

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION

TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION

relating to

Condemnation Law and Procedure

The Eminent Domain Law

January 1974

CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION
School of Law
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

THE CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION

COMMISSION MEMBERS

JOHN D. MILLER
Chairman

NOBLE K. GREGORY
Member

MARC SANDSTROM
Vice Chairman

JOHN N. McLAURIN
Member

ROBERT S. STEVENS
Member of the Senate

THOMAS E. STANTON, JR.
Member

ALISTER MCALISTER
Member of the Assembly

HOWARD R. WILLIAMS
Member

JOHN J. BALLUFF
Member

GEORGE H. MURPHY
Ex Officio

COMMISSION STAFF

Legal

JOHN H. DEMOULLY
Executive Secretary

NATHANIEL STERLING
Staff Counsel

JACK I. HORTON
Assistant Executive Secretary

STAN G. ULRICH
Legal Counsel

Administrative-Secretarial

ANNE JOHNSTON
Administrative Assistant

VIOLET S. HARJU
Secretary

KRISTINE A. POWERS
Secretary

NOTE

This pamphlet begins on page 1. The Commission's annual reports and its recommendations and studies are published in separate pamphlets which are later bound in permanent volumes. The page numbers in each pamphlet are the same as in the volume in which the pamphlet is bound. The purpose of this numbering system is to facilitate consecutive pagination of the bound volumes. This pamphlet will appear in Volume 12 of the Commission's *Reports, Recommendations, and Studies*.

This recommendation includes an explanatory Comment to each section of the recommended legislation. The Comments are written as if the legislation were enacted since their primary purpose is to explain the law as it would exist (if enacted) to those who will have occasion to use it after it is in effect.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION

TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION

relating to

Condemnation Law and Procedure

The Eminent Domain Law

January 1974

CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION
School of Law
Stanford University
Stanford, California 94305

CONTENTS

	<i>Page</i>
Letter of Transmittal	5
Acknowledgments	7
Preface	15
Summary of Report	17
Tentative Recommendation	23
(A detailed outline of the tentative recommendation begins on page 23)	
Proposed Legislation	69
(A detailed outline of the proposed legislation begins on page 69)	
Appendix—Disposition of Existing General Condemnation Statute	371
Table of Sections Affected	479

CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION

SCHOOL OF LAW—STANFORD UNIVERSITY

STANFORD, CALIFORNIA 94305

(415) 321-2300, EXT. 2479

JOHN D. MILLER

Chairman

MARC SANDSTROM

Vice Chairman

SENATOR ROBERT S. STEVENS

ASSEMBLYMAN ALISTER MCALISTER

JOHN J. BALLUFF

NOBLE K. GREGORY

JOHN N. MCLAURIN

THOMAS E. STANTON, JR.

HOWARD R. WILLIAMS

GEORGE H. MURPHY

Ex Officio

November 30, 1973

To: THE HONORABLE RONALD REAGAN
Governor of California and
THE LEGISLATURE OF CALIFORNIA

The California Law Revision Commission was directed by Resolution Chapter 42 of the Statutes of 1956 to make a study to determine whether condemnation law and procedure should be revised "to safeguard the property rights of private citizens." Subsequently this direction was broadened by Resolution Chapter 130 of the Statutes of 1965 to direct a revision of condemnation law and procedure in the form of a comprehensive statute "that will safeguard the rights of all parties to such proceedings."

Pursuant to these directions, the Commission has previously submitted recommendations concerning the following eminent domain problems, selected because they were in need of immediate attention:

Recommendation	Action by Legislature
<i>Evidence in Eminent Domain Proceedings</i> , 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at A-1 (1961)	Not enacted. But see EVID. CODE § 810 <i>et seq.</i> enacting substance of recommendation.
<i>Taking Possession and Passage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings</i> , 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at B-1 (1961)	Enacted. Cal. Stats. 1961, Chs. 1612, 1613
<i>Reimbursement for Moving Expenses When Property Is Acquired for Public Use</i> , 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at C-1 (1961)	Not enacted. But see GOVT. CODE § 7260 <i>et seq.</i> enacting substance of recommendation.
<i>Discovery in Eminent Domain Proceedings</i> , 4 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 701 (1963); 8 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 19 (1967)	Enacted. Cal Stats. 1967, Ch. 1104

<i>Recovery of Condemnee's Expenses on Abandonment of an Eminent Domain Proceeding</i> , 8 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1361 (1967)	Enacted. Cal. Stats. 1968, Ch. 133
<i>Arbitration of Just Compensation</i> , 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 123 (1969)	Enacted. Cal. Stats. 1970, Ch. 417
<i>Revisions of Governmental Liability Act</i> , 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 801 (1969) (entry on property for survey and tests)	Enacted in part: Cal. Stats. 1970, Chs. 662 (entry on property for survey and tests), 1099

Since 1965, the Commission has also been engaged in preparing a comprehensive revision of condemnation law and procedure and herewith submits a preliminary report containing its tentative recommendation for a comprehensive Eminent Domain Law. This report is one of four related reports. The other three are:

Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Improvement Acts (January 1974), to be reprinted in 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1001 (1974)

Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Condemnation Authority of State Agencies (January 1974), to be reprinted in 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1051 (1974)

Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Special District Statutes (January 1974), to be reprinted in 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1101 (1974)

This report is submitted at this time so that interested persons will have an opportunity to study the tentative recommendation and to send comments to the Commission. The comments will be considered by the Commission in formulating its final recommendation which the Commission plans to submit to the 1975 Legislature. Communications concerning the tentative recommendation should be addressed to the California Law Revision Commission, School of Law, Stanford, California 94305.

In formulating its tentative recommendation, the Commission has been aided in its task by consultants retained to provide expert assistance and by a special committee of the State Bar appointed primarily to assist the Commission. In addition, the Commission has had the assistance of numerous persons throughout the state who attended Commission meetings, commented on various aspects of the study, and responded to inquiries or questionnaires, thereby providing the Commission with a wealth of empirical data and contributing materially to the quality of the product. The Commission's indebtedness to these persons is recorded in the list of acknowledgments that follows.

Respectfully submitted,
JOHN D. MILLER
Chairman

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Former Commissioners

A number of former members of the Law Revision Commission participated at the early stages in the formulation of this recommendation: Roger Arnebergh, F. James Bear, Hon. James A. Cobey, James R. Edwards, G. Bruce Gourley, Richard H. Keatinge, John R. McDonough, Hon. Carlos J. Moorhead, Sho Sato, Herman F. Selvin, Hon. Joseph T. Sneed, Hon. Alfred H. Song, Lewis K. Uhler, Richard H. Wolford, and Hon. William A. Yale. While the contribution of these former members is acknowledged, the present members of the Commission necessarily must assume the sole responsibility for the content of this tentative recommendation.

Expert Consultants

The Commission retained a number of expert consultants who provided background research reports or expert advice that was useful in formulating this tentative recommendation: Professor Douglas Ayer, Stanford; Thomas M. Dankert, Ventura attorney; Fadem and Kanner, Los Angeles law firm; Hill, Farrer & Burrill, Los Angeles law firm; Maurice A. Garbell, Maurice A. Garbell, Inc., San Francisco; Norman E. Matteoni, Deputy Counsel, Santa Clara County; Hon. Paul E. Overton, San Diego; Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, University of Utah. The Commission is especially indebted to Gideon Kanner, of Fadem and Kanner, who regularly attended Commission meetings and was of great assistance to the Commission. Useful background research reports also were prepared by Clarence B. Taylor, a former member of the Commission's staff.

The Commission is also grateful to representatives of public agencies who attended the meetings of the Commission and provided factual information and expert assistance. Particularly helpful were: Robert F. Carlson, Department of Transportation; Norval Fairman, Department of Transportation; Lloyd Hinkleman, Office of Attorney General; James Markle, Department of Water Resources; John M. Morrison, Office of Attorney General; Kenneth G. Nellis, Department of Transportation; Anthony J. Ruffolo, Department of Transportation; Willard A. Shank, Office of Attorney General; Terry C. Smith, County of Los Angeles; Charles E. Spencer, Department of Transportation; Gerald J. Thompson, County of Santa Clara.

State Bar Committee on Governmental Liability and Condemnation

The State Bar Committee on Governmental Liability and Condemnation was established in 1962. (Prior to June 1968, this committee was known as the Committee on Condemnation Law and Procedure.) Since 1965, a primary task of this committee has been to review and comment on preliminary drafts of this and related recommendations. The committee has also reviewed recommendations submitted by the Commission to the 1967, 1968, and 1970 sessions of the Legislature. The present members and those former members who served at any time between 1965-1973 are listed below.

Present Members

Thomas M. Dankert, <i>Chairman</i> Ventura	James E. Jefferis, <i>Vice Chairman</i> Oakland
Jerrold A. Fadem, <i>Secretary</i> Beverly Hills	Robert F. Carlson, <i>Adviser</i> Sacramento
Henry H. Kilpatrick, <i>Liaison</i> Vallejo	
Thomas G. Baggot, Jr. Los Angeles	Roscoe D. Keagy San Diego
Robert C. Carlson Los Angeles	Joseph A. Montoya Los Angeles
Peter W. Davis Oakland	Carl K. Newton Los Angeles
Maury Engel Hayward	Gary Rinehart Oakland
John P. Horgan San Francisco	Roger M. Sullivan Los Angeles
Richard L. Huxtable Los Angeles	Oliver W. Wanger Fresno
Jess S. Jackson, Jr. Burlingame	

Former Members

Richard A. Clarke San Francisco	William L. Gordon Santa Barbara
George De Lew San Francisco	Stephen W. Hackett Napa
Richard A. DelGuercio Los Angeles	George C. Hadley Los Angeles
Hodge L. Dolle Los Angeles	William T. Ivey, Jr. Merced
Donald J. Drew Los Angeles	Holloway Jones Saratoga
John L. Endicott Los Angeles	Lawrence W. Jordan, Jr. San Francisco
Richard L. Franck Los Angeles	Justin M. McCarthy Riverside

Homer L. McCormick, Jr. Santa Ana	William J. Schall San Diego
John N. McLaurin Los Angeles	Willard A. Shank Sacramento
Robert E. Nisbet Oakland	Terry C. Smith Los Angeles
Paul E. Overton San Diego	John H. Tallett San Francisco
R. B. Pegram Los Angeles	C. W. Thissell San Francisco
Enos C. Reid Riverside	Grace M. Wallis Oakland
John B. Reiley Oakland	Norman S. Wolff San Francisco
Ned Robinson Oakland	

Individuals

During the period since 1965, numerous other persons also have aided the Commission in its task by providing information and advice at Commission meetings, responding to questionnaires or inquiries, or providing the Commission with information or with critical evaluations of all or a portion of its tentative proposals. These persons are listed below; the Commission regrets any inadvertent errors or omissions that may have been made in the compilation of this list.

William W. Abelmann Glendale	Seward L. Andrews Sacramento
James T. Adair Fresno	William Y. Armstrong American Society of Appraisers
Thomas B. Adams San Mateo	Troy G. Arnold, Jr. Richmond, Va.
David M. Ager Los Angeles	F. W. Audrain Los Angeles
Robert Alcock Washington, D.C.	Philip D. Assaf San Mateo
Robert C. Alexander Sacramento	Rodney R. Atchison Santa Cruz
C. Douglas Alford San Diego	Michael Atherton Mt. View
Mark C. Allen, Jr. Los Angeles	Maurice Attie Los Angeles
Richard Allen Sacramento	Willis W. Babb San Francisco
W. D. Allison Santa Barbara	Henry A. Babcock Los Angeles
C. William Altman Santa Barbara	W. Bruin Barr Los Angeles
S. Robert Ambrose Los Angeles	Hon. Richard Barry Los Angeles
Virgil P. Anderson San Francisco	Robert I. Behar Los Angeles

Richard Bein San Diego	Donald L. Clark San Diego
Donald L. Benton Ventura	Ralph F. Clark San Francisco
Michael M. Berger Los Angeles	Robert D. Charlebois San Francisco
R. C. Bergman Attorney General's Office	Thomas H. Clayton Sacramento
Manfred Beschel Nurnberg, Germany	S. C. Cackayne Salt Lake City, Utah
Jesse M. Bethel Sacramento	Jerome Cohen San Francisco
Richard M. Betts Berkeley	Rex A. Collings, Jr. Berkeley
D. Bianco Bakersfield	Edward J. Connor, Jr. Sacramento
Robert Bidlingmaier Los Angeles	James E. Cox Martinez
V. F. Biondo, Jr. Escondido	Joseph R. Crotti Sacramento
Dwight E. Bishop Van Nuys	Homer D. Crotty Los Angeles
William Bitting Los Angeles	Harold W. Culver San Diego
Robert V. Blade Orville	G. J. Cummings Oakland
Robert K. Booth, Jr. Palo Alto	Robert Owen Curran San Diego
Davis Brabant Huntington Park	Larry A. Curtis Los Angeles
LeRoy A. Broun Fremont	Paul F. Dauer Santa Barbara
Virgil J. Butler Los Angeles	Henry F. Davis San Francisco
Donald K. Byrne Los Angeles	William L. Day Springfield, Ill.
E. J. Caldecott Los Angeles	John Deacon Los Angeles
William Camil Santa Fe Springs	Richard D. DeLuce Los Angeles
Robert E. Capron San Francisco	Richard F. Desmond Sacramento
C. A. Carlson Ventura	C. E. Dixon Sacramento
T. C. Carlstrom Palo Alto	Stacy H. Dobrzensky Oakland
Laurence W. Carr Redding	Kenneth W. Downey Los Angeles
Grant Cattaneo San Francisco	William Fastag Claremont
T. L. Chamberlain Auburn	Donald Fillman Sacramento
Stephen M. Chandler San Leandro	Paul Fitting Los Angeles

John D. Flitner Santa Rosa	John K. Hass Santa Barbara
James G. Ford Red Bluff	L. Nelson Hayhurst Fresno
Joseph A. Forest San Rafael	Hon. Herbert S. Herlands Santa Ana
Albert J. Forn Los Angeles	Eugene Hill Sacramento
Howard Foulds Downieville	George I. Hoffman San Francisco
Havelock Fraser Los Angeles	William G. Holliman Sacramento
John P. Fraser Sacramento	Sherman E. Hollingsworth San Diego
Eugene L. Freeland San Diego	Ben W. Hornlin Walnut Creek
Maxwell M. Freeman Stockton	Joseph K. Horton Los Angeles
Glen E. Fuller Salt Lake City, Utah	Martin Huff Sacramento
Stanley J. Gale Sacramento	Edward W. Huneke Olympia, Wash.
William C. George San Diego	David Ingram Menlo Park
George A. Ghiselli San Francisco	Robert W. Jackson American Society of Appraisers
Tom P. Gilfoy Rosemead	Richard F. Jacobsen San Diego
Dugald Gillies Sacramento	Russell B. Jarvis Pasadena
Milnor E. Gleaves Los Angeles	H. Gary Jeffries Pasadena
E. A. Goggin Oakland	Philip M. Jolley Oakland
Melvin R. Goldman San Francisco	William R. Johnson San Francisco
Stanley Z. Goodfarb	Ernest I. Johnston Inglewood
Phoenix, Arizona	Orlo D. Jones San Francisco
Vernon L. Goodin San Francisco	George P. Kading Santa Barbara
Alvin G. Greenwald Los Angeles	David S. Kaplan Sacramento
Allen Grimes Beverly Hills	Hon. Otto M. Kaus Los Angeles
D. Reginald Gustaveson Fullerton	P. Dennis Keenan Los Angeles
Herbert Hafif Claremont	Haig Kehiayan Los Angeles
Donald G. Hagman Los Angeles	William H. Keiser Mt. View
William H. Hair Oxnard	Harold W. Kennedy Los Angeles
Gerald B. Hansen San Jose	

Henry H. Kilpatrick Vallejo	Robert P. McNamee San Jose
Richard J. Kohlman San Jose	E. E. McTaggert Sacramento
Chris Krapp Oakland	Daniel R. Mandelker St. Louis, Mo.
Peter Kruchman Los Angeles	C. R. Martin San Marino
Ralph C. Kuchler Oakland	Richard D. Martland Sacramento
R. G. Lamb Pomona	Edwin P. Martin Santa Ana
Edward L. Lascher Ventura	Robert Martin Sacramento
Hugh G. Lawrence San Rafael	John M. Merget Los Angeles
Philip R. Lawrence San Francisco	Carlyle Miller Aptos
Paul M. Levesque San Francisco	Elmer M. Million Norman, Okla.
David R. Levin Washington, D. C.	Clifton A. Moore Los Angeles
Neville R. Lewis San Fernando	Robert A. Munroe Sacramento
Richard N. Light Sacramento	Wallace S. Myers San Rafael
James E. Linneman Merced	S. Stephen Nakashima San Jose
David Livingston San Francisco	Gerald I. Neiter Los Angeles
Bert J. Lockwood Los Angeles	Gary R. Netzer Los Angeles
Ralph Long San Jose	Robert Nibley Los Angeles
George C. Lucia Oakland	John E. Nolan Oakland
James E. Ludlam Los Angeles	Maurice O'Connor Pomona
Oswald C. Ludwig San Diego	Charles E. Ogle Morro Bay
John J. Lynch Hawthorne	John Ormasa Los Angeles
Robert C. Lynch Los Angeles	Edwin M. Osborne Ventura
William J. McCormack Trenton, N. J.	Donald M. Pach Sacramento
J. J. McCue Alhambra	Mary Moran Pajalich San Francisco
James P. McGowan San Diego	Samuel C. Palmer, III Los Angeles
William H. McInerney Oakland	Keiffer E. Parker Sacramento
T. W. McKinsey Long Beach	James M. Parmelee Redwood City

A. C. Paulden Bakersfield	Julius H. Selinger San Rafael
J. H. Petry San Bernardino	R. H. Sharpe Sacramento
Hon. Jerry L. Pettis Loma Linda	John P. Sheehan Sacramento
Atherton Phleger San Francisco	Milton N. Sherman Los Angeles
Seymour S. Pizer Santa Ana	James M. Shumway Fairfield
Jeffrey D. Polisner Richmond	Philip G. Simpson Sacramento
David L. Price — ? Sacramento	M. N. Singer Riverside
William C. Price Long Beach	Sanford M. Skaggs San Francisco
Kermit K. Purcell San Jose	Edward B. Smith, III Los Angeles
Edward H. Rabin Davis	Jim Smith San Diego
Earl A. Radford Los Angeles	Robert Smith San Diego
Joseph W. Rainville Glendale	Jon D. Smock San Francisco
Richard G. Randolph San Mateo	Eldon V. Soper Burbank
Robert D. Raven San Francisco	Royal M. Sorenson Los Angeles
S. E. Remelmeyer Torrance	John M. Stanton Bakersfield
Michael Remy Sacramento	G. W. Stenquist Los Angeles
Richard L. Riemer Santa Ana	Tom Stevens Los Angeles
Norman L. Roberts Los Angeles	Thomas W. Stoever Los Angeles
Edward H. Robinson, Jr. San Bernardino	Timothy L. Strader Santa Ana
Richard P. Roe Los Angeles	Eugene K. Sturgis Oakland
John D. Rogers San Francisco	J. Dennis Sullivan San Francisco
J. Kerwin Rooney Oakland	Ray T. Sullivan, Jr. Riverside
Denis G. Rose Sacramento	Robert S. Teaze San Diego
Richard D. Rypinski San Diego	Vincent N. Tedesco San Jose
Louis F. Saylor Berkeley	William E. Thomas Los Angeles
David E. Schricker Redwood City	Wallace W. Thompson Sacramento
Philip M. Schwabacher Lancaster	Wendell R. Thompson Pasadena

John Thorne San Jose	William M. Whelan Sacramento
Hon. Saul Tischler Trenton, N. J.	Rex M. Whitton Washington, D. C.
P. A. Towner Sacramento	Hon. James G. Whyte Los Angeles
Clemons C. Turner Long Beach	Charles J. Williams Martinez
Norman Tuttle, II Oakland	Robert H. Williams San Francisco
John A. Van Ryn Santa Maria	Robert J. Williams San Jose
James Vizzard Bakersfield	J. A. Withers Santa Ana
Robert F. Waldron Santa Ana	John W. Witt San Diego
David B. Walker San Diego	William E. Woodard Los Angeles
Russell W. Walker San Diego	Harold H. Woodward Sacramento
Paul D. Ward San Francisco	Henry K. Workman Los Angeles
Reginald Watt Chico	Thomas C. Yager Los Angeles
Robert S. Webber San Bruno	David M. Yorton Sacramento
Melbourne B. Weddle Santa Barbara	Nicholas C. Yost Los Angeles
James H. Wernecke Sacramento	Mr. Justice Zelling Adelaide, South Australia
Daniel J. Weston Sacramento	

PREFACE

The Eminent Domain Reports

This report is one of a series published concurrently by the California Law Revision Commission relating to condemnation law and procedure. It contains the comprehensive Eminent Domain Law tentatively recommended by the Commission to replace the existing eminent domain title of the Code of Civil Procedure. The text of the existing eminent domain title is set out in the Appendix to this report; the disposition of each section in the Appendix is noted in the Comment following that section. This report also contains additions, amendments, and repeals of sections of other statutes that will be required upon enactment of the Eminent Domain Law.

Separately published reports in this series indicate the needed revisions in the statutes relating to acquisition of property for state purposes and statutes relating to special districts. See *Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Condemnation Authority of State Agencies*, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1051 (1974) and *Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Special District Statutes*, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1101 (1974). These tentative recommendations are dependent upon enactment of the Eminent Domain Law. Also separately published is a recommendation proposing to eliminate special condemnation provisions from the statutes relating to special assessments for improvements. See *Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Improvement Acts*, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1001 (1974). The latter recommendation (which will be submitted to the 1974 Legislature) is not dependent upon enactment of the Eminent Domain Law.

The reports described above are part of a series that must be viewed as a whole. The statutes and the Comments to them are drafted as if the entire series were enacted. Thus, when reference is made to a statute by another statute or a Comment, the reference is to the statute as it would be if the entire series were enacted. So that one can determine whether a particular statute to which reference is made is affected by any of the reports in the series, this report contains a table of sections affected by the whole series. It is important to refer to this table because in some cases a statute referred to in one report may

be affected by a statute contained in another report in the series.

SUMMARY OF REPORT

This tentative recommendation proposes the enactment of a new comprehensive statute governing condemnation law and procedure—the Eminent Domain Law. Although some important changes in existing law are proposed, the Eminent Domain Law is basically a reorganization and restatement of existing California law with numerous minor changes of a technical or corrective nature. A major purpose of the proposed statute is to supply a complete, well organized compilation of the law that will replace the duplicative, inconsistent, and special provisions of existing law relating to condemnation.

The proposed Eminent Domain Law is composed of 12 chapters that follow generally the sequence of events in an eminent domain proceeding. The basic content of the statute and the more important changes in the law it embodies are summarized below.

Scope of Statute

All eminent domain proceedings will be conducted under the Eminent Domain Law; numerous special provisions will be eliminated from codified and uncodified statutes. However, the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission is unaffected, and the provisions relating to arbitration of compensation are reenacted without change.

Delegation of Condemnation Authority

The rule that only persons authorized by statute may condemn property is continued. The detailed listing of specific public uses is eliminated from the eminent domain statute, but the right of public entities and public utilities to condemn property for those uses is continued. The right of cities, counties, and school districts to condemn property for their purposes is made clear, and cities and counties are authorized to condemn property to preserve open space (with limitations to prevent abuse). The right of private persons to condemn property is abolished, but the right of nonprofit hospitals to condemn is broadened (with limitations to prevent abuse), and the right of nonprofit educational institutions of collegiate grade, certain nonprofit housing corporations, and mutual water companies is continued and clarified.

The new statute makes clear that, unless otherwise limited by statute, a delegation of condemnation authority carries with it the right to acquire the fee or any lesser right or interest in

property of any type and the right to take any property necessary for the protection and efficient use of the project. It also makes clear that a local public entity may condemn property only within its boundaries unless extraterritorial condemnation is expressly or impliedly authorized by statute. The existing provisions relating to preliminary surveys and tests by the condemnor to determine the suitability of property for public use are continued in the new statute, but the award of attorney's fees in an action to recover damages resulting from the entry—mandatory under existing law—is permitted only where such an award is in the interests of justice.

Public Use and Necessity

The Eminent Domain Law reiterates the constitutional public use requirement and the statutory public necessity requirement but makes changes in several important aspects of public use and necessity.

The new statute requires that every public entity adopt a resolution of necessity as a prerequisite to condemnation. Generally, a majority vote of all the members of the governing body is required to adopt the resolution. The resolution will be conclusive on matters of public necessity for acquisitions within the boundaries of the public entity. Superseded by these general provisions will be numerous provisions of existing law that provide a variety of different rules governing the necessity for, adoption of, and effect of, the resolution of necessity.

Acquisition of property by a condemnor for use in the future is permitted if the property will be used within a reasonable period. If the use will be within seven years, it is deemed reasonable; if the use will not be within seven years, the burden of proof is on the condemnor to show that the actual period is reasonable.

The authority of a public entity to condemn a remnant left by a partial taking is continued, provided the remnant is of little market value. If the property owner contests the taking, the public entity must establish that the remnant meets this criterion. Taking the remnant is not permitted if the contesting property owner establishes that the condemnor can provide a reasonable, practicable, and economically sound "physical solution" to the problem.

The statutory hierarchy of more necessary public uses is retained for the condemnation of property already appropriated to public use. The Eminent Domain Law, however, precludes a more necessary public use from

displacing a less necessary public use upon objection of the less necessary user if joint use is possible. Likewise, it permits a less necessary user to condemn for joint use with a more necessary use if the uses will be compatible.

The authority of public entities to condemn property to exchange for property needed for public use is continued and clarified.

Commencement of Proceeding

The principle that eminent domain proceedings should be governed by the same general rules as civil actions is continued, but the general rules are supplemented with special rules that are required by the unique nature of an eminent domain proceeding. Existing special rules relating to jurisdiction and venue, service, recordation of a lis pendens, parties, and joinder are retained with minor modifications. The pleadings will be simplified by eliminating the requirements that the complaint indicate whether the part taken is part of a larger parcel and that the answer set forth the amount claimed as compensation.

Possession Prior to Judgment

Major changes are proposed in the procedure by which a condemnor may obtain possession of property following commencement of an eminent domain proceeding but prior to entry of judgment. The Eminent Domain Law authorizes all condemners to obtain possession prior to judgment; however, it imposes procedural safeguards by giving the property owner the right to obtain a copy of the deposit appraisal, to have an inadequate deposit increased, to receive 90 days' notice prior to dispossession, and to obtain a stay of possession in case of hardship. In addition, homeowners and owners of rental property may require the condemnor to make a prejudgment deposit, with appropriate sanctions for failure to do so.

Discovery

The existing provisions for exchange of valuation data are reenacted with modifications designed to permit follow-up discovery. The time for a demand to be made is advanced, the provision for a cross-demand is eliminated, and the exchange date made 40 days prior to trial. Subsequent discovery without requirement of court order is permitted to within 20 days before trial.

Procedures for Determining Right to Take and Compensation

The eminent domain trial preference is retained and early disposition of right to take issues encouraged. The order of proof and argument is unchanged, but neither party is assigned the burden of proof on the issue of compensation.

Compensation

The basic California compensation scheme (awarding the value of the part taken plus the difference, if any, between damages and benefits to the remainder) is continued. However, the Eminent Domain Law incorporates important changes in several aspects of the computations.

Permission for the plaintiff to establish a fixed valuation date regardless of subsequent occurrences by making a deposit is superimposed on the existing date of valuation scheme. Where a new trial is held, absent a deposit by the plaintiff, the date of valuation will be the date of the new trial rather than the date used in the previous trial. Where there have been fluctuations in the market value of the property prior to the date of valuation that were caused by the imminence of the project, the Eminent Domain Law makes clear that the property is to be valued as if the project for which it is taken had not been planned.

Provision is made for compensation for the goodwill of a business taken or damaged. Also, the rule that manufacturing or industrial equipment is part of the realty for purposes of compensation is broadened to cover any business equipment which cannot be removed without a substantial loss in value.

In partial taking cases, the rule of *People v. Symons* (that the damage-causing portion of the project must be located on the part taken in order to be compensable) is abrogated. The statute provides that damage caused by a project to a remainder is compensable regardless of the location of the damage-causing portion of the project; the equivalent rule as to offsetting benefits is also codified.

Divided Interests

The Eminent Domain Law continues the procedure permitting the plaintiff in an eminent domain proceeding to elect to have compensation determined in a lump sum against all defendants with a second-stage apportionment among the defendants. However, significant changes are made in the substantive rules for compensating particular interests. Where there is a partial taking of property subject to a lease, provision

is made for the pro rata reduction of rent or, if the purpose of the lease is frustrated, for the termination of the lease, absent a governing provision in the lease. The right to compensation of an option holder or a person owning a contingent future interest is recognized.

Postjudgment Procedure

The various postjudgment procedures peculiar to eminent domain proceedings are retained. The provisions for payment of a judgment and for deposit pending appeal are consolidated to provide one uniform deposit procedure, thereby enabling uniform provisions for withdrawal of the award and for obtaining possession after judgment. The one-year delay in payment of a judgment afforded certain public entities is eliminated in favor of a uniform 30-day period. The provisions relating to interest on the judgment and proration of property taxes are retained unchanged. Case law relating to costs is clarified and codified; the substance of the provisions relating to abandonment and litigation expenses on abandonment and dismissal for other reasons is continued and expanded to apply to a case where the proceeding is dismissed for failure to prosecute.

TENTATIVE RECOMMENDATION

	Page
INTRODUCTION	24
THE RIGHT TO TAKE	27
Delegation of Eminent Domain Power	27
Basic Statutory Scheme	27
Persons Authorized to Exercise Power	28
State agencies	28
Special districts	29
Cities and counties	30
School districts	30
Public utilities	31
Quasi-public entities and private persons	31
Joint Exercise of Power	32
Property Subject to Condemnation	33
Property Interest That May Be Acquired	33
Property Already Appropriated to Public Use	34
Extraterritorial Condemnation	35
Public Use and Necessity	35
Public Use	35
Constitutional requirement	35
Acquisition for future use	36
Acquisition of physical and financial remnants	36
Acquisition for exchange purposes	37
Public Necessity	38
Statutory requirement	38
Resolution of necessity	38
COMPENSATION	40
Basic Compensation Scheme	40
Accrual of Right to Compensation	41
Date of Valuation	41
Deposit to Establish Date	42
Date in Case of New Trial	43
Date Based on Commencement of Proceeding	43
Enhancement and Blight	43
Divided Interests	44
Leaseholds	44
Options	45
Future Interests	45
Improvements	46
Business Equipment	46
Removal of Improvements	46
Subsequent Improvements	47
Harvesting and Marketing of Crops	48
Compensation for Injury to Remainder	48
Rule of <i>People v. Symons</i>	48
Computation of Future Damages and Benefits	49
Compensation for Loss of Goodwill	49
Work to Reduce Compensation	50
Prohibition Against Double Recovery	50
CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE	51
Pleadings	51
Contents of Pleadings	51
Verification	52
Amendment	53

	<i>Page</i>
Summons	53
Possession Prior to Judgment.....	54
Extension of Right to Obtain Early Possession	54
Improvement of Prejudgment Possession Procedure	57
Amount of deposit	57
Procedure for making deposits	57
Withdrawal of deposit	58
Cost of withdrawal bonds	59
Possession	59
Prejudgment Deposit on Demand of Property Owner	59
Procedures for Determining Right to Take.....	60
Procedures for Determining Compensation	61
Pretrial Exchange of Valuation Data.....	61
Burden of Proof of Compensation	61
Valuation Evidence	62
Limitation on Valuation Experts.....	63
Compensation of Court-Appointed Appraisers	63
Possession After Judgment	63
Deposit of Award	63
Withdrawal of Award.....	64
Possession After Judgment	65
Satisfaction of Judgment	65
Costs	66
Litigation Expenses	67
Entry for Examination.....	67
Abandonment and Dismissal	67
Rights of Former Owner in Property Taken	67

INTRODUCTION

Pursuant to a 1965 legislative directive,¹ the California Law Revision Commission presents in this report its tentative recommendation for a comprehensive Eminent Domain Law,² along with necessary conforming changes.³ The proposed comprehensive statute is the culmination of the Commission's exhaustive study of condemnation law and procedure that has

¹ The Commission was directed by Resolution Chapter 130 of the Statutes of 1965 to study condemnation law and procedure with a view to recommending a comprehensive statute that will safeguard the rights of all parties to such proceedings. This was an expansion of an earlier direction to make such a study with a view to recommending revisions "to safeguard the property rights of private citizens." See Cal. Stats. 1956, Res. Ch. 42, at 263.

² The Eminent Domain Law is intended to supply rules for eminent domain proceedings. No recommendation is made as to whether any of its provisions should also be applicable in inverse condemnation actions. This determination is at this time left to judicial development.

³ This report proposes conforming changes in general statutes relating to eminent domain. For conforming changes in statutes relating to the exercise of eminent domain by the state, see *Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Condemnation Authority of State Agencies*, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1051 (1974); for conforming changes in statutes relating to exercise of eminent domain by special districts, see *Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Special District Statutes*, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1101 (1974). Also related is *Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Improvement Acts*, 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1001 (1974).

previously resulted in the enactment of legislation on several major aspects of eminent domain law.⁴

Although Title 7 (commencing with Section 1237) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a comprehensive and systematic statement of the law of eminent domain, in fact it falls far short of that. Enacted over 100 years ago, its draftsmanship does not meet the standards of modern California statutes. There are duplicating and inconsistent provisions. There are long and complex sentences that are difficult to read and more difficult to understand. There are sections that are obsolete and inoperative. There is a total lack of statutory guidance in certain critically important areas of the law, and there are other areas that are treated in the most cursory fashion. Nor is Title 7 the exclusive statutory source of eminent domain law. There are hundreds of provisions in other statutes, both codified and uncodified, that duplicate provisions of the general eminent domain statute or that are unnecessarily or undesirably inconsistent with it.

These deficiencies call for a thorough revision and recodification of the California law of eminent domain. In formulating the comprehensive Eminent Domain Law, the Commission has looked to reform efforts in a number of other jurisdictions⁵ and has reviewed the eminent domain law of every jurisdiction in the United States.⁶ The Commission has examined the draft of the Model Eminent Domain Code⁷ and has followed the development of a Uniform Eminent Domain Code by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws.⁸ The Commission has drawn upon all these

⁴ See *CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA* xii (Cal. Cont. Ed. Bar 1973):

In dealing with trends and developments in eminent domain law, the major role played by the California Law Revision Commission for more than a decade should be considered. Commission studies and recommendations have led to many statutory changes, e.g., exchange of valuation data, evidence in condemnation cases, immediate possession, possession pending appeal, abandonment, voluntary arbitration, and governmental liability.

For a complete listing of Commission recommendations in this field and the legislative action on the recommendations, see the letter of transmittal accompanying this report.

⁵ Recent reports received by the Commission include NEW YORK STATE COMMISSION ON EMINENT DOMAIN, REPORT (1971, 1972); VIRGINIA ADVISORY LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, LAWS RELATING TO EMINENT DOMAIN (1972); IOWA EMINENT DOMAIN STUDY COMMITTEE, FINAL REPORT (1971); LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION (1971).

⁶ Among the many contemporary revisions of the law of eminent domain, the 1964 Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code is particularly noteworthy. See PENNSYLVANIA JOINT STATE GOVERNMENT COMMISSION, EMINENT DOMAIN CODE, AS AMENDED WITH COMMENTS AND NOTES (1972).

⁷ See *Draft of Model Eminent Domain Code*, 2 REAL PROPERTY, PROBATE & TRUST J. 365 (1967).

⁸ A special committee is drafting the Uniform Eminent Domain Code. The Reporter-Draftsman for the special committee is Professor Arvo Van Alstyne, University of

sources in producing a modern Eminent Domain Law within the existing California statutory framework.

The comprehensive Eminent Domain Law proposed in this report will replace the existing general eminent domain title of the Code of Civil Procedure.⁹ Its major purpose is to cover, in a comprehensive manner, all aspects of condemnation law and procedure.¹⁰ It will constitute a complete and well organized compilation of the law and will provide one uniform statute applicable to all condemnors and all condemnation proceedings.¹¹ Its enactment will permit the repeal of approximately 825 sections and the amendment of approximately 180 sections to delete unnecessary language.¹²

While the Eminent Domain Law requires that all condemnors follow its provisions, it imposes no new mandatory costs on local public agencies. A public agency is not required to exercise the power of eminent domain in pursuance of its property acquisition program; the statute provides that any agency authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a particular purpose may also acquire the property by grant, purchase, lease, gift, devise, contract, or other means. Whether property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase or other means or by eminent domain is left to the discretion of the agency authorized to acquire the property.

Utah College of Law, who has served as a consultant to the California Law Revision Commission on a number of topics. The Commission has provided Professor Van Alstyne with preliminary drafts of this tentative recommendation and plans to review the Uniform Eminent Domain Code as soon as a tentative draft has been approved by the special committee.

⁹ The Commission considered various locations for the Eminent Domain Law, including enactment of a separate code. However, due to the relatively narrow scope of the subject when considered with reference to the California codes and to the adoption of the general principle that eminent domain proceedings should be governed by the same rules as civil actions generally (see discussion under "Condemnation Procedure" *infra*), the Commission recommends that the Eminent Domain Law should simply be substituted for the present Title 7 (commencing with Section 1237) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

¹⁰ There are some areas of the law purposely left to judicial development. Moreover, the Eminent Domain Law cannot limit any provisions of the California or United States Constitutions.

It should also be noted that there are some statutes applicable to property acquisition generally and not limited to eminent domain proceedings. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 7260–7274 (relocation assistance and fair acquisition policies). Such statutes are not affected by the Eminent Domain Law and continue to remain applicable when property is acquired by eminent domain.

¹¹ The special provisions relating to valuation of public utility property by the Public Utilities Commission pursuant to California Constitution, Article XII, Section 23a and Public Utilities Code Sections 1401–1421 will not be affected.

¹² See "Table of Sections Affected" *infra*.

While the Eminent Domain Law will make a number of important changes in existing law, to a large extent it restates that law, corrects technical defects, eliminates obsolete and inconsistent provisions, and fills gaps in the law. The more important changes made by the Eminent Domain Law are discussed below. Other changes of less importance are noted in the Comments that follow the text of the proposed legislation.

THE RIGHT TO TAKE

Delegation of Eminent Domain Power

Basic Statutory Scheme

The power of eminent domain may only be exercised in aid of a recognized public use by a person authorized by statute to exercise such power.¹³ In California, the statutory delegation of the power of eminent domain appears to be exceedingly broad. Section 1001 of the Civil Code states in part: "Any person may, without further legislative action, acquire private property for any use specified in Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure" by exercise of the power of eminent domain.

When enacted in 1872, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 listed a great number of uses as "public uses," and it has been amended many times since then to list additional uses. Despite the amendments, many recognized public uses are not listed in the section, and the inclusion of a use in the listing is no guarantee that the use is in fact a public use.¹⁴ Moreover, Civil Code Section 1001, although unchanged since its enactment in 1872 and purporting to authorize the exercise of eminent domain power by "any person," has been narrowly construed by the courts when a person other than a public entity or privately owned public utility has sought to condemn property.¹⁵

To a considerable extent, the listing of uses in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 is surplusage since the Legislature has generally ignored the statutory scheme established by Civil Code Section 1001 and Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 in delegating the power of eminent domain. The Legislature has instead enacted numerous other codified and uncodified sections that authorize condemnation for particular public uses.

¹³ People v. Superior Court, 10 Cal.2d 288, 295-296, 73 P.2d 1221, 1225 (1937).

¹⁴ The question whether a particular use is a public use is always subject to judicial review. See discussion *infra* under "Public Use."

¹⁵ See discussion *infra* under "Quasi-public entities and private persons."

In fact, there are hundreds of statutes that grant the power of eminent domain to particular persons for particular purposes.

The Commission recommends that clear statements of the extent of eminent domain authority of public entities, public utilities, and others be substituted for the statutory scheme established by Civil Code Section 1001 and Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238. In addition, where a statute grants the power of eminent domain to a particular entity for a particular use, this grant should be treated as a legislative declaration that a taking by that entity for that use is a taking for a public use; it should not be necessary to add to the statute the superfluous statement that the taking is for a public use.

The adoption of this approach will eliminate the need for a separate listing of public uses in the general eminent domain law. It will eliminate the need for frequent amendments to list public uses that merely duplicate grants of eminent domain authority made by other statutes. It will eliminate the existing uncertainty concerning the extent to which private persons may exercise the power of eminent domain and will insure that the power of eminent domain will be construed to extend only to those private persons intended to have such power.

The effect of this approach is to recognize the long-standing legislative practice of delegating the power of eminent domain by specific statute despite the listing of public uses in Section 1238. Nonetheless, to assure that no public entity will be deprived of any right it now has to exercise the power of eminent domain, clear statements of condemnation authority should be enacted to cover those few cases where such authority is now based on Sections 1001 and 1238 and is not otherwise specifically provided. Likewise, clear statements of the condemnation authority of privately owned public utilities should be added to the Public Utilities Code. The extent to which other private individuals and corporations should be authorized to exercise the right of eminent domain is discussed later in this recommendation.¹⁶

Persons Authorized to Exercise Power

State agencies. In a separate publication,¹⁷ the Commission has made the following recommendations with respect to the delegation of condemnation authority to state agencies:

¹⁶ *Id.*

¹⁷ See *Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Condemnation Authority of State Agencies* (January 1974), to be reprinted in 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1051 (1974). This tentative recommendation also indicates the amendments, additions, and repeals needed to conform the state eminent domain provisions to the Eminent Domain Law.

(1) The Department of Transportation, Department of Water Resources, Regents of the University of California, and the Reclamation Board (on behalf of the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District) should continue to be authorized by statute to condemn for their purposes.

(2) Condemnation of property for all other state purposes should be a responsibility of the Public Works Board under the Property Acquisition Law.¹⁸ This recommendation will eliminate the delegation of eminent domain authority to those agencies that now have but do not now exercise such authority: the Adjutant General, Department of Aeronautics, Trustees of the California State University and Colleges, Department of Fish and Game, Department of General Services, State Lands Commission, and Department of Parks and Recreation.

Special districts. The great majority of special districts have, by virtue of their enabling statutes, general authority to condemn any property necessary to carry out any of their objects or purposes. Thus, approximately 160 different types of special districts, totaling more than 2,000 individual districts, have general condemnation authority.¹⁹ With respect to these districts, there is no need to rely on Section 1001 of the Civil Code and Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure as the source of condemnation authority, and the repeal of those sections will have no effect on the condemnation authority of these districts.

Approximately 30 different types of districts either are not authorized by their enabling statutes to exercise the power of eminent domain, or the grant of eminent domain power in their enabling statutes is not sufficiently broad to permit condemnation of property for some of the district's authorized functions. The Commission has reviewed these enabling statutes and has concluded, with two exceptions noted below, that no revision of these statutes is needed. Some of these districts have no power to acquire or hold property. Others have no corporate power. In some cases, the acquisition of necessary property for the district by eminent domain is accomplished by the county or a city. The omission of a grant in other statutes appears to be a conscious legislative decision. Accordingly, absent any experience that demonstrates a need to grant the power of eminent domain to any of these special

¹⁸ GOVT. CODE §§ 15850–15866.

¹⁹ For a listing, see CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA, Appendix A: Tables ID and IE (Cal. Cont. Ed. Bar 1973).

districts, the Commission proposes no change in their enabling statutes.

Public cemetery districts and resort improvement districts²⁰ derive their power of eminent domain from Civil Code Section 1001 and Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238. In order that the repeal of these sections will not adversely affect these types of districts, the statutes governing these districts should be revised to preserve their condemnation authority.²¹

Cities and counties. A great number of statutes authorize cities and counties to condemn property for essentially all of their activities.²² This broad condemnation authority is justified. Accordingly, for purposes of clarification, cities and counties should be specifically authorized to condemn property to carry out any of their powers or functions just as special districts are now authorized to condemn for all their functions. Specific restrictions on the power of cities and counties to condemn property for particular purposes²³ would not be affected by such authorization.

School districts. Section 1001 of the Civil Code and Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure are the primary bases for the condemnation authority of school districts. Since these sections will not be continued, a provision should be added to the Education Code to preserve the authority of school districts to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for school purposes.

²⁰ Although no new resort improvement districts can be formed after May 19, 1965 (see PUB. RES. CODE § 13003), the authority of existing districts should be preserved.

²¹ For the amendments, additions, and repeals needed to conform the special district statutes to the Eminent Domain Law, see *Tentative Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Special District Statutes* (January 1974), to be reprinted in 12 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1101 (1974).

²² For a listing, see CONDEMNATION PRACTICE IN CALIFORNIA, Appendix A: Table IC (Cal. Cont. Ed. Bar 1973). The one possible exception to this generalization is acquisition of property for open space purposes. See GOVT. CODE §§ 6950-6954. Compare Note, *Property Taxation of Agricultural and Open Space Land*, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 158 & n.1 (1970) (implying condemnation authorized) with California Legislative Counsel, Opinion No. 17885 (Eminent Domain) (Oct. 24, 1969) (concluding condemnation not authorized). The Commission recommends that the authority of cities and counties to condemn property for open space purposes be made clear with appropriate limitations to prevent any abuse of the power.

²³ E.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 37353(c) (existing golf course may not be condemned by city for golf course purposes), 50701 (local agency may not condemn for golf course, marina, or small craft harbor under revenue bond act), 54341 (local agency may not condemn publicly owned property under Revenue Bond Law of 1941 without consent of owner).

Public utilities. Section 1001 of the Civil Code and various subdivisions of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure are also the primary source of the condemnation authority of privately owned public utilities. In order that the repeal of these sections will not adversely affect the condemnation authority of public utilities, provisions should be added to the Public Utilities Code to preserve and clarify the authority of public utilities to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary to carry out their regulated activities.

Quasi-public entities and private persons. The right to exercise the power of eminent domain in California is not limited to governmental entities and public utilities. Section 1001 of the Civil Code literally authorizes a private person to condemn property for any of the uses listed in Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Other statutes have expressly granted the power of eminent domain to certain private entities which are engaged in quasi-public activities.

In *Lingga v. Garovotti*,²⁴ the California Supreme Court held that the owner of an apartment building could condemn a necessary easement for a sewer across his neighbor's property to connect the apartment building to the mains of an established sewer system. The extent to which private persons can condemn for other uses listed in Section 1238 is unclear. The *Lingga* case is an exceptional one; the courts generally have not permitted a private person to condemn property unless he is engaged in a quasi-public activity.²⁵

Having considered the various uses listed in Section 1238 and the judicial decisions involving attempts by private persons to exercise the power of eminent domain, the Commission recommends that condemnation by private persons be abolished²⁶ except in the following cases:

²⁴ 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955).

²⁵ *Lorenz v. Jacob*, 63 Cal. 73 (1883) (supplying mines with water); *Lindsay Irr. Co. v. Mehrtens*, 97 Cal. 676, 32 P. 802 (1893) (supplying farming neighborhoods with water); *People v. Elk River Mill & Lumber Co.*, 107 Cal. 221, 40 P. 531 (1895) (floating logs on nonnavigable streams); *General Petroleum Corp. v. Hobson*, 23 F.2d 349 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (byroad to prospect for oil).

²⁶ In addition to the repeal of Section 1001 of the Civil Code and Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Commission recommends the repeal of Streets and Highways Code Sections 1050–1054 (special private byroad statute) and Water Code Sections 7020–7026 (private ways for canals) and the amendment of Harbors and Navigation Code Section 4009 (private wharves, chutes, and piers). The Commission recommends no change in Health and Safety Code Section 8715 (alteration, vacation, or replatting of public and private cemetery drives and parks an exercise of eminent domain).

In this connection, the last sentence of Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution, which declares certain logging and lumbering railroads to be "public uses" and specifies that the takings of property for such purposes constitutes the taker a common carrier, should be deleted. Takings for this purpose are authorized

(1) The condemnation authority of nonprofit educational institutions of collegiate grade should be continued without change.²⁷

(2) The existing condemnation authority of nonprofit hospitals²⁸ should be liberalized to permit condemnation not only to expand existing hospitals but also to establish a newly organized and licensed hospital and to permit the acquisition of property whether or not "immediately adjacent" to existing holdings. At the same time, no acquisition should be permitted unless it has been reviewed and approved by appropriate local authorities and by the Director of Health and, if objection to the taking is made, by the court in the eminent domain proceeding. This would expand the condemnation power but, at the same time, would provide appropriate limitations to prevent its abuse.

(3) The condemnation authority of certain nonprofit housing corporations which provide housing for low income families should be continued and clarified.²⁹

(4) The condemnation authority of mutual water companies should be continued without change.³⁰

Joint Exercise of Power

Two or more public entities should be authorized to enter into an agreement under the Joint Powers Agreement Act³¹ for the joint exercise of their respective powers of eminent domain, whether or not possessed in common, for the acquisition of property as a single parcel. This authority already exists where a school district is a party to the joint powers agreement³²

by existing legislation, and the constitutional provision is obsolete since it applies only to "a railroad run by steam or electric power." Such railroads have been largely replaced for logging purposes by diesel powered locomotives and trucks. Moreover, the sentence adds little, if anything, to decisional law (some of which is based on the Constitution of the United States) relative to takings for such purposes or to the status and obligations of "common carriers."

²⁷ The condemnation authority of these institutions, now found in subdivision 2 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, should be continued by a provision added to the Education Code.

²⁸ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.3. Section 1238.3 should be repealed and provision made for condemnation by nonprofit hospitals in the Health and Safety Code.

²⁹ See HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 34874-34879 (limited dividend housing corporations). Provisions comparable to the sections relating to the exercise of condemnation authority by limited dividend housing corporations should be added to the statute relating to land chest corporations in the Health and Safety Code. Land chest corporations, if they now have condemnation authority, must base such authority on Section 1001 of the Civil Code and subdivision 21 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

³⁰ The substance of subdivision 4 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be continued by a provision added to the Public Utilities Code.

³¹ GOVT. CODE §§ 6500-6583.

³² EDUC. CODE § 15007.5.

and should be extended to permit exercise of such authority by public entities whether or not a school district is a party to the joint powers agreement.

Property Subject to Condemnation

Property Interest That May Be Acquired

The grants of condemnation authority to various public entities differ widely in their description of the types of property and rights or interests therein that may be acquired by eminent domain. Some grants are restricted to “real property”;³³ some grants broadly allow condemnation of “real or personal property”³⁴ or permit condemnation of “property” without limitation;³⁵ other grants contain an extensive listing of the various types of property and rights and interests in property that may be taken.³⁶

A general provision should be enacted that, except to the extent otherwise limited by statute,³⁷ will permit the condemnation of any type of property and any right, title, or interest therein necessary for the public use for which it is acquired. Further, the existing judicially developed rule that a grant of condemnation authority includes the authority to acquire any property necessary to carry out and make effective

³³ State condemnation authority under the Property Acquisition Law is limited, for example, to any interest in real property. See GOVT. CODE § 15853. The Commission does not recommend that the Property Acquisition Law be broadened to cover acquisition of “personal property” since other statutes provide for state acquisition of personal property. See also, e.g., HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 34325 (housing authority).

³⁴ E.g., PUB. RES. CODE § 5006 (Department of Parks and Recreation), PUB. UTIL. CODE § 30503 (Southern California Rapid Transit District).

³⁵ E.g., HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 5900.4 (harbor improvement districts), 6076 (harbor districts), 6296 (port districts); PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12703 (municipal utility districts), 16404 (public utility districts), 28953 (San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit District). The vast majority of condemnation grants authorize the taking of any necessary “property.”

³⁶ E.g., Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act § 5 (“real and personal property of every kind, including lands, structures, buildings, rights-of-way, easements, and privileges” and “all lands and water and water rights and other property necessary or convenient for [district purposes]”).

³⁷ The Commission recommends no change in the statutory provisions which exempt certain types of property from condemnation. See, e.g., FISH & GAME CODE § 1349 (farm lands exempt except by specific authorization of Legislature); HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 8134, 8560, 8560.5 (cemetery land not subject to condemnation for rights of way); PUB. RES. CODE § 5006.2 (property within Aptos Forest not subject to eminent domain except by permission of Legislature); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21632 (Department of Aeronautics cannot take existing airport owned by local public entity without consent of entity). See also *Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co.*, 28 Cal. 345 (1865) (money not subject to eminent domain). The substance of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240(2) (16th and 36th sections of certain public domain land not subject to condemnation) should be continued.

the principal purpose involved should be codified,³⁸ and duplicating and inconsistent provisions should be repealed.³⁹ The resolution of necessity should, as it generally is now, be conclusive on the issue of the necessity for acquiring any right or interest in property to be devoted to public use.⁴⁰

Property Already Appropriated to Public Use

Existing law permits to a limited extent the acquisition by eminent domain of property already appropriated to public use.⁴¹ The Commission believes, however, that joint use of property appropriated to public use should be encouraged in the interest of the fullest utilization of public land and the least imposition on private ownership. To this end, it recommends that any authorized condemnor be permitted to acquire, for use in common, property already devoted to public use if the joint uses are compatible or can be made compatible without substantial alteration of the preexisting public use.

Only where the two uses are not compatible and cannot be made compatible should a condemnor be permitted to take for its exclusive use property already appropriated to public use. In such a case, taking of the property should be permitted only for a more necessary public use than the use to which the property is already appropriated.⁴²

The resolution of necessity of a public entity should not be conclusive on the question whether a use is compatible with or more necessary than another public use.⁴³ It should be noted,

³⁸ Inherent in the power to condemn property for a particular purpose is the power to condemn additional property to effectuate that purpose. See, e.g., *City of Santa Barbara v. Cloer*, 216 Cal. App.2d 127, 30 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1963), and *Monterey Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Hughes*, 201 Cal. App.2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1962).

³⁹ Numerous statutes, as well as a constitutional provision, provide a variety of tests to determine to what extent additional property may be acquired. See, e.g., CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 14½ (memorial grounds, streets, squares, parkways, reservations to 150 feet); CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238(18) (trees along highways to 300 feet); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104.3 (protect and preserve highways to 150 feet); WATER CODE § 256 (protect and preserve dams and water facilities to 500 feet). The Commission recommends that, in place of this multiplicity, there be substituted a uniform and comprehensive authorization to acquire all property necessary to carry out and make effective the principal purpose involved.

⁴⁰ See Taylor, *The Right to Take—The Right to Take a Fee or Any Lesser Interest*, 1 PAC. L.J. 555 (1970).

⁴¹ See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240(3), (4), (6), 1241(3) (acquisition of property devoted to public use for "consistent" and more necessary public uses).

⁴² This scheme should also apply where two or more persons seek to condemn the same property and the proceedings have been consolidated. In this case, condemnation should be allowed for joint use among the condemnors. Where the various uses are not compatible, condemnation should be allowed for the more necessary public use and the proceeding dismissed as to the others.

⁴³ See discussion *infra* under "Public Necessity."

however, that there is a statutory hierarchy of more necessary users—state,⁴⁴ local public entities,⁴⁵ private persons—as well as specific statutory more necessary use presumptions such as those afforded certain park property and property kept in its natural condition.⁴⁶ No change in this scheme is recommended. The Commission does, however, solicit comments on whether the substance of Sections 1240(3) and 1241(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure (property appropriated to public use by certain local public entities may not be taken by another such entity) should be retained as proposed in Section 1240.660 of the Eminent Domain Law.

Extraterritorial Condemnation

Case law establishes that a local public entity—such as a city, county, or special district—may condemn only property within its territorial limits except where the power to condemn property outside its limits is expressly granted by statute or is necessarily implied as an incident to one of its other statutory powers.⁴⁷ This rule should be codified. Unaffected by this codification would be statutes that expressly authorize extraterritorial condemnation⁴⁸ and statutes—such as those authorizing the furnishing of sewage facilities or the supplying of water—under which the power of extraterritorial condemnation may be implied.⁴⁹

Public Use and Necessity

Public Use

Constitutional requirement. Article I, Section 14, of the California Constitution prohibits the exercise of eminent domain except for a “public use.”⁵⁰ Whether a particular

⁴⁴ GOVT. CODE § 15856.

⁴⁵ CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240(3) and 1241(3).

⁴⁶ CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1241.7 and 1241.9.

⁴⁷ See *City of No. Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co.*, 192 Cal. App.2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961) (implied authority); *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles*, 166 Cal. App.2d 758, 333 P.2d 442 (1959) (statutory authority); *Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.*, 72 Cal. App.2d 638, 165 P.2d 741 (1946) (statutory authority).

⁴⁸ E.g., GOVT. CODE § 61610; HARB. & NAV. CODE § 7147; HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 6514, 13852(c); PUB. RES. CODE § 5540. Such statutes are constitutional. *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles*, 166 Cal. App.2d 758, 333 P.2d 442 (1959); *Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.*, 72 Cal. App.2d 638, 165 P.2d 741 (1946).

⁴⁹ *City of Pasadena v. Stimson*, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891) (sewage) (dictum); *City of No. Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co.*, 192 Cal. App.2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961) (water). Cf. *Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles*, 50 Cal.2d 713, 718, 329 P.2d 289, 291 (1958). Compare *City of Carlsbad v. Wight*, 221 Cal. App.2d 756, 34 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1963).

⁵⁰ *City & County of San Francisco v. Ross*, 44 Cal.2d 52, 279 P. 529 (1955).

purpose is a public use is an issue that is always justiciable in an eminent domain proceeding.⁵¹ Ordinarily, however, a taking by a public entity or public utility does not present a public use issue. The property sought to be taken will be devoted to a purpose that is declared to be a public use by statute, and history indicates that there is little likelihood that the court will declare the use not to be a public use. There are, however, some situations that may present a significant public use issue. These situations are discussed below.

Acquisition for future use. It is well established that statutory grants of general condemnation power carry with them the right to condemn property in anticipation of the condemnor's future needs, provided there is a reasonable probability of use of the property within a reasonable period of time.⁵² This standard should be codified. The question whether there is such a probability should always be justiciable; however, any use of property within seven years after the commencement of an eminent domain proceeding should be deemed "reasonable."⁵³

Acquisition of physical and financial remnants. The acquisition of part of a larger parcel of property for public use will on occasion leave the remainder in such size, shape, or condition as to be of little market value. The elimination of such remnants may be of substantial benefit to the community at large as well as to the owners of such property. Generally speaking, California's condemners with any substantial need therefor have been granted specific statutory authority to condemn the excess for the purpose of remnant elimination.⁵⁴ Some of these statutes are so broadly drawn that they literally authorize exercise of the power of eminent domain to acquire remnants in circumstances not constitutionally permitted.⁵⁵

⁵¹ People v. Chevalier, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).

⁵² See, e.g., Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman, 152 Cal. 303, 92 P. 849 (1907); City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899); San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co., 194 Cal. App.2d 472, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961).

⁵³ Seven years is within sound planning limits and is the period from the date of advancement of funds for the purchase of a right of way within which actual construction must commence under the Federal Aid Highway Act of 1968. 23 U.S.C. § 108.

⁵⁴ E.g., CODE CIV. PROC. § 1266 (city and county highway authorities); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104.1 (Department of Transportation); WATER CODE §§ 254 (Department of Water Resources), 43533 (water districts). These statutes, however, vary from agency to agency, often with little or no apparent reason for the difference.

⁵⁵ See People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968).

The Commission has concluded that all public entities should be granted the authority to condemn excess property for the purpose of remnant elimination,⁵⁶ whether the remnant be physical or financial, provided it is of little market value. Such remnants should be subject to acquisition by both voluntary means and by condemnation but, to safeguard against the abuse of such authority, the property owner should always be able to contest whether the remainder will be of "little market value." The property owner should also be permitted to show that the condemnor has available a reasonable and economically feasible means to avoid leaving a remnant; if he is successful in demonstrating such a "physical solution," condemnation of the excess should not be allowed.

Acquisition for exchange purposes. A number of California condemnors are authorized to acquire property of a third party for the purpose of exchange with the owner of property that is needed for public use.⁵⁷ This authority to acquire "substitute property" to be exchanged for the "necessary property" should be extended to all public entities; but, in order to safeguard the rights of the third party, the authority should be restricted to the following situations.

Where the necessary property is devoted by its owner to a public use and he could exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire substitute property for the same public use from a third party, the public entity should be permitted to acquire substitute property by eminent domain for the owner of the necessary property. This authority will avoid the need for two condemnation proceedings. To protect against possible abuses, a substitute taking on these grounds should be allowed only where the owner of the necessary property has agreed to the exchange and it is clear that the substitute property will be devoted to the same public use as the necessary property.

In exceedingly rare cases, justice may require that the detriment to the owner of the necessary property be avoided in whole or in part by providing substitute facilities on land of a third party. The most frequently encountered situation of this sort is where the acquisition of the necessary property would leave other property in such condition as to be deprived of utility service or access to a public road. In such a case, substitute condemnation could provide a quite simple physical

⁵⁶ Nongovernmental condemnors have no statutory authority to acquire excess property. No change in this regard is recommended.

⁵⁷ See, e.g., GOVT. CODE § 15858 (state); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 104(b), 104.2 (Department of Transportation); WATER CODE § 253(b) (Department of Water Resources).

solution to what otherwise would be a case of severely damaged property. Accordingly, a public entity should be authorized to condemn such property as appears reasonably necessary and appropriate to supply utility service or access after taking into account any hardship to the owner of the substitute property. In cases other than utility or access cases, the public entity should be authorized to acquire substitute property for exchange purposes only if (a) the owner of the necessary property has agreed to the exchange, (b) the substitute property is in the same general vicinity as the necessary property, and (c) taking into account the relative hardship to both owners, the exchange would not be unjust to the owner of the substitute property.

The propriety of a taking for the purpose of exchange should always be subject to challenge, and the public entity should have the burden of proof that its taking of substitute property will satisfy these criteria.

Public Necessity

Statutory requirement. The necessity for a taking must be established before property may be acquired by eminent domain.⁵⁸ The Commission believes that this statutory requirement is a sound one and recommends that no person be permitted to exercise the power of eminent domain unless:

- (a) The public interest and necessity require the proposed project;
- (b) The proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury; and
- (c) The property and interest therein sought to be acquired are necessary for the proposed project.

Resolution of necessity. Some, but not all, public entities must adopt a resolution of necessity to acquire property by eminent domain before such a proceeding may be commenced.⁵⁹ Among those public entities required to adopt a resolution of necessity, the vote requirement for most is a simple majority.⁶⁰ The Commission believes that the requirement of the adoption of the resolution of necessity is a salutary one: In addition to informing the property owner of the authority for the proposed acquisition, it helps to insure that the

⁵⁸ See, e.g., CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240(6), 1241(2), and 1242.

⁵⁹ Compare, e.g., CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2) (resolution may be adopted) *with* WATER CODE § 8594 and GOVT. CODE § 15855 (resolution required).

⁶⁰ See, e.g., GOVT. CODE § 15855 and STS. & HWYS. CODE § 102.

public entity makes a considered decision of both the need for the property as well as for the proposed project itself. Accordingly, the Commission recommends that all public entities be required to adopt a resolution of necessity for the acquisition of any property by eminent domain. The adoption should be by a majority vote of all the members of the governing body of the public entity⁶¹ since a majority vote is normally required for the decision to undertake the proposed project itself.⁶² The resolution should describe the proposed project and refer to the statutory authority for the project; it should describe the property needed for the project and its use in the project; it should declare that the public entity has found and determined that the public interest and necessity require the proposed project, that the proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury, and that the property sought to be taken is necessary for the proposed project.

In the great majority of cases, the resolution of necessity of a public entity establishes a conclusive presumption of public necessity.⁶³ The Commission has weighed the need for court review of necessity questions against the economic and procedural burdens such review would entail and against the policy that entrusts to the legislative branch of government basic political and planning decisions concerning the need for and design and location of public projects. The Commission has concluded that the policy to provide conclusive effect to the resolution of necessity of a public entity is a sound one and should be continued. Where the condemnor is a public utility or other private entity, however, the issue of public necessity should always be subject to court determination.

There are certain situations where the necessity of the taking by a public entity should be subject to court review. The resolution of necessity should not have a conclusive effect for

⁶¹ This rule should not apply to the Regents of the University of California. See EDUC. CODE § 23151 (two-thirds vote required for taking by Regents of the University of California).

⁶² Thus, the majority requirement should not apply to acquisition of property by a county for state highway purposes since the decision to undertake such a project requires a greater than majority vote. See STS. & HWYS. CODE § 760 (four-fifths vote of supervisors required for project as well as for condemnation).

⁶³ See, e.g., GOVT. CODE § 15855 (Public Works Board); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 103 (Department of Transportation); WATER CODE § 251 (Department of Water Resources); CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2) (city, county, school district). The resolution is given conclusive effect even if its passage is obtained through fraud, bad faith, corruption, or gross abuse of discretion. *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959).

acquisitions outside the territorial limits of the public entity.⁶⁴ In addition, it should be made clear that the resolution of necessity has no effect on the justiciability of such "public use" issues as takings for exchange purposes, taking of remnants, and some takings for future use.⁶⁵

COMPENSATION

Basic Compensation Scheme

Existing law provides that compensation shall be paid for property taken by eminent domain and, if the property is part of a larger parcel, for damage to the remainder caused by its severance from the part taken and by construction and use of the project for which it is taken.⁶⁶ If benefits are conferred by the project, the benefits may be offset against compensation for damage to the remainder but not against compensation for the part taken.⁶⁷

Most states use the same general compensation scheme as California.⁶⁸ Nevertheless, the Commission has considered the compensation approaches adopted in the remaining states. The most popular alternative is the "before and after" rule under which the value of the property before the taking and the value of the remainder after the taking are determined and the difference, if any, is awarded to the property owner. Despite the apparent fairness and simplicity of operation of the before and after rule, the Commission has determined not to

⁶⁴ Judicial review of necessity in extraterritorial condemnation cases is desirable since the political process may operate to deny extraterritorial property owners an effective voice in the affairs and decision-making of the local public entity. *Cf. Scott v. City of Indian Wells*, 6 Cal.3d 541, 492 P.2d 1137, 99 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1972). For this reason, when extraterritorial condemnation is undertaken, a local public entity is denied a conclusive presumption as to the public necessity of its acquisition. See, e.g., CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2); *City of Los Angeles v. Keck*, 14 Cal. App.3d 920, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1971).

⁶⁵ These public use issues have previously been discussed. See discussion *supra* under "Public Use."

⁶⁶ The basic compensation scheme appears in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1248(1)-(3).

⁶⁷ The language of the first sentence of Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution requires that, in certain cases, compensation be made "irrespective of any benefits from any improvement proposed by such corporation." The phrase applies only to "corporations other than municipal" and, oddly, only to takings for right of way or reservoir purposes. The language may be inoperative under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See *Beveridge v. Lewis*, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902). In any event, the complex question of the offsetting of benefits in cases of partial takings should be left to the Legislature; hence, the Commission recommends that this language be deleted from the Constitution.

⁶⁸ See, e.g., 4A P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 14.23 *et seq.* (rev. 3d ed. 1971) (including a discussion of the numerous variations).

recommend any change in the general California compensation scheme because there appears to be no general consensus in California that adoption of a different scheme would be desirable.⁶⁹

Although the Commission has concluded that the basic method of measuring compensation in California should be retained, there are a number of defects or deficiencies that need correction, and there are some losses suffered by property owners that are not now compensated but should be. The revisions of existing law recommended by the Commission are outlined below.

Accrual of Right to Compensation

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1249 provides that, for the purpose of assessing compensation and damages, the right thereto accrues as of the date of issuance of summons. This date is an arbitrary one since summons may not be issued at the time the complaint is filed and, even if issued, may not be served immediately. The filing of the complaint commences the eminent domain proceeding and serves to vest the court with jurisdiction;⁷⁰ hence, the date the complaint is filed is a more appropriate date for accrual of the right to compensation.

Date of Valuation

Since 1872, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1249 has required that the property taken be valued as of the date the summons is issued. In an attempt to improve the position of the property owner and to compel the condemnor to expedite the

⁶⁹ The Commission notes that the California scheme of valuing the part taken, computing damages to the remainder, and offsetting benefits against the damages to the remainder has undergone a continuing process of judicial development. Court decisions have limited compensable items of damage, for example, to those that amount to more than "mere inconvenience" and that are peculiar to the particular property. See, e.g., *Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry.*, 103 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750 (1894), and *City of Berkeley v. Von Adelung*, 214 Cal. App.2d 791, 29 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1963). Recent cases, however, indicate that particular items of damage may be compensable in any case where the property owner is required to bear more than his "fair share" of the burden of the public improvement. See, e.g., *People v. Volunteers of America*, 21 Cal. App.3d 111, 98 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971). A similar development has taken place in the determination of what items of benefit may be offset against damages; traditionally only "special" benefits might be offset, but recent cases have found special benefits in areas not previously included. Compare *Beveridge v. Lewis*, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902), with *People v. Giumarra Farms, Inc.*, 22 Cal. App.3d 98, 99 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1971).

In light of this continuing judicial development and improvement under the California scheme, the Commission recommends no codification of particular elements of damage and benefits.

⁷⁰ See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 411.10 and 1243; *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924).

proceeding, a provision was added in 1911 specifying that, if a case is not brought to trial within one year and the delay is not caused by the defendant, the date of valuation is the date of trial. Neither the taking of possession nor the depositing of probable compensation has any bearing in determining the date of valuation. In cases in which the issue of compensation is once tried and a new trial is necessary, the Supreme Court of California has held that the date of valuation remains the same date used for that purpose in the original trial.⁷¹

The Commission has considered the oft-made proposal that the date of valuation be, in all cases, the date of trial. Much can be said in favor of that change. Unless the condemnor deposits probable compensation and takes possession of the property at that time, the date the proceedings are begun is not an entirely logical date of valuation. It would seem more appropriate to ascertain the level of the general market and the value of the particular property in that market at the time the exchange of the property for "just compensation" actually takes place. Also, in a rapidly rising market, property values may have increased so much that the property owner cannot purchase equivalent property when he eventually receives the award. In other states in which the power of eminent domain is exercised through judicial proceedings, the majority rule is to fix the date of trial as the date of valuation.⁷² Nonetheless, the existing California rules appear to have worked equitably in most cases. The alternative rule might provide an undesirable incentive to condemnees to delay the proceedings to obtain the latest possible date of valuation. And, as a matter of convenience, there is merit in fixing the date of valuation as of a date certain, rather than by reference to the uncertain date that the trial may begin. The Commission therefore recommends retention of the existing rules with the modifications described below.

Deposit to Establish Date

The condemnor should be permitted to establish an early date of valuation by depositing the probable amount of compensation for withdrawal by the property owner. In addition to providing a needed incentive to condemnors to deposit approximate compensation, the rule would accord with the view that the property should be valued as of the time payment is made. For convenience, the date of valuation should be the date the deposit is made unless an earlier date is made

⁷¹ See *People v. Murata*, 55 Cal.2d 1, 357 P.2d 833, 9 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1960).

⁷² See 3 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.5(2) at 38-39 (rev. 3d ed. 1965).

applicable by the existing rules. A date of valuation thus established should not be subject to change by any subsequent development in the proceeding.

Date in Case of New Trial

In case of a new trial, the date of the new trial, rather than the date used in the original trial, should be the date of valuation unless the condemnor deposits the amount awarded in the original trial within a reasonably brief period after entry of judgment in the original trial. Unless such a deposit has been made, the date used in the original trial is of no practical or economic significance. To clarify existing law, a similar rule should be provided for a "retrial" following a mistrial except that the amount to be deposited should be determined in the same manner as a deposit made to obtain possession before judgment.

Date Based on Commencement of Proceeding

As a technical matter, provisions respecting the date of valuation should be changed to compute that date from the commencement of the proceeding (filing of the complaint) rather than from the issuance of summons since the date of commencement of the proceeding marks the inception of the court's jurisdiction over the property.

Enhancement and Blight

It is generally recognized that announcement of a public improvement may cause property values to fluctuate before eminent domain proceedings are begun. Existing California statutes do not deal with this problem.⁷³ Case law establishes, however, that any increase in the value of the property before the time it becomes reasonably certain that the property will be taken for the project is to be included in arriving at the compensation to be made for the property; any increases thereafter attributable to the project itself are excluded.⁷⁴

⁷³ Recently enacted Government Code Section 7267.2 requires condemnors to make an offer to acquire property in the amount of their determination of probable compensation. The section also provides that, for the purpose of this offer:

Any decrease or increase in the fair market value of real property to be acquired prior to the date of valuation caused by the public improvement for which such property is acquired, or by the likelihood that the property would be acquired for such improvement, other than that due to physical deterioration within the reasonable control of the owner or occupant, will be disregarded in determining the compensation for the property.

⁷⁴ See Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme, 4 Cal.3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971).

The law as to the treatment of any decrease in value is uncertain; demands by property owners that alleged decreases in value be excluded have frequently been denied. The reason commonly given is that any attempt to determine the existence or amount of such a decrease would be to engage in speculation. As recognized by recent cases, however, the injustice to the property owner is clear if general knowledge of the proposed improvement has actually depreciated the market value of the property prior to the date of valuation.⁷⁵ Such influence can be shown by expert testimony and by direct evidence as to the general condition of the property and its surroundings as well where the value is depressed as where the value is enhanced.

Equitably, the amount awarded to the owner should be equivalent to what the market value of the property would have been on the date of valuation but for the proposed improvement's influence on the market. Accordingly, a uniform rule should be established by statute to provide that the value of the property taken on the date of valuation may not include any increase or decrease in such value resulting from (1) the project for which the property is taken, (2) the eminent domain proceeding itself, or (3) any preliminary actions on the part of the condemnor related to the taking or damaging of the property.⁷⁶ In the case of a partial taking, this rule should also apply in valuing the remainder in the "before" condition.

Divided Interests

At the time property acquired by eminent domain is taken, it is not always held by a single owner in fee simple; frequently, there are coowners, liens and encumbrances, deed restrictions, leases, and the like. The Commission has reviewed the statutory and case law relating to compensating and apportioning the award among divided interests and recommends the following changes in existing law.

Leaseholds

Under existing law, where property subject to a lease is partially taken, the lessee's obligation to pay rent under the terms of the lease for the property taken continues unabated, and the lessor's compensation for the property is given in part to the lessee to be paid back to the lessor as a part of the rental installments.⁷⁷ This rule, which in effect makes the lessee a

⁷⁵ *Cf. Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).

⁷⁶ The recommended rule is consistent with Government Code Section 7267.2.

⁷⁷ *City of Pasadena v. Porter*, 201 Cal. 381, 257 P. 526 (1927).

trustee for the lessor's compensation, has been widely criticized.⁷⁸ The lessor should be compensated immediately for the property taken, and the lessee should not be required to make payments on property no longer subject to the lease. Unless the lease otherwise provides, a partial taking of property subject to a leasehold should work a pro rata reduction of the rental obligation; and, if the taking is so great that it operates as a frustration of the whole lease, the court should, on motion of any party, terminate the lease.

Options

Existing law denies compensation to the holder of an unexercised option to acquire property.⁷⁹ An option may be a valuable interest for which substantial consideration was given. An option holder should receive compensation for the fair market value of the option.⁸⁰

Future Interests

When property subject to a life tenancy is taken by eminent domain, the life tenant's portion of the award may be inadequate for investment to provide the life tenant with the same income or comparable living conditions as the original life tenancy. In this situation, the court should have authority to defer distribution of the eminent domain award pending termination of the life tenancy and meanwhile to permit investment of the funds or their devotion to such purposes as would be equitable under the circumstances. The grant of such authority would codify existing case law.⁸¹

Contingent future interests in property such as rights of reentry and possibilities of reverter are denied compensation under existing law.⁸² Such future interests may have substantial market value, particularly where the reentry or reverter is imminent at the time of the taking. If the transformation of the future interest to a present interest was reasonably imminent at the time the eminent domain proceeding was commenced, the future interest should be compensated at its fair market value. Additionally, where the occurrence was not reasonably

⁷⁸ See, e.g., Horgan & Edgar, *Leasehold Valuation Problem in Eminent Domain*, 4 U.S.F. L. REV. 1 (1969).

⁷⁹ See, e.g., People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 90 Cal. App.2d 464, 203 P.2d 579 (1949).

⁸⁰ This is consistent with the general rule that unexercised options to purchase or lease property are considered in determining the value of a lease. See, e.g., People v. Gianni, 29 Cal. App.3d 151, 105 Cal. Rptr. 248 (1972).

⁸¹ Estate of Giacometos, 192 Cal. App.2d 244, 13 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1961).

⁸² See, e.g., Romero v. Dep't of Public Works, 17 Cal.2d 189, 109 P.2d 662 (1941).

imminent but the future interest was appurtenant to some property that is damaged by the acquisition, the owner should be compensated for that damage.⁸³ And, where the occurrence was not reasonably imminent but the future interest restricted the use of the property to charitable or public purposes, the award should be devoted to the same purposes subject to the continued future interest.

Improvements

A condemnor must take and pay for all improvements pertaining to the realty that it acquires by eminent domain.⁸⁴ Discussed below are several problem areas in the application of this rule.

Business Equipment

Whether certain types of business equipment are improvements pertaining to the realty has been a continuing source of litigation.⁸⁵ In 1957, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1248b was enacted to provide that equipment designed for manufacturing or industrial purposes and installed for use in a fixed location is deemed a part of the realty regardless of the manner of installation. Nevertheless, this did not completely resolve the issue. It is sometimes difficult to determine whether particular equipment falls within the language of Section 1248b. Moreover, some types of business equipment—particularly equipment used in a commercial enterprise—are clearly *not* covered by the section. The Commission recommends that improvements pertaining to the realty include all types of business equipment installed on the property to be taken or damaged except equipment that can be removed without a substantial loss in value. This will assure that equipment having special in-place value will be taken and compensated as part of the realty.

Removal of Improvements

While improvements pertaining to the realty must be taken and paid for by the condemnor, there may be situations where the condemnor does not require improvements that the owner desires to keep. In such situations, the owner should be

⁸³ See, e.g., *City of Santa Monica v. Jones*, 104 Cal. App.2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951), for a situation in which the use restriction served to benefit appurtenant property.

⁸⁴ See, e.g., CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1248 and 1249.1.

⁸⁵ See, e.g., *People v. Texaco, Inc.*, 25 Cal. App.3d 514, 101 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1972); *City of Los Angeles v. Klinker*, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933).

expressly authorized to remove the improvements and to receive compensation for their removal and relocation cost, provided that such cost does not exceed the value of the improvements.

Where improvements pertaining to the realty are removed or destroyed before transfer of title or possession, the improvements are not taken into account in determining compensation.⁸⁶ Hence, where there is a dispute whether the improvements pertain to the realty, the owner of the improvements may wish to protect them from vandalism or destruction pending resolution of the issue. A procedure should be provided to enable the owner to remove and store the improvements, absent opposition from the condemnor. Thus, if the improvements are ultimately held to pertain to the realty, they will be returned to the condemnor; if they are held to be personality, the owner will retain them in good condition.

Where the removal of improvements will damage property to which they are attached, a procedure should also be provided to enable the owner to remove the improvements without being charged with such damage, absent opposition from the condemnor.

Subsequent Improvements

As a general rule, improvements placed on the property after service of summons are not included in the determination of compensation.⁸⁷ Where the improvement is in the process of construction at the time of service of summons, this rule can cause the owner serious difficulties. For example, the partially completed improvement may present the risk of injury to the public or may be exposed to destruction by vandalism or by the elements. In such a situation, if the property owner continues with additional construction after service of summons with the written consent of the condemnor, compensation should be determined on the basis of the improvement with the additional construction. Such consent may well be forthcoming if the condemnor anticipates a lengthy delay in the time of acquisition and wishes to avoid payment of damages for such delay.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1249.1.

⁸⁷ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1249. This rule is subject to the judicially recognized exception that improvements required to be made by a public utility to its utility system following service of summons are compensable. *Citizens Util. Co. v. Superior Court*, 59 Cal.2d 805, 382 P.2d 356, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1963).

⁸⁸ See, e.g., *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1972) (inverse condemnation).

Absent the condemnor's written consent, the property owner in the process of construction should, at least, be authorized to recover the cost of making additional improvements designed to protect the public from the risk of injury from the partially completed improvement whether or not the additional work adds to the value of the improvement. In addition, such an owner should be authorized to obtain a court order allowing compensation for the property to include the value added by subsequent improvements upon a showing that the hardship to the condemnor of permitting the subsequent improvements is outweighed by the hardship to the property owner of leaving the construction incomplete. No such order should be permitted after the condemnor has deposited the probable compensation with the court.

Harvesting and Marketing of Crops

Where a condemnor takes possession of property at a time that prevents the owner from harvesting and marketing crops growing on the property, the value of the crops is included in the compensation.⁸⁹ However, because the value of growing crops is speculative, depending upon climatic and other natural conditions as well as upon economic conditions that may fluctuate rapidly, the imprecise standard of the value of the crops should not be used. Rather the property owner should be awarded the reasonable value of material and labor reasonably expended in connection with the crops up to the time the condemnor is authorized to take possession of the property.

Compensation for Injury to Remainder

The Commission recommends no change in the basic rules relating to compensation for injury to the remainder in the case of a partial taking. However, features of these basic rules that require improvement include (1) the rule of *People v. Symons*⁹⁰ and (2) the computation of damages and benefits that will accrue in the future.

Rule of People v. Symons

The *Symons* case held that a property owner may not recover severance damages in eminent domain unless the portion of the project that cause the damage is located on property taken from the owner. Subsequent cases cast doubt on the continued vitality of the *Symons* rule,⁹¹ and the present state of the law is not clear.

⁸⁹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1249.2.

⁹⁰ 54 Cal.2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960).

⁹¹ See, e.g., *People v. Ramos*, 1 Cal.3d 261, 460 P.2d 992, 81 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1969).

A property owner whose remaining property is injured by the project for which a portion of his property was taken may suffer substantial losses whether the damage-causing portion of the project is located on or off the property taken. Accordingly, the rule of *Symons* should be abrogated by statute and should be replaced by the general rule that severance damages are awarded whether or not the damage is caused by a portion of the project located on the part taken.

By parity of reasoning, it should be made clear that benefits created by the project should be offset against severance damages whether or not the benefits are caused by a portion of the project located on the part taken. This would continue existing law.⁹²

Computation of Future Damages and Benefits

Existing law requires compensation for severance damage to be computed on the assumption that the project is completed as of the date compensation is assessed.⁹³ This requirement may work a hardship on the property owner where present damages are offset against benefits to be conferred by the project at some time in the future, thereby postponing compensation for the damage. To alleviate this problem, both damages and benefits should be assessed on the basis of the proposed schedule for completion of the improvement rather than on the assumption that the improvement is completed and in operation. Should the project not be completed as anticipated, damages would be recoverable by the property owner as at present.⁹⁴

Compensation for Loss of Goodwill

Eminent domain frequently works a severe hardship on owners of businesses affected by public projects. As a rule, business losses have not been compensated.⁹⁵ This rule of noncompensability has been widely criticized,⁹⁶ and the

⁹² See *People v. Hurd*, 205 Cal. App.2d 16, 23 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962).

⁹³ See, e.g., *People v. Schultz Co.*, 123 Cal. App.2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).

⁹⁴ *Id.*

⁹⁵ See, e.g., *City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co.*, 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915). Government Code Section 7262, enacted Cal. Stats. 1971, Ch. 1574, provides for limited business losses in the form of relocation or in-lieu payments not to exceed \$10,000 where relocation is not possible without a substantial loss of patronage.

⁹⁶ See, e.g., Kanner, *When Is "Property" Not "Property Itself": A Critical Examination of the Bases of Denial of Compensation for Loss of Goodwill in Eminent Domain*, 6 CAL. WEST. L. REV. 57 (1969); Note, *The Unsoundness of California's Noncompensability Rule as Applied to Business Losses in Condemnation Cases*, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 675 (1969); see also Alois & Goldberg, *A Reexamination of Value, Good Will and Business Losses in Eminent Domain*, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 604

Commission believes that some step should be taken to compensate the owner of a business taken or damaged in an eminent domain proceeding for losses he suffers. But, in order to assure that the losses are certain and measurable for the purposes of compensation, recovery should be allowed only for the loss of goodwill⁹⁷ and only to the extent that such loss is caused by the acquisition of the property or the injury to the remainder and cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the business and by taking those steps and adopting those procedures that a reasonably prudent person would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill.

Work to Reduce Compensation

There may be several practical ways by which the condemnor can reduce the damages to the property owner. For instance, if there are structures on the property that the owner desires to keep, it may be relatively inexpensive for the condemnor to relocate the structures for the owner while the project equipment is on the site. Likewise, the condemnor may be able to reduce severance damages substantially by constructing fences, sidewalks, driveways, retaining walls, drainage works, and the like on the owner's remaining property at the time work on the project is in progress. Public entities should be authorized to enter into agreements with the property owner to perform such work when it will result in an overall savings.⁹⁸

Prohibition Against Double Recovery

There are situations where there may be an overlap of two statutes granting compensation for the same loss in an eminent domain proceeding. For example, the provisions recommended by the Commission for compensation for loss of goodwill of a business might in some situations duplicate to a limited extent the payment under Government Code Section 7262(d) to the business in lieu of a relocation allowance. To avoid the possibility of double recovery in this and other situations, the law should clearly state that a person may recover only once for the same loss.

(1968); Note, "Just Compensation" for the Small Businessman, 2 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROB. 144 (1966); Comment, An Act to Provide Compensation for Loss of Goodwill Resulting From Eminent Domain Proceedings, 3 HARV. J. LEGIS. 445 (1966).

⁹⁷ See BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (goodwill defined as expectation of continued public patronage).

⁹⁸ This concept is an expansion of existing authority in Streets and Highways Code Section 970 (certain types of work in connection with an acquisition for opening or widening a county road).

CONDEMNATION PROCEDURE

It has long been the California rule that eminent domain proceedings are governed by the same procedures as civil actions generally.⁹⁹ These procedures are supplemented where appropriate by provisions specially applicable to eminent domain proceedings, but such provisions are relatively few in number. Generally speaking, there has been little criticism of this procedural scheme, and the Commission recommends few major changes in it. However, the provisions relating to possession and deposits prior to judgment have been under continuing Commission study for a number of years,¹⁰⁰ and major changes in these provisions are recommended.

Pleadings

The special nature of an eminent domain proceeding has required special rules relating to pleadings; the Commission believes that such special treatment is necessary.

Contents of Pleadings

The complaint should include an adequate description of the property sought to be taken, as under existing law,¹⁰¹ and should include a map indicating generally the property described in the complaint and its relation to the project for which it is being taken. Presently, a map is required only where a right of way is sought.¹⁰²

The existing requirements that the complaint indicate (1) the nature and extent of the interests of the defendants in the property and (2) whether the property sought to be taken is part of a "larger parcel" should be eliminated. The first issue is one that should be pleaded by the defendants; the second is one more appropriately raised and resolved at a later point in the proceedings.

Existing law also requires that the complaint contain "a statement of the right of the plaintiff" to take the property.¹⁰³ To enable the defendant to have a better understanding of the ground for the proceeding and to prepare more adequately for

⁹⁹ See, e.g., CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1256, 1257, 1262.

¹⁰⁰ The Commission previously published and distributed for comment a tentative recommendation and background study on this subject. See *Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Number 1—Possession Prior to Final Judgment and Related Problems*, 8 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1101 (1967). The comments received on that tentative recommendation have been taken into account in preparing this report.

¹⁰¹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1244(5).

¹⁰² CODE CIV. PROC. § 1244(4).

¹⁰³ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1244(3).

his response, the statement of the plaintiff's right should be more detailed. The complaint should include a description of the purpose for which the property is sought to be taken, an allegation of "public necessity" for the taking (including references where appropriate to the resolution of necessity), and references to the specific statutes authorizing the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain for the purpose alleged. Failure to comply with these requirements should subject the complaint to attack by way of demurrer.

Existing law requires that the defendant set forth in his answer both a statement of his right, title, or interest in the property taken and the amount of compensation he claims for the taking.¹⁰⁴ The second requirement should be eliminated; it serves little purpose at the initial stage of the proceeding and generally represents at best an ill-informed guess of what will be the compensation for the taking.

The existing requirement that a defendant file a claim with a public entity as a condition to bringing a cross-complaint in an eminent domain proceeding¹⁰⁵ should not be continued. The cause of action is necessarily related to the pending eminent domain proceeding;¹⁰⁶ hence, no useful purpose is served by presentation of the claim to the public entity prior to filing the cross-complaint.

Verification

A public entity need not verify its pleadings but, where a public entity is the plaintiff, the defendant must verify his answer.¹⁰⁷ The Commission recommends a new scheme for eminent domain pleadings. In place of verification, the pleading of a party (including a public entity) who is represented by an attorney should be signed by his attorney. The signature of the attorney should constitute a certification that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is ground to support its contents, and that it is not interposed for delay. If the pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purposes of the signature requirement, it should be subject to being stricken as sham. These provisions would be substantively the same as those of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.¹⁰⁸ Under this scheme, verification will not

¹⁰⁴ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1246.

¹⁰⁵ County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co., 16 Cal. App.3d 383, 94 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1971); see GOVT. CODE §§ 905 and 905.2.

¹⁰⁶ See CODE CIV. PROC. § 428.10 and Comment thereto.

¹⁰⁷ CODE CIV. PROC. § 446. If the defendant is also a public entity, it need not verify its answer.

¹⁰⁸ See FED. R. CIV. PROC. 11.

be required where an attorney represents a party, but the requirement of signature and the sanctions for noncompliance will apply to both plaintiff and defendant.

Amendment

The liberal rules generally applicable to the amendment of pleadings¹⁰⁹ are also desirable in an eminent domain proceeding. It should be made clear, however, that a court may, where justice so requires, impose such terms and conditions to an amendment as a change in the date of valuation or awarding costs and fees. Where an amendment would add property to that covered by the complaint of a public entity, adoption of a resolution of necessity for the additional property should be a prerequisite. And, where an amendment would delete property from the complaint, the plaintiff should follow the procedures and pay the price for a partial abandonment.¹¹⁰

Summons

Existing law requires that the summons duplicate such items contained in the complaint as the description of the property and the statement of the plaintiff's right to condemn.¹¹¹ This duplication should not be required in the ordinary case since the defendant may refer to the complaint for this information. However, where service of summons is by publication, the summons should describe the property to be taken in a manner reasonably calculated to give a person with an interest in the property notice of the proceeding.

Existing law requires that the summons be served in the same manner as in civil actions generally.¹¹² This requirement should be continued except that, where service is by publication, the plaintiff should also post copies of the summons on the property taken and record a notice of the pendency of the proceeding in the office of the county recorder of the county where the property is located.¹¹³ These additional requirements will not be burdensome and will increase the likelihood that interested persons receive actual notice of the proceeding.

¹⁰⁹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 473.

¹¹⁰ See discussion *infra* under "Abandonment and Dismissal."

¹¹¹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1245.

¹¹² *Id.*

¹¹³ It should be noted that filing of a lis pendens at the commencement of a proceeding is required by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1243, but the plaintiff's failure to do so is not a jurisdictional defect. This requirement should be revised to make clear that such filing is not mandatory except in the case recommended by the Commission.

Where the state is a defendant, existing law requires service of summons on the Governor, Attorney General, Director of General Services, and State Lands Commission.¹¹⁴ The Commission recommends that *only* the Attorney General be served; he can notify the proper state agency of the proceeding. The Commission is advised that this would work no substantial change in present practice.

Possession Prior to Judgment

Extension of Right to Obtain Early Possession

Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution authorizes the state and local public entities¹¹⁵ to take possession of the property to be condemned immediately upon commencement of an eminent domain proceeding, or at any time thereafter, if the condemnation is for any "right of way" or "lands to be used for reservoir purposes." Except to this limited extent, the condemnor may not obtain possession prior to entry of judgment unless the owner consents.¹¹⁶

The narrow limits of the authorization for early possession in Section 14 reflect a fairly general impression that the best interests of the property owner always lie in postponing the inevitable relinquishment of possession as long as possible. There is some justification for this impression because the California Constitution and statutes for many years failed to provide adequate procedural safeguards for the property owner.¹¹⁷ Improvements were made in 1957 and, in 1961, the Legislature enacted legislation recommended by the Commission that partially systematized the law on this subject.¹¹⁸ Nevertheless, careful analysis reveals that broader provisions for early possession, with appropriate safeguards for both parties, would benefit both condemnors and property owners.

¹¹⁴ CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240(8) and 1245.4.

¹¹⁵ The authorization extends to "a municipal corporation or a county or the State or metropolitan water district, municipal utility district, municipal water district, drainage, irrigation, levee, reclamation or water conservation district, or similar public corporation." See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.4.

¹¹⁶ Code of Civil Procedure Section 1254 provides a procedure whereby any condemnor may obtain possession "at any time after trial and judgment entered or pending an appeal from the judgment."

¹¹⁷ Before 1957, there were no provisions for withdrawal of the required deposit. Further, no period of notice to the property owner was specified, and the order for possession could be made effective when granted. These pre-1957 rules afforded at least the possibility of serious inconvenience to the property owner.

¹¹⁸ See *Recommendation and Study Relating to Taking Possession and Passage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings*, 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS at B-1 (1961). See also Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1613, amending or adding CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1243.4, 1243.5, 1243.6, 1243.7, 1249, 1249.1, 1253, 1254, 1255a, and 1255b.

To the condemnor, an assurance of timely possession facilitates an orderly program of property acquisition. In acquiring property for public use, it is frequently essential that there be a definite future date as of which all property needed for the public improvement will be available. An undue delay in acquiring even one essential parcel can prevent construction of a vitally needed public improvement and can complicate financial and contractual arrangements for the entire project. To avoid such a delay, the condemnor may be forced to pay the owner of that parcel more than its fair value and more than the owners of similar property received. In general, the need of the condemnor is not for haste but for certainty in the date of acquisition. The variable conditions of court calendars and the unpredictable period required for the trial of the issue of compensation preclude any certainty in the date of acquisition if that date is determined solely by entry of judgment in the proceeding. Lack of the right to obtain possession prior to entry of judgment thus may lead to precipitate filing of proceedings and premature acquisition of property.

From the property owner's point of view, if reasonable notice is given before dispossession and if prompt receipt of the probable compensation for the property is assured, possession prior to judgment frequently will be advantageous. Upon the commencement of the eminent domain proceeding, the landowner loses many of the valuable incidents of ownership. He is practically precluded from selling or financing the property and is legally deprived of any further increase in the value of the property. He is denied compensation for improvements made after service of the summons in the proceeding. As a practical matter, he usually must find and purchase other property prior to termination of the litigation. He must also defray the expenses of the litigation. It is possible that these difficulties will force him to settle for an amount less than he would eventually have received in the eminent domain proceeding. In contrast, the taking of possession and payment of approximate compensation prior to judgment permit the landowner to meet these problems and expenses while proceeding with the trial on the issue of compensation. Even if he has no urgent need for prompt payment, he may invest in other property the amount he receives as approximate compensation or he may leave it on deposit and receive interest at the legal rate of seven percent.

The desirability of determining the condemnor's right to take the property before transfer of possession does not preclude broadened provisions for exchanging probable compensation for possession prior to judgment. While the limiting doctrines of "public use" and "public necessity" once played important roles in condemnation cases, now the only substantial question to be determined in nearly all condemnation proceedings is the amount of compensation. And, because the question of the condemnor's right to take the property is decided by the court—rather than by the jury—that question can be expeditiously determined in the cases in which it arises.

The existing constitutional authorization for immediate possession in takings for rights of way applies to most acquisitions for highway, freeway, and street purposes. As expansively interpreted, the authorization for such possession in takings of lands for reservoir purposes applies to most acquisitions of property needed to develop and conserve water resources. It has become apparent, however, that these two classes are neither entirely logical nor sufficiently inclusive. For example, a local government—but not a public utility serving the same needs—may obtain possession of the rights of way for an electric system; and neither may obtain possession of the site for the power plant.

The development of highways, and especially freeways, sometimes necessitates the taking of property outside the right of way. Even though the acquisition is by the state, no authorization exists for early possession of property outside the boundaries of the right of way. Similarly, many acquisitions in which possession prior to judgment would be appropriate are excluded both by the limitation as to entities and by the limitation as to the public purpose for which the property is being acquired. As an example, an assured date of possession is not available for the acquisition of a school site however great the need and whatever the size or responsibility of the school district.

The Commission accordingly recommends that any person authorized to acquire property by eminent domain should also be authorized to obtain possession of that property prior to judgment.¹¹⁹ This recommendation would extend the right of prejudgment possession to public utilities which, at present, do not have the right.¹²⁰

¹¹⁹ Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution should be revised to permit the Legislature to specify the purposes for which and the persons by whom possession may be taken prior to judgment. The revision should also provide explicitly that a property owner will be compensated concurrently with the transfer of possession.

¹²⁰ A few quasi-public entities also would be authorized to take possession prior to

Improvement of Prejudgment Possession Procedure

In order to protect the rights of owners and occupants of property of which possession prior to judgment is taken, the Commission recommends that the substance of the existing procedure for making and withdrawing deposits and for taking possession prior to judgment be modified in several important ways.

Amount of deposit. Under existing law, the court fixes the amount of the deposit on ex parte application of the condemnor.¹²¹ The amount fixed is almost always the amount suggested by the condemnor. Although existing law gives the property owner the right to have the court redetermine the amount of the deposit,¹²² experience has demonstrated that the court, having once made an order fixing the amount of the deposit, is reluctant to reconsider that decision even though the initial order was made on ex parte application.

Before making a deposit, the condemnor should be required to have an appraisal made by an expert appraiser. The amount deposited should be the amount determined by the appraiser to be the probable amount of compensation that will be awarded in the proceeding. The condemnor should be required to notify interested parties of the making of the deposit and to make available a statement of the valuation data upon which the amount of the deposit is based. The amount deposited should be subject to review and change by the court on motion of any interested party.

The recommended procedure would simplify existing practice by eliminating the need for an ex parte application to the court in every case. It would, however, provide the interested parties with information as to the valuation data on which the amount of the deposit is based and, if any party is dissatisfied with the amount of the deposit, he will have a factual basis for applying to the court for an increase in the deposit.

Procedure for making deposits. Existing law provides for the deposit of approximate compensation only in connection with an order for possession.¹²³ However, any condemnor, whether or not it seeks possession prior to judgment, should be authorized to make a deposit of the probable amount of

judgment. See discussion *supra* under "Quasi-public entities and private persons." Under the Commission's recommendation, private persons would not have the right of prejudgment possession because they would no longer exercise the power of eminent domain.

¹²¹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.5(a).

¹²² CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.5(d).

¹²³ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.5(a).

compensation that will be awarded in the proceeding. After a deposit is made, the condemnor should be entitled to an order for possession, effective 30 days after the making of the order, if the property owner either (a) expresses in writing his willingness to surrender possession of the property on or after a stated date or (b) withdraws the deposit.

The recommended procedure would provide a method by which the parties could effect a transfer of the right to possession in exchange for substantial compensation without prejudice to their rights to litigate the issue of compensation. It would benefit both parties to the proceeding. The property owner could withdraw the deposit and thus finance the acquisition of other property and defray other expenses incident to the taking. The withdrawal would benefit the condemnor; the property owner would, as under existing law, thereby waive all defenses to the proceeding except the claim to greater compensation, and withdrawal would also permit the condemnor to obtain possession without regard to the uncertain date that the trial and possible appeals may be concluded.

Withdrawal of deposit. The existing system for withdrawing the deposit should be streamlined to eliminate obstacles and delays. Under existing practice, where a party makes application to withdraw a deposit and the plaintiff objects to the withdrawal, such withdrawal is not permitted unless the plaintiff is able to make personal service of notice of the application upon all parties.¹²⁴ Two changes in the withdrawal procedure are recommended:

(1) The existing absolute prohibition of withdrawal absent personal service on all parties should be eliminated.¹²⁵ Quite often, "defendants" in eminent domain proceedings can easily be shown to have no compensable interest in the property. The courts can protect the rights of persons upon whom it is not possible to make service by requiring a bond or limiting the amount withdrawn in any case where it appears that the party not served actually has a compensable interest in the property.¹²⁶

(2) The plaintiff should be permitted to serve the notice of the application by mail on the other parties and their attorneys, if any, in all cases in which the other party has appeared or been served with the complaint and summons.

¹²⁴ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.7(e).

¹²⁵ *Id.*

¹²⁶ Cf. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.7(f).

Cost of withdrawal bonds. Existing law requires the condemnor to reimburse the cost of bond premiums where the need for the bond arises from the defendant's efforts to withdraw an amount greater than that originally deposited.¹²⁷ Reimbursement is not required under existing law if the bond is required because of completing claims among defendants.¹²⁸ However, conflicting claims to a deposit usually result from the need to allocate the award among owners of separate interests in the property. In such a case, the need for the allocation—as well as for the bond—arises from the eminent domain proceeding rather than from any act or omission of the defendants. Accordingly, the condemnor should be required to reimburse the cost of the bond in all cases except where the need for the bond arises primarily due to an issue as to title between the claimants.¹²⁹

Possession. The present requirement of 20 days' notice to the owners and occupants of property before the condemnor takes possession¹³⁰ should be extended to 90 days in the case of property occupied by a dwelling, business, or farm and to 30 days in all other cases. The present 20 days' notice can result in serious hardship and inconvenience. The longer notice requirements will not only serve to reduce the possibility of hardship and inconvenience but will also make possible the actual disbursement to the property owner of the required deposit before he is obligated to relinquish possession.¹³¹

In addition to a lengthened notice period, the owner or occupant of property should be able to obtain relief from the order for possession prior to judgment if the hardship to him will be substantial and the condemnor does not need possession or will suffer insignificant hardship by having possession delayed. So long as an order for possession is in effect, however, the condemnor should be entitled to enforcement of the order as a matter of right.

Prejudgment Deposit on Demand of Property Owner

The Commission has considered statutes of other states that permit the property owner, in all cases, to demand deposit of approximate compensation at the beginning of the

¹²⁷ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.7(b).

¹²⁸ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.7(f).

¹²⁹ Cf. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1246.1 (costs of determining issue as to title among defendants are borne by defendants).

¹³⁰ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243.5(c).

¹³¹ The lengthened time periods are also in accord with Government Code Section 7267.3, requiring 90 days' written notice before possession of occupied property.

proceedings.¹³² Under these statutes, the condemnor usually is given the right to possession upon complying with the demand of the condemnee. Although these statutes have merit, integration of such a requirement into California condemnation procedure does not appear feasible at this time. Nonetheless, a greater incentive should be provided to the condemnor to deposit approximate compensation in certain classes of hardship cases.

One such class of cases is where a residence is being taken. The common need to purchase another home before receipt of the final award places a particularly onerous burden upon the property owner. The property owner should have a right to demand that a deposit be made if the property being taken is residential property having not more than two dwelling units and he resides thereon. If the deposit is not made, interest at the legal rate of seven percent should be allowed on the amount of the eventual award from the date that the deposit should have been made.

Another class of "hardship case" is where rental property becomes subject to a high vacancy rate due to the condemnation proceeding. The owner of this type of property should be permitted to demand a prejudgment deposit and, absent compliance with the demand, be entitled to recover his rental losses caused by the eminent domain proceeding.¹³³

Procedures for Determining Right to Take

Where objections to the right to take are raised, the practice has been to hear and determine such objections prior to the trial of compensation issues. This priority should be continued and reflected in statutory form.

Where the court determines that the plaintiff does not have the right to acquire by eminent domain any property described in the complaint, it should be authorized to order, in lieu of immediate dismissal, conditional dismissal as to that property unless such corrective action as the court may direct has been taken within the time directed. The court should impose such limitations and conditions as are just under the circumstances of the particular case including the requirement that the plaintiff pay to the defendant all or a part of the reasonable litigation expenses necessarily incurred by the defendant

¹³² See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 26, § 1-407 (Supp. 1965).

¹³³ This recommendation would supplement the recovery for lost rents occasioned by precondemnation publicity as provided in *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).

because of the plaintiff's failure or omission which constituted the basis of the objection to the right to take.

Procedures for Determining Compensation

Pretrial Exchange of Valuation Data

The existing California scheme for pretrial exchange of valuation data among the parties to an eminent domain proceeding calls for a demand by a party no later than 50 days prior to trial and the opportunity to make a cross-demand no later than 40 days prior to trial, with the actual exchange of data occurring 20 days prior to trial.¹³⁴ While this scheme permits the exchange of basic valuation data, it does not permit sufficient time for follow-up discovery¹³⁵ and therefore is not as effective as it ought to be. To remedy this defect, the Commission recommends that the demand and exchange occur earlier in the proceeding¹³⁶ with an opportunity for the parties thereafter to undertake subsequent discovery to within 20 days before trial. This recommendation would preserve the mutuality of the exchange scheme without imposing additional burdens on the parties.

Burden of Proof of Compensation

Existing law places the burden of proof on the issue of compensation on the defendant.¹³⁷ This burden is inappropriate in an eminent domain proceeding since the task of the trier of fact is to sift through the conflicting opinions of value and supporting data and fix a value based on the weight it gives to them. Neither party should be made to bear a greater burden of persuasion than the other.

¹³⁴ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1272.01.

¹³⁵ See CAL. R. CT. 222 (limiting discovery undertaken within 30 days of trial).

¹³⁶ The demand should occur no later than 10 days following the date on which a trial date is selected. This will enable an earlier cutoff of demands while preserving adequate notice to the parties when the cutoff will occur. In this connection, the provision for a cross-demand should be eliminated. It is of marginal utility, the parties having ample opportunity to submit any necessary demands prior to the cutoff date. Elimination of the cross-demand will also serve to allay the misimpression that has arisen in some cases that a party who serves a demand need not exchange his own data unless a cross-demand has been served on him. The exchange of data should occur 40 days prior to trial unless the parties agree to another date.

¹³⁷ See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Tillman Estate Co., 205 Cal. 651, 272 P. 585 (1928).

Valuation Evidence

Evidence of the value of property in an eminent domain proceeding must relate to the fair market value of the property.¹³⁸ Although fair market value is normally determined by reference to "open market" transactions,¹³⁹ there may be some types of property for which there is no open market.¹⁴⁰ To assure that the basic evidentiary standard of fair market value is applicable to such special purpose properties, the phrase "in the open market" should be deleted from the definition of fair market value.¹⁴¹ This change will have no effect on the valuation of other properties for which there is an open market.

The value of property may be shown only by opinions of expert witnesses and the property owner.¹⁴² Where the owner of the property is a corporation, however, a corporate representative may not testify unless he is otherwise qualified as an expert.¹⁴³ This rule should be changed. Where there is a corporate owner of property, an officer or employee designated by the corporation should be permitted to give an opinion of the value of the property if the designee is knowledgeable as to the character and use of the property. This will enable the small corporation to give adequate testimony as to the value of its property in cases where it might not be able to afford the cost of an expert.

Where an expert witness relies on comparable sales as a basis for his opinion of value,¹⁴⁴ the Commission recommends that he be permitted a wide discretion in his selection of the sales, for it is better to have all relevant evidence available to the trier of fact than to have insufficient evidence. Any errors of excess can be cured by motions to strike and proper instructions to the jury.

While it may be proper to rely on comparable sales, it is not proper to give an opinion as to the value of property other than that being valued.¹⁴⁵ To this end, it should be made clear by

¹³⁸ See EVID. CODE § 814.

¹³⁹ *Id.*; see also *Sacramento S.R.R. v. Heilbron*, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980 (1909).

¹⁴⁰ Examples of such special purpose properties are schools, churches, cemeteries, parks, and utilities.

¹⁴¹ Application of the fair market value standard to special purpose properties is consistent with other provisions dealing expressly with valuation of particular properties. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE § 51295 (valuation of property under contract under California Land Conservation Act of 1965) and PUB. RES. CODE § 5407.2 (valuation of park land).

¹⁴² EVID. CODE § 813.

¹⁴³ See, e.g., *City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church*, 1 Cal. App.3d 384, 411–412, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1, 19 (1969).

¹⁴⁴ See EVID. CODE § 816.

¹⁴⁵ EVID. CODE § 822(d).

express provision that transactions involving the trade or exchange of any property are not a proper basis for an opinion as to the value of property.

Limitation on Valuation Experts

The number of valuation experts who may testify for a party in an eminent domain proceeding is presently limited to two, subject to a showing of good cause for additional witnesses.¹⁴⁶ This special provision is unnecessary and should be repealed. Its repeal would not affect the general authority of the court to control the number of expert witnesses.¹⁴⁷

Compensation of Court-Appointed Appraisers

The court may appoint appraisers, referees, commissioners, or other such persons to fix the value of property taken.¹⁴⁸ The fees fixed by the court for such persons may not exceed “similar fees for similar services in the community where such services are rendered.”¹⁴⁹ This restriction on the amount of compensation is unwarranted and may preclude effective use of court-appointed appraisers and the like in communities with comparatively low fee scales. The court, in fixing the fees for services, should be limited only by the requirement that they be reasonable in the circumstances of the case.

Possession After Judgment

The provisions for deposit, withdrawal, and possession of property following judgment but prior to the time the judgment becomes final are unnecessarily restrictive. Specific changes to improve the procedures are recommended below.

Deposit of Award

Under existing law, the defendant receives notice that a deposit has been made on the award only when he is served with an order for possession.¹⁵⁰ Since interest ceases to accrue when such a deposit is made¹⁵¹ and since the defendant may need the money for a short-notice move, he should receive notice of the deposit in all situations. Accordingly, the plaintiff at the time of making a postjudgment deposit should be required to serve a notice that the deposit has been made on all

¹⁴⁶ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1267.

¹⁴⁷ CODE CIV. PROC. § 723.

¹⁴⁸ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1266.2.

¹⁴⁹ *Id.*

¹⁵⁰ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1254.

¹⁵¹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255b(c).

the parties who have appeared in the proceeding and who claim an interest in the property taken. This will parallel the prejudgment deposit requirement.

In case the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside, it should be made clear that there is no judgment for deposit and withdrawal purposes or for obtaining possession after judgment. Prejudgment procedures should be used, and any amounts deposited should be deemed prejudgment deposits for the purposes of these procedures.

Withdrawal of Award

Existing law provides the opportunity for one of several defendants to withdraw a deposit after entry of judgment without notice to the other defendants.¹⁵² This provision creates a race to withdraw among parties laying claim to the award that could result in prejudice to parties who have had no opportunity to protect their interests. In order to protect all parties, a defendant seeking to withdraw any part of the award following judgment but prior to the time the award has been apportioned should serve a notice of application for withdrawal on all other parties who have appeared and are interested in the award. After the award has been apportioned, an applicant for withdrawal should be required to give notice only as the court may require.

The court should be authorized to require, in its discretion, that the defendant provide an undertaking to secure repayment of any excessive withdrawal made after entry of judgment. This will permit the courts to protect the condemnor in cases where it appears that the final judgment may be less than the amount withdrawn. For example, the court might require an undertaking in a case where the condemnor has made a motion for a new trial or has appealed from the judgment and the court believes that there is a substantial possibility that the judgment will be vacated, reversed, or set aside and a new trial granted.

Where there is a delay between entry of judgment and the time of apportionment of the award and the defendants are unable to agree to the withdrawal of an amount deposited for them, such amount should be deposited in an interest-bearing account for their benefit upon motion of any defendant having an interest in the award. This will assure that the defendants will not lose interest earned on the deposit pending resolution of their dispute.

¹⁵² CODE CIV. PROC. § 1254(f).

Possession After Judgment

The 10-day notice period before which possession may be taken by the condemnor pursuant to an order for possession obtained after entry of judgment¹⁵³ is unduly short in the case of occupied property. This period should be extended to 30 days in cases where the property is occupied by a dwelling, business, or farm.

Satisfaction of Judgment

Under existing law, unnecessary confusion has arisen from the purely theoretical distinction between a payment into court to satisfy the judgment¹⁵⁴ and a deposit made pending appeal or motion for new trial.¹⁵⁵ One uniform procedure should be provided for paying the amount of the award into court after entry of judgment, and for withdrawing the amount so paid, whether or not either party plans to appeal or move for a new trial.

Existing law requires that the condemnor satisfy the judgment no later than 30 days after it becomes final except that, where the condemnor is the state or a public corporation, it may delay payment up to a year in order to market bonds to enable it to pay the judgment.¹⁵⁶ This delay provision should be eliminated; a property owner suffers many hardships in the course of the planning and execution of a public project without the added hardship of a year's delay before he receives payment for his property.

In the event that the 30-day period elapses without satisfaction of the judgment, existing law requires the property owner to seek execution before he is entitled to have the proceeding dismissed.¹⁵⁷ The property owner should be permitted to seek dismissal of the eminent domain proceeding upon nonpayment without having to make an expensive, time-consuming, and futile attempt to execute. To protect the condemnor in such a case from dismissal for an inadvertent failure to pay, the property owner should give notice of intent to seek dismissal and should have a right to obtain the dismissal if the condemnor fails to pay within 20 days thereafter.

At present, it is not clear whether the final order of condemnation may be obtained after satisfaction of judgment alone or whether the judgment must first become final;¹⁵⁸

¹⁵³ See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1254(c).

¹⁵⁴ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1252.

¹⁵⁵ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1254.

¹⁵⁶ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1251.

¹⁵⁷ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1252.

¹⁵⁸ See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1253; *cf. Arechiga v. Housing Authority*, 183 Cal. App.2d 835, 7 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1960).

for the protection of all parties concerned, the law should be made clear that a final order of condemnation may be issued only after final judgment.

Costs

Code of Civil Procedure Section 1255 states that, in eminent domain proceedings "costs may be allowed or not, and if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides, in the discretion of the court." However, very early the California Supreme Court held that Section 1255 "must be limited by section 14 of article I of the constitution. . . . To require the defendants in [an eminent domain] case to pay any portion of their costs necessarily incidental to the trial of the issues on their part, or any part of the costs of the plaintiff, would reduce the just compensation awarded by the jury, by a sum equal to that paid by them for such costs."¹⁵⁹ Thus, despite the language of Section 1255, the cases have generally allowed the defendant in an eminent domain proceeding his ordinary court costs¹⁶⁰ except that the costs of determining title as between two or more defendants is borne by the defendants.¹⁶¹ The statutes should be revised to conform with existing law on costs.

In case of an appeal by the plaintiff, the defendant has normally been allowed his costs on appeal whether or not he is the prevailing party.¹⁶² Where the defendant appeals and prevails, he is always allowed his costs.¹⁶³ However, the law is not clear whether the defendant who takes an appeal but does not prevail is entitled to costs.¹⁶⁴ A general rule should be provided that the defendant is entitled to his costs on appeal in all eminent domain cases except where the Judicial Council, by court rule, provides limitations specifically applicable to eminent domain.

If the defendant obtains a new trial and subsequently fails to obtain an increased award, the cost of the new trial is taxed against him.¹⁶⁵ This rule is unduly harsh and should be

¹⁵⁹ City & County of San Francisco v. Collins, 98 Cal. 259, 262, 33 P. 56, 57 (1893).

¹⁶⁰ See, e.g., Decoto School Dist. v. M. & S. Tile Co., 225 Cal. App.2d 310, 315, 37 Cal. Rptr. 225, 229 (1964).

¹⁶¹ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1246.1.

¹⁶² See, e.g., Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed, 217 Cal. App.2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963).

¹⁶³ See, e.g., Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Morris, 12 Cal. App.3d 679, 90 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1970).

¹⁶⁴ Compare, e.g., City of Baldwin Park v. Stoskus, 8 Cal.3d 563, 571, 503 P.2d 1333, 1338, 105 Cal. Rptr. 325, 330 (1972), with City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co., 172 Cal. 332, 156 P. 468 (1916).

¹⁶⁵ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1254(k). See, e.g., Los Angeles, P. & G. Ry. v. Rumpf, 104 Cal. 20, 37 P. 859 (1894).

eliminated; a defendant should not be required to pay the cost of obtaining a proper and error-free trial.

Litigation Expenses

Entry for Examination

Where a condemnor enters upon property to determine the suitability of the property for public use, it must compensate the owner for any damages caused by the entry and by any tests made and must pay the owner for his court costs and reasonable attorney's fees expended in obtaining such compensation.¹⁶⁶ The provision for award of attorney's fees should not be automatically applied but should be limited to those cases where the interests of justice require such an award.

Abandonment and Dismissal

Litigation expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and fees for the services of other experts, are awarded to the defendant where the plaintiff abandons the proceeding¹⁶⁷ or the defendant defeats a public entity plaintiff's right to take the property by eminent domain.¹⁶⁸ This rule should be expanded to allow litigation expenses against all plaintiffs in any case where the eminent domain proceeding is dismissed, including dismissal for failure to prosecute (a situation where litigation expenses are denied by the existing law).¹⁶⁹

Rights of Former Owner in Property Taken

The Law Revision Commission considered in depth the possibility of permitting the former owner of property taken by eminent domain to repurchase that property should it become surplus to the needs of the condemnor.¹⁷⁰ The Commission has concluded, however, that a general repurchase right would create practical problems of administration that far outweigh its potential social benefits and accordingly recommends against adoption of the repurchase right as a statutory requirement.¹⁷¹

¹⁶⁶ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1242.5(e).

¹⁶⁷ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255a.

¹⁶⁸ CODE CIV. PROC. § 1246.4.

¹⁶⁹ See, e.g., *City of Industry v. Gordon*, 29 Cal. App.3d 90, 105 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1972).

¹⁷⁰ For a background study prepared for the Commission on this subject, see Sterling, *Former Owner's Right to Repurchase Land Taken for Public Use*. 4 PAC. L.J. 65 (1973).

¹⁷¹ For a similar conclusion, see LAW REFORM COMMISSION OF BRITISH COLUMBIA, REPORT ON EXPROPRIATION 118-121 (1971).

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

TITLE 7. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

(This title is to be added to Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure)

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

- § 1230.010. Short title
- § 1230.020. Law governing exercise of eminent domain power
- § 1230.030. Exercise of eminent domain power discretionary
- § 1230.040. Rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings
- § 1230.050. Court may enforce right to possession
- § 1230.060. Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction preserved
- § 1230.070. Effect of enactment of title on prior proceedings

CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION; DEFINITIONS

Article 1. Construction

- § 1235.010. Construction of title
- § 1235.020. Effect of headings
- § 1235.030. References to statutes
- § 1235.040. "Chapter," "article," "section," "subdivision," and "paragraph"
- § 1235.050. Construction of tenses
- § 1235.060. "Shall" and "may"
- § 1235.070. Constitutionality

Article 2. Words and Phrases Defined

- § 1235.110. Application of definitions
- § 1235.120. Final judgment
- § 1235.130. Judgment
- § 1235.140. [Reserved for expansion]
- § 1235.150. Local public entity
- § 1235.160. Person
- § 1235.170. Property
- § 1235.180. Property appropriated to public use
- § 1235.190. Public entity
- § 1235.200. State
- § 1235.210. Statute

CHAPTER 3. THE RIGHT TO TAKE

Article 1. General Limitations on Exercise of Power of Eminent Domain

- § 1240.010. Public use limitation
- § 1240.020. Statutory delegation of condemnation authority required
- § 1240.030. Public necessity required
- § 1240.040. Resolution of necessity required
- § 1240.050. Extraterritorial condemnation

Article 2. Rights Included in Grant of Eminent Domain Authority

- § 1240.110. Right to acquire any necessary right or interest in any type of property
- § 1240.120. Right to acquire property to make effective the principal use
- § 1240.130. Acquisition by gift, purchase, lease, or other means
- § 1240.140. Joint exercise of condemnation power pursuant to Joint Powers Agreements Act

- § 1240.150. Acquisition of all or portion of remainder with owner's consent
- § 1240.160. Interpretation of grants of eminent domain authority; separate authorizations

Article 3. Future Use

- § 1240.210. "Date of use" defined
- § 1240.220. Acquisitions for future use
- § 1240.230. Burden of proof

Article 4. Substitute Condemnation

- § 1240.310. Definitions
- § 1240.320. Substitute condemnation where owner of necessary property authorized to condemn property
- § 1240.330. Substitute condemnation to permit condemnor to relocate public use
- § 1240.340. Substitute condemnation where owner of necessary property lacks power to condemn property
- § 1240.350. Substitute condemnation to provide utility service or access to public road

Article 5. Excess Condemnation

- § 1240.410. Condemnation of remnants
- § 1240.420. Resolution of necessity and complaint
- § 1240.430. Disposal of acquired remnants

Article 6. Condemnation for Compatible Use

- § 1240.510. Property appropriated to public use may be taken for compatible public use
- § 1240.520. Burden of proof
- § 1240.530. Terms and conditions of joint use

Article 7. Condemnation for More Necessary Public Use

- § 1240.610. Property appropriated to public use may be taken for more necessary public use
- § 1240.620. Burden of proof
- § 1240.630. Right of prior user to joint use
- § 1240.640. Use by state more necessary than other uses
- § 1240.650. Use by public entity more necessary than use by other persons
- § 1240.660. Property appropriated to the public use of cities, counties, or certain special districts
- § 1240.670. Property preserved in its natural condition by nonprofit organization
- § 1240.680. Property appropriated to park or similar uses
- § 1240.690. Declaratory relief where acquisition for state highway purposes.
- § 1240.700. Declaratory relief where regional park to be acquired for city or county street purposes

CHAPTER 4. PRECONDEMNATION ACTIVITIES

Article 1. Preliminary Location, Survey, and Tests

- § 1245.010. Right to make examinations and tests
- § 1245.020. Liability for damages
- § 1245.030. Consent or court order required in certain cases
- § 1245.040. Court order permitting entry; deposit of probable compensation
- § 1245.050. Modification of court order

- § 1245.060. Management of amount deposited
- § 1245.070. Recovery of damages and expenses

Article 2. Resolution of Necessity

- § 1245.210. “Governing body” defined
- § 1245.220. Resolution of necessity required
- § 1245.230. Contents of resolution
- § 1245.240. Adoption of resolution
- § 1245.250. Effect of resolution
- § 1245.260. Failure to initiate eminent domain proceeding within six months from adoption of resolution

CHAPTER 5. COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDING

Article 1. Jurisdiction and Venue

- § 1250.010. Jurisdiction in superior court
- § 1250.020. Place of commencement
- § 1250.030. Place of trial
- § 1250.040. Change of place of trial generally

Article 2. Commencement of Proceeding Generally

- § 1250.110. Complaint commences proceeding
- § 1250.120. Contents of summons
- § 1250.130. Additional requirements where service is by publication
- § 1250.140. Attorney General served where state is a defendant
- § 1250.150. Lis pendens

Article 3. Parties; Joinder of Property

- § 1250.210. Identification of parties
- § 1250.220. Naming defendants
- § 1250.230. Appearance by named and unnamed defendants
- § 1250.240. Joinder of property

Article 4. Pleadings

- § 1250.310. Contents of complaint
- § 1250.320. Contents of answer
- § 1250.330. Signing of pleadings by attorney
- § 1250.340. Amendment of pleadings
- § 1250.350. Pleading objections to right to take
- § 1250.360. Grounds for objection to right to take where resolution conclusive
- § 1250.370. Grounds for objection to right to take where resolution not conclusive

CHAPTER 6. DEPOSIT AND WITHDRAWAL OF PROBABLE COMPENSATION; POSSESSION PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Article 1. Deposit of Probable Compensation

- § 1255.010. Deposit of amount of appraised value of property
- § 1255.020. Service of notice of deposit
- § 1255.030. Increase or decrease in amount of deposit
- § 1255.040. Deposit for relocation purposes on motion of certain defendants
- § 1255.050. Deposit on motion of owner of rental property
- § 1255.060. Limitation on use of evidence submitted in connection with deposit
- § 1255.070. Deposit in State Treasury unless otherwise required
- § 1255.080. Deposit does not affect other rights

Article 2. Withdrawal of Deposit

- § 1255.210. Application for withdrawal of deposit
- § 1255.220. Order permitting withdrawal
- § 1255.230. Objections to withdrawal
- § 1255.240. Security where conflicting claims to amount withdrawn
- § 1255.250. Security when amount in excess of original deposit is withdrawn
- § 1255.260. Withdrawal waives all defenses except claim to greater compensation
- § 1255.270. Limitation on use of evidence submitted in connection with deposit
- § 1255.280. Repayment of amount of excess withdrawal

Article 3. Possession Prior to Judgment

- § 1255.410. Order for possession prior to judgment
- § 1255.420. Stay of order for hardship
- § 1255.430. Stay of order where right to take contested
- § 1255.440. Vacating order for possession
- § 1255.450. Service of order
- § 1255.460. Right of plaintiff to take possession after defendant's consent or withdrawal of deposit
- § 1255.470. Taking possession does not affect other rights
- § 1255.480. Police power not affected

CHAPTER 7. DISCOVERY; EXCHANGE OF VALUATION DATA**Article 1. Discovery**

- § 1258.010. Use of discovery procedures
- § 1258.020. Discovery following exchange of valuation data
- § 1258.030. Admissibility of evidence

Article 2. Exchange of Valuation Data

- § 1258.210. Demand for exchange
- § 1258.220. Date of exchange
- § 1258.230. Exchange of lists and statements
- § 1258.240. Contents of list of expert witnesses
- § 1258.250. Persons for whom statements of valuation data must be exchanged
- § 1258.260. Contents of statement of valuation data
- § 1258.270. Supplementation of lists and statements
- § 1258.280. Limitations upon calling witnesses and testimony by witnesses
- § 1258.290. Relief from limitations on calling witness or testimony by witness
- § 1258.300. Applicability of article

CHAPTER 8. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING RIGHT TO TAKE AND COMPENSATION**Article 1. General Provisions**

- § 1260.010. Trial preference
- § 1260.020. Determination of compatibility and more necessary public use where separate proceedings are consolidated

Article 2. Contesting Right to Take

- § 1260.110. Priority for hearing
- § 1260.120. Disposition of defendant's objections to right to take

Article 3. Procedures Relating to Determination of Compensation

- § 1260.210. Order of proof and argument; burden of proof
- § 1260.220. Procedure where there are divided interests
- § 1260.230. Separate assessment of elements of compensation
- § 1260.240. Court determination of compensation for deceased and unknown persons
- § 1260.250. Compensation for appraisers, referees, commissioners, and others

CHAPTER 9. COMPENSATION**Article 1. General Provisions**

- § 1263.010. Right to compensation
- § 1263.020. Accrual of right to compensation

Article 2. Date of Valuation

- § 1263.110. Date of valuation fixed by deposit
- § 1263.120. Trial within one year
- § 1263.130. Trial not within one year
- § 1263.140. New trial
- § 1263.150. Mistrial

Article 3. Compensation for Improvements

- § 1263.210. Compensation for improvements pertaining to the realty
- § 1263.220. Business equipment
- § 1263.230. Improvements removed, destroyed, or damaged
- § 1263.240. Improvements made after service of summons
- § 1263.250. Harvesting and marketing of crops
- § 1263.260. Removal of improvements pertaining to realty
- § 1263.270. Removal of improvements for storage in case of dispute
- § 1263.280. Improvements whose removal may damage structure

Article 4. Measure of Compensation for Property Taken

- § 1263.310. Compensation for property taken
- § 1263.320. Fair market value
- § 1263.330. Changes in property value due to imminence of project

Article 5. Compensation for Injury to Remainder

- § 1263.410. Compensation for injury to remainder
- § 1263.420. Damage to remainder
- § 1263.430. Benefit to remainder
- § 1263.440. Computing damage and benefit to remainder
- § 1263.450. Compensation to reflect project as proposed

Article 6. Loss of Goodwill

- § 1263.510. Loss of goodwill

Article 7. Miscellaneous Provisions

- § 1263.610. Performance of work to reduce compensation
- § 1263.620. Partially completed improvements; performance of work to protect public from injury

CHAPTER 10. DIVIDED INTERESTS**Article 1. General Provisions**

- § 1265.010. Scope of chapter

Article 2. Leases

- § 1265.110. Termination of lease in whole taking
- § 1265.120. Partial termination of lease in partial taking
- § 1265.130. Termination of lease in partial taking
- § 1265.140. Time of termination or partial termination
- § 1265.150. Remedies of parties not affected
- § 1265.160. Rights under lease not affected

Article 3. Encumbrances

- § 1265.210. "Lien" defined
- § 1265.220. Acquisition of property subject to encumbrances
- § 1265.230. Allocation of award among encumbrancers in partial taking
- § 1265.240. Prepayment penalty

Article 4. Options

- § 1265.310. Unexercised options

Article 5. Future Interests

- § 1265.410. Contingent future interests
- § 1265.420. Property subject to life tenancy

CHAPTER 11. POSTJUDGMENT PROCEDURE**Article 1. Payment of Judgment; Final Order of Condemnation**

- § 1268.010. Payment of judgment
- § 1268.020. Remedies of defendant if judgment not paid
- § 1268.030. Final order of condemnation

Article 2. Deposit and Withdrawal of Award

- § 1268.110. Deposit after judgment
- § 1268.120. Notice of deposit
- § 1268.130. Increase or decrease in amount of deposit
- § 1268.140. Withdrawal of deposit
- § 1268.150. Deposit in State Treasury unless otherwise required
- § 1268.160. Repayment of excess withdrawal
- § 1268.170. Making deposit does not affect other rights

Article 3. Possession After Judgment

- § 1268.210. Order for possession
- § 1268.220. Service of order
- § 1268.230. Taking possession does not affect other rights
- § 1268.240. Police power not affected

Article 4. Interest

- § 1268.310. Date interest commences to accrue
- § 1268.320. Date interest ceases to accrue
- § 1268.330. Offsets against interest
- § 1268.340. Interest to be assessed by court

Article 5. Proration of Property Taxes

- § 1268.410. Liability for taxes
- § 1268.420. Application for separate valuation of property
- § 1268.430. Reimbursement for taxes

Article 6. Abandonment

§ 1268.510. Abandonment

Article 7. Litigation Expenses and Damages Upon Dismissal or Defeat of Right to Take

§ 1268.610. Litigation expenses

§ 1268.620. Damages caused by possession

Article 8. Costs

§ 1268.710. Court costs

§ 1268.720. Costs on appeal

CHAPTER 12. ARBITRATION OF COMPENSATION IN ACQUISITIONS OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE

§ 1273.010. Arbitration of amount of compensation authorized

§ 1273.020. Expenses of arbitration

§ 1273.030. Effect and enforceability of agreements

§ 1273.040. Abandonment of acquisition

§ 1273.050. Recordation of agreements

AMENDMENTS, ADDITIONS, AND REPEALS**DELEGATION OF CONDEMNATION AUTHORITY**

Civil Code § 1001 (repealed)

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

Code of Civil Procedure § 170 (technical amendment)

CROSS-COMPLAINTS

Code of Civil Procedure

§ 426.70 (added)

§ 428.10 (technical amendment)

ACTION TO ENJOIN DIVERSION OF WATER

Code of Civil Procedure § 534 (technical amendment)

REFEREES

Code of Civil Procedure § 640 (amended)

GARNISHMENT OF DEBT OWED BY PUBLIC ENTITY

Code of Civil Procedure § 710 (technical amendment)

LITIGATION EXPENSES IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

Code of Civil Procedure § 1036 (added)

GENERAL CONDEMNATION STATUTE

Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1237–1273.06 (repealed)

SCHOOL DISTRICTS**Education Code**

- § 1047.5 (added)
- § 1048 (added)
- § 15007.5 (repealed)
- § 15009 (amended)
- § 16003 (repealed)

NONPROFIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLLEGIATE GRADE

Education Code § 30051 (added)

EVIDENCE**Evidence Code**

- § 811 (technical amendment)
- § 812 (technical amendment)
- § 813 (amended)
- § 814 (technical amendment)
- § 816 (amended)
- § 817 (technical amendment)
- § 822 (amended)

GENERAL CONDEMNATION AUTHORIZATION

Government Code § 184 (repealed)

PROTECTIVE CONDEMNATION

Government Code §§ 190–196 (repealed)

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITIES

Government Code § 816 (technical amendment)

ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY COUNTY OR CITY FOR OPEN SPACE**Government Code**

- Heading for Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 6950) (amended)
- § 6950 (amended)
- § 6952 (amended)
- § 6953 (amended)
- § 6955 (added)
- § 6956 (added)

ACQUISITION PRICE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Government Code § 7275 (added)

RESTORATION OF DESTROYED STATE RECORDS

Government Code § 14770 (added)

CONDEMNATION DEPOSITS FUND**Government Code**

- § 16429.1 (added)
- § 16429.2 (added)
- § 16429.3 (added)

COUNTIES

Government Code § 25350.5 (added)

MOBILIZATION, TRAINING, AND SUPPLY STATIONS

Government Code § 25431 (technical amendment)

CITIES

Government Code § 37350.5 (added)

CITY REVOLVING FUND

Government Code § 43424 (technical amendment)

PROPERTY TO BE USED FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES

Government Code § 50366 (technical amendment)

AIRPORT HAZARDS

Government Code

§ 50485.2 (amended)

§ 50485.13 (repealed)

AGRICULTURAL PRESERVES

Government Code § 51291 (technical amendment)

RESTORATION OF DESTROYED LOCAL PUBLIC RECORDS

Government Code § 53040 (added)

INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

Government Code § 53844 (technical amendment)

JOINT SANITATION PROJECTS

Government Code § 55003 (technical amendment)

WHARVES, CHUTES, AND PIERS

Harbors & Navigation Code § 4009 (amended)

NONPROFIT HOSPITALS

Health & Safety Code

§ 438.4 (amended)

§ 1427 (added)

SEWER CONSTRUCTION

Health & Safety Code § 4967 (added)

COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT LAW

Health & Safety Code § 33398 (technical amendment)

RENEWAL AREA AGENCY**Health & Safety Code**

- § 33720 (amended)
- § 33721 (amended)
- § 33723 (amended)

HOUSING AUTHORITY

Health & Safety Code § 34325 (amended)

LIMITED DIVIDEND HOUSING CORPORATIONS**Health & Safety Code**

- § 34875 (amended)
- § 34876 (amended)
- § 34878 (amended)

LAND CHEST CORPORATIONS**Health & Safety Code**

- § 35167 (added)
- § 35168 (added)
- § 35169 (added)
- § 35170 (added)
- § 35171 (added)

HOUSING AUTHORITY

Health & Safety Code § 36059 (technical amendment)

PREVENTION OF SUBSIDENCE IN OIL OR GAS PRODUCTION AREA**Public Resources Code**

- § 3320.1 (technical amendment)
- § 3341 (technical amendment)

RECREATIONAL TRAILS

Public Resources Code § 5077.1 (repealed)

PARKS AND BOULEVARDS

Public Resources Code § 5301 (technical amendment)

LANDS EXEMPT FROM CONDEMNATION

Public Resources Code § 8030 (added)

NATIONAL PARKS

Public Resources Code § 8402 (technical amendment)

PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITIES**Public Utilities Code**

- § 610 (added)
- § 611 (added)
- § 612 (added)
- § 613 (added)
- § 614 (added)

§ 615 (added)
§ 616 (added)
§ 617 (added)
§ 618 (added)
§ 619 (added)
§ 620 (added)
§ 621 (added)
§ 622 (added)
§ 623 (added)
§ 624 (added)

CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING RELOCATION OF UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS

Public Utilities Code § 861 (added)

EXTENSION OF SERVICE INTO AREAS SERVED BY PRIVATE UTILITY

Public Utilities Code § 1503 (technical amendment)

MUTUAL WATER COMPANIES

Public Utilities Code § 2729 (added)

RAILROADS

Public Utilities Code

§ 7526 (technical amendment)
§ 7557 (added)

AIRPORT HAZARDS

Public Utilities Code § 21634 (repealed)

AIRCRAFT HAZARD OR DISTURBANCE ELIMINATION

Public Utilities Code

§ 21652 (added)
§ 21653 (added)

COUNTY—ACQUISITIONS FOR STATE HIGHWAY PURPOSES

Streets & Highways Code § 760 (technical amendment)

CHANGE OF GRADE

Streets & Highways Code § 858 (technical amendment)

BOUNDARIES OF HIGHWAYS

Streets & Highways Code § 869 (technical amendment)

COUNTY ROADS AND HIGHWAYS

Streets & Highways Code

§ 943 (amended)
§ 943.1 (repealed)
§ 943.2 (repealed)
§ 943.4 (repealed)

WORK TO REDUCE COMPENSATION
Streets & Highways Code § 970 (repealed)**PRIVATE BYROADS**
Streets & Highways Code §§ 1050–1054 (repealed)**IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1911**

Streets & Highways Code
§ 5100 (technical amendment)
§ 5101 (technical amendment)
§ 5104 (technical amendment)
§ 5661 (technical amendment)

MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1913

Streets & Highways Code § 10100.1 (technical amendment)

PEDESTRIAN MALL LAW OF 1960

Streets & Highways Code § 11400 (amended)

PRIVATE WAYS FOR CANALS

Water Codes §§ 7020–7026 (repealed)

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS**CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION**

Article I
§ 14 (amended)
§ 14½ (repealed)

TITLE 7. EMINENT DOMAIN LAW

CHAPTER 1. GENERAL PROVISIONS

§ 1230.010. Short title

1230.010. This title shall be known and may be cited as the Eminent Domain Law.

Comment. Section 1230.010 is similar to comparable sections in recently enacted California laws. *E.g.*, CIVIL CODE § 4000 (The Family Law Act).

§ 1230.020. Law governing exercise of eminent domain power

1230.020. Except as otherwise specifically provided by statute, the power of eminent domain may be exercised only as provided in this title.

Comment. Section 1230.020 is the same in substance as the second sentence of former Section 1237. See also former Section 1258. The provisions of the Eminent Domain Law govern all acquisitions by eminent domain except to the extent that specific provision is otherwise made by statute. Instances of specific provisions otherwise are (1) where the Public Utilities Commission may determine just compensation (see PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1206–1218 and 1401–1421) and (2) where the state has expressly provided that federal law controls (see, *e.g.*, *County of Marin v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.2d 633, 349 P.2d 526, 2 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1960)).

The provisions of the Eminent Domain Law are intended to supply rules for eminent domain proceedings. Whether any of its provisions may also be applicable in inverse condemnation actions is a matter not determined by statute but is left to judicial development. Cf. Section 1263.010 and Comment thereto (right to compensation).

§ 1230.030. Exercise of eminent domain power discretionary

1230.030. Nothing in this title requires that the power of eminent domain be exercised to acquire property necessary for public use. Whether property necessary for public use is to be acquired by purchase or other means or by eminent domain is a decision left to the discretion of the person authorized to acquire the property.

Comment. Section 1230.030 makes clear that whether property is to be acquired by purchase or other means, or by exercise of the power of eminent domain, is a discretionary decision. Nothing in this title requires that the power of eminent domain be exercised; but, if the decision is that the power of eminent domain is to be used to acquire property for public use, the provisions of this title apply except as otherwise specifically provided by statute. See Section 1230.020. Compare GOVT. CODE § 15854 (property acquired pursuant to Property Acquisition Law).

§ 1230.040. Rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings

1230.040. Except as otherwise provided in this title, the rules of practice that govern civil actions generally are the rules of practice for eminent domain proceedings.

Comment. Section 1230.040 supersedes Section 1256 and the first portion of former Section 1257 which incorporated Part 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to civil actions. It continues the general principle that eminent domain proceedings are to be governed by the same rules as civil actions generally. See *Felton Water Co. v. Superior Court*, 82 Cal. App. 382, 256 P. 255 (1927). The advantages of having the practice in different proceedings in the courts as nearly uniform as possible is manifest. See Code Commissioners' Note to former Section 1256.

Generally speaking, the rules of practice that govern civil actions may be found in Part 2 (Sections 307–1062a) of this code. However, additional provisions in other portions of the Code of Civil Procedure and many nonstatutory rules of procedure which apply to civil actions generally may also be applicable to eminent domain proceedings. Such general rules of practice are incorporated by Section 1230.040 unless the Eminent Domain Law expressly provides a different rule or application of the general rule that would be inconsistent with the provisions of this title. Cf. *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924); *City of Santa Rosa v. Fountain Water Co.*, 138 Cal. 579, 582, 71 P. 1123, 1136 (1903) (dissenting opinion). As a rule, the mere fact that a provision of the Code of Civil Procedure utilizes the term "action" rather than "proceeding," or the fact that a provision has not been applied to other special proceedings, does not preclude its applicability in eminent domain proceedings. See *City of Oakland v. Darbee*, 102 Cal.

App.2d 493, 227 P.2d 909 (1951). The intent of Section 1230.040 is to include as many rules of practice as would be consistent with the efficient administration of the provisions of this title.

The following summary indicates for some major areas of civil procedure which rules are incorporated by Section 1230.040 and which are displaced by specific provisions of this title.

Jurisdiction; venue. Section 1250.010 states the basic rule that eminent domain proceedings are to be conducted in the superior court. This continues the substance of former Section 1243 and creates an exception to Section 89 which would otherwise give jurisdiction in some cases to the municipal court.

Section 1250.020 provides specific rules relating to the place of commencement of an eminent domain proceeding, but Section 1250.040 makes clear that the change of venue provisions for civil actions generally apply as well to eminent domain proceedings.

Commencement of the proceeding. Section 1250.110 provides that an eminent domain proceeding is commenced by the filing of a complaint. This duplicates the provisions of Section 411.10 and supersedes a portion of former Section 1243 which provided that eminent domain proceedings were commenced by filing a complaint "and issuing a summons." The filing of a complaint in the proper court confers subject matter jurisdiction on the court. See *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924); *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. App.2d 636, 116 P.2d 458 (1941).

Summons. The Code of Civil Procedure provisions relating to the form of summons and manner of service apply generally to eminent domain proceedings. See generally Section 412.10 *et seq.* However, subdivision (b) of Section 1250.120 supplements the rules relating to the form of the summons, and Sections 1250.130 and 1250.140 provide additional rules relating to the manner of service. Service of summons is, of course, essential to confer jurisdiction over any defendant, absent a general appearance or waiver by such person. See Section 410.50 (general appearance); *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924) (waiver).

Lis pendens. The plaintiff in an eminent domain proceeding should file a lis pendens after the proceeding is commenced in order to assure that it acquires full title to the property that it seeks. See Section 409. See also CIVIL CODE § 1214 (every conveyance is void as against any judgment affecting title unless the conveyance is recorded prior to a lis pendens). Former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1243 required the plaintiff to file a lis pendens at the time of the

commencement of the action. However, such filing is now discretionary (Section 1250.150) except where service is by publication (Section 1250.130).

Failure of the plaintiff to record a notice of the pendency of the proceeding pursuant to the provisions of Section 409 does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction but may relieve innocent third parties from the operation of a judgment affecting the property in dispute. See *Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co.*, 13 Cal. 306, 319 (1859); *Housing Authority v. Forbes*, 51 Cal. App.2d 1, 124 P.2d 194 (1942) (dictum). See also former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1243 (duplicating the requirements of Section 409) and *Roach v. Riverside Water Co.*, 74 Cal. 263, 15 P. 776 (1887) (Section 409 applicable to condemnation proceedings).

Parties. Section 1250.210 supplements Section 1063 and makes clear that the terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" are to be used in an eminent domain proceeding just as in civil actions generally. As to special joinder provisions, see Section 1250.240.

In some situations, it is desirable that an eminent domain proceeding have the attributes of a quiet title action and specific provisions of this title accomplish this end. See Sections 1250.120(b), 1250.130 (service by publication), 1250.220 (naming defendants), 1250.230 (appearance by defendants), 1260.240 (court determination of compensation for deceased and unknown persons).

Pleadings. Certain requirements for the contents of the complaint and answer in an eminent domain proceeding are specified by Sections 1250.310 and 1250.320 respectively. Moreover, Section 1250.330 provides special rules relating to the signing of pleadings where a party is represented by an attorney. Finally, Section 1250.340 supplements the liberal rules applicable to amendments provided by Section 473. However, many general statutory or court rules relating to pleadings continue to apply; see, e.g., Sections 426.70 and 428.10(b) (cross-complaints), 430.10 *et seq.* and 1250.350 (demurrers and answers), 1003 *et seq.* (motion and orders), 1010 *et seq.* (notices); CAL. R. CT., 201 *et seq.*

Pretrial activities. Between the time of pleading and trial, there may be many activities specified in and controlled by the Code of Civil Procedure. Although Chapter 7 (commencing with Section 1258.010) provides certain special rules relating to discovery, including the exchange of valuation data, these rules supplement and do not replace the general discovery procedures. See Section 1258.010. The judge may be subject to disqualification due to financial interest or prejudice. Sections

170 and 170.6. See *John Heinlen Co. v. Superior Court*, 17 Cal. App. 660, 121 P. 293 (1911). Section 1260.010 provides a trial preference for eminent domain proceedings; however, Code of Civil Procedure Section 594, which provides generally for setting an action for trial, is not affected. Section 1260.020 provides certain rules relating to the issues of compatibility and “more necessary” use where separate proceedings are consolidated, but this section does not otherwise limit Section 1048. And, of course, the court has the power to grant a continuance where necessary. See, e.g., Section 594a.

Trial. Nothing in this title alters the rule provided by Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution that the issue of compensation to the owner of property shall be determined by a jury unless a jury trial is waived. However, with respect to the method of determining issues other than compensation involved in an eminent domain proceeding, the courts have looked to the rules applicable in actions generally and have held that Section 592 requires that other issues of fact or of mixed fact and law are to be tried by the court. *People v. Ricciardi*, 23 Cal.2d 390, 402–403, 144 P.2d 799, 805–806 (1943); *Vallejo & N.R.R. v. Reed Orchard Co.*, 169 Cal. 545, 555–558, 147 P. 238, 243–245 (1915). See also Section 1260.120 (court determination of objections to the right to take). The court may submit such other issues to the jury, but the jury’s verdict is only advisory and the court must then make its findings thereon. *Vallejo & N.R.R. v. Reed Orchard Co.*, *supra*. See *California S.R.R. v. Southern Pac. R.R.*, 67 Cal. 59, 7 P. 123 (1885). In addition to adjudicating the right to take and the amount of just compensation (subject to jury trial of facts), the court may, for example, also decide any subsidiary issues such as liability for property taxes, the rights of parties under an executory sale contract, claims of adverse interests in the property, and the like. See, e.g., *City of San Gabriel v. Pacific Elec. R.R.*, 129 Cal. App. 460, 18 P.2d 996 (1933) (conflicting claims), and *City of Los Angeles v. Darms*, 92 Cal. App. 501, 268 P. 487 (1928) (title to condemned property). See also Sections 1260.240 (court determination of compensation for deceased and unknown persons), 1268.340 (interest to be assessed by the court), 1268.430 (liability for property taxes), and 1268.610 (fixing of litigation expenses), *Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Truslow*, 125 Cal. App.2d 478, 499, 270 P.2d 928, 941 (1954) (protection of lienholders), and *City of Los Angeles v. Dawson*, 139 Cal. App. 480, 34 P.2d 236 (1934) (construing assignment of right and interest in award). Contrast *California Pac. R.R. v. Central Pac. R.R.*, 47 Cal. 549, 553–554 (1874), and *Yolo Water*

& Power Co. v. Edmands, 50 Cal. App. 444, 450, 195 P. 463, 465 (1920) (denying power of court to determine damage to other property of parties). Cf. Section 1250.230 and *City of Alhambra v. Jacob Bean Realty Co.*, 138 Cal. App. 251, 31 P.2d 1052 (1934) (denying right to intervene to third party alleging consequential damages).

During the trial, the court has all its normal and usual powers, including the authority to control the number of expert witnesses and to appoint its own expert. See EVID. CODE §§ 352 and 730. See also Section 1260.250. However, special rules regarding the order of proof and argument and the burden of proof are provided by Section 1260.210. Other statutory provisions in this title regarding the burden of proof or burden of producing evidence with regard to right to take issues include: Section 1240.230 (future use), 1240.420 (remnants), 1240.520 (compatible public use), 1240.620 (more necessary public use), 1245.250 (effect of properly adopted resolution of necessity).

The substance of the former statutory requirement of separate assessment of damages (and benefits) is continued by Section 1260.230. Compare former Section 1248. In addition, either party may request that the jury, if there be one, be directed to find a special verdict or to find upon particular questions of fact relating to the issue of compensation. See Section 625. After trial of the eminent domain proceeding, judgment must be rendered and entered as in other civil actions. See, e.g., Sections 632 and 668. *Fountain Water Co. v. Dougherty*, 134 Cal. 376, 66 P. 316 (1901). See also Section 1268.030 (final order of condemnation).

Attacking judgments. A judgment in an eminent domain proceeding may be attacked in the same manner as judgments in civil actions generally. Relief from default may be obtained. Section 473. Also, equitable relief from judgment on the basis of fraud may be available. See generally, 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE *Attack on Judgment in Trial Court* §§ 175–198 at 3744–3770 (2d ed. 1971).

Civil writs may be available to attack interlocutory orders and judgments of the court. See, e.g., *Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.2d 845, 215 P.2d 462 (1950); *Weiler v. Superior Court*, 188 Cal. 729, 207 P. 247 (1922); *People v. Rodoni*, 243 Cal. App.2d 771, 52 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1966).

The provisions regulating appeals in civil actions apply generally to eminent domain proceedings. See Sections 901–923; *San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Hong Mow*, 123 Cal. App.2d 668, 267 P.2d 349 (1954).

Dismissal. Sections 1260.120 and 1268.510 provide specific grounds for dismissal. However, these grounds are not the exclusive grounds. Certain provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to dismissal are also applicable in eminent domain proceedings. *E.g.*, Section 581a (failure to timely prosecute); Section 583 (failure to timely bring to trial). See *City of Industry v. Gordon*, 29 Cal. App.3d 90, 105 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1972) (the rule stated in this case with respect to the consequences of such a dismissal is altered by Section 1268.610). See also *Dresser v. Superior Court*, 231 Cal. App.2d 68, 41 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1964); *City of San Jose v. Wilcox*, 62 Cal. App.2d 224, 144 P.2d 636 (1944); *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. App.2d 636, 116 P.2d 468 (1941).

§ 1230.050. Court may enforce right to possession

1230.050. The court in which a proceeding in eminent domain is brought has the power to:

(a) Determine the right to possession of the property, as between the plaintiff and the defendants, in accordance with this title.

(b) Enforce any of its orders for possession by appropriate process. The plaintiff is entitled to enforcement of an order of possession as a matter of right.

Comment. Section 1230.050 is new. In general, the section codifies judicial decisions which hold that, after an eminent domain proceeding is begun, the court in which that proceeding is pending has the exclusive power to determine the respective rights of the plaintiff and of the defendants to possession and to enforce its determinations. See, *e.g.*, *Neale v. Superior Court*, 77 Cal. 28, 18 P. 790 (1888); *In re Bryan*, 65 Cal. 375, 4 P. 304 (1884); *San Bernardino Valley Municipal Water Dist. v. Gage Canal Co.*, 226 Cal. App.2d 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1964). In addition to the writs of possession or writs of assistance which the court may issue and enforce in exercise of its general jurisdiction (see *Marblehead Land Co. v. County of Los Angeles*, 276 Fed. 305 (S.D. Cal. 1921); 3 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE *Enforcement of Judgment* § 64 (1954)), orders for possession contemplated by the section include those made under Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6 and Article 3 (commencing with Section 1268.210) of Chapter 11.

§ 1230.060. Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction preserved

1230.060. Nothing in this title affects any other statute granting jurisdiction over any issue in eminent domain proceedings to the Public Utilities Commission.

Comment. Section 1230.060 preserves such jurisdiction as the Public Utilities Commission may have over issues in eminent domain proceedings. It supersedes the portion of former Section 1243 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provided that the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission to ascertain just compensation was not affected by eminent domain law.

The Public Utilities Commission has concurrent jurisdiction over certain eminent domain proceedings. See, e.g., PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1401 *et seq.* (local public entities may petition Public Utilities Commission to acquire public utility property by eminent domain) and PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1351 (Public Utilities Commission may ascertain value of public utility property in such proceeding). Cf. CAL. CONST., Art. XII, § 23a (legislative power to grant Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction to ascertain just compensation).

The Public Utilities Commission has exclusive jurisdiction over railroad crossings. See, e.g., PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1201 *et seq.* and *Northwestern Pac. R.R. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.2d 454, 211 P.2d 571 (1949) (Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction over crossings extends to eminent domain proceedings in superior court); cf. CAL. CONST., Art. XII, § 23 (legislative power to grant Public Utilities Commission control of public utilities) and PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7537 (farm and private crossings). In addition, there may be specific grants of jurisdiction to the Public Utilities Commission over certain issues involved in particular eminent domain acquisitions. See, e.g., PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 861 (Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction over controversies concerning relocation of utility improvements), 30503 (Public Utilities Commission review of acquisition of railroad property by Southern California Rapid Transit District), and 102243 (Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction in proceedings of Sacramento Regional Transit District). Whether the Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over the place and manner of relocation of utility property generally is not clear. Compare PUB. UTIL. CODE § 851 (Public Utilities Commission approval required before utility property may be disposed of) with *People v. City of Fresno*, 254 Cal. App.2d 76, 62 Cal. Rptr. 79

(1967) (Section 851 not applicable in condemnation of public utility property). See also GOVT. CODE §§ 55300–55367 (joint project for construction of conduit or line).

§ 1230.070. Effect of enactment of title on prior proceedings

1230.070. No proceeding to enforce the right of eminent domain, or judgment rendered pursuant thereto, commenced prior to the enactment of this title and the repeal of former Title 7 of this part, is affected by such enactment and repeal.

Comment. Section 1230.070 has a dual effect. It makes clear that the repeal of the former eminent domain title of this code and the enactment of new provisions of the Eminent Domain Law in no way affect the validity of proceedings and judgments rendered prior thereto. In addition, it makes clear that pending proceedings are to be completed under old law and are not affected by enactment of the Eminent Domain Law. For comparable provisions, see former Sections 1261 and 1262.

CHAPTER 2. PRINCIPLES OF CONSTRUCTION; DEFINITIONS

Article 1. Construction

§ 1235.010. Construction of title

1235.010. Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, these preliminary provisions and rules of construction shall govern the construction of this title.

Comment. Section 1235.010 is a standard provision in the various California codes. *E.g.*, EVID. CODE § 4; VEH. CODE § 6. Unless otherwise provided in this title, the preliminary provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. See, *e.g.*, CODE CIV. PROC. § 17 (“words used in the masculine gender include the feminine and neuter; the singular number includes the plural and the plural the singular”). See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 5 (construction of provisions as continuation of existing statutes). See also GOVT. CODE § 9604.

§ 1235.020. Effect of headings

1235.020. Chapter, article, and section headings do not in any manner affect the scope, meaning, or intent of the provisions of this title.

Comment. Provisions similar to Section 1235.020 appear in almost all of the existing California codes. *E.g.*, EVID. CODE § 5; VEH. CODE § 7.

§ 1235.030. References to statutes

1235.030. Whenever any reference is made to any portion of this title or to any other statute, such reference shall apply to all amendments and additions heretofore or hereafter made.

Comment. Section 1235.030 is a standard provision in various California codes. *E.g.*, EVID. CODE § 6; VEH. CODE § 10.

§ 1235.040. “Chapter,” “article,” “section,” “subdivision,” and “paragraph”

1235.040. Unless otherwise expressly stated:

(a) “Chapter” means a chapter of this title.

- (b) “Article” means an article of the chapter in which that term occurs.
- (c) “Section” means a section of this code.
- (d) “Subdivision” means a subdivision of the section in which that term occurs.
- (e) “Paragraph” means a paragraph of the subdivision in which that term occurs.

Comment. Section 1235.040 is similar to Evidence Code Section 7. Compare CODE CIV. PROC. § 17(8).

§ 1235.050. Construction of tenses

1235.050. The present tense includes the past and future tenses; and the future, the present.

Comment. Section 1235.050 is a standard provision in various California codes. *E.g.*, EVID. CODE § 8; VEH. CODE § 12. Compare CODE CIV. PROC. § 17.

§ 1235.060. “Shall” and “may”

1235.060. “Shall” is mandatory and “may” is permissive.

Comment. Section 1235.060 is a standard provision in various California codes. *E.g.*, EVID. CODE § 11; VEH. CODE § 15.

§ 1235.070. Constitutionality

1235.070. If any provision or clause of this title or application thereof to any person or circumstances is held invalid, such invalidity shall not affect other provisions or applications of the title that can be given effect without the invalid provision or application, and to this end the provisions of this title are declared to be severable.

Comment. Section 1235.070 is the same as Section 3 of the Evidence Code and Section 1108 of the Commercial Code.

Article 2. Words and Phrases Defined

§ 1235.110. Application of definitions

1235.110. Unless the provision or context otherwise requires, these definitions govern the construction of this title.

Comment. Section 1235.110 is a standard provision found in the definitional portion of recently enacted California codes. See, e.g., EVID. CODE § 100; VEH. CODE § 100. Unless otherwise provided in this title, the definitions in the preliminary portion of the Code of Civil Procedure are applicable. See, e.g., CODE CIV. PROC. § 17.

§ 1235.120. Final judgment

1235.120. “Final judgment” means a judgment with respect to which all possibility of direct attack by way of appeal, motion for a new trial, or motion under Section 663 to vacate the judgment has been exhausted.

Comment. Section 1235.120 continues the substance of the second sentence of former Section 1264.7. Unlike the former section, Section 1235.120 makes clear that the motion to vacate must be one made under Section 663, thus excluding, for example, a motion for relief from a default under Section 473. This clarification is consistent with the construction given the language of the former section by the courts. *E.g., Southern Pac. Util. Dist. v. Silva*, 47 Cal.2d 163, 301 P.2d 841 (1956).

§ 1235.130. Judgment

1235.130. “Judgment” means the judgment determining the right to take the property by eminent domain and fixing the amount of compensation to be paid by the plaintiff.

Comment. Section 1235.130 continues the substance of the first sentence of former Section 1264.7.

§ 1235.140. [Reserved for expansion]

§ 1235.150. Local public entity

1235.150. “Local public entity” means any public entity other than the state.

§ 1235.160. Person

1235.160. “Person” includes any public entity, individual, association, organization, partnership, trust, or corporation.

Comment. Section 1235.160 provides a broad definition of "person." Compare CODE CIV. PROC. § 17.

§ 1235.170. Property

1235.170. "Property" includes real and personal property and any right, title, or interest therein and, by way of illustration and not by way of limitation, includes submerged lands, rights of any nature in water, subsurface rights, airspace rights, flowage or flooding easements, aircraft noise or operation easements, rights to limit the use or development of property, right of temporary occupancy, public utility facilities and franchises, and franchises to collect tolls on a bridge or highway.

Comment. Section 1235.170 is intended to provide the broadest possible definition of property and to include any type of right, title, or interest in property that may be required for public use. If the property authorized to be taken is limited by the statutory grant of condemnation authority to property of a certain type, an attempt to take property other than the type designated in the grant of condemnation authority is precluded by Section 1240.020. See Section 1240.020 and Comment thereto.

Section 1235.170 eliminates the need for duplicative listings of property types and interests subject to condemnation. Cf., e.g., former Section 1240 (real property, tide and submerged lands, franchises for any public utility, rights of way and any and all structures and improvements thereon) and former Section 1238(3) ("ponds, lakes, canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, tunnels, flumes, ditches, or pipes, lands, water system plants, buildings, rights of any nature in water, and any other character of property necessary" for certain purposes).

§ 1235.180. Property appropriated to public use

1235.180. "Property appropriated to public use" means property either already in use for a public purpose or set aside for a specific public purpose with the intention of using it for such purpose within a reasonable time.

Comment. Section 1235.180 defines "property appropriated to public use" in accordance with prior California decisions. See *East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Lodi*, 120 Cal. App. 740, 750–758, 8 P.2d 532, 536–539 (1932). The general concept of "public use" is discussed in connection with Section 1240.010. See Section 1240.010 and Comment thereto.

It should be noted that appropriation to a public use does not require actual physical use, but may be satisfied by formal dedication or facts indicating a reasonable prospect of use within a reasonable time. See, e.g., *Woodland School Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n*, 174 Cal. App.2d 243, 344 P.2d 326 (1959) (property formally dedicated but not yet used by corporation for cemetery purposes); *City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pac. Co.*, 31 Cal. App. 100, 159 P. 992 (1916) (property assembled by electric railway for planned subway). Moreover, property may be appropriated to public use even though it is owned by a private individual or corporation. E.g., *Woodland School Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n, supra*; *City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pac. Co., supra*. Conversely, property may be owned by a public entity but not be appropriated to public use. *Deseret Water, Oil & Irr. Co. v. State*, 167 Cal. 147, 138 P. 981 (1914), *rev'd on other grounds*, 243 U.S. 415, and 176 Cal. 745, 171 P. 287 (1917).

The term defined in Section 1235.180 is used primarily in Article 6 (commencing with Section 1240.510) and Article 7 (commencing with Section 1240.610) of Chapter 3. These articles relate to a taking for a compatible use or for a more necessary public use.

§ 1235.190. Public entity

1235.190. “Public entity” includes the state, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision in the state.

§ 1235.200. State

1235.200. “State” means the State of California and includes the Regents of the University of California.

§ 1235.210. Statute

1235.210. “Statute” means a constitutional provision or statute, but does not include a charter provision or ordinance.

CHAPTER 3. THE RIGHT TO TAKE

Article 1. General Limitations on Exercise of Power of Eminent Domain

§ 1240.010. Public use limitation

1240.010. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property only for a public use. Where the Legislature provides by statute that a use, purpose, object, or function is one for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised, such action is deemed to be a declaration by the Legislature that such use, purpose, object, or function is a public use.

Comment. The first sentence of Section 1240.010 reiterates the basic constitutional limitation that property may be acquired by eminent domain only for “public use.” CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 14; U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV.

The second sentence is included in Section 1240.010 to avoid the need to state in each condemnation authorization statute that the taking by eminent domain under that statute is a taking for public use. For example, Section 104 of the Streets and Highways Code authorizes the acquisition of property by eminent domain for state highway purposes. Section 1240.010 provides that such legislative action is also deemed to be a legislative declaration that use for state highway purposes constitutes a public use. Section 1240.010 supersedes former Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which purported to declare the public uses for which property might be taken by eminent domain.

The fact that Section 1240.010 declares that a particular use for which the power of eminent domain may be exercised is a public use does not preclude judicial review to determine whether the proposed use in the particular case is actually a public use. *E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Ross*, 44 Cal.2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955). Nevertheless, the Legislature’s declaration that the particular use is a public use will be accepted as controlling unless clearly erroneous and without reasonable foundation. *E.g., People v. Superior Court*, 68 Cal.2d 206, 210, 436 P.2d 342, 345, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 345 (1968); *Housing Authority v. Dockweiler*, 14 Cal.2d 437, 449–450, 94 P.2d 794, 801 (1939); *County of Los Angeles v. Anthony*, 224 Cal. App.2d 103, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308, *cert. denied*, 376 U.S. 963 (1964);

Redevelopment Agency v. Hayes, 122 Cal. App.2d 777, 266 P.2d 105, *cert. denied*, 348 U.S. 897 (1954). Doubts are resolved in favor of the legislative declaration. *University of So. Cal. v. Robbins*, 1 Cal. App.2d 523, 525-526, 37 P.2d 163, 164 (1934). A legislatively authorized taking will be upheld if the taking is for a "use which concerns the whole community or promotes the general interest in its relation to any legitimate object of government." *Bauer v. County of Ventura*, 45 Cal.2d 276, 284, 289 P.2d 1, 6 (1955).

§ 1240.020. Statutory delegation of condemnation authority required

1240.020. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a particular use only by a person authorized by statute to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire such property for that use.

Comment. Section 1240.020 codifies the prior law that no person may condemn property for a particular public use unless the Legislature has delegated the power to that person to condemn property for that use. *E.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Ross*, 44 Cal.2d 52, 55, 279 P.2d 529, 531 (1955); *People v. Superior Court*, 10 Cal.2d 288, 295-296, 73 P.2d 1221, 1225 (1937); *Yeshiva Torath Emeth Academy v. University of So. Cal.*, 208 Cal. App.2d 618, 25 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1962); *Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Superior Court*, 189 Cal. App.2d 421, 425, 11 Cal. Rptr. 189, 192 (1961); *City of Menlo Park v. Artino*, 151 Cal. App.2d 261, 266, 311 P.2d 135, 139 (1957). See also *City of Sierra Madre v. Superior Court*, 191 Cal. App.2d 587, 590, 12 Cal. Rptr. 836, 838 (1961).

If the property authorized to be taken is limited by statutory grant to property of a certain type—*e.g.*, "natural, open" areas or "blighted" areas—an attempt to take property other than the type designated by statute is precluded by Section 1240.020. Cf. 7 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN App-309 (3d ed. 1970). Likewise, where the statute grants authority to take only an easement, an attempt to take the fee is precluded by Section 1240.020. See also discussion in the Comment to Section 1240.110.

Under former law, the right of eminent domain was delegated to any person seeking to acquire property for public use. See former CIVIL CODE § 1001; *Lingga v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955). The Eminent Domain Law does not continue this broad delegation of condemnation authority.

Specific statutes continue the condemnation authorization of all presently authorized public entities. Separately enacted provisions also continue the right of some types of private persons to condemn for certain public uses. Privately owned public utilities may condemn for utility purposes. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 610–624. Mutual water companies may condemn to irrigate lands that they service. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2729. Land chest corporations (HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 35167) and limited dividend housing corporations (HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 34874) may condemn property for their projects. Nonprofit hospitals may condemn property for their purposes. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1427. Nonprofit educational institutions of collegiate grade may condemn to carry out their functions. EDUC. CODE § 30051. Private persons may no longer condemn for sewers. Compare *Linggi v. Garovotti, supra*. However, a private person may request the appropriate public entity to undertake condemnation on his behalf for a sewer. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 4967.

§ 1240.030. Public necessity required

1240.030. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if all of the following are established:

- (a) The public interest and necessity require the project.
- (b) The project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
- (c) The property sought to be acquired is necessary for the project.

Comment. Section 1240.030 requires that the necessity for the taking be established before property may be taken for a project by eminent domain. The word “project” replaces a variety of terms formerly found in comparable statutes; it is intended to apply to any type of public use regardless whether the use is active (requiring construction of an improvement) or passive (requiring appropriation of property in unimproved condition).

Public entity plaintiffs must adopt a resolution of necessity before condemning property. Section 1240.040. See also Section 1245.220. This resolution conclusively establishes the matters listed in Section 1240.030 if it is adopted by a vote of a majority of all the members of the governing body of the public entity.

See Sections 1245.240, 1245.250(a). If property sought to be taken by a local public entity is not located entirely within the boundaries of the local public entity, the resolution of necessity creates a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence that the matters listed in Section 1240.030 are true. Section 1245.250(b). Condemnors other than public entities have the burden of proof on the issue of necessity under Section 1240.030.

It should be noted that the prerequisites to condemnation specified in Section 1240.030 may not be the only prerequisites for public projects. Environmental statements and hearings may be required by statute, relocation plans may be required, or consent of various public agencies may be required. See, e.g., *Lathan v. Volpe*, 455 F.2d 1111 (9th Cir. 1972) (rehearing denied 1972); *Keith v. Volpe*, 352 F. Supp. 1324 (C.D. Cal. 1972). See also *Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Coastsides Water Dist.*, 27 Cal. App.3d 695, 104 Cal. Rptr. 197 (1972) (proper relocation program and environmental statement prerequisite to public projects). The public necessity elements of Section 1240.030 supplement but do not replace any other prerequisites to condemnation imposed by any other law.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) prevents the taking of property by eminent domain unless the public interest and necessity require the project. "Public interest and necessity" include all aspects of the public good including but not limited to social, economic, environmental, and esthetic considerations. Under prior law, the necessity of the proposed improvement was not subject to judicial review; the decision of the condemnor on the need for the improvement was conclusive. E.g., *City of Pasadena v. Stimson*, 91 Cal. 238, 253, 27 P. 604, 607 (1891).

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) prevents the taking of property by eminent domain unless the proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. This limitation, which involves essentially a comparison between two or more sites, has also been described as "the necessity for adopting a particular plan" for a given public improvement. *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 307, 340 P.2d 598, 603 (1959). See also *City of Pasadena v. Stimson*, *supra*; *Eel R. & E. R.R. v. Field*, 67 Cal. 429, 7 P. 814 (1885).

Proper location is based on two factors: public good and private injury. Accordingly, the condemnor's choice is correct or proper unless another site would involve an equal or greater public good and a lesser private injury. A lesser public good can

never be counterbalanced by a lesser private injury to equal a more proper location. See *Montebello etc. School Dist. v. Keay*, 55 Cal. App.2d 839, 131 P.2d 384 (1942). Nor can equal public good and equal private injury combine to make the condemnor's choice an improper location. *California Cent. Ry. v. Hooper*, 76 Cal. 404, 412-413, 18 P. 599, 603 (1888).

Subdivision (b) generalizes the plan or location requirement formerly found in Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1242(a) and 1240(6) (acquisition of land or rights of way).

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) prevents the taking of property by eminent domain unless the property or interest therein sought to be acquired is necessary for the proposed project. Cf. Section 1240.110 (right to take any necessary property or right or interest therein) and Section 1240.120 (right to acquire property to make effective the principal use). This aspect of necessity includes the suitability and usefulness of the property for the public use. See *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles*, 166 Cal. App.2d 758, 763, 333 P.2d 442, 445 (1959) ("necessity does not signify impossibility of constructing the improvement . . . without taking the land in question, but merely requires that the land be reasonably suitable and useful for the improvement"). *Accord, Rialto Irr. Dist. v. Brandon*, 103 Cal. 384, 37 P. 484 (1894). Thus, evidence on the aspect of necessity covered by subdivision (c) is limited to evidence showing whether the particular property will be suitable and desirable for the construction and use of the proposed public project.

Subdivision (c) also requires a showing of the necessity for taking a particular interest in the property. See Section 1235.170 (defining "property" to include any right or interest therein). Cf. *City of Los Angeles v. Keck*, 14 Cal. App.3d 920, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1971).

Subdivision (c) continues former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1241(2) to the extent that that provision required a showing of necessity for taking the particular property or a particular interest therein.

§ 1240.040. Resolution of necessity required

1240.040. A public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of Article 2 (commencing with Section 1245.210) of Chapter 4.

Comment. A public entity may not take property by eminent domain unless its governing body has adopted a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of Section 1245.210 *et seq.* If the public entity fails to adopt such a resolution, or adopts a defective resolution, it may not condemn property.

Section 1240.040 generalizes the provision, previously applicable to some but not all public entities, that a resolution of necessity is a condition precedent to condemnation. See, *e.g.*, former WATER CODE § 8594 and former GOVT. CODE § 15855 (resolution required).

As to the effect of the resolution of necessity on matters of proof in eminent domain proceedings, see Section 1245.250 and Comment thereto.

§ 1240.050. Extraterritorial condemnation

1240.050. A local public entity may acquire by eminent domain only property within its territorial limits except where the power to acquire by eminent domain property outside its limits is expressly granted by statute or necessarily implied as an incident of one of its other statutory powers.

Comment. Section 1240.050 codifies prior law. Although express statutory authority generally is required, extraterritorial condemnation also is permitted where this power is necessarily implied as an ~~incident~~ to the existence of other powers expressly granted. See *City of No. Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co.*, 192 Cal. App.2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961) (implied authority); *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles*, 166 Cal. App.2d 758, 333 P.2d 442 (1959) (statutory authority); *Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.*, 72 Cal. App.2d 638, 165 P.2d 741 (1946) (statutory authority). See also *Harden v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal.2d 630, 284 P.2d 9 (1955); *City of Carlsbad v. Wight*, 221 Cal. App.2d 756, 34 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1963). Cf. *Mulville v. City of San Diego*, 183 Cal. 734, 737, 192 P. 702, 703 (1920); *McBean v. City of Fresno*, 112 Cal. 159, 44 P. 358 (1896). Furnishing sewage facilities and supplying water are services for which the power of extraterritorial condemnation may be implied. *City of Pasadena v. Stimson*, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891) (sewage) (dictum); *City of No. Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co.*, *supra* (water). Cf. *Southern Cal. Gas Co. v. City of Los Angeles*, 50 Cal.2d 713, 718, 329 P.2d 289, 291 (1958). Compare *City of Carlsbad v. Wight*, *supra*.

There are a number of statutes that expressly authorize extraterritorial condemnation. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE § 61610; HARB. & NAV. CODE § 7147; HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 6514, 13852(c); PUB. RES. CODE § 5540. Such statutes are constitutional. *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, supra; Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra*.

A significant limitation on the exercise of extraterritorial condemnation is that the resolution of necessity of a local public entity is not conclusive where the property to be taken is outside its boundaries. Section 1245.250(b). See *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, supra; City of Los Angeles v. Keck*, 14 Cal. App.3d 920, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1971). See also *Orange County Water Dist. v. Bennett*, 156 Cal. App.2d 745, 750, 320 P.2d 536, 539 (1958); *Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist. v. Jan*, 154 Cal. App.2d 389, 394, 316 P.2d 25, 28 (1957). The "necessity" required to justify extraterritorial condemnation is only a reasonable necessity under all the circumstances of the case and not an absolute or imperative necessity. *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles, supra*. While economic considerations alone may not be sufficient to justify extraterritorial condemnation, considerations of economy may be taken into account in determining necessity. *Sacramento Mun. Util. Dist. v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co., supra*. Compare *City of Carlsbad v. Wight, supra*.

Article 2. Rights Included in Grant of Eminent Domain Authority

§ 1240.110. Right to acquire any necessary right or interest in any type of property

1240.110. Except to the extent limited by statute, any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire any right or interest in property of any type necessary for that use. Where a statute authorizes the acquisition by eminent domain only of specified rights, interests, or types of property, this section does not expand the scope of the authority so granted.

Comment. Section 1240.110 is both an authorization and a limitation on the power of condemnation. It provides that a person authorized to condemn may take any type of property and any right or interest in such property but limits this grant only to property that is necessary for the purpose for which the

condemnation is authorized. See Sections 1235.170 ("property" includes any right or interest in property) and 1240.030 (necessity to acquire particular property must be established). It should be noted that the resolution of necessity of a public entity may be conclusive evidence of the necessity for the acquisition of the particular property and interest therein. See Section 1245.250 and Comment thereto.

The authorization to take any right or interest is generally consistent with the former law that permitted a public entity to take a fee rather than merely an easement. See former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1239(4) (local public entities). However, under former law, most privately owned public utilities and some local public entities were permitted to acquire only an easement except in certain circumstances. See former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1239. Moreover, under former law, the distinction generally made was between taking a fee or an easement. See generally Taylor, *The Right to Take—The Right to Take a Fee or Any Lesser Interest*, 1 PAC. L.J. 555 (1970). Section 1240.110 permits taking of the fee or any other right or interest in property. See Section 1235.170 (defining "property").

The second sentence of Section 1240.110 recognizes that, if the interest in property authorized to be taken is limited by the statutory grant (as, for example, where the statute authorizes acquisition of only an easement), an attempt to take an interest in the property other than that permitted by the statute is precluded. Also, if the statutory grant to the particular entity is specifically limited to "real property," Section 1240.110 does not extend that grant to include personal property. On the other hand, if the statutory grant of condemnation authority is to acquire any "property" necessary for a particular use, Section 1240.110 makes clear that this includes authority to condemn both real and personal property.

The authorization to take property of any type necessary for a particular use supersedes former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240 which attempted to list the various types of property that might be taken. The broad authorization in Section 1240.110 codifies cases holding that inherent in the right to condemn property is the right to take all interests and all rights appurtenant. See, e.g., *City of Los Angeles v. Hughes*, 202 Cal. 731, 262 P. 737 (1927) (nursery plants and trees); *People v. Superior Court*, 208 Cal. App.2d 659, 25 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1962) (dredger tailings); *County of Kern v. Galatas*, 200 Cal. App.2d 353, 19 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1962) (oil, gas, mineral rights); *Northern Light etc. Co. v. Stacher*, 13 Cal. App. 404, 109 P. 896 (1910) (water). It should be noted, however, that money is not

subject to the power of eminent domain. *Emery v. San Francisco Gas Co.*, 28 Cal. 346 (1865).

The initial proviso to Section 1240.110 recognizes that other statutes may make certain property exempt from condemnation. For example, an existing golf course may not be acquired by a city for golf course purposes. GOVT. CODE § 37353(c). Cemetery land may not be taken for rights of way. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 8134, 8560, 8560.5; see *Eden Memorial Park Ass'n v. Superior Court*, 189 Cal. App.2d 421, 11 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1961). Property within the Aptos Forest is not subject to eminent domain except by specific permission of the Legislature. PUB. RES. CODE § 5006.2. Certain land in the public domain may not be taken at all. PUB. RES. CODE § 8030. An existing airport owned by a local entity cannot be taken by the Department of Aeronautics without consent. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21632. See generally Article 6 (commencing with Section 1240.510) and Article 7 (commencing with Section 1240.610) (limitations on the acquisition of property appropriated to public use).

§ 1240.120. Right to acquire property to make effective the principal use

1240.120. (a) Subject to any other statute relating to the acquisition of property, any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary to carry out and make effective the principal purpose involved including but not limited to property to be used for the protection or preservation of the attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the project.

(b) Subject to any applicable procedures governing the disposition of property, a person may acquire property under subdivision (a) with the intent to sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the property, or a right or interest therein, subject to such reservations or restrictions as are necessary to protect or preserve the attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the project.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1240.120 codifies the rule that, absent any express limitation imposed by the Legislature, the power to condemn property for a particular purpose includes the power to condemn property necessary to carry out and make effective the principal purpose involved.

See *City of Santa Barbara v. Cloer*, 216 Cal. App.2d 127, 30 Cal. Rptr. 743 (1963). See also *University of So. Cal. v. Robbins*, 1 Cal. App.2d 523, 37 P.2d 163 (1934). Cf. *Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Hughes*, 201 Cal. App.2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1962).

Section 1240.120 permits a condemnor to protect the attractiveness, safety, or usefulness of a public work or improvement from deleterious conditions or uses by condemning a fee or any lesser right or interest necessary for protective purposes. See Section 1235.170 (defining "property" to include the fee or any lesser right or interest). A taking for this purpose is a public use. E.g., *People v. Lagiss*, 223 Cal. App.2d 23, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554 (1963); *Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Hughes*, *supra*. See also *United States v. Bowman*, 367 F.2d 768, 770 (1966). See Capron, *Excess Condemnation in California—A Further Expansion of the Right to Take*, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 571, 589–591 (1969).

Where it is necessary to protect a public work or improvement from detrimental uses on adjoining property, the condemnor has the option either (1) to acquire an easement-like interest in the adjoining property that will preclude the detrimental use or (2) to acquire the fee or some other interest and then—if the condemnor desires—lease, sell, exchange, or otherwise dispose of the property to some other public entity or a private person subject to carefully specified permitted uses.

If a condemnor has the power of eminent domain to condemn property for a particular improvement, Section 1240.120 is sufficient authority to condemn such additional property as is necessary to preserve or protect the attractiveness, safety, and usefulness of the improvement. No additional statutory authority is required, and some of the former specific grants of protective condemnation authority have been repealed as unnecessary. E.g., former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238(18) (trees along highways). Not all such specific authorizations have been repealed. E.g., STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104(f) (trees along highways), (g) (highway drainage), (h) (maintenance of unobstructed view along highway). Except to the extent that these specific authorizations contain restrictions on protective condemnation for particular types of projects (see GOVT. CODE §§ 7000–7001), they do not limit the general protective condemnation authority granted by Section 1240.120.

In the case of a public entity, the resolution of necessity is conclusive on the necessity of taking the property or interest therein for protective purposes. See Section 1245.250 and

Comment thereto. However, the resolution does not preclude the condemnee from raising the question whether the condemnor actually intends to use the property for protective purposes. If the property is claimed to be needed for protective purposes but is not actually to be used for that purpose, the taking can be defeated on that ground. See Section 1250.360 and Comment thereto. See *People v. Lagiss*, 223 Cal. App.2d 23, 33–44, 35 Cal. Rptr. 554, 560–567 (1963).

Section 1240.120 is derived from and supersedes former Government Code Sections 190–196, Streets and Highways Code Section 104.3, and Water Code Section 256.

§ 1240.130. Acquisition by gift, purchase, lease, or other means

1240.130. Subject to any other statute relating to the acquisition of property, any public entity authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may also acquire such property for such use by grant, purchase, lease, gift, devise, contract, or other means.

Comment. Section 1240.130 makes clear that a public entity is authorized to acquire property by negotiation or other means in any case in which it may condemn property. See also GOVT. CODE § 7267.1(a) (public entity shall make every reasonable effort to acquire real property by negotiation). This general authority is, of course, subject to any limitations that may be imposed by statute. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE § 15854 (acquisition under the Property Acquisition Law must be by condemnation except in certain circumstances).

Section 1240.130 makes unnecessary the detailed listing of various types of property that may be acquired under specific statutes authorizing acquisition by eminent domain and other means. See Sections 1235.170 (“property” defined) and 1240.110 (right to acquire any necessary property or right or interest therein). Section 1240.130 supersedes former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1266.1 (gift or purchase authorized for certain purposes).

§ 1240.140. Joint exercise of condemnation power pursuant to Joint Powers Agreements Act

1240.140. (a) As used in this section, “public agencies” includes all those agencies included within the definition

of “public agency” in Section 6500 of the Government Code.

(b) Two or more public agencies may enter into an agreement for the joint exercise of their respective powers of eminent domain, whether or not possessed in common, for the acquisition of property as a single parcel. Such agreement shall be entered into and performed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 6500) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code.

Comment. Section 1240.140 authorizes several public agencies to acquire a particular parcel under the Joint Powers Agreements Act, not only where the particular parcel is needed for a joint project but also where each of the agencies requires a portion of the parcel for its own purposes. The section is based on former Education Code Section 15007.5. Section 15007.5, however, applied only where a school district was a party to the joint powers agreement, and Section 1240.140 is not so restricted. As to how title is to be held, see GOVT. CODE § 6508. Cf. GOVT. CODE § 55004 (joint sanitation projects).

§ 1240.150. Acquisition of all or portion of remainder with owner's consent

1240.150. Whenever a part of a larger parcel of property is to be acquired by a public entity for public use and the remainder, or a portion of the remainder, will be left in such size, shape, or condition as to be of little value to its owner or to give rise to a claim for severance or other damages, the public entity may acquire the remainder, or portion of the remainder, by any means (including eminent domain) expressly consented to by the owner.

Comment. Section 1240.150 provides a broad authorization for public entities to acquire remainders of property by a voluntary transaction or a condemnation proceeding initiated with the consent of the owner. Cf. GOVT. CODE § 7267.7 (“If the acquisition of only a portion of a property would leave the remaining portion in such a shape or condition as to constitute an uneconomic remnant, the public entity shall offer to and may acquire the entire property if the owner so desires.”). See also former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1266.1 (cities and counties may acquire excess property by purchase or gift). Compare Article 5 (commencing with Section 1240.410) and the Comments to the sections in that article (condemnation of remnants).

The language of Section 1240.150 is similar to that contained in former Sections 104.1 and 943.1 of the Streets and Highways Code and former Sections 254, 8590.1, 11575.2, and 43533 of the Water Code. Inasmuch as exercise of the authority conferred by this section depends upon the consent and concurrence of the property owner, the language of the section is broadly drawn to authorize acquisition whenever the remainder would have little value to its owner (rather than little market value or value to another owner). Compare *Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court*, 68 Cal.2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968); *La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planing Mill*, 146 Cal. App.2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956).

Where property is needed for public use and a structure is located partly on the property to be acquired and partly on other property, Section 1240.150 permits the public entity to acquire the entire structure by agreement with the owner or by a condemnation proceeding initiated with the consent of the owner. Where a structure is located partly on property needed for a public use and partly on other property, there are a number of alternatives available to the parties which may be less costly or more convenient than taking only part of the structure and paying severance damages on this basis. In some cases, severance may so destroy a structure that total demolition in one operation is the only economically or practically feasible alternative. Pursuant to Section 1240.150, the parties may agree that the public entity will acquire the entire structure and demolish it, leaving the property owner with the remainder in a cleared condition. Section 1240.150 also permits the parties to agree that the public entity will purchase the structure to relocate it. For other possibilities, see Section 1263.610 (condemnor may relocate structure or perform other work for owner); Section 1240.410 (excess condemnation). See also the Comments to the cited sections.

§ 1240.160. Interpretation of grants of eminent domain authority; separate authorizations

1240.160. (a) None of the provisions of this article is intended to limit, or shall limit, any other provision of this article, each of which is a distinct and separate authorization.

(b) None of the provisions of Article 2 (commencing with Section 1240.110), Article 3 (commencing with Section 1240.210), Article 4 (commencing with Section

1240.310), Article 5 (commencing with Section 1240.410), Article 6 (commencing with Section 1240.510), or Article 7 commencing with Section 1240.610) is intended to limit, or shall limit, the provisions of any other of the articles, each of which articles is a distinct and separate authorization.

Comment. Section 1240.160 makes clear that the various articles contained in this chapter are distinct and separate authorizations. For example, the authority granted by Article 6 (condemnation for compatible use) is independent of the authority contained in Article 7 (more necessary public use) and is not limited in any way by the rules set forth therein. Likewise, condemnation of property appropriated to a public use may be accomplished under Article 7 independently of any authority stated in Article 6. Section 1240.160 is based on former Section 104.7 of the Streets and Highways Code.

Article 3. Future Use

§ 1240.210. “Date of use” defined

1240.210. For the purposes of this article, the “date of use” of property taken for public use is the date when the property is devoted to that use or when construction is started on the project for which the property is taken with the intent to complete the project within a reasonable time. In determining the “date of use,” periods of delay caused by extraordinary litigation or by failure to obtain from any public entity any agreement or permit necessary for construction shall not be included.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1240.220.

§ 1240.220. Acquisitions for future use

1240.220. (a) Any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property to be used in the future for that use, but property may be taken for future use only if there is a reasonable probability that its date of use will be within seven years from the date the complaint is filed or within such longer period as is reasonable.

(b) Unless the plaintiff plans that the date of use of property taken will be within seven years from the date the complaint is filed, the complaint, and the resolution of necessity if one is required, shall refer specifically to this section and shall state the estimated date of use.

Comment. Section 1240.220 continues prior case law and makes clear that statutory grants of condemnation power carry with them the power to condemn property in anticipation of the condemnor's future needs. See, e.g., *Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman*, 152 Cal. 303, 309, 92 P. 849, 852 (1907); *City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy*, 124 Cal. 597, 616, 57 P. 585, 591 (1899); *Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Parachini*, 29 Cal. App.3d 159, 105 Cal. Rptr. 477 (1972); *San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co.*, 194 Cal. App.2d 472, 480-481, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899, 904-905 (1961). Section 1240.220 may be duplicated in part by specific statutory grants of the power to condemn for future use. See, e.g., STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104.6 (Department of Transportation authorized to acquire real property for future highway needs); WATER CODE § 258 (Department of Water Resources authorized to acquire real property for future state dam and water purposes). These specific statutory grants are subject to the general provisions of Section 1240.220.

The basic substantive test that determines when condemnation for future needs is permitted is stated in subdivision (a). If the date of use of property will be within seven years from the date the complaint is filed, the taking is permitted. (The date of use is that date when property is actually devoted to the use for which taken or when construction on the project is commenced in good faith. See Section 1240.210.) If the date of use will not be within the seven-year period, the taking is permitted only if there is a reasonable probability that the date of use will be within a "reasonable time." What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon all the circumstances of the particular case: Is there a reasonable probability that funds for the construction of the project will become available? Have plans been drawn and adopted? Is the project a logical extension of existing improvements? Is future growth likely, and should the condemnor anticipate and provide for that growth? However, it should be noted that periods of delay caused by litigation (other than the normal resolution of valuation issues) or by difficulty in obtaining an agreement or permit necessary for construction from a public entity (such as freeway route

agreements from local public entities) are not to be included in determining date of use. See Section 1240.210.

Subdivision (b) specifies an additional requirement for the complaint and, if the plaintiff is a public entity, for the resolution of necessity. If the plaintiff does not plan to use the property for the public use within seven years from the date the complaint is filed, it must so state in the complaint and resolution. The required information in the complaint will put the defendant on notice that there is a potential issue whether the plaintiff is authorized to take the property under this section.

§ 1240.230. Burden of proof

1240.230. (a) If the defendant objects to a taking for future use, the burden of proof is as prescribed in this section.

(b) Unless the complaint states an estimated date of use that is not within seven years from the date the complaint is filed, the defendant has the burden of proof that there is no reasonable probability that the date of use will be within seven years from the date the complaint is filed.

(c) If the defendant proves that there is no reasonable probability that the date of use will be within seven years from the date the complaint is filed, or if the complaint states an estimated date of use that is not within seven years from the date the complaint is filed, the plaintiff has the burden of proof that a taking for future use satisfies the requirements of this article.

Comment. Section 1240.230 states the rules governing the burden of proof where the defendant objects to a taking for future use. A defendant who desires to contest the taking of his property on the ground that the taking is for a future use and is not authorized under Section 1240.220 must plead this defense. See Sections 430.30, 1250.350, and 1250.360.

If the defendant does contest the taking, the court must first find that there is no reasonable probability that date of use will be within the seven-year period. Unless the court so finds, the taking cannot be defeated on the ground that it is not authorized under Section 1240.220. Except where the complaint indicates that the date of use will not be within the seven-year period, the defendant has the burden of proof to establish that there is no reasonable probability that his property will be used for the public use within that period. When the plaintiff

estimates that the date of use will not be within the seven-year period or when it is established by proof that there is no reasonable probability that the property will be used for the designated use within such period, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that there is a reasonable probability that the property will actually be devoted to the public use within a "reasonable time." See discussion in Comment to Section 1240.220.

Section 1240.230 makes a significant change in former practice. Under prior law, as under Section 1240.230, condemnation for future use was permitted only if there was a reasonable probability that the property would be devoted to the public use within a reasonable time. See, e.g., *San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co.*, 194 Cal. App.2d 472, 480-481, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899, 904-905 (1961). See also *East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. City of Lodi*, 120 Cal. App. 740, 750-755, 8 P.2d 532, 536-538 (1932). However, under prior law, this issue—whether there was a reasonable probability of use within a reasonable time—was ordinarily nonjusticiable. The issue was regarded as an issue of necessity. The resolution of necessity was conclusive on issues of necessity in the great majority of takings; hence, the issue could be raised only in those few cases where the resolution was not conclusive. Compare *Anaheim Union High School Dist. v. Vieira*, 241 Cal. App.2d 169, 51 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (resolution conclusive), and *County of San Mateo v. Bartole*, 184 Cal. App.2d 422, 7 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1960) (resolution conclusive), with *San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co.*, *supra* (justiciable issue). This aspect of the prior law has not been continued. The resolution of necessity is not conclusive on the issue of whether a taking is authorized under this article.

Article 4. Substitute Condemnation

§ 1240.310. Definitions

1240.310. As used in this article:

(a) "Necessary property" means property to be used for a public use for which the public entity is authorized to acquire property by eminent domain.

(b) "Substitute property" means property to be exchanged for necessary property.

Comment. Section 1240.310 provides definitions useful in applying the "substitute condemnation" provisions contained in this chapter. Briefly stated, "substitute condemnation" involves the following type of situation: The potential

condemnor determines that it needs certain property (the "necessary property") for its use. It agrees to compensate the owner of the necessary property in whole or in part by other property (the "substitute property") rather than money. It then condemns the "substitute property" and exchanges it for the "necessary property." See generally Note, *Substitute Condemnation*, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1097 (1966).

§ 1240.320. Substitute condemnation where owner of necessary property authorized to condemn property

1240.320. (a) Any public entity authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a particular use may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire for that use substitute property if all of the following are established:

(1) The owner of the necessary property has agreed in writing to the exchange.

(2) The necessary property is devoted to or held for some public use and the substitute property will be devoted to or held for the same public use by the owner of the necessary property.

(3) The owner of the necessary property is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the substitute property for such use.

(b) Where property is sought to be acquired pursuant to this section, the resolution of necessity and the complaint filed pursuant to such resolution shall specifically refer to this section and shall include a statement that the property is necessary for the purpose specified in this section. The determination in the resolution that the taking of the substitute property is necessary has the effect prescribed in Section 1245.250.

Comment. Section 1240.320 authorizes a public entity to condemn property to be exchanged only where the person with whom the property is to be exchanged has agreed in writing to the exchange and could himself have condemned the property to be exchanged. In this situation, the same end can be reached no matter which party to the exchange exercises the power of condemnation so that the authority provided here is a simply a shortcut to an identical result. Subdivision (a) extends the advantages of this procedure to public entities generally. Under

former law, only certain entities were explicitly authorized to condemn for exchange purposes. See, e.g., former GOVT. CODE § 15858; former STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104.2; *People v. Garden Grove Farms*, 231 Cal. App.2d 666, 42 Cal. Rptr. 118 (1965) (state may condemn property to be conveyed to school district in exchange for property necessary for highway right of way). See generally *Langenau Mfg. Co. v. City of Cleveland*, 159 Ohio St. 525, 112 N.E.2d 658 (1953) (relocation of railroad by municipality); *Tiller v. Norfolk & W. Ry.*, 201 Va. 222, 110 S.E.2d 209 (1959) (relocation of state highway by railroad); Note, *Substitute Condemnation*, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1099–1100 (1966).

Where the owner of the necessary property does not have the power to condemn the substitute property for the use contemplated, the public entity must rely upon the authority granted by some other provision such as Section 1240.330, 1240.340, or 1240.350.

Subdivision (b) specifies an additional requirement for the resolution of necessity and complaint. The second sentence of subdivision (b) makes clear that the determination in the resolution authorizing the taking that the property to be taken is necessary for exchange purposes is conclusive unless a local public entity is acquiring property outside its territorial limits. See Section 1245.250 and Comment thereto (effect of resolution of necessity). See also *People v. Garden Grove Farms, supra*.

§ 1240.330. Substitute condemnation to permit condemnor to relocate public use

1240.330. (a) Where necessary property is devoted to public use, any public entity authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire such property for a particular use may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire substitute property in its own name, relocate on such substitute property the public use to which necessary property is devoted, and thereafter convey the substitute property to the owner of the necessary property if all of the following are established:

(1) The public entity is required by court order or judgment in an eminent domain proceeding, or by agreement with the owner of the necessary property, to relocate the public use to which the necessary property is devoted and thereafter to convey the property upon

which the public use has been relocated to the owner of the necessary property.

(2) The substitute property is necessary for compliance with the court order or judgment or agreement.

(3) The owner of the necessary property will devote the substitute property to the public use being displaced from the necessary property.

(b) Where property is sought to be acquired pursuant to this section, the resolution of necessity and the complaint filed pursuant to such resolution shall specifically refer to this section and shall include a statement that the property is necessary for the purpose specified in this section. The determination in the resolution that the taking of the substitute property is necessary has the effect prescribed in Section 1245.250.

Comment. Section 1240.330 provides general authority for substitute condemnation where a public entity is required by a court order or judgment or by agreement to relocate a public use. It should be noted that condemnation of property devoted to public use may be accomplished only in certain circumstances and the relocation of improvements in an eminent domain proceeding may be ordered only upon express statutory authority. See, *e.g.*, Section 1240.530 (compatible use); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7557; Orange County Water District Act, § 39 (Cal. Stats. 1933, Ch. 924); San Bernardino County Flood Control District Act, § 25 (Cal. Stats. 1939, Ch. 73); Ventura County Flood Control District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1944, 4th Ex. Sess., Ch. 44). Unlike Section 1240.320 (which applies where the owner of the necessary property is the one who will relocate the public use), Section 1240.330 applies where the public entity seeks to acquire substitute property in its own name so that it may itself relocate the public use and then convey the property as improved to the owner of the necessary property. Subdivision (b) specifies an additional requirement for the resolution of necessity and complaint. The second sentence of subdivision (b) makes clear that the determination in the resolution authorizing the taking that the property is necessary for the purposes of this section is conclusive unless a local public entity is acquiring property outside its territorial limits. See Section 1245.250 and Comment thereto (effect of resolution of necessity).

Section 1240.330 is derived from and supersedes numerous special provisions providing such authority to particular public entities. See, *e.g.*, Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 28 (Cal. Stats. 1949, Ch. 1275); Alpine County Water Agency Act, § 19 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1896); Amador County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2137); Contra Costa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1617); Del Norte County Flood Control District Act, § 30 (Cal. Stats. 1955, Ch. 166); El Dorado County Water Agency Act, § 20 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2139); Humboldt County Flood Control District Act, § 30 (Cal. Stats. 1945, Ch. 939); Kern County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1003); Lake County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1544), § 33 (added Cal. Stats. 1954, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 62, § 48); Madera County Flood Control and Water Conservation Agency Act, § 651 (Cal. Stats. 1969, Ch. 916); Marin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 28 (Cal. Stats. 1953, Ch. 666); Mariposa County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2036); Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1947, Ch. 699); Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1449); Nevada County Water Agency Act, § 19 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2122); Orange County Water District Act, § 39 (Cal. Stats. 1933, Ch. 924); Placer County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 1234); Riverside County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 35 (Cal. Stats. 1945, Ch. 1122); Sacramento County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1952, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 10); San Benito County Water Conservation and Flood Control District Act, § 33 (Cal. Stats. 1953, Ch. 1598); San Bernardino County Flood Control District Act, § 25 (Cal. Stats. 1939, Ch. 73); San Diego Flood Control District Act, § 39 (Cal. Stats. 1966, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 55); San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 33 (Cal. Stats. 1956, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 46); San Luis Obispo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1945, Ch. 1294); San Mateo County Flood Control District Act, § 31 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2108); Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 30 (Cal. Stats. 1955, Ch. 1057); Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1945, Ch. 1501); Santa Clara Valley Water District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1405); Shasta County Water Agency Act, § 58 (Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 1512); Solano County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 4.8 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch.

1656); Sutter County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2088); Tulare County Flood Control District Act, § 32 (Cal. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1149); Tuolumne County Water Agency Act, § 20 (Cal. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1236); Ventura County Flood Control District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1944, 4th Ex. Sess., Ch. 44); Yuba-Bear River Basin Authority Act, § 19 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2131); Yuba County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 788).

Public Utilities Code Section 861 grants the Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction in certain controversies that may arise under Section 1240.330 where the public entity is a special law water district.

It should be noted that property may be acquired for the purpose specified in Section 1240.330 by gift, purchase, or other means. See Section 1240.130.

§ 1240.340. Substitute condemnation where owner of necessary property lacks power to condemn property

1240.340. (a) Any public entity authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for a particular use may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire for that use substitute property if all of the following are established:

(1) The owner of the necessary property has agreed in writing to the exchange and, under the circumstances of the particular case, justice requires that he be compensated in whole or in part by substitute property rather than by money.

(2) The substitute property is in the vicinity of the public improvement for which the necessary property is taken.

(3) Taking into account the relative hardship to both owners, it is not unjust to the owner of the substitute property that his property be taken so that the owner of the necessary property may be compensated by such property rather than by money.

(b) Where property is sought to be acquired pursuant to this section, the resolution of necessity and the complaint filed pursuant to such resolution shall specifically refer to this section.

(c) If the defendant objects to a taking under this section, the court in its discretion, upon motion of the owner of the substitute property, the owner of the necessary property, or the plaintiff, may order that the owner of the necessary property be joined as a party plaintiff. At the hearing of the objection, the plaintiff has the burden of proof as to the facts that justify the taking of the property.

Comment. Section 1240.340 authorizes substitute condemnation where the requirements of Section 1240.320, 1240.330, or 1240.350 cannot be satisfied but, under the circumstances, justice demands that the owner of the necessary property be compensated in land rather than money. Under former law, only certain condemnors were explicitly authorized to condemn for exchange purposes generally. See, e.g., STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104(b) (Department of Transportation); WATER CODE § 253(b) (Department of Water Resources). However, the right to exercise the power of eminent domain for exchange purposes probably would have been implied from the right to take property for the improvement itself in the circumstances contemplated. See *Brown v. United States*, 263 U.S. 78 (1923) (property acquired to relocate town displaced by reservoir); *Pitznogle v. Western Md. R.R.*, 119 Md. 673, 87 A. 917 (1913) (property needed to relocate private road). One of the more common examples of such substitute condemnation is a taking to provide utility service to or access to a public road from property cut off from access by the condemnor's original acquisition. This situation is provided for specifically by Section 1240.350. See Section 1240.350 and the Comment thereto. Similar situations may arise where private activities—such as a nonpublic utility, railroad serving a mining, quarrying, or logging operation or belt conveyors, or canals and ditches—are displaced by a public improvement. However, the authority granted by Section 1240.340 is reserved for only these and similarly extraordinary situations. Paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) requires the court to consider the relative hardship to both owners and to permit condemnation only where both owners can be treated fairly.

Section 1240.340 contains special procedural provisions to help insure complete fairness for the owner of the substitute property. The defendant will receive notice that the condemnor is relying on the authority conferred by Section 1240.340 because the section requires that the condemnation complaint specifically refer to the section. In contrast to the

procedure under Sections 1240.320 and 1240.330, the resolution authorizing the taking under Section 1240.340 is never conclusive, the necessity for the taking is justiciable, and the condemnor has the burden of proof of showing that the facts justify the taking of the substitute property. Under subdivision (c) of Section 1240.340, the court may order the person who is to receive the substitute property joined as a party to the action, thereby securing complete representation of all positions. Finally, the owner of the substitute property may recover litigation expenses connected with the taking of the property to be exchanged where the condemnor is unable to justify such taking. See Section 1268.610. The risk of incurring this additional burden should aid in limiting the exercise of this power to those situations where its exercise is appropriate.

§ 1240.350. Substitute condemnation to provide utility service or access to public road

1240.350. (a) Notwithstanding Section 1240.340, whenever a public entity acquires property for a public use and exercises or could have exercised the power of eminent domain to acquire such property for such use, the public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire such additional property as appears reasonably necessary and appropriate (after taking into account any hardship to the owner of the additional property) to provide utility service to, or access to a public road from, any property that is not acquired for such public use but which is cut off from utility service or access to a public road as a result of the acquisition by the public entity.

(b) Where property is sought to be acquired pursuant to this section, the resolution of necessity and the complaint filed pursuant to such resolution shall specifically refer to this section and shall include a statement that the property is necessary for the purpose specified in this section. The determination in the resolution that the taking of the substitute property is necessary has the effect prescribed in Section 1245.250.

Comment. Section 1240.350 provides explicit statutory recognition of the right of a public condemnor that acquires property for a public use to condemn such additional property as is necessary to provide utility service or access to property not taken that would otherwise lack utility service or access as a

result of the acquisition. The utility service or access road need not be open or available to the general public. Under former law, the right to exercise the power of eminent domain for such purposes probably would have been implied from the right to take property for the public improvement itself. Such a taking would be a taking for a public use. *E.g., Department of Public Works v. Farina*, 29 Ill.2d 474, 194 N.E.2d 209 (1963); *Pitznogle v. Western Md. R.R.*, 119 Md. 673, 87 A. 917 (1913); *Luke v. Mass. Turnpike Auth.*, 337 Mass. 304, 149 N.E.2d 225 (1958); *North Carolina State Highway Comm'n v. Asheville School, Inc.*, 276 N.C. 556, 173 S.E.2d 909 (1970); *May v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n*, 172 Ohio St. 555, 178 N.E.2d 920 (1962); *Tracey v. Preston*, 172 Ohio St. 567, 178 N.E.2d 923 (1962).

Section 1240.350 is related to Section 1240.340 but is intended to resolve somewhat different problems and is accordingly quite different in content. Frequently, where property is acquired for an engineering-oriented project (such as a freeway or irrigation canal), parcels not acquired will be deprived of utility service or access to a public road. To restore these parcels to a useful life and, in doing so, to avoid claims of substantial severance damage, a condemnor is authorized to provide substitute utility service or access in connection with the improvement itself. Although the agreement of the owner of the landlocked parcel will generally be obtained, this is not a prerequisite here. Contrast Section 1240.340(a)(1). The owner is not being compensated for property taken; the condemnor is simply minimizing the damage to property retained by the owner. The substitute utility service or access will of necessity be located in the general vicinity of the improvement, and it is unnecessary to provide such a requirement here. Compare Section 1240.340(a)(2). Subdivision (a) of Section 1240.350 requires the condemnor to consider and to minimize the hardship to the owner of both the landlocked parcel and the substitute property. However, in contrast with Section 1240.340, no special procedural safeguards are set forth in Section 1240.350; and, under subdivision (b), the condemnor's resolution of necessity will be conclusive as to issues of necessity unless a local public entity is acquiring property outside its territorial limits. See Section 1245.250 and Comment thereto (effect of resolution of necessity).

Proper consideration as a mitigating factor in determining compensation for the damage, if any, to the property not acquired must be given where the condemnor provides utility service or an access road to property to replace lost utility

service or access or commits itself to making such provision. See Section 1263.450 and the Comment to that section.

Section 1240.350 provides discretionary authority for the condemnor to provide utility service or access. Where the condemnor does not choose to avail itself of this authority, an owner of property has no right to force such a physical solution upon it but is limited to the recovery of damages except as provided in Section 1240.410(c).

Article 5. Excess Condemnation

§ 1240.410. Condemnation of remnants

1240.410. (a) As used in this section, "remnant" means a remainder or portion thereof that will be left in such size, shape, or condition as to be of little market value.

(b) Whenever the acquisition by a public entity by eminent domain of part of a larger parcel of property will leave a remnant, the public entity may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the remnant in accordance with this article.

(c) Property may not be acquired under this section if the defendant proves that the public entity has a reasonable, practicable, and economically sound means to prevent the property from becoming a remnant.

Comment. Section 1240.410 states the test to be applied by the court in determining whether a remainder or portion thereof is a remnant that may be taken by eminent domain. With respect to physical remnants, see *Kern County High School Dist. v. McDonald*, 180 Cal. 7, 179 P. 180 (1919); *People v. Thomas*, 108 Cal. App.2d 832, 239 P.2d 914 (1952). As to the concept of "financial remnants," see *Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court*, 68 Cal.2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968).

The test is essentially that stated in *Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court*, *supra*, except that the confusing concept of "excessive" damages is not used. The remainder or a portion thereof may be taken if it would be left in "such size, shape, or condition as to be of little market value." The "of little market value" concept is a flexible one; whether the excess property may be taken is to be determined in light of the circumstances of the particular case. Thus, the project may result in the excess property having relatively little market value in situations such as, for example, where (1) it will be totally "landlocked" and no

physical solution will be practical, (2) it will be reduced below the minimum zoning limits for building purposes and it is not reasonably probable that there will be a zoning change, (3) it will be of significant value to only one or few persons (such as adjoining landowners), or (4) it will be landlocked and have primarily a speculative value dependent upon access being provided when adjacent land is developed and the time when the adjacent land will be developed is a matter of speculation. See, e.g., *Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court, supra*; *State v. Buck*, 94 N.J.S. 84, 226 A.2d 840 (1967). The test is the objective one of marketability and market value generally of the excess property. Compare Section 1240.150 (purchase of remnants). Cf. GOVT. CODE § 7267.7 ("If the acquisition of only a portion of a property would leave the remaining portion in such a shape or condition as to constitute an uneconomic remnant, the public entity shall offer to and may acquire the entire property if the owner so desires.").

On the other hand, a usable and generally salable piece of property is neither a physical nor financial remnant even though its "highest and best use" has been downgraded by its severance or a serious controversy exists as to its best use and value after severance. See, e.g., *La Mesa v. Tweed & Gambrell Planing Mill*, 146 Cal. App.2d 762, 304 P.2d 803 (1956); *State Highway Comm'n v. Chapman*, 152 Mont. 79, 446 P.2d 709 (1968). Likewise, Section 1240.410 does not authorize a taking of excess property (1) to avoid the cost and inconvenience of litigating the issue of damages, (2) to preclude the payment of damages, including damages substantial in amount in appropriate cases, (3) to coerce the condemnee to accept whatever price the condemnor offers for the property actually needed for the public project, or (4) to afford the condemnor an opportunity to "recoup" damages or unrecognized benefits by speculating as to the future market for the property not actually devoted to the public project. See *Dep't of Public Works v. Superior Court, supra*.

A remnant may be a portion of a remainder where the taking affecting a parcel leaves more than one piece (e.g., the severance of a ranch by a highway so as to leave pieces on both sides of the highway). In certain cases, only one piece might be a remnant.

Subdivision (c) permits the condemnee to contest a taking under Section 1240.410 upon the ground that a "physical solution" could be provided by the condemnor as an alternative to either a total taking or a partial taking that would leave an unusable or unmarketable remainder. The condemnee may be

able to demonstrate that, given construction of the public improvement in the manner proposed, the public entity is able to provide substitute access or take other steps that would be equitable under the circumstances of the particular case. If he can do so, subdivision (c) prevents acquisition of the excess property. In most cases, some physical solution would be possible; but subdivision (c) requires that the solution also be "reasonable, practicable, and economically sound." To be "economically sound," the proposed solution must, at a minimum, reduce the overall cost to the condemnor of the taking. Thus, the total of the cost of the solution, the compensation paid for the part taken, and the damages to the remainder must be less than the amount that would be required to be paid if the entire parcel were taken. The court should, moreover, consider questions of maintenance, hardship to third persons, potential dangers, risk of tort liability, and similar matters in determining whether the solution is also "reasonable and practicable."

If the court determines that a taking is not permitted under Section 1240.410 because a physical solution is "reasonable, practicable, and economically sound," the damages to the remainder must be computed taking into account the extent to which any physical solution that will be provided avoids or reduces such damages. See Section 1263.450 and the Comment thereto.

Section 1240.410 supersedes Section 1266 of the Code of Civil Procedure, Sections 100130.5 and 102241 of the Public Utilities Code, Sections 104.1 and 943.1 of the Streets and Highways Code, Sections 254, 8590.1, 11575.2, and 43533 of the Water Code, and various provisions of uncodified special district acts.

§ 1240.420. Resolution of necessity and complaint

1240.420. When property is sought to be acquired pursuant to Section 1240.410, the resolution of necessity and the complaint filed pursuant to such resolution shall specifically refer to that section. It shall be presumed from the adoption of the resolution that the taking of the property is authorized under Section 1240.410. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.

Comment. Section 1240.420 requires a specific reference in both the resolution and the complaint to the section that is the statutory basis for the proposed taking; it does not require either the recitation or the pleading of the facts that may bring the case within the purview of the section. See *People v. Jarvis*, 274 Cal. App.2d 217, 79 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). A resolution that refers to Section 1240.410 gives rise to a presumption that the taking is authorized under that section. Thus, in the absence of a contest of that issue, Section 1240.420 permits a finding and judgment that the "excess" property may be taken. However, the presumption is specified to be one affecting the burden of producing evidence (see EVID. CODE §§ 603, 604) rather than one affecting the burden of proof (see EVID. CODE §§ 605, 606). Accordingly, the burden of proving the facts that bring the case within Section 1240.410 is on the plaintiff (*i.e.*, the condemnor). See *People v. Van Gorden*, 226 Cal. App.2d 634, 38 Cal. Rptr. 265 (1964); *People v. O'Connell Bros.*, 204 Cal. App.2d 34, 21 Cal. Rptr. 890 (1962). In this respect, Section 1240.420 eliminates any greater effect that might be attributed to the resolution (compare *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959)) or that might be drawn from a legislative (see *County of Los Angeles v. Anthony*, 224 Cal. App.2d 103, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308 (1964)) or administrative (see *County of San Mateo v. Bartole*, 184 Cal. App.2d 422, 7 Cal. Rptr. 569 (1960)) determination or declaration as to "public use." Compare former Section 1266.

As to the manner of raising the issue whether a taking is authorized under Section 1240.410, see Sections 1250.350 and 1250.360(f).

§ 1240.430. Disposal of acquired remnants

1240.430. A public entity may sell, lease, exchange, or otherwise dispose of property taken under this article and may credit the proceeds to the fund or funds available for acquisition of the property being acquired for the public work or improvement. Nothing in this section relieves a public entity from complying with any applicable statutory procedures governing the disposition of property.

Comment. Section 1240.430 authorizes the entity to dispose of property acquired under this article.

Article 6. Condemnation for Compatible Use

§ 1240.510. Property appropriated to public use may be taken for compatible public use

1240.510. Any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire for that use property appropriated to public use if the proposed use will not unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance of the public use as it then exists or may reasonably be expected to exist in the future. Where property is sought to be acquired pursuant to this section, the complaint, and the resolution of necessity if one is required, shall refer specifically to this section.

Comment. Section 1240.510 makes clear that the authority to condemn property includes the general authority to condemn for compatible joint use property already devoted to public use. See Section 1235.180 ("property appropriated to public use" defined). Section 1240.510 does not contemplate displacement of the existing use by the second use; rather it authorizes common enjoyment of the property where the second use does not unreasonably interfere with the existing use.

The authority granted by Section 1240.510 is independent of the authority contained in Article 7 ("more necessary public use") and is not limited in any way by the rules set forth therein. Likewise, condemnation of property appropriated to a public use may be accomplished under Article 7 independent of any authority stated in Article 6. See Section 1240.160. It should be noted, however, that, where property is taken under more necessary use authority, the defendant may be entitled to continue joint use of the property. See Section 1240.630.

The requirement that the proposed use be compatible with the existing use continues prior law that permitted condemnation for consistent uses. See former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240(3), (4), (6). The term "consistent" was necessarily imprecise because of the variety of circumstances it embraced. See, e.g., *City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co.*, 209 Cal. 152, 287 P. 496 (1930), cert. denied, 282 U.S. 863 (1930) (abundant water for use of both parties) (alternate holding); *Reclamation Dist. No. 551 v. Superior Court*, 151 Cal. 263, 90 P. 545 (1907) (railroad right of way sought on top of reclamation district levee); *City of Pasadena v. Stimson*, 91 Cal. 238, 27 P. 604 (1891)

(sewer line in highway right of way); *City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pac. Co.*, 31 Cal. App. 100, 159 P. 992 (1916) (railway company's electric transmission lines and subway on property taken for city park).

Section 1240.510 continues the basic principle of consistency by requiring that the proposed use not unreasonably interfere with or impair the continuance of the existing use or such future use as may reasonably be anticipated for the purpose for which the property is already appropriated. See *San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Superior Court*, 269 Cal. App.2d 514, 75 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1969); *Reclamation Dist. No. 551 v. Superior Court, supra*. See generally 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.2[8], at 235-238 (3d ed. 1964). Section 1240.510 does not grant authority to displace or interfere substantially with a prior use; the power to displace an existing use is dealt with in Article 7 (commencing with Section 1240.610).

Section 1240.510 authorizes any condemnor able to satisfy the requirement that its proposed use will be compatible with the existing one to condemn the property of any person. Former law was uncertain. See *San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Superior Court*, 269 Cal. App.2d 514, 523-524 n.10, 75 Cal. Rptr. 24, 32 n.10 (1969). Subdivision 3 of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240 referred only to property "appropriated to a public use or purpose, by any person, firm or private corporation," thereby implying that property appropriated to public use by a public entity could not be subjected to imposition of a consistent use. Subdivision 4 of former Section 1240 also dealt with joint use, but the subdivision was limited to property appropriated to public use by an irrigation district. However, subdivision 6 of former Section 1240 authorized the imposition of "rights of way" on property appropriated to public use with no limitation as to the person who had appropriated the property to public use. In view of the limited nature of the authority granted and the desirability of encouraging common use, Section 1240.510 adopts the latter approach and is applicable to all condemnors and all condemnees.

It should be noted that Section 1240.510 has no effect on the respective rights of the owner of the underlying fee and any easement holders to compensation for the additional burdens imposed by a condemnor exercising the authority granted by this section. In such a situation, if the plaintiff does not make the owner of the underlying fee or easement holder a party to the eminent domain proceeding, the owner or easement holder may either appear as a defendant in the eminent domain

proceeding or bring a separate inverse action. See Section 1250.230 (appearance as defendant in eminent domain proceeding) and *People v. Schultz Co.*, 123 Cal. App.2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954) (possibility of subsequent action).

Section 1240.510 requires the plaintiff to refer specifically to this section in its complaint where it seeks to exercise the authority granted here. If the plaintiff is a public entity, it also must refer to this section in its resolution of necessity.

In certain situations, a plaintiff may be uncertain of its authority to condemn under Article 7 and may, therefore, proceed under both that article and Section 1240.510. Such inconsistent allegations are proper. See Section 1250.310 and Comment thereto.

The authority granted by Section 1240.510 does not permit condemnation of property made exempt from condemnation by statute. See Section 1240.110 and Comment thereto.

§ 1240.520. Burden of proof

1240.520. If the defendant objects to a taking under Section 1240.510, the defendant has the burden of proof that his property is appropriated to public use. If it is established that the property is appropriated to public use, the plaintiff has the burden of proof that its proposed use satisfies the requirements of Section 1240.510.

Comment. Section 1240.520 states the rules governing the burden of proof where the defendant objects to a taking for compatible use. As to the manner of raising the objection that a taking is not authorized under Section 1240.510 because the proposed use will be incompatible with the public use to which the property is appropriated, see Sections 1250.350 and 1250.360(f). If the taking is contested, the court must first determine whether the property is in fact already appropriated to a public use, and the defendant bears the burden of proof on this issue. Cf. *City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pac. Co.*, 31 Cal. App. 100, 159 P. 992 (1916). Where this fact is established, the plaintiff must then show that the taking is authorized under this article.

§ 1240.530. Terms and conditions of joint use

1240.530. (a) Where property is taken under Section 1240.510, the parties shall make an agreement determining the terms and conditions upon which the property is taken and the manner and extent of its use by each of the parties.

Except as otherwise provided by statute, if the parties are unable to agree, the court shall fix the terms and conditions upon which the property is taken and the manner and extent of its use by each of the parties.

(b) If the court determines that the use in the manner proposed by the plaintiff would not satisfy the requirements of Section 1240.510, the court shall further determine whether the requirements of Section 1240.510 could be satisfied by fixing terms and conditions upon which the property may be taken. If the court determines that the requirements of Section 1240.510 could be so satisfied, the court shall permit the plaintiff to take the property upon such terms and conditions and shall prescribe the manner and extent of its use by each of the parties.

(c) Where property is taken under this article, the court may order any necessary removal or relocation of structures or improvements if such removal or relocation would not require any significant alteration of the use to which the property is appropriated. Unless otherwise provided by statute, all costs and damages that result from the relocation or removal shall be paid by the plaintiff.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1240.530 requires that, in granting the plaintiff the right to use property appropriated to public use, the court may regulate the manner in which the proposed and prior uses will be enjoyed. This continues the substance of portions of former Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240(3), 1247(1), 1247a.

The introductory clause of subdivision (a) recognizes that exceptions to its provisions may be found in other statutes. *E.g.*, the Public Utilities Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine and regulate crossings involving railroads (PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1201 and 1202), and issues involving street and highway crossings may not be subject to judicial review. (*Cf.* STS. & HWYS. CODE § 100.2.)

If the parties agree as to the terms and conditions upon which the property is taken and the manner and extent of its use by each of the parties, the agreement avoids the need for the court to act under subdivisions (a) and (b).

The terms and conditions referred to in subdivision (a) would include a provision specifying how any liability arising out of the compatible use is to be borne.

Subdivision (b) requires that, before a court refuses to allow a taking for joint use because the taking does not satisfy the requirements of Section 1240.510, the court must determine whether terms and conditions could be imposed on the proposed taking so that it would satisfy the requirements of Section 1240.510. If the court refuses to approve the joint use as proposed because of a particular feature of the joint use, the court must specify in what respect the joint use as proposed fails to satisfy the requirements of Section 1240.510 and, where possible, specify the modifications in the use as proposed that are necessary in order to satisfy the requirements of Section 1240.510. Under prior law, decisions could be found which implied that the court could not review the proposed joint use or indicate what changes would be required in the proposed joint use so that the taking would be permitted. *E.g., San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Superior Court*, 269 Cal. App.2d 514, 75 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1969).

Under subdivision (c), the court may require any necessary removal or relocation of structures or improvements if such removal or relocation would not require any significant alteration of the existing use. A similar provision was found in former Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240(3) and 1247a. See *County of Marin v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.2d 633, 349 P.2d 526, 2 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1960). Subdivision (c) provides that the plaintiff will normally bear the cost of such relocation although, in some cases, specific statutory provisions may allocate all or part of such cost otherwise. For a listing and discussion of statutes dealing with the cost of relocation of facilities of franchise holders, see *A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity*, 5 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1, 186-190 (1963); *California Inverse Condemnation Law*, 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1, 353-358 (1971). See also Note, *Cost Allocation in Public Utility Relocation in California*, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 848 (1972).

Article 7. Condemnation for More Necessary Public Use

§ 1240.610. Property appropriated to public use may be taken for more necessary public use

1240.610. Any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire for that use property appropriated to public use if the use for which the

property is sought to be taken is a more necessary public use than the use to which the property is appropriated. Where property is sought to be acquired pursuant to this section, the complaint, and the resolution of necessity if one is required, shall refer specifically to this section.

Comment. Section 1240.610 permits a plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain to displace an existing public use. (For the definition of "property appropriated to public use," see Section 1235.180.) The plaintiff may do so only if the proposed use is "more necessary" than the existing use. It should be noted, however, that the defendant may be permitted to continue joint use of the property under authority granted in Section 1240.630.

The authority to take property appropriated to public use for a more necessary use continues prior law. See former Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240(3), (5) and 1241(3) and numerous repetitions of the rule in other provisions. The authority to take property for a "more necessary" public use makes unnecessary the authority formerly granted to a number of condemners to take property "whether the property is already devoted to the same use or otherwise." See, e.g., HARB. & NAV. CODE § 6296; PUB. RES. CODE § 5542; PUB. UTIL. CODE § 16404; STS. & HWYS. CODE § 27166; WATER CODE § 71693. The meaning of "more necessary public use" is given greater specificity in the succeeding sections in this article as well as numerous provisions in other codes. See, e.g., STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 30402 (use by Toll Bridge Authority a more necessary use than any other use except railroad uses), 31001 (use by Folsom Lake Bridge Authority a more necessary use than any other use), 31201 (use by El Dorado County Toll Tunnel Authority a more necessary use than any other use).

Prior law apparently required a plaintiff seeking to condemn property already appropriated to a public use to allege facts showing that its proposed use was a more necessary public use than that to which the property was already appropriated. See *Woodland School Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n*, 174 Cal. App.2d 243, 344 P.2d 326 (1959). Section 1240.610 eliminates this pleading requirement, but Section 1240.620 continues the rule that the condemnor has the burden of proving that the proposed use is a more necessary public use.

The authority granted by Section 1240.610 does not permit condemnation of property made exempt from condemnation by statute. See Section 1240.110 and Comment thereto.

§ 1240.620. Burden of proof

1240.620. If the defendant objects to a taking under Section 1240.610, the defendant has the burden of proof that his property is appropriated to public use. If it is established that the property is appropriated to public use, the plaintiff has the burden of proof that its use satisfies the requirements of Section 1240.610.

Comment. Section 1240.620 states the rules governing the burden of proof where the defendant objects to a taking for a more necessary public use. As to the manner of raising the objection that a taking is not authorized under Section 1240.610 because the proposed use is not more necessary than the public use to which the property is appropriated, see Sections 1250.350 and 1250.360(f). If the taking is contested, the court must first determine whether the property is in fact already appropriated to public use, the defendant bearing the burden of proof on this issue. *Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pac. Co.*, 31 Cal. App. 100, 159 P. 992 (1916). Where this fact is proved or otherwise established, the plaintiff must then show that its use is a more necessary public use than the existing use.

§ 1240.630. Right of prior user to joint use

1240.630. (a) Where property is sought to be taken under Section 1240.610, the defendant is entitled to continue the public use to which the property is appropriated if the continuance of such use will not unreasonably interfere with or impair, or require a significant alteration of, the more necessary public use as it is then planned or exists or may reasonably be expected to exist in the future.

(b) If the defendant objects to a taking under this article on the ground that he is entitled under subdivision (a) to continue the public use to which the property is appropriated, upon motion of either party, the court shall determine whether the defendant is entitled under subdivision (a) to continue the use to which the property is appropriated; and, if the court determines that the defendant is so entitled, the parties shall make an agreement determining the terms and conditions upon which the defendant may continue the public use to which the property is appropriated, the terms and conditions

upon which the property taken by the plaintiff is acquired, and the manner and extent of the use of the property by each of the parties. Except as otherwise provided by statute, if the parties are unable to agree, the court shall fix such terms and conditions and the manner and extent of the use of the property by each of the parties.

Comment. Section 1240.630 provides a right new to California law; where property appropriated to public use is taken for a more necessary public use, the prior user may continue his use jointly with the more necessary use if the continuance will not unreasonably interfere with or impair, or require a significant alteration of, the more necessary use.

Subdivision (a). The test for whether the defendant may continue to jointly use the property is comparable to that defining compatible uses. Cf. Sections 1240.510 and 1240.530.

Subdivision (b). In order to have a determination of the right to joint use under subdivision (a), the defendant must raise the issue. As to the manner of raising the issue, see Sections 1250.350 and 1250.360(g).

If the defendant objects to the taking on the ground that he is entitled under subdivision (a) to continue the prior use as a joint use, the court must determine whether the defendant is entitled to continue use of the property and must consider possible alterations that would enable joint use and, at the same time, not require significant alteration of the more necessary use or unreasonably impair or interfere with it.

§ 1240.640. Use by state more necessary than other uses

1240.640. (a) Where property has been appropriated to public use by any person other than the state, the use thereof by the state for the same use or any other public use is a more necessary use than the use to which such property has already been appropriated.

(b) Where property has been appropriated to public use by the state, the use thereof by the state is a more necessary use than any use to which such property might be put by any other person.

Comment. Section 1240.640 broadens somewhat the general rule stated under former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240(3) and former Government Code Section 15856 (Property Acquisition Law). Section 1240(3) provided a state priority over private ownership and Section 15856 provided an absolute

priority for all acquisitions under that statute. See, e.g., *State v. City of Los Angeles*, 256 Cal. App.2d 930, 64 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1967). Section 1240.640 not only embraces state acquisitions under the Property Acquisition Law but also under any other authority, most notably by the Department of Water Resources and the Department of Transportation. See also WATER CODE § 252 (authority of the Department of Water Resources to take park lands). Specific exemptions or qualifications to the rule of state supremacy may be stated elsewhere. E.g., Section 1240.680 (park use presumed "more necessary" than highway use); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 155 (Department of Transportation may not take for memorials without county consent); 103.5, 210.1 (Department of Transportation may condemn parks but shall avoid doing so wherever possible). Also, property appropriated to public use by the state may be taken for common use where compatible pursuant to Section 1240.510 *et seq.* and the prior user may, under appropriate circumstances, be permitted under Section 1240.630 to continue his use jointly with the more necessary state use.

§ 1240.650. Use by public entity more necessary than use by other persons

1240.650. (a) Where property has been appropriated to public use by any person other than a public entity, the use thereof by a public entity for the same use or any other public use is a more necessary use than the use to which such property has already been appropriated.

(b) Where property has been appropriated to public use by a public entity, the use thereof by the public entity is a more necessary use than any use to which such property might be put by any person other than a public entity.

Comment. Section 1240.650 is similar in substance to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240(3) except that Section 1240.650 embraces all public entities. Thus, for example, Section 1240.650 includes school districts which formerly were not included.

The preference under Section 1240.650 is not merely one of public ownership over private ownership for the same use but includes any use. Thus, for example, a public entity may condemn the easement of a privately owned public utility not merely to perpetuate the utility use in public ownership but also to provide some separate and distinct use. Specific exceptions

to the rule of public supremacy may be legislatively declared elsewhere. Perhaps the most notable of these exceptions are contained in Section 1240.660. Under the latter section, property appropriated by any person to the use of certain public entities is protected from subsequent appropriation by certain other public entities. See Section 1240.660 and Comment thereto. See also *Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles*, 284 F. 784 (9th Cir. 1922) (city precluded by former Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240(3) and 1241(3)—now Section 1240.660—from condemning property appropriated to use of other governmental entities by private corporation).

Property appropriated to public use by a public entity may always be taken for common use by any other person where compatible pursuant to Section 1240.510 *et seq.*

§ 1240.660. Property appropriated to the public use of cities, counties, or certain special districts

1240.660. Property appropriated to the public use of any city, county, municipal water district, irrigation district, transit district, rapid transit district, public utility district, community services district, or water district may not be taken under this article by any other city, county, municipal water district, irrigation district, transit district, rapid transit district, public utility district, community services district, or water district while such property is so appropriated to such use.

Comment. Section 1240.660 codifies prior law under former Sections 1240(3) and 1241(3) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 1240.660, like its predecessors, protects property appropriated to a public use by or to the use of one of a group of public entities from displacement by any other entity in the group. The list of entities in Section 1240.660 conforms to that contained in former Section 1241(3). Former Section 1241(3) listed a greater number of entities than former Section 1240(3); however, the discrepancy appears to have been unintentional, and the sections were apparently regarded as interchangeable. See *City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist.*, 63 Cal.2d 291, 405 P.2d 377, 46 Cal. Rptr. 465 (1965); *County of Marin v. Superior Court*, 53 Cal.2d 633, 349 P.2d 526, 2 Cal. Rptr. 758 (1960). The term “appropriated to public use” is defined by Section 1235.180. See Section 1235.180 and Comment thereto. Former Sections 1240(3) and 1241(3) prohibited takings “while such property is so appropriated and used for the public purposes for

which it has been so appropriated." (Emphasis added.) This language implied that the property must not only be appropriated but also actually used for a public purpose. However, the cases did not so construe the section. See *East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. City of Lodi*, 120 Cal. App. 740, 750, 8 P.2d 532, 536 (1932) ("'used' does not mean actual physical use . . . but . . . property reasonably necessary for use" which will be used within a reasonable time). The term "used" has accordingly been eliminated from Section 1240.660 to conform with the actual construction. Similarly, both sections referred to takings of "private" property appropriated to the use of the respective entities. It was clear, however, that the sections were not limited to private property devoted to public use but included property owned by public entities as well as by private individuals or corporations. See *City of Beaumont v. Beaumont Irr. Dist.*, *supra* (city may not condemn property appropriated to use by irrigation district); *County of Marin v. Superior Court*, *supra* (county road may not be condemned by municipal water district); *Mono Power Co. v. City of Los Angeles*, 284 F. 784 (9th Cir. 1922) (city may not condemn property appropriated to use of other governmental entities by private corporation). The modifying word "private" has, therefore, been omitted.

Section 1240.660, like its predecessors, protects property appropriated to a public use by the specific defendants listed from displacement only by the plaintiffs listed. Thus, for example, a city may not take from a rapid transit district; but a school district—because it is not listed—may both take from those listed and have its property taken by those listed without regard to these provisions (although the general rule stated in Section 1240.610 would still apply).

It should be noted that Section 1240.660 places a limitation only on displacement of one user by another. Any entity listed in Section 1240.660 may take property of any other entity listed for common uses where compatible under Section 1240.510. See, e.g., *City of San Diego v. Cuyamaca Water Co.*, 209 Cal. 152, 287 P. 496 (1930), and *Turlock Irr. Dist. v. Sierra etc. Power Co.*, 69 Cal. App. 150, 230 P. 671 (1924).

§ 1240.670. Property preserved in its natural condition by nonprofit organization

1240.670. (a) Subject to Section 1240.690, notwithstanding any other provision of law, property is presumed to have been appropriated for the best and most necessary public use if all of the following are established:

(1) The property is owned by a nonprofit organization contributions to which are deductible for state and federal income tax purposes under the laws of this state and of the United States and having the primary purpose of preserving areas in their natural condition.

(2) The property is open to the public subject to reasonable restrictions and is appropriated, and used exclusively, for the preservation of native plants or native animals including, but not limited to, mammals, birds, and marine life, or biotic communities, or geological or geographical formations of scientific or educational interest.

(3) The property is irrevocably dedicated to such uses so that, upon liquidation, dissolution, or abandonment of or by the owner, such property will be distributed only to a fund, foundation, or corporation whose property is likewise irrevocably dedicated to such uses, or to a governmental agency holding land for such uses.

(b) The presumption established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.

Comment. Section 1240.670 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivision (a) of former Section 1241.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For special procedural limitations where the property described is sought to be taken for state highway purposes, see Section 1240.690.

§ 1240.680. Property appropriated to park or similar uses

1240.680. (a) Subject to Sections 1240.690 and 1240.700, notwithstanding any other provision of law, property is presumed to have been appropriated for the best and most necessary public use if the property is appropriated to public use as any of the following:

(1) A state, regional, county, or city park or recreation area.

(2) A wildlife or waterfowl management area established by the Department of Fish and Game pursuant to Section 1525 of the Fish and Game Code.

(3) A historic site included in the National Register of Historic Places or state-registered landmarks.

(4) An ecological reserve as provided for in Article 4 (commencing with Section 1580) of Chapter 5 of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code.

(b) The presumption established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.

Comment. Section 1240.680 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivision (a) of former Section 1241.7 of the Code of Civil Procedure and subdivision (a) of former Section 5542.5 of the Public Resources Code. The portion of Section 5542.5(a) which described the property ("whether owned in fee or lesser title interest, leased, or operated under a license, management agreement, or otherwise") has been omitted in view of the broad definition of "property" in Section 1235.170. See also Section 1235.180 (defining "property appropriated to public use").

For special procedural limitations where the property described is sought to be taken for state highway purposes, see Section 1240.690. For special procedural limitations where the property described is sought to be taken for city or county road, street, or highway purposes, see Section 1240.700.

§ 1240.690. Declaratory relief where acquisition for state highway purposes

1240.690. (a) When property described in Section 1240.670 or Section 1240.680 is sought to be acquired for state highway purposes, and such property was dedicated or devoted to a use described in those sections prior to the initiation of highway route location studies, an action for declaratory relief may be brought by the public entity or nonprofit organization owning such property in the superior court to determine the question of which public use is the best and most necessary public use for such property.

(b) The action for declaratory relief shall be filed and served within 120 days after the California Highway Commission has published in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Section 6061 of the Government Code, and delivered to the public entity or nonprofit organization owning such property, a written notice that a proposed route or an adopted route includes such property. In the case of nonprofit organizations, the written notice need only be given to nonprofit

organizations that are on file with the Registrar of Charitable Trusts of this state.

(c) In the declaratory relief action, the resolution of the California Highway Commission is not conclusive evidence of the matters set forth in Section 1240.030.

(d) With respect to property described in Section 1240.670 or Section 1240.680 which is sought to be acquired for state highway purposes:

(1) If an action for declaratory relief is not filed and served within the 120-day period established by subdivision (b), the right to bring such action is waived and the provisions of Sections 1240.670 and 1240.680 do not apply.

(2) When a declaratory relief action may not be brought pursuant to this section, the provisions of Sections 1240.670 and 1240.680 do not apply.

Comment. Section 1240.690 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivision (b) of former Sections 1241.7 and 1241.9 of the Code of Civil Procedure except for portions that have been omitted as unnecessary. The portion of subdivision (b) that related to trial preference duplicates Code of Civil Procedure Section 1062a (trial preference for declaratory relief actions generally). The portions of former Section 1241.7 relating to takings for public utility purposes are unnecessary because use by a public entity is more necessary than use by a public utility. See Section 1240.650.

§ 1240.700. Declaratory relief where regional park to be acquired for city or county street purposes

1240.700. (a) When property described in Section 1240.680 is sought to be acquired for city or county road, street, or highway purposes, and such property was dedicated or devoted to regional park or recreational purposes prior to the initiation of road, street, or highway route location studies, an action for declaratory relief may be brought in the superior court by the regional park district which operates the park or recreational area to determine the question of which public use is the best and most necessary public use for such property.

(b) The action for declaratory relief shall be filed and served within 120 days after the city or county, as the case may be, has published in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Section 6061 of the Government Code, and delivered to the regional park district, a written notice that a proposed route or site or an adopted route includes such property.

(c) With respect to property dedicated or devoted to regional park or recreational purposes which is sought to be acquired for city or county road, street, or highway purposes:

(1) If an action for declaratory relief is not filed and served within the 120-day period established by subdivision (b), the right to bring such action is waived and the provisions of Section 1240.680 do not apply.

(2) When a declaratory relief action may not be brought pursuant to this section, the provisions of Section 1240.680 do not apply.

Comment. Section 1240.700 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivision (b) of former Section 5542.5 of the Public Resources Code except that the portion of Section 5542.5 relating to trial preference has been omitted as unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1062a (trial preference for declaratory relief actions generally).

CHAPTER 4. PRECONDEMNATION ACTIVITIES

Article 1. Preliminary Location, Survey, and Tests

§ 1245.010. Right to make examinations and tests

1245.010. Subject to requirements of this article, any person authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain may enter upon property to make studies, surveys, examinations, tests, soundings, or appraisals or to engage in similar activities reasonably related to acquisition or use of the property for that use.

Comment. Section 1245.010 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivision (b) of former Section 1242.

§ 1245.020. Liability for damages

1245.020. (a) The liability, if any, of a public entity for damages to property that arise from the entry and activities mentioned in Section 1245.010 is determined by Section 816 of the Government Code.

(b) Any person, other than a public entity, authorized to acquire property for a particular use by eminent domain is liable for damages to property that arise from the entry and activities mentioned in Section 1245.010 to the same extent that a public entity is liable for such damages under Section 816 of the Government Code.

Comment. Section 1245.020 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivisions (c) and (d) of former Section 1242.

§ 1245.030. Consent or court order required in certain cases

1245.030. In any case in which the entry and activities mentioned in Section 1245.010 will subject the person having the power of eminent domain to liability under Section 1245.020, before making such entry and undertaking such activities, the person shall secure:

(a) The written consent of the owner to enter upon his property and to undertake such activities; or

(b) An order for entry from the superior court in accordance with Section 1245.040.

Comment. Except as noted in the Comment to Section 1245.070, Sections 1245.030–1245.070 continue without substantive change the provisions of former Section 1242.5.

§ 1245.040. Court order permitting entry; deposit of probable compensation

1245.040. (a) The person seeking to enter upon the property may petition the court for an order permitting the entry and shall give such prior notice to the owner of the property as the court determines is appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case.

(b) Upon such petition and after such notice has been given, the court shall determine the purpose for the entry, the nature and scope of the activities reasonably necessary to accomplish such purpose, and the probable amount of compensation to be paid to the owner of the property for the actual damage to the property and interference with its possession and use.

(c) After such determination, the court may issue its order permitting the entry. The order shall prescribe the purpose for the entry and the nature and scope of the activities to be undertaken and shall require the person seeking to enter to deposit with the court the probable amount of compensation.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1245.030.

§ 1245.050. Modification of court order

1245.050. At any time after an order has been made pursuant to Section 1245.040, either party may, upon noticed motion, request the court to determine whether the nature and scope of the activities reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the entry should be modified or whether the amount deposited is the probable amount of compensation that will be awarded. If the court determines that the nature and scope of the activities to be undertaken or the amount of the deposit should be modified, the court shall make its order prescribing the necessary changes.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1245.030.

§ 1245.060. Management of amount deposited

1245.060. The court shall retain the amount deposited under this article for a period of six months following the termination of the entry. Such amount shall be deposited in the Condemnation Deposits Fund in the State Treasury and shall be held, invested, deposited, and disbursed in accordance with Article 10 (commencing with Section 16429.1) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1245.030.

§ 1245.070. Recovery of damages and expenses

1245.070. (a) The owner is entitled to recover from the person who entered his property the amount necessary to compensate the owner for any damage which arises out of the entry and for his court costs in the proceeding under this article. In the interests of justice, the court may award the owner, in addition to his court costs, reasonable attorney's fees in an amount fixed by the court.

(b) Where a deposit has been made pursuant to this article, the owner may, upon noticed motion made within six months following the termination of the entry, request the court to determine the amount he is entitled to recover under this section. Thereupon, the court shall determine such amount and award it to the owner and the money on deposit shall be available for the payment of such amount.

(c) Nothing in this section affects the availability of any other remedy the owner may have for the damaging of his property.

Comment. Section 1245.070 continues without substantive change the provisions of subdivision (e) of former Section 1242.5 except that Section 1245.070 permits the award of reasonable attorney's fees only in the interests of justice—*e.g.*, where the person who entered or sought to enter acted arbitrarily and without any reasonable justification—whereas former Section 1242.5 contained no such limitation on the award of reasonable attorney's fees.

Article 2. Resolution of Necessity

§ 1245.210. “Governing body” defined

1245.210. As used in this article, “governing body” means:

- (a) In the case of a taking by a local public entity, the governing body of the local public entity.
- (b) In the case of a taking by the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District, the State Reclamation Board.
- (c) In the case of a taking by the State Public Works Board pursuant to the Property Acquisition Law, Part 11 (commencing with Section 15850) of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, the State Public Works Board.
- (d) In the case of a taking by the Department of Transportation (other than a taking pursuant to Section 30100 of the Streets and Highways Code), the California Highway Commission.
- (e) In the case of a taking by the Department of Transportation pursuant to Section 30100 of the Streets and Highways Code, the California Toll Bridge Authority.
- (f) In the case of a taking by the Department of Water Resources, the California Water Commission.
- (g) In the case of a taking for the University of California, the Regents of the University of California.

Comment. Section 1245.210 defines the term “governing body” as used in this article.

Subdivision (a). A local public entity is any public entity other than the state. Section 1235.150. The governing bodies of such entities are specified by statute. *E.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 23005* (board of supervisors governs county) and *34000* (legislative body of municipal corporation is board of trustees, city council, or other governing body).

Subdivision (b). The San Joaquin Drainage District, while by definition a local public entity (Section 1235.150), is comparable in some ways to an agency of the state. Its work is in the interest of the entire state. See *Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Riley*, 199 Cal. 668, 251 P. 207 (1926). It is partially funded by the state. See WATER CODE § 8527. Its management and control are vested in a state agency—the Reclamation Board—which is its governing body. See WATER CODE § 8502.

Subdivision (c). Takings for all general state purposes (other than state highways, toll bridges, state water projects, and the University of California) are made by the State Public Works Board under the Property Acquisition Law (GOVT. CODE § 15850 *et seq.*). Under former law, there may have been cases where the Department of General Services or other state agencies could condemn on behalf of the state under authority formerly found in Government Code Section 14661 or other provisions (basically where an appropriation was made not subject to the Property Acquisition Law), but this authority is not continued. See GOVT. CODE § 15855 and Comment thereto. It should be noted that the Public Works Board may condemn property only with the approval of the agency concerned. GOVT. CODE § 15853.

Subdivision (d). Takings for state highway purposes are accomplished on behalf of and in the name of the state by the Department of Transportation. STS. & HWYS. CODE § 102. The governing body for the Department of Transportation in such takings is the California Highway Commission. This continues a provision formerly found in Streets and Highways Code Section 102.

Subdivision (e). Takings for toll bridges and other transportation facilities designated by Streets and Highways Code Section 30100 are accomplished on behalf and in the name of the state by the Department of Transportation. STS. & HWYS. CODE § 30400. The governing body for the Department of Transportation in such takings is the California Toll Bridge Authority. STS. & HWYS. CODE § 30400. See also former STS. & HWYS. CODE § 30404.

Subdivision (f). Takings for state water and dam purposes and for the Central Valley Project are accomplished on behalf and in the name of the state by the Department of Water Resources. WATER CODE §§ 250 and 11575. The governing body of the Department of Water Resources is the California Water Commission. This supersedes provisions formerly found in Sections 250 and 11581 of the Water Code that required a declaration of necessity by the Director of Water Resources with the concurrence of the Water Commission.

Subdivision (g). The Regents of the University of California, while comparable to an agency of the state, is a separate corporation administering the public trust known as the University of California. The Regents is authorized to condemn property for the university in its own name and is, therefore, the governing body of the university for purposes of

Section 1245.220. See CAL. CONST., Art. IX, § 9 and EDUC. CODE § 23151. *Cf.* EDUC. CODE §§ 23201 and 23204.

§ 1245.220. Resolution of necessity required

1245.220. A public entity may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until its governing body has adopted a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of this article.

Comment. Before a public entity begins condemnation proceedings, its governing body must adopt a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of Sections 1245.230 and 1245.240. See Section 1240.040 and Comment thereto.

It should be noted that failure to commence an eminent domain proceeding within six months after adoption of a resolution of necessity constitutes a cause of action for inverse condemnation. Section 1245.260.

§ 1245.230. Contents of resolution

1245.230. The resolution of necessity shall contain all of the following:

(a) A general description of the proposed project with a reference to the specific statute or statutes authorizing the public entity to acquire property for such project.

(b) A description of the property to be acquired for the proposed project and its use in the proposed project.

(c) A declaration that the governing body of the public entity has found and determined each of the following:

(1) The public interest and necessity require the proposed project.

(2) The proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

(3) The property described in the resolution is necessary for the proposed project.

Comment. Section 1245.230 prescribes the contents of the resolution of necessity by a public entity. The resolution is an administrative determination that the statutory prerequisites for taking particular property have been met. Section 1245.230 supersedes various provisions that required a resolution of necessity by different public entities.

Subdivision (a). The resolution of necessity must contain a general description of the proposed project. A statement, for example, that the project is an “elementary school and grounds” or “right of way for a freeway” would satisfy this requirement.

The resolution also must make reference to the specific statute or statutes authorizing the exercise of the power of eminent domain for the project. Only persons authorized by statute to condemn for a particular public use can condemn for that use. Section 1240.020. Such authorizing statutes may be of several types. The state, the University of California, cities, counties, and school districts, for example, may condemn any property necessary to carry out any of their powers or functions. See, e.g., EDUC. CODE §§ 1047 (school districts), 23151 (Regents of the University of California); GOVT. CODE §§ 15853 (Public Works Board), 25350.5 (counties), 37350.5 (cities). Many special districts have similar broad authority, but some may condemn only for limited or special purposes. Additionally, if the condemnor is acquiring property under authority of certain general public uses, it must specify that authority. E.g., Sections 1240.220 (taking for future use), 1240.320–1240.350 (condemnation for exchange purposes), 1240.420 (excess condemnation), 1240.510 (taking for compatible use), and 1240.610 (taking for more necessary public use).

Subdivision (b). The resolution of necessity must contain a description of the property, right, or interest to be taken. See Section 1235.170 (“property” defined). The description must be sufficiently precise to enable the owner to determine the physical extent of the taking and the interest sought. The resolution must also indicate in what way the property will be used for the proposed project.

Subdivision (c). The resolution of necessity must contain a declaration that the governing body of the public entity has found and determined the existence of each of the three elements of public necessity required by Section 1240.030 to be established for a taking. See Section 1240.030 and Comment thereto. This provision is modeled after similar provisions formerly applicable to various condemners. See, e.g., former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1241(2), former STS. & HWYS. CODE § 25052, former WATER CODE § 8595.

§ 1245.240. Adoption of resolution

1245.240. Except as otherwise provided by statute, the resolution shall be adopted by a vote of a majority of the members of the governing body of the public entity.

Comment. Section 1245.240 states the general rule that, to be valid, the resolution of necessity must be adopted by a majority of all of the members of the governing body of the entity, not merely a majority of those present at the time of adoption. In the past, it was not clear whether a majority of those present could authorize condemnation. *Cf.* 52 OPS. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 56 (1969) (majority of those present needed for city ordinance).

Section 1245.240 continues the majority vote requirement for takings by the state. See, *e.g.*, former GOVT. CODE § 15855 and STS. & HWYS. CODE § 102. Section 1245.240 also continues the majority vote requirement formerly applicable to most takings by local public entities under numerous specific provisions superseded by Section 1245.240. Section 1245.240 supersedes the provision of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1241(2) that made the resolutions of certain local public entities conclusive on necessity if the resolution was adopted by a two-thirds vote.

The introductory proviso of Section 1245.240 recognizes that differing vote requirements may be imposed by special statute. See, *e.g.*, EDUC. CODE § 23151 (two-thirds vote required for taking by Regents of the University of California); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 760 (four-fifths vote required for takings by county for state highway purposes).

§ 1245.250. Effect of resolution

1245.250. (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, a resolution of necessity adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to this article conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030.

(b) If the taking is by a local public entity and the property described in the resolution is not located entirely within the boundaries of the local public entity, the resolution of necessity creates a presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 are true. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence.

(c) For the purposes of subdivision (b), a taking by the State Reclamation Board for the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District is not a taking by a local public entity.

Comment. Section 1245.250 provides a uniform rule governing the effect to be given to a resolution of necessity. It continues the conclusive effect given to the resolution in state takings. See, *e.g.*, former GOVT. CODE § 15855. It supersedes numerous sections of various codes that afforded disparate treatment to the resolution of necessity of various types of local public entities and generalizes the conclusive effect given the resolution of certain local public entities by former Section 1241(2).

Subdivision (a). A valid resolution of necessity conclusively establishes the matters of public necessity specified in Section 1240.030 (1) in all takings by local public entities where the property taken is entirely within the boundaries of the condemning entity and (2) in all takings by state entities regardless of the location of the property taken. Giving a conclusive effect to the resolution of necessity has been held constitutionally permissible. *Rindge Co. v. County of Los Angeles*, 262 U.S. 700 (1923), *aff'g County of Los Angeles v. Rindge Co.*, 53 Cal. App. 166, 200 P. 27 (1921); *City of Oakland v. Parker*, 70 Cal. App. 295, 233 P. 68 (1924). Among the matters encompassed in the conclusive resolution are the extent of and interest in necessary property. See Section 1245.230 and Comment thereto.

A valid resolution precludes judicial review of the matters specified in Section 1240.030 even where it is alleged that such matters were determined by "fraud, bad faith, or abuse of discretion." See *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959). However, the resolution is conclusive *only* on the matters specified in Section 1240.030; it does not affect in any way the right of a condemnee to challenge a taking on the ground that the project is not an authorized public use or on the ground that the condemnor does not intend to put the property to its declared public purpose. See Sections 1240.010 and 1250.360 and Comments thereto. Likewise, the resolution does not affect the right of a defendant to contest the right to take his property on specific statutory grounds provided in the Eminent Domain Law. See Sections 1240.230 (taking for future use), 1240.340 (condemnation for exchange purposes), 1240.420 (excess condemnation), 1240.520 (taking for compatible use), and 1240.620 (taking for more necessary public use). Cf. Section

1240.050 (extraterritorial condemnation). Likewise, the condemnor must demonstrate its compliance with any other requirements and regulations governing the institution of public projects. *Cf.* Comment to Section 1240.030.

The initial proviso of Section 1245.250 recognizes that there may be exceptions to the uniform conclusive effect given the resolution of necessity. One important exception is in subdivision (b) (extraterritorial acquisitions by local public entity). As to the effect of the resolution of necessity where the taking is by a city or county for open space, see Government Code Section 6953.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) provides that a resolution of necessity of a local public entity creates a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence with regard to public necessity if the property described in the resolution is not located entirely within the boundaries of the local public entity. See EVID. CODE § 604.

Subdivision (b) continues the portion of former Section 1241(2) that denied conclusive effect of a resolution to property lying outside the territorial limits of certain local public entities. Under that provision, necessity and proper location were justiciable questions in the condemnation proceeding. See *City of Hawthorne v. Peebles*, 166 Cal. App.2d 758, 333 P.2d 442 (1959); *City of Carlsbad v. Wight*, 221 Cal. App.2d 756, 34 Cal. Rptr. 820 (1963); *City of Los Angeles v. Keck*, 14 Cal. App.3d 920, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1971). Subdivision (b) extends this limitation on the effect of the resolution of necessity to all local public entities condemning property outside their territorial jurisdiction and also makes the question whether the proposed project is necessary a justiciable question in such a condemnation proceeding.

Subdivision (c). The limitation contained in subdivision (b) is not applicable to acquisitions for the Sacramento and San Joaquin Drainage District. Acquisitions for this district are undertaken by the State Reclamation Board. See WATER CODE § 8590 and Section 1245.210 and Comment thereto. The conclusive effect given resolutions of the board by former Water Code Section 8595 is continued under subdivisions (a) and (c).

§ 1245.260. Failure to initiate eminent domain proceeding within six months from adoption of resolution

1245.260. (a) If a public entity has adopted a resolution of necessity that meets the requirements of this article and is authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the property described in the resolution but does not commence an eminent domain proceeding to acquire such property within six months after the date the resolution was adopted, the owner of the property may bring an action in inverse condemnation requiring the taking of such property and a determination of the compensation for such taking. In such inverse condemnation action, the court may, in addition, or in the alternative, if it finds that the rights of the owner have been interfered with, award damages for any such interference by the public entity.

(b) This section does not affect any authority a public entity may have to do any of the following:

- (1) Institute an eminent domain proceeding.
- (2) Take possession of property pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6.
- (3) Rescind a resolution of necessity and abandon the eminent domain proceeding.

Comment. Section 1245.260 continues without substantive change the provisions of former Section 1243.1.

CHAPTER 5. COMMENCEMENT OF PROCEEDING

Article 1. Jurisdiction and Venue

§ 1250.010. Jurisdiction in superior court

1250.010. Except as otherwise provided in Section 1230.060 and in Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 1273.010), all eminent domain proceedings shall be commenced and prosecuted in the superior court.

Comment. Section 1250.010 declares the basic rule that eminent domain proceedings are to be conducted in the superior court. This declaration continues prior law. See former Section 1243. For demurrer based on lack of jurisdiction, see Section 430.10.

However, the jurisdiction of the superior court is not exclusive. The issue of just compensation may be submitted to arbitration. See Chapter 12. Moreover, Section 1230.060 preserves such jurisdiction as the Public Utilities Commission may have over issues in eminent domain proceedings. See Section 1230.060 and Comment thereto.

§ 1250.020. Place of commencement

1250.020. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), an eminent domain proceeding shall be commenced in the county in which the property sought to be taken is located.

(b) When property sought to be taken is situated in more than one county, the plaintiff may commence the proceeding in any one of such counties.

Comment. Section 1250.020 specifies where an eminent domain proceeding must be brought. Failure to bring the proceeding in the proper county is a failure to vest the necessary jurisdiction in the court. For provisions authorizing transfer of the proceedings for trial, see Section 1250.040. For demurrer on ground of lack of jurisdiction, see Section 430.10.

Section 1250.020 does not authorize a condemnor to condemn property beyond its territorial limits. *Cf.* Section 1240.050 and Comment thereto. For authority to separate property in a complaint for trial, see Section 1048.

Section 1250.020 recodifies the substance of the venue provisions of former Section 1243.

Subdivision (a). Generally speaking, the only place an eminent domain proceeding may be brought is the county in which the property sought to be acquired lies.

Subdivision (b). Where property straddles a county line, the plaintiff has the option to bring suit on either side of the line, and the county so chosen is the proper place of trial for all the property even though a portion is not located in the county. See Section 1250.030. Under former law, where property situated in more than one county was sought to be acquired, the plaintiff could elect to bring separate proceedings relating to separate portions of the property in the county where such portion was situated. See former Section 1243. Subdivision (b), however, requires the plaintiff in this situation to make an election and bring the proceeding in one of the counties in which the tract is situated. In certain situations, relief from the plaintiff's choice of county may be obtained pursuant to Section 1250.040. See Section 1250.040 and Comment thereto.

§ 1250.030. Place of trial

1250.030. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the county in which an eminent domain proceeding is commenced pursuant to Section 1250.020 is the proper county for trial of the proceeding.

(b) Where the court changes the place of trial pursuant to Section 1250.040, the county to which the proceeding is transferred is the proper county for trial of the proceeding.

Comment. Section 1250.030 continues the substance of a portion of former Section 1243.

§ 1250.040. Change of place of trial generally

1250.040. The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure for the change of place of trial of actions apply to eminent domain proceedings.

Comment. Section 1250.040 makes clear that the rules of practice for civil actions generally govern venue change in eminent domain proceedings. This continues prior law. See former Section 1243 and *City of Long Beach v. Lakewood Park*, 118 Cal. App.2d 596, 258 P.2d 538 (1953). See also Section 1230.040 and *Yolo Water & Power Co. v. Superior Court*, 28 Cal. App. 589, 153 P. 394 (1915). Contrast *City of Santa Rosa v. Fountain Water Co.*, 138 Cal. 579, 581, 71 P. 1123, 1124 (1903).

Included in the provisions incorporated by Section 1250.040 is Section 394. Under the applicable portions of Section 394, if a local public entity commences an eminent domain proceeding in a county in which it is situated against a defendant who is not situated, doing business, or residing in such county, either party may move to have the proceeding transferred for trial to another county. Alternatively, if a local public entity commences an eminent domain proceeding in a county in which it is not situated, either the entity or any defendant who is not situated, doing business, or residing in such county may move to have the proceeding transferred for trial to another county. Upon such motion, the court is obligated to transfer the trial to as nearly a neutral county as possible. The county to which the proceeding may be transferred includes the county (1) upon which the parties agree, (2) in which, as nearly as possible, no party is situated, doing business, or residing, or (3) in which, as nearly as possible, all parties are situated, doing business, or residing. Where the property is located in a neutral county to begin with, the court need not transfer the proceeding even though a motion to transfer would be authorized under Section 394. See *City of Stockton v. Wilson*, 79 Cal. App. 422, 249 P. 835 (1926). See also *City of Los Angeles v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co.*, 164 Cal. App.2d 253, 330 P.2d 888 (1958).

Section 394 applies to proceedings commenced by any public entity other than the state. See Section 394(3). See also *People v. Spring Valley Co.*, 109 Cal. App.2d 656, 241 P.2d 1069 (1952) (Section 394 not applicable in action by state); *Riverside etc. Dist. v. Joseph W. Wolfskill Co.*, 147 Cal. App.2d 714, 306 P.2d 22 (1957) (Section 394 not applicable in action by state agency); *Georgetown Divide Pub. Util. Dist. v. Bacchi*, 204 Cal. App.2d 194, 22 Cal. Rptr. 27 (1962) (Section 394 applicable in action by special district having status of local public entity).

Section 394 applies to any defendant regardless of the interest the defendant claims in the property sought to be taken. See *Georgetown Divide Pub. Util. Dist. v. Bacchi*, *supra* (joint owners may take advantage of Section 394); *City of Oakland v. Darbee*, 102 Cal. App.2d 493, 227 P.2d 909 (1951) (separate owners may take advantage of Section 394); *City of Long Beach v. Lakewood Park*, *supra* (owners of oil exploration and development rights may take advantage of Section 394). The mere fact that the proceeding is a "mixed action," one in which only some of the defendants fall within the terms of this section, does not preclude its applicability. See *Georgetown Divide Pub. Util. Dist. v. Bacchi*, *supra*; 1 J. CHADBOURN, H. GROSSMAN, A. VAN ALSTYNE, CALIFORNIA PLEADING § 367 (1961). See also

People v. Ocean Shore R.R., 24 Cal. App.2d 420, 75 P.2d 560 (1938) (order changing venue on motion by but one of several defendants on grounds of impossibility of impartial trial affirmed).

The term “doing business” as used in Section 394 is intended to mean conducting some substantial activity, *e.g.*, holding one’s self out to others as engaged in the selling of goods or services. See *City of Los Angeles v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., supra*.

Article 2. Commencement of Proceeding Generally

§ 1250.110. Complaint commences proceeding

1250.110. An eminent domain proceeding is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.

Comment. Section 1250.110 supersedes a portion of former Section 1243 which provided that eminent domain proceedings were commenced by filing a complaint and issuing summons. Section 1250.110 makes clear that the filing of a complaint alone is sufficient to commence an eminent domain proceeding and confers subject matter jurisdiction on the court. See *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924); *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. App.2d 636, 116 P.2d 458 (1941).

Section 1250.110 is comparable to Section 411.10 which provides that “a civil action is commenced by filing a complaint with the court.”

§ 1250.120. Contents of summons

1250.120. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the form and contents of the summons shall be as in civil actions generally.

(b) Where process is served by publication, in addition to the summons, the publication shall describe the property sought to be taken in a manner reasonably calculated to give persons with an interest in the property actual notice of the pending proceeding.

Comment. Section 1250.120, which prescribes the contents of the summons, supersedes former Section 1245. Sections 412.20 and 412.30 specify the matters to be included in the summons.

Since the summons does not contain a description of the property (which formerly was required), the defendant must refer to the complaint for this information. However, where service of the summons is by publication, a copy of the complaint is not published. To assure that a person served by

publication will be able to determine if he has an interest in the property, subdivision (b) requires the publication to contain a description of the property where process is served by publication. *Cf.* Section 413.10 (service required in a manner "reasonably calculated to give actual notice").

§ 1250.130. Additional requirements where service is by publication

1250.130. Where the court orders service by publication, it shall also order the plaintiff (1) to post a copy of the summons and complaint on the property sought to be taken and (2), if not already recorded, to record a notice of the pendency of the proceeding in the manner provided by Section 1250.150. Such posting and recording shall be done not later than 10 days after the date the order is made.

Comment. Section 1250.130 provides additional requirements where service is by publication. The manner of service generally in an eminent domain proceeding is provided by Sections 415.10–415.50. See Section 1230.040 (rules of practice in eminent domain proceeding).

Due process requires that the rights of a person may be adjudicated only if that person is served with process in a manner reasonably calculated to give him actual notice and an opportunity to be heard. See, e.g., *Milliken v. Meyer*, 311 U.S. 457 (1940); *Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan*, 150 Cal. 289, 88 P. 356 (1906). If a person cannot, after reasonable diligence, be served personally or by mail, the court may order service by publication. Section 415.50. This may occur either because the whereabouts of a named defendant are unknown or because the identity of the defendant is unknown (as where there are heirs and devisees or all persons unknown are named as defendants pursuant to Section 1250.220). However, where service by publication is ordered pursuant to Section 415.50, Section 1250.130 requires that the court also order the plaintiff to post a copy of the summons and complaint on the property and record a lis pendens within 10 days after the making of the order. This provision is designed to increase the likelihood that interested parties will receive actual notice of the proceeding. *Cf. Title & Document Restoration Co. v. Kerrigan, supra.* The court should by order also give appropriate directions as to the manner of posting, e.g., location and number of copies. See Section 413.30.

Section 1250.130 supersedes a portion of the second sentence of former Section 1245.3 relating to service on heirs and devisees, persons unknown, and others. Section 1250.130 extends the posting requirement to the case where any defendant is served by publication. As to the requirement of recording, compare Sections 749, 749.1 (lis pendens must be filed in quiet title action against unknown claimants).

Although generally service statutes are liberally construed (*cf.* Sections 4 and 187), the due process considerations involved in service by publication demand strict compliance with the statute. See *Stanford v. Worn*, 27 Cal. 171 (1865). See also *City of Los Angeles v. Glassell*, 203 Cal. 44, 262 P. 1084 (1928).

§ 1250.140. Attorney General served where state is a defendant

1250.140. Where the state is a defendant, the summons and the complaint shall be served on the Attorney General.

Comment. Section 1250.140 requires service on the Attorney General when property belonging to the state is sought to be taken. This continues a requirement of subdivision 8 of former Section 1240 which also required service on the Governor and the State Lands Commission. In a special provision relating to the condemnation of a "square," former Section 1245.4 required service on the Director of General Services. These additional service requirements are eliminated. The Attorney General is charged with the responsibility for seeing that the proper agency of the state receives notice of the proceeding.

§ 1250.150. Lis pendens

1250.150. The plaintiff, at the time of the commencement of an eminent domain proceeding, or at any time thereafter, may record a notice of the pendency of the proceeding in the office of the county recorder of any county in which property described in the complaint is located.

Comment. Section 1250.150 makes clear that the plaintiff in an eminent domain proceeding may file a lis pendens after the proceeding is commenced. This provision supersedes a portion of former Section 1243 that required the plaintiff to file a lis pendens after service of summons. Compare Section 1250.130

(lis pendens required where service is by publication). Where a lis pendens is recorded prior to a transfer, the judgment in the proceeding will be binding upon the transferee from a defendant named by his real name who is properly made a party to the proceeding. *Drinkhouse v. Spring Valley Water Works*, 87 Cal. 253, 25 P. 420 (1890).

Failure to file such a notice of pendency of the eminent domain proceeding does not deprive the court of subject matter jurisdiction. See *Housing Authority v. Forbes*, 51 Cal. App.2d 1, 124 P.2d 194 (1942). However, where a lis pendens is not recorded prior to a recorded transfer, the transferee will not be bound by the judgment in the proceeding unless he is properly made a party to the proceeding. See *Bensley v. Mountain Lake Water Co.*, 13 Cal. 306, 319 (1859). See also Section 1250.220 (naming defendants).

Section 1250.150 is analogous to Section 409 (obligation to file lis pendens and consequences of failure to do so). See also *Roach v. Riverside Water Co.*, 74 Cal. 263, 15 P. 776 (1887) (Section 409 applicable to condemnation proceedings prior to adoption of former Section 1243).

Article 3. Parties; Joinder of Property

§ 1250.210. Identification of parties

1250.210. (a) A person seeking to take property by eminent domain shall be designated the plaintiff.

(b) A person from whom property is sought to be taken by eminent domain shall be designated the defendant.

Comment. Although an eminent domain proceeding is a special proceeding, the terms "plaintiff" and "defendant" are utilized throughout the Eminent Domain Law. This usage is consistent with the generally judicial nature of eminent domain proceedings in California as well as with past practice and custom. See former Section 1244(1), (2) (parties styled "plaintiff" and "defendant"). See also Section 1063.

The plaintiff must be a person authorized by statute to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire the property sought for the purpose listed in the complaint. See Section 1240.020. A proceeding may not be maintained in the name of any other person. See *People v. Superior Court*, 10 Cal.2d 288, 73 P.2d 1221 (1937); *City of Sierra Madre v. Superior Court*, 191 Cal. App.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1961); *Black Rock etc. Dist. v. Summit etc. Co.*, 56 Cal. App.2d 513, 133 P.2d 58 (1943). Cf. *City of Oakland v. Parker*, 70 Cal. App. 295, 233 P. 68 (1924).

(objection that real party in interest was a private person rejected). As to joinder of the owner of "necessary property" in a proceeding to acquire "substitute property," see Section 1240.340. The defendants can only be those having an interest in the property described in the complaint. See Sections 1250.220, 1250.230.

§ 1250.220. Naming defendants

1250.220. (a) The plaintiff shall name as defendants, by their real names, those persons who appear of record or are known by the plaintiff to have or claim any right, title, or interest in the property described in the complaint.

(b) If a person described in subdivision (a) is dead and the plaintiff knows of a duly qualified and acting personal representative of the estate of such person, the plaintiff shall name such personal representative as a defendant. If a person described in subdivision (a) is dead or is believed by the plaintiff to be dead and if plaintiff knows of no duly qualified and acting personal representative of the estate of such person and states these facts in an affidavit filed with the complaint, plaintiff may name as defendants "the heirs and devisees of _____ (naming such deceased person), deceased, and all persons claiming by, through, or under said decedent," naming them in that manner and, where it is stated in the affidavit that such person is believed by the plaintiff to be dead, such person also may be named as a defendant.

(c) In addition to those persons described in subdivision (a), the plaintiff may name as defendants "all persons unknown claiming any right, title, or interest in or to the property," naming them in that manner.

(d) Any judgment rendered in a proceeding under this title shall be binding and conclusive upon all persons named as defendants as provided in this section and properly served.

Comment. Section 1250.220 supersedes portions of former Sections 1244 and 1245.3. Subdivision (a) is substantively the same as paragraph 2 of former Section 1244. Subdivisions (b) and (c) are substantively the same as the first sentence of former Section 1245.3. See also paragraph 2 of former Section

1244. Subdivision (d) is substantively the same as the last paragraph of former Section 1245.3. See also Section 1250.130 and Comment thereto (posting where service is by publication).

The naming of defendants is basically within the control of the plaintiff—*People v. Shasta Pipe etc. Co.*, 264 Cal. App.2d 520, 537, 70 Cal. Rptr. 618, 629 (1968)—but failure to join a proper party to the proceeding leaves his interest unimpaired. *Wilson v. Beville*, 47 Cal.2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957). Nevertheless, a person not named as a defendant who claims an interest in the property sought to be acquired may participate in the proceeding. Section 1250.230.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) reenacts the requirement found in paragraph 2 of former Section 1244 that the names of all owners and claimants of the property must be listed in the complaint. This includes occupants of the property who claim a possessory interest in the property. The form of subdivision (a) has been adapted from former Section 1245.3.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) specifies the requirements for naming defendants where one of the claimants to the property is deceased. The basic rule is that the personal representative of the estate of the decedent must be named as defendant in the decedent's place. This codifies prior law. See *Monterey County v. Cushing*, 83 Cal. 507, 23 P. 700 (1890) (decided under former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1582, predecessor of Probate Code Section 573).

Where there is no duly qualified and acting personal representative known to the plaintiff, the plaintiff need not await the appointment and qualification of one but may proceed with the suit naming as defendants the heirs and devisees of the deceased person and, if such person is believed to be but not known to be dead, the plaintiff may also name such person as a defendant.

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) enables the plaintiff to name unknown holders of interests in the property. A plaintiff may also proceed pursuant to Section 474 by fictitiously naming defendants who claim an interest but whose names are not known. See *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. App.2d 636, 116 P.2d 458 (1941). When the fictitiously named party's real name is discovered, the pleading must be amended accordingly. *Alameda County v. Crocker*, 125 Cal. 101, 57 P. 766 (1899).

Subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) assures that persons properly named under this section and served in compliance with the general provisions governing service—Chapter 4

(commencing with Section 413.10) of Title 5 of Part 2—and the requirements for service provided by this title (Sections 1250.120 and 1250.130) are bound by the judgment in the proceeding.

§ 1250.230. Appearance by named and unnamed defendants

1250.230. Any person who claims any right, title, or interest, whether legal or equitable, in the property described in the complaint may appear in the proceeding. Whether or not such person is named as a defendant in the complaint, he shall appear as a defendant.

Comment. Section 1250.230 reenacts without substantive change the second sentence of the second paragraph of former Section 1245.3 and the second paragraph of former Section 1246. It makes clear that all interested persons may participate in an eminent domain proceeding.

An eminent domain judgment is generally binding only on persons, including "unknown persons," named in the complaint and properly served. See Sections 1250.150 (lis pendens), 1250.220 (naming defendants); *Wilson v. Beville*, 47 Cal.2d 852, 306 P.2d 789 (1957) (failure to join interest holder leaves his interest unimpaired). However, any person who has an interest in the property even if he is not named and served may, if he chooses, participate. See *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, 46 Cal. App.2d 636, 116 P.2d 458 (1941); *Stratford Irr. Dist. v. Empire Water Co.*, 44 Cal. App.2d 61, 111 P.2d 957 (1941) (dictum) (persons not defendants who claim any interest may appear and defend). If he does participate by making a general appearance in the proceeding, he will, of course, be bound by the judgment. *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924); *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, *supra*.

In order to participate, a person must have a legal or equitable interest in the property described in the complaint. For examples of interest holders who have been permitted to participate, see *Harrington v. Superior Court*, *supra* (named defendant holding fee interest not served but appeared voluntarily); *County of San Benito v. Copper Mtn. Min. Co.*, 7 Cal. App.2d 82, 45 P.2d 428 (1935) (successor in interest to fee holder); *Bayle-Lacoste & Co. v. Superior Court*, *supra* (lessee); *City of Vallejo v. Superior Court*, 199 Cal. 408, 249 P. 1084 (1926) ("owner and holder" of deed of trust); *City of Los Angeles v.*

Dawson, 139 Cal. App. 480, 34 P.2d 236 (1934) (assignee of eminent domain proceeds).

Section 1250.230 does not authorize the participation of a person who fails to show that he has an interest in the property sought to be taken. Thus, third parties who would not be affected by the adjudication of either title or compensation in the eminent domain proceeding have been denied the right to participate in the proceeding. See *San Joaquin etc. Irr. Co. v. Stevenson*, 164 Cal. 221, 235-237, 240-242, 128 P. 924, 930, 932 (1912) (upstream riparian owners); *City of Alhambra v. Jacob Bean Realty Co.*, 138 Cal. App. 251, 31 P.2d 1052 (1934) (owners of abutting property who might suffer consequential damages from the project for which the property is being acquired). See also *City of Riverside v. Malloch*, 226 Cal. App.2d 204, 37 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1964) (shareholder in company from which property sought to be acquired not permitted to participate). However, what constitutes "property" is subject to both legislative and judicial change. See Sections 1265.310 (unexercised options) and 1265.410 (contingent future interests); *Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie*, 9 Cal.3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973). Section 1250.230 is intended to be flexible enough to accommodate such changes and to permit participation by any person with a recognizable interest.

In *San Bernardino etc. Water Dist. v. Gage Canal Co.*, 226 Cal. App.2d 206, 37 Cal. Rptr. 856 (1964), it was suggested in dictum that a person who sought to acquire by eminent domain the same property involved in a pending eminent domain proceeding could appear in such proceeding under former Section 1246. However, under the Eminent Domain Law, his proper remedy is to commence another proceeding and move to consolidate the proceedings. See Section 1048. See also Section 1260.020 (procedure where separate proceedings consolidated).

§ 1250.240. Joinder of property

1250.240. The plaintiff may join in one complaint all property located within the same county which is sought to be acquired for the same project.

Comment. Section 1250.240, which reenacts the substance of a portion of subdivision 5 of former Section 1244, permits the plaintiff at his option to join an unlimited number of parcels belonging to different defendants in the same eminent domain proceeding provided that the property joined lies wholly or partially in the same county (see Section 1250.020) and it is to

be used for the same project. See *County of Sacramento v. Glann*, 14 Cal. App. 780, 788-790, 113 P. 360, 363-364 (1910). The contents of the complaint must, of course, be complete as to all property joined. See Section 1250.310 and Comment thereto.

Section 1250.240 provides simply for joinder in the initial pleading; it in no way limits the authority of the court to order separate trials where appropriate. See Section 1048.

Article 4. Pleadings

§ 1250.310. Contents of complaint

1250.310. The complaint shall contain all of the following:

(a) The names of all plaintiffs and defendants.

(b) A description of the property sought to be taken. If the plaintiff claims an interest in the property sought to be taken, the complaint shall indicate the nature and extent of such interest. The description may, but is not required to, indicate the nature or extent of the interest of the defendant in the property.

(c) A statement of the right of the plaintiff to take by eminent domain the property described in the complaint. The statement shall include:

(1) A description of the purpose for which the property is sought to be taken.

(2) An allegation of the necessity for the taking as required by Section 1240.030; where the plaintiff is a public entity, a reference to its resolution of necessity; where the plaintiff is a nonprofit hospital, a reference to the certificate required by Section 1427 of the Health and Safety Code.

(3) A reference to the specific statutes authorizing the plaintiff to exercise the power of eminent domain for the purpose alleged. Specification of the statutory authority may be in the alternative and may be inconsistent.

(d) A map or plat delineating the boundaries of the property described in the complaint and showing its relation to the project for which it is sought to be taken.

Comment. Section 1250.310 prescribes the necessary contents of a complaint in an eminent domain proceeding. A complaint that does not contain the elements specified in this section is subject to demurrer. See Sections 430.10 and 430.30.

Section 1250.310 is an exclusive listing of the substantive allegations required to be made by the plaintiff. Other substantive allegations may, but need not, be made. See, e.g., *California S.R.R. v. Southern Pac. R.R.*, 67 Cal. 59, 7 P. 123 (1885) (averment of value not required and is surplusage); *County of San Luis Obispo v. Simas*, 1 Cal. App. 175, 81 P. 972 (1905) (averment of manner of construction of proposed improvement not required).

Other necessary procedural elements not specified in this section are required to be incorporated in the complaint, however. These include a caption (Sections 422.30 and 422.40), a request for relief (Section 425.10), and a subscription (Section 446). See also Section 1250.330 (signing of pleadings); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7557 (additional requirement where complaint seeks relocation or removal of railroad tracks).

Subdivision (a). The rules for designating parties to an eminent domain proceeding are prescribed in Sections 1250.210 and 1250.220.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b), which requires a description of the property sought to be taken, supersedes subdivision 5 of former Section 1244. The property described in the complaint may consist of anything from a fee interest in land to water rights, to noise easements, or to franchises. See Section 1235.170 ("property" defined).

The description of the property should be sufficiently certain to enable the parties, and any ministerial officer who may be called upon to enforce the judgment, to know precisely what land is to be taken and paid for. See *California Cent. R. R. v. Hooper*, 76 Cal. 404, 18 P. 599 (1888). See also Section 430.10(g) (demurrer for uncertainty).

Like the former provision, subdivision (b) does not require the complaint to identify the nature of the interests the various parties may have in the property sought to be taken. Specification of the precise interest held by the defendant is left to the defendant. See Section 1250.320 (answer). However, the judgment in an eminent domain proceeding affects only the interests of parties properly joined or appearing. See Sections 1250.220 and 1250.230 and Comments thereto. Where the plaintiff has or claims a preexisting interest in the property sought to be taken, this interest must be described in the complaint. See *People v. Shasta Pipe etc. Co.*, 264 Cal. App.2d 520, 70 Cal. Rptr. 618 (1968); cf. *City of Los Angeles v. Pomeroy*, 124 Cal. 597, 57 P. 585 (1899); *State v. Whitlow*, 243 Cal. App.2d 490, 52 Cal. Rptr. 336 (1966).

Unlike former Section 1244, subdivision (b) does not require that the complaint indicate whether the property taken is a part of a larger parcel but requires only a description of the property taken. Contrast *Inglewood v. O. T. Johnson Corp.*, 113 Cal. App.2d 587, 248 P.2d 536 (1952).

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) supersedes subdivision 3 of former Section 1244 requiring a statement of the right of the plaintiff. Subdivision (c) is intended to provide the owner of the property sought to be taken with an understanding of the purpose for which his property is being taken and the authority on which the taking is based. The requirements of subdivision (c) may be satisfied in any way convenient to the plaintiff as long as they are indicated in the complaint. This might include summarizing the resolution of necessity or attaching the resolution to the complaint and incorporating it by reference.

Paragraph (1) requires a description of the public purpose or public use for which the property is being taken. Property may not be taken by eminent domain except for a public use. CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 14; Section 1240.010.

Paragraph (2) requires a description of the public necessity for the taking. The items of public necessity are listed in Section 1240.030 and include (1) public necessity for the project, (2) plan or location of the project compatible with the greatest public good and least private injury, and (3) the necessity of the particular property for the project. This extensive description of the necessity for the taking supplants the general allegation permitted under prior law. See, e.g., *Lingga v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955). It should be noted that a public entity must first adopt a resolution of necessity before it may proceed to condemn property. Sections 1240.040, 1245.220. Thus, while subdivision (2) requires an extensive statement of the necessity for the acquisition, this statement may be satisfied by incorporation of the resolution containing appropriate findings and declarations. The resolution, under certain conditions, is given conclusive effect in the proceeding. See Section 1245.250. If the resolution is not incorporated, a reference to the resolution should be included which is adequate to identify it so that a copy of the resolution may be obtained. A similar reference to the certificate required by Section 1427 of the Health and Safety Code must be included where applicable.

Paragraph (3) requires specific reference to the authority of the condemnor. The power of eminent domain may be exercised only by persons expressly authorized by statute for purposes expressly designated by statute. Section 1240.020. For

other sections that require a statement of statutory authority in the complaint, see Sections 1240.220 (future use), 1240.320–1240.350 (substitute condemnation), 1240.420 (excess condemnation), 1240.510 (compatible use), 1240.610 (more necessary use). The requirement of a specific reference to all authorizing statutes supplants the general allegation of right to condemn permitted under prior law. See, e.g., *Kern County High School Dist. v. McDonald*, 180 Cal. 7, 179 P. 180 (1919), and *Los Altos School Dist. v. Watson*, 133 Cal. App.2d 447, 284 P.2d 513 (1955). Where the plaintiff may be authorized to take the property on differing and inconsistent grounds, the plaintiff may allege such authority in the alternative.

Subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) broadens the requirement formerly found in subdivision 4 of Section 1244 that the complaint be accompanied by a map where the taking was for a right of way. Subdivision (d) requires a map to be attached to the complaint in all cases. The map should be sufficiently detailed and accurate to enable the parties to identify the property and its relation to the project. Where the taking is for a right of way, the map should show its location, general route, and termini with respect to the property sought to be taken. The map need not indicate whether the property sought is a part of a larger parcel. Cf. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7557 (map required where complaint seeks relocation or removal of railroad tracks).

§ 1250.320. Contents of answer

1250.320. The answer shall include a statement of the right, title, or interest the defendant claims in the property described in the complaint.

Comment. Section 1250.320 continues the requirement of former Section 1246 that the answer include a statement of the defendant's claimed interest in the property. Unlike former Section 1246, which Section 1250.320 supersedes, Section 1250.320 does not require a defendant to specify the compensation he claims for the proposed taking; the defendant's claims relating to compensation are revealed by discovery and other pretrial procedures.

The allegations of the answer are deemed denied as in civil actions generally. See Section 431.20(b). Amendments to the answer are made as in civil actions generally. See Sections 472 and 473. See also Section 1250.340.

Defenses that the defendant has to the taking may be alleged in the answer or, where appropriate, may be raised by demurrer. See Section 1250.350. See also Sections 1250.360 and 1250.370 (grounds for objecting to right to take). The rules governing demurrers to the complaint are the same as in civil actions generally. See Section 1230.040 (rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings). See generally Sections 430.10, 430.30–430.80.

As to the use of a cross-complaint in an eminent domain proceeding, see Sections 426.70 (compulsory cross-complaints) and 428.10 (when cross-complaint permitted) and the Comments to those sections.

§ 1250.330. Signing of pleadings by attorney

1250.330. Where a party is represented by an attorney, his pleading need not be verified but shall be signed by the attorney for the party. The signature of the attorney constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his knowledge, information, and belief there is ground to support it, and that, if it is an answer, it is not interposed for delay. If the pleading is not signed or is signed with intent to defeat the purposes of this section, it may be stricken as sham and false.

Comment. Section 1250.330 requires all pleadings to be signed by the attorney where the party in an eminent domain proceeding is represented by an attorney. The effect of signature by the attorney is substantially the same as that under Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For a willful violation of this section, an attorney is subject to appropriate disciplinary action. See Rules 1, 13, 17 of the Rules of Professional Conduct of the State Bar of California. See also BUS. & PROF. CODE § 6076.

It should be noted that Section 1250.330 requires both the attorney for the plaintiff and the attorney for the defendant to sign their respective pleadings. The plaintiff may also verify, if it chooses, but such verification will not require verification by the defendant if he is represented by an attorney. Compare Section 446 (verification by defendant generally required where plaintiff is a public entity or where complaint is verified).

§ 1250.340. Amendment of pleadings

1250.340. (a) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), the court may allow upon such terms and conditions as may be just an amendment or supplement to any pleading. In the case of an amendment or supplement to the complaint, such terms and conditions may include a change in the applicable date of valuation for the proceeding and an award of costs, attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and fees for the services of other experts which would not have been incurred had the proceeding as originally commenced been the same as the proceeding following such amendment or supplement.

(b) A public entity may add to the property sought to be taken only if it has adopted a resolution of necessity that satisfies the requirements of Article 2 (commencing with Section 1245.210) of Chapter 4 for the property to be added.

(c) Property previously sought to be taken may be deleted from the complaint only if the plaintiff has followed the procedure for partial abandonment of the proceeding as to that property.

Comment. Section 1250.340 supplements the liberal rules applicable to amendments and supplements provided by Sections 464 and 473. Subdivision (a) makes clear that the terms and conditions which may be imposed by the court include a change in the date of valuation for either all or a portion of the property sought to be taken in the proceeding and payment of reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses which would not have been incurred but for the amendment.

Subdivision (b) makes clear that, in order to add property to the complaint, where appropriate there must be a valid resolution of necessity for the property to be added.

Subdivision (c) makes clear that, in order to delete property from the complaint, the plaintiff must follow the procedures and pay the price for abandonment. See Sections 1268.510, 1268.610–1268.620. This provision continues prior law as to "partial abandonment"; see, e.g., *County of Kern v. Galatas*, 200 Cal. App.2d 353, 19 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1962); *Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams*, 23 Cal.2d 770, 147 P.2d 6 (1944); *Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, 4 Cal.3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971).

§ 1250.350. Pleading objections to right to take

1250.350. A defendant may object to the plaintiff's right to take, by demurrer or answer as provided in Section 430.30, on any ground authorized by Section 1250.360 or Section 1250.370. The demurrer or answer shall state the specific ground upon which the objection is taken and, if the objection is taken by answer, the specific facts upon which the objection is based. An objection may be taken on more than one ground, and the grounds may be inconsistent.

Comment. Section 1250.350 makes clear the rules governing the pleading of objections to the right to take. See Sections 1250.360 and 1250.370 (listing grounds upon which objection may be taken). The general rules that determine whether the objection may be taken by demurrer or answer (see Section 430.30) apply to pleading an objection to the right to take. Objections to the complaint, other than objections to the right to take, are governed by the rules applicable to civil actions generally. See Section 1230.040 (rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings).

The facts supporting each objection to the right to take must be specifically stated in the answer. This requirement is generally consistent with former law that, for example, required the defendant to allege specific facts indicating an abuse of discretion such as an intention not to use the property as resolved. See, e.g., *County of San Mateo v. Bartole*, 184 Cal. App.2d 422, 433, 7 Cal. Rptr. 569, 576 (1960). See also *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959); *People v. Nahabedian*, 171 Cal. App.2d 302, 340 P.2d 1053 (1959); *People v. Olsen*, 109 Cal. App. 523, 293 P. 645 (1930).

§ 1250.360. Grounds for objection to right to take where resolution conclusive

1250.360. Grounds for objection to the right to take, regardless of whether the plaintiff has adopted a resolution of necessity that satisfies the requirements of Article 2 (commencing with Section 1245.210) of Chapter 4, include:

- (a) The plaintiff is not authorized by statute to exercise the power of eminent domain for the purpose stated in the complaint.
- (b) The stated purpose is not a public use.

(c) The plaintiff does not intend to devote the property described in the complaint to the stated purpose.

(d) There is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will devote the described property to the stated purpose within seven years or such longer period as is reasonable.

(e) The described property is not subject to acquisition by the power of eminent domain for the stated purpose.

(f) The described property is sought to be acquired pursuant to Section 1240.340 (substitute condemnation), 1240.410 (excess condemnation), 1240.510 (condemnation for compatible use), or 1240.610 (condemnation for more necessary public use), but the acquisition does not satisfy the requirements of those provisions.

(g) The described property is sought to be acquired pursuant to Section 1240.610 (condemnation for more necessary public use), but the defendant has the right under Section 1240.630 to continue the public use to which the property is appropriated as a joint use.

(h) Any other ground provided by law.

Comment. Section 1250.360 prescribes the grounds for objection to the right to take that may be raised in any eminent domain proceeding regardless of whether the plaintiff has adopted a resolution of necessity that is given conclusive effect on other issues. See Section 1250.370 for a listing of grounds for objection that may be raised only where there is no conclusive resolution of necessity.

Subdivision (a). The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a public use only by a person authorized by statute to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire such property for that use. Section 1240.020.

Subdivision (b). The power of eminent domain may be exercised only to acquire property for a public use. Section 1240.010. CAL. CONST., Art I, § 14. U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV.

Subdivision (c). This subdivision codifies the classic test for lack of public use: whether the plaintiff *intends* to apply the property to the proposed use. See *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959). Once the acquisition has been found initially proper, the plaintiff may thereafter devote the property to any other use, public or private. See *Arechiga v. Housing Authority*, 159 Cal. App.2d 657, 324 P.2d 973 (1958). See generally Sterling, *Return Right for Former Owners of Land Taken by Eminent Domain*, 4 PAC. L.J. 65 (1973).

Subdivision (d). This subdivision adds a test for public use new to California law. If the defendant is able to demonstrate that there is no reasonable probability that the plaintiff will apply the property to the proposed use within seven years or within a reasonable period of time, the plaintiff may not take the property. *Cf.* Section 1240.220 (future use).

Subdivision (e). Condemnation for certain specified purposes is not available in the case of some land. For example, a city may not acquire by eminent domain an existing golf course for golf course purposes. GOVT. CODE § 37353(c). Property appropriated to a public use may not be taken except for more necessary or compatible uses. Sections 1240.510 and 1240.610. Cemetery land may not be taken for rights of way. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 8134, 8560, 8560.5. Certain land in the public domain may not be taken at all. PUB. RES. CODE § 8030. See also Section 1240.010 and Comment thereto (eminent domain only for purposes authorized by statute); *cf.* subdivision (f) *infra* (more necessary public use).

Subdivision (f). Section 1240.340 permits property to be taken for substitute purposes only if: (1) the owner of the property needed for the public use has agreed in writing to the exchange and, under the circumstances of the particular case, justice requires that he be compensated in whole or in part by substitute property rather than by money; (2) the property to be exchanged is in the vicinity of the public improvement for which the property needed is taken; and (3) taking into account the relative hardship to the owners, it is not unjust to the owner of the property to be exchanged that his property be taken so that the owner of the needed property may be compensated by such property rather than by money.

Section 1240.410 permits property excess to the needs of the proposed project to be taken only if it would be left as a remainder in such size, shape, or condition as to be of little market value.

Property appropriated to a public use may be taken by eminent domain only if the proposed use is compatible with or more necessary than the existing use. See Sections 1240.510 (compatible use), 1240.610 (more necessary use).

Subdivision (g). Section 1240.630 gives the prior user a right to continue a public use as a joint use under certain circumstances where the plaintiff seeks to displace the prior use by a more necessary use.

Subdivision (h). While the provisions of Section 1250.360 catalog the objections to the right to take available under the Eminent Domain Law where the resolution is conclusive, there

may be other grounds for objection not included in the Eminent Domain Law, *e.g.*, where there exist federal or constitutional grounds for objection or where prerequisites to condemnation are located in other codes. See, for example, Section 1427 of the Health and Safety Code, which imposes certain requirements that must be satisfied before a nonprofit hospital may exercise the right of eminent domain. See also various special district laws that require consent of the board of supervisors of the affected county before extraterritorial condemnation authority may be exercised. *E.g.*, HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 4741 (county sanitation district), 6514 (sanitary district), 13852(c) (fire protection district); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 98213 (Santa Cruz Metropolitan Transit District); WATER CODE §§ 43532.5 (California water storage district), 60230(8) (water replenishment district), 71694 (municipal water district); Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 5(13) (Cal. Stats. 1949, Ch. 1275); Alameda County Water District Act, § 4(d) (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1942); Alpine County Water Agency Act, § 7 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1896); Amador County Water Agency Act, § 3.4 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2137); Antelope Valley-East Kern Water Agency Law, § 61(7) (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2146); Bethel Island Municipal Improvement District Act, § 81 (Cal. Stats. 1960, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 22); Castaic Lake Water Agency Act, § 15(7) (Cal. Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 28); Crestline-Lake Arrowhead Water Agency Act, § 11(9) (Cal. Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 40); Embarcadero Municipal Improvement District Act, § 82 (Cal. Stats. 1960, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 81); Estero Municipal Improvement District Act, § 82 (Cal. Stats. 1960, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 82); Fresno Metropolitan Transit District Act, § 6.3 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1932); Guadalupe Valley Municipal Improvement District Act, § 80.5 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2037); Kern County Water Agency Act, § 3.4 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1003); Lake County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 5(12) (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1544); Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 4 (Cal. Stats. 1947, Ch. 699); Mountain View Shoreline Regional Park Community Act, § 51 (Cal. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1109); Nevada County Water Agency Act, § 7 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2122); North Lake Tahoe-Truckee River Sanitation Agency Act, § 146 (Cal. Stats. 1967, Ch. 1503); Placer County Water Agency Act, § 3.4 (Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 1234); Plumas County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 3(f) (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2114); Sacramento County Water Agency Act, § 3.4 (Cal. Stats. 1952, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 10); San Gorgonio Pass Water Agency Law, § 15(9) (Cal.

Stats. 1961, Ch. 1435); Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 5.3 (Cal. Stats. 1955, Ch. 1057); Shasta County Water Agency Act, § 65 (Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 1512); Sierra County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 3(f) (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2123); Yolo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 3(f) (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1657); Yuba-Bear River Basin Authority Act, § 8 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2131); Yuba County Water Agency Act, § 3.4 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 788).

§ 1250.370. Grounds for objection to right to take where resolution not conclusive

1250.370. In addition to the grounds listed in Section 1250.360, grounds for objection to the right to take where the plaintiff has not adopted a resolution of necessity that conclusively establishes the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 include:

- (a) The plaintiff is a public entity and has not adopted a resolution of necessity that satisfies the requirements of Article 2 (commencing with Section 1245.210) of Chapter 4.
- (b) The public interest and necessity do not require the proposed project.
- (c) The proposed project is not planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.
- (d) The property described in the complaint, or right or interest therein, is not necessary for the proposed project.

Comment. Section 1250.370 lists the grounds for objection to the right to take that may be raised where there is not a conclusive resolution of necessity. Thus, they may be raised against a nonpublic-entity plaintiff in all cases and against a public-entity plaintiff in cases where it has not adopted a resolution or where the resolution is not conclusive. See Section 1245.250 for the effect of the resolution. The introductory clause to Section 1250.370 makes clear that the grounds listed here are in addition to those listed in Section 1250.360. See Section 1250.360 and Comment thereto.

Subdivision (a) applies only to public entities. A public entity may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until after it has passed a resolution of necessity that meets the

requirements of Article 2 of Chapter 4. See Sections 1240.040 and 1245.220. A duly adopted resolution must contain all the information required in Section 1245.230 and must be adopted by a vote of a majority of all the members of the governing body of the local public entity. Section 1245.240.

Subdivisions (b)–(d) recognize that the power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property for a proposed project only if (1) the public interest and necessity require the proposed project, (2) the proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury, and (3) the property and particular interest sought to be acquired are necessary for the proposed project. Section 1240.030. *Cf. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1427* (eminent domain proceeding brought by nonprofit hospital—effect of certificate of Director of Health).

CHAPTER 6. DEPOSIT AND WITHDRAWAL OF PROBABLE COMPENSATION; POSSESSION PRIOR TO ENTRY OF JUDGMENT

Article 1. Deposit of Probable Compensation

§ 1255.010. Deposit of amount of appraised value of property

1255.010. (a) At any time after filing the complaint and prior to entry of judgment, the plaintiff may deposit with the court the amount indicated by the appraisal referred to in subdivision (b) to be the compensation for the property for which the deposit is made. The deposit may be made whether or not the plaintiff applies for an order for possession or intends to do so.

(b) Before making a deposit under this section, the plaintiff shall have an expert qualified to express an opinion as to the value of the property (1) make an appraisal of the property and (2) prepare a statement of valuation data justifying the appraisal. The statement of valuation data shall set forth all amounts, opinions, and supporting data required by Section 1258.260 to be included in a statement of valuation data.

(c) Notwithstanding subdivision (b), upon ex parte application, the court may make an order permitting the plaintiff to defer preparation of the statement of valuation data for a reasonable time not exceeding 50 days from the date the deposit is made if the plaintiff, by affidavit, presents facts showing that an emergency exists and that the statement of valuation data cannot reasonably be prepared prior to making the deposit.

Comment. Section 1255.010 is new. In contrast with subdivision (a) of former Section 1243.5, (1) the deposit may be made without obtaining the court's order therefor and without regard to an order for possession and (2) the amount of the initial deposit is determined by an appraisal obtained by the plaintiff rather than by the court upon ex parte application of the plaintiff. Under Section 1255.030, however, the amount deposited may be determined or redetermined by the court on motion of any interested party.

The appraisal and the statement of valuation data required by subdivision (b) may be made either by a member of the condemnor's appraisal staff or by an independent appraiser. The statement of valuation data is necessary to enable the plaintiff to comply with Section 1255.020 which requires the notice of the deposit to be accompanied by or to refer to the statement of valuation data which justifies the amount of the deposit. The required statement must contain all the information required to be included in a statement of valuation data. See Section 1258.260, which requires that such a statement set forth the appraiser's opinions as to the compensation for the property and specified items of supporting data—such as "comparable transactions"—to the extent that the opinions are based thereon. An appraisal report containing all of such information could be used as a statement of valuation data. See Section 1258.260(e).

The making of a deposit by the plaintiff, and any subsequent possession of the property by the plaintiff, does not waive its right to appeal in the proceeding. See Sections 1255.080 and 1255.470. *Cf.* Section 1268.170.

Under emergency circumstances, it may be possible to make only a rough, preliminary appraisal of the property. In such cases, subdivision (c) permits the plaintiff to apply ex parte to the court for an order permitting the plaintiff to defer preparation of the statement of valuation data for a reasonable time not exceeding 50 days from the date of the deposit. Even where the plaintiff obtains such an order, the order does not relieve the plaintiff from depositing an amount based on an initial appraisal of the property.

Upon entry of judgment, a deposit made pursuant to this article is deemed to be a deposit made pursuant to Section 1268.110 (postjudgment deposit of award). See Section 1268.010.

§ 1255.020. Service of notice of deposit

1255.020. (a) On making a deposit pursuant to Section 1255.010, the plaintiff shall serve a notice of deposit on all parties to the proceeding who have an interest in the property for which the deposit was made. The notice of deposit shall state that a deposit has been made and the date and the amount of the deposit. Service of the notice of deposit shall be made in the manner provided in Section 1255.450 for service of an order for possession.

(b) The notice of deposit shall either (1) be accompanied by a copy of the statement of valuation data referred to in Section 1255.010 or (2) state the place where and the normal business hours during which such statement may be inspected and copied and also state that, upon written request, the plaintiff will send the party a copy of the statement. If the notice is not accompanied by the copy of the statement, the plaintiff shall, at the places and times indicated in the notice, make the statement available for inspection and copying to any party who has an interest in the property and also shall, within 10 days after receipt of a written request from any such party, send that party a copy of the statement.

(c) If the plaintiff has obtained an order under Section 1255.010 deferring completion of the statement of valuation data, the plaintiff shall comply with subdivision (a) on making the deposit and shall comply with subdivision (b) upon completion of the statement.

Comment. Section 1255.020 is new. It requires that notice of the deposit be given in all cases to facilitate motions to change the amount of the deposit (Section 1255.030) or applications to withdraw the funds deposited (Section 1255.210 *et seq.*).

§ 1255.030. Increase or decrease in amount of deposit

1255.030. (a) At any time after a deposit has been made pursuant to this article, the court shall, upon motion of the plaintiff or of any party having an interest in the property for which the deposit was made, determine or redetermine whether the amount deposited is the probable amount of compensation that will be awarded for the taking of the property.

(b) If the plaintiff has taken possession or obtained an order for possession and the court determines that the probable amount of compensation exceeds the amount deposited, the court shall order the amount deposited to be increased to the amount determined to be the probable amount of compensation and, if the amount on deposit is not increased accordingly within 30 days from the date of the court's order, the defendant may serve on the plaintiff a notice of election to treat such failure as an abandonment of the proceeding. If the plaintiff does not cure its failure

within 10 days after receipt of such notice, the court shall, upon motion of the defendant, enter judgment dismissing the proceeding and awarding the defendant his litigation expenses and damages as provided in Sections 1268.610 and 1268.620.

(c) After any amount deposited pursuant to this article has been withdrawn by a defendant, the court may not determine or redetermine the probable amount of compensation to be less than the total amount already withdrawn. Nothing in this subdivision precludes the court from making a determination or redetermination that probable compensation is greater than the amount withdrawn.

(d) The plaintiff may at any time increase the amount deposited without making a motion under this section. In such case, notice of the increase shall be served as provided in subdivision (a) of Section 1255.020.

Comment. Section 1255.030 is new. It supersedes subdivision (d) of former Section 1243.5, which provided for redetermination of the amount of probable compensation. As to the duty of the plaintiff and the power of the court to maintain the deposit in an adequate amount, see *G.H. Deacon Inv. Co. v. Superior Court*, 220 Cal. 392, 31 P.2d 372 (1934); *Marblehead Land Co. v. Superior Court*, 60 Cal. App. 644, 213 P. 718 (1923).

Subdivision (b) requires that the plaintiff increase the amount of the deposit in accordance with the court's order. Failure to so increase the deposit while in possession may result in an abandonment with attendant litigation expenses and damages. See Sections 1268.610 and 1268.620. Cf. Section 1263.110 (effect on date of valuation of failure to increase deposit).

Section 1255.280 provides for recovery of any excessive withdrawal after final determination of amounts in the eminent domain proceeding. No provision is made for recovery, prior to such final determination, of any amount withdrawn. Accordingly, subdivision (c) prevents determination or redetermination of the amount of probable compensation to be less than the total sum withdrawn.

Subdivision (d) is included to make clear that the deposit may be increased without the need for a court determination under this section.

§ 1255.040. Deposit for relocation purposes on motion of certain defendants

1255.040. (a) Where the plaintiff has not made a deposit that satisfies the requirements of this article and the property to be taken includes a dwelling containing not more than two residential units and the dwelling or one of its units is occupied as his residence by a defendant, such defendant may move the court for an order determining the amount of such compensation for the dwelling and so much of the land upon which it is constructed as may be required for its convenient use and occupation. The notice of motion shall specify the date on which the moving party desires the deposit to be made. Such date shall not be earlier than 30 days after the date noticed for the hearing of the motion and may be any later date. The motion shall be heard and determined in the same manner as a motion made to modify a deposit under Section 1255.030.

(b) The court shall make its order determining the probable compensation if the court determines that the defendant will use the amount deposited for relocation purposes only. Notwithstanding Section 1268.310, if the plaintiff deposits the amount stated in the order on or before the date specified by the moving party, (1) interest upon that amount shall not accrue and (2) the plaintiff may, after making the deposit and upon ex parte application to the court, obtain an order for possession that authorizes the plaintiff to take possession of the property 30 days after the date for the deposit specified by the moving party or such later date as the plaintiff may request.

(c) Notwithstanding Section 1268.310, if the deposit is not made on or before the date specified by the moving party, the compensation awarded in the proceeding to the moving party shall draw legal interest from that date. The moving party is entitled to the full amount of such interest without offset for rents or other income received by him or the value of his continued possession of the property.

(d) If the proceeding is abandoned by the plaintiff, the interest under subdivision (c) may be recovered as costs in the proceeding in the manner provided for the

recovery of litigation expenses under Section 1268.610. If, in the proceeding, the court or a jury verdict eventually determines the compensation that would have been awarded to the moving party, then such interest shall be computed on the amount of such award. If no such determination is ever made, then such interest shall be computed on the amount of probable compensation as determined on the motion.

(e) The filing of a motion pursuant to this section constitutes a waiver by operation of law, conditioned upon subsequent deposit by the plaintiff of the amount determined to be probable compensation, of all claims and defenses in favor of the moving party except his claim for greater compensation.

(f) Notice of a deposit made under this section shall be served as provided by subdivision (a) of Section 1255.020. The defendant may withdraw the deposit as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 1255.210) on condition that the deposit is used for relocation purposes only.

(g) No motion may be made by a defendant under subdivision (a) after entry of judgment unless the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside and no other judgment has been entered at the time the motion is made.

Comment. Section 1255.040 is new. Section 1255.040 makes available to homeowners a procedure by which probable just compensation may be determined, deposited, and withdrawn for relocation purposes within a relatively brief period after the beginning of the proceeding.

Except as provided in Sections 1255.040 and 1255.050, the depositing of probable compensation pursuant to this article or the taking of possession pursuant to this chapter is optional with the plaintiff; if a deposit is not made and possession is not taken, a defendant is not entitled to be paid until 30 days after final judgment. Section 1268.010.

The reference in subdivision (a) to the amount of land required for the "convenient use and occupation" of the dwelling is taken from Section 3128 of the Civil Code which deals with mechanic's liens. The limitation precludes application of this section to land owned in common with the dwelling but unnecessary to the convenient use of the dwelling.

Under subdivision (b), the timely making of a deposit under this section entitles the plaintiff to an order for possession effective 30 days after the date for the making of the deposit specified in the notice of motion served by the moving party.

Subdivisions (b) and (c) provide special rules governing when interest commences to accrue. If the required deposit is made on or before the date specified by the moving party, interest on the amount deposited does not accrue. If the deposit is not made on or before the date specified by the moving party, interest commences to accrue on the date specified by the moving party. If a deposit is thereafter made, subdivision (a) of Section 1268.320 provides that interest ceases to accrue on the date such amount is withdrawn by the person entitled thereto.

Under subdivision (d), abandonment by the plaintiff entitles the defendant to recover interest in the manner provided for recovery of litigation expenses upon abandonment. The plaintiff may not abandon, however, if the defendant, to his detriment, has substantially changed his position in justifiable reliance upon the proceeding. Section 1268.510.

§ 1255.050. Deposit on motion of owner of rental property

1255.050. (a) If the property to be taken is subject to a leasehold interest and the plaintiff has not made a deposit that satisfies the requirements of this article, the lessor may move the court for an order determining the amount of compensation for the property in the same manner and subject to the same procedures and conditions as a motion pursuant to Section 1255.040 except that, upon the plaintiff's failure to make any deposit so ordered, interest shall not commence to accrue.

(b) If the plaintiff fails to make any deposit ordered pursuant to subdivision (a), the court shall include in the compensation awarded in the eminent domain proceeding or the damages on abandonment the lessor's net rental losses occurring after the date specified in the order to the extent that the losses are directly attributable to actions of the plaintiff or the pendency of the eminent domain proceeding.

Comment. Section 1255.050 is new to California law. Section 1255.050 provides for recovery of rental losses only where the lessor has obtained an order requiring a deposit prior to judgment and the plaