutes relating to disclosure of that information by a financial institution. Section 4058.3 does not apply to the extent a statute specifically addresses the conflict. See, e.g., Fin. Code § 4058.2 (effect on other statutes), Code Civ. Proc. § 1985.4 (subpoena for production of personal records), Rev. & Tax. Code § 19271.6 (financial institution match system); see also Fin. Code § 4056(b)(5), (7) (release of nonpublic personal information to extent necessary to comply with requirements of other statutes).

The policy stated in this section is not absolute, but expresses a general constructional preference. Other public policies may prevail with respect to a particular body of law. For example, the less protective statute may be part of a comprehensive scheme that provides consistent rules throughout an industry, and injection of the stronger financial privacy requirements of this division could be unduly disruptive.

Subdivision (b) limits application of this section to preexisting statutes. A statute enacted after enactment of this division is presumed to have been enacted with knowledge of the requirements of this division.

Rev. & Tax. Code § 19271.6 (amended). Financial institution match system

SEC. ____. Section 19271.6 of the Revenue and Taxation Code is amended to read:

19271.6. (a) The Franchise Tax Board, through a cooperative agreement with the Department of Child Support Services, and in coordination with financial institutions doing business in this state, shall operate a Financial Institution Match System utilizing automated data exchanges to the maximum extent feasible. The Financial Institution Match System shall be implemented pursuant to guidelines prescribed by the Department of Child Support Services and
the Franchise Tax Board. These guidelines shall include a structure by which financial institutions, or their designated data processing agents, shall receive from the Franchise Tax Board the file or files of past-due support obligors compiled in accordance with subdivision (c), that the institution shall match with its own list of accountholders to identify past-due support obligor accountholders at the institution. To the extent allowed by the federal Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996, the guidelines shall include an option by which financial institutions without the technical ability to process the data exchange, or without the ability to employ a third-party data processor to process the data exchange, may forward to the Franchise Tax Board a list of all accountholders and their social security numbers, so that the Franchise Tax Board shall match that list with the file or files of past-due support obligors compiled in accordance with subdivision (c).

(b) The Financial Institution Match System shall not be subject to any limitation set forth in the following statutes:

(1) The California Right to Financial Privacy Act, Chapter 20 (commencing with Section 7460) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code. However, any use

(2) The California Financial Information Privacy Act, Division 1.2 (commencing with Section 4050) of the Financial Code.

Use of the information provided pursuant to this section for any purpose other than the enforcement and collection of a child support delinquency, as set forth in Section 19271, shall be a violation of Section 19542.

(c) (1) Each county shall compile a file of support obligors with judgments and orders that are being enforced by local child support agencies pursuant to Section 17400 of the Family Code, and who are past due in the payment of their support obligations. The file shall be compiled, updated, and
forwarded to the Franchise Tax Board, in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Child Support Services and the Franchise Tax Board.

(2) The Department of Child Support Services, shall compile a file of obligors with support arrearages from requests made by other states for administrative enforcement in interstate cases, in accordance with federal requirements (42 U.S.C. Sec. 666(a)(14)). This file shall be compiled and forwarded to the Franchise Tax Board in accordance with the guidelines prescribed by the Department of Child Support Services and the Franchise Tax Board. The file shall include, to the extent possible, the obligor’s address.

(d) To effectuate the Financial Institution Match System, financial institutions subject to this section shall do all of the following:

(1) Provide to the Franchise Tax Board on a quarterly basis the name, record address and other addresses, social security number or other taxpayer identification number, and other identifying information for each noncustodial parent who maintains an account at the institution and who owes past-due support, as identified by the Franchise Tax Board by name and social security number or other taxpayer identification number.

(2) Except as provided in subdivision (j), in response to a notice or order to withhold issued by the Franchise Tax Board, withhold from any accounts of the obligor the amount of any past-due support stated on the notice or order and transmit the amount to the Franchise Tax Board in accordance with Section 18670 or 18670.5.

(e) Unless otherwise required by applicable law, a financial institution furnishing a report or providing information to the Franchise Tax Board pursuant to this section shall not disclose to a depositor or an accountholder, or a codepositor or coaccountholder, that the name, address, social security number, or other identifying information for each noncustodial parent who maintains an account at the institution and who owes past-due support, as identified by the Franchise Tax Board by name and social security number or other taxpayer identification number.
number, or other taxpayer identification number or other identifying information of that person has been received from or furnished to the Franchise Tax Board.

(f) A financial institution shall incur no obligation or liability to any person arising from any of the following:

(1) Furnishing information to the Franchise Tax Board as required by this section.

(2) Failing to disclose to a depositor or accountholder that the name, address, social security number, or other taxpayer identification number or other identifying information of that person was included in the data exchange with the Franchise Tax Board required by this section.

(3) Withholding or transmitting any assets in response to a notice or order to withhold issued by the Franchise Tax Board as a result of the data exchange. This paragraph shall not preclude any liability that may result if the financial institution does not comply with subdivision (b) of Section 18674.

(4) Any other action taken in good faith to comply with the requirements of this section.

(g) Information required to be submitted to the Franchise Tax Board pursuant to this section shall only be used by the Franchise Tax Board to collect past-due support pursuant to Section 19271. If the Franchise Tax Board has issued an earnings withholding order and the condition described in subparagraph (C) of paragraph (1) of subdivision (i) exists with respect to the obligor, the Franchise Tax Board shall not use the information it receives under this section to collect the past-due support from that obligor.

(1) With respect to files compiled under paragraph (1) of subdivision (c), the Franchise Tax Board shall forward to the counties, in accordance with guidelines prescribed by the Department of Child Support Services and the Franchise Tax Board, information obtained from the financial institutions
pursuant to this section. No county shall use this information for directly levying on any account. Each county shall keep the information confidential as provided by Section 17212 of the Family Code.

(2) With respect to files compiled under paragraph (2) of subdivision (c), the amount collected by the Franchise Tax Board shall be deposited and distributed to the referring state in accordance with Section 19272.

(h) For those noncustodial parents owing past-due support for which there is a match under paragraph (1) of subdivision (d), the amount past due as indicated on the file or files compiled pursuant to subdivision (c) at the time of the match shall be a delinquency under this article for the purposes of the Franchise Tax Board taking any collection action pursuant to Section 18670 or 18670.5.

(i) A child support delinquency need not be referred to the Franchise Tax Board for collection if a jurisdiction outside this state is enforcing the support order.

(j) (1) Each county shall notify the Franchise Tax Board upon the occurrence of the circumstances described in the following subparagraphs with respect to an obligor of past-due support:

(A) A court has ordered an obligor to make scheduled payments on a child support arrearages obligation and the obligor is in compliance with that order.

(B) An earnings assignment order or an order/notice to withhold income that includes an amount for past-due support has been served on the obligated parent’s employer and earnings are being withheld pursuant to the earnings assignment order or an order/notice to withhold income.

(C) At least 50 percent of the obligated parent’s earnings are being withheld for support.

(2) Notwithstanding Section 704.070 of the Code of Civil Procedure, if any of the conditions set forth in paragraph (1)
exist, the assets of an obligor held by a financial institution are subject to levy as provided by paragraph (2) of subdivision (d). However, the first three thousand five hundred dollars ($3,500) of an obligor’s assets are exempt from collection under this subdivision without the obligor having to file a claim of exemption.

(3) An obligor may apply for a claim of exemption pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 703.510) of Chapter 4 of Division 2 of Title 9 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure for an amount that is less than or equal to the total amount levied. The sole basis for a claim of exemption under this subdivision shall be the financial hardship for the obligor and the obligor’s dependents.

(4) For the purposes of a claim of exemption made pursuant to paragraph (3), Section 688.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply.

(5) For claims of exemption made pursuant to paragraph (3), the local child support agency responsible for enforcement of the obligor’s child support order shall be the levying officer for the purpose of compliance with the provisions set forth in Article 2 (commencing with Section 703.510) of Chapter 4 of Division 2 of Title 9 of Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure except for the release of property required by subdivision (e) of Section 703.580 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(6) The local child support agency shall notify the Franchise Tax Board within two business days of the receipt of a claim of exemption from an obligor. The Franchise Tax Board shall direct the financial institution subject to the order to withhold to hold any funds subject to the order pending notification by the Franchise Tax Board to remit or release the amounts held.

(7) The superior court in the county in which the local child support agency enforcing the support obligation is located shall have jurisdiction to determine the amount of exemption.
to be allowed. The court shall consider the needs of the obligor, the obligee, and all persons the obligor is required to support, and all other relevant circumstances in determining whether to allow any exemption pursuant to this subdivision. The court shall give effect to its determination by an order specifying the extent to which the amount levied is exempt.

(8) Within two business days of receipt of an endorsed copy of a court order issued pursuant to subdivision (e) of Section 703.580 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the local child support agency shall provide the Franchise Tax Board with a copy of the order. The Franchise Tax Board shall instruct the financial institution to remit or release the obligor’s funds in accordance with the court’s order.

(k) For purposes of this section:

(1) “Account” means any demand deposit account, share or share draft account, checking or negotiable withdrawal order account, savings account, time deposit account, or a money market mutual fund account, whether or not the account bears interest.

(2) “Financial institution” has the same meaning as defined in Section 669A(d)(1) of Title 42 of the United States Code.

(3) “Past-due support” means any child support obligation that is unpaid on the due date for payment.

(l) Out of any money received from the federal government for the purpose of reimbursing financial institutions for their actual and reasonable costs incurred in complying with this section, the state shall reimburse those institutions. To the extent that money is not provided by the federal government for that purpose, the state shall not reimburse financial institutions for their costs in complying with this section.

Comment. Section 19271.6(b) is amended to make clear that its operation is not affected by enactment of the California Financial Information Privacy Act. See also Fin. Code § 4056(b)(7) (financial institution may release nonpublic personal information to comply with state law).
Uncodified (added). Continuing study and recommendations

SEC. ____. (a) The California Law Revision Commission shall study the law governing sharing and disclosure of a consumer’s nonpublic personal information by a financial institution and shall from time to time make recommendations to the Governor and the Legislature for any revisions of California law necessary for any of the following purposes:

(1) The proper implementation and operation of the California Financial Information Privacy Act, Division 1.2 (commencing with Section 4050) of the Financial Code.

(2) To adjust California statutes to the extent necessary to recognize any federal preemption, and any further revisions necessary to balance the rights and interests of interested persons adversely affected by federal preemption.

(3) To coordinate California statutes with each other.

(b) The commission shall commence the study authorized by this section on or after January 1, 2007, or such other time that litigation over the extent of federal preemption has been adequately resolved.

(c) This section applies to the extent the commission has funding and staffing adequate to accomplish the purposes of the section without unduly impairing other projects of the commission.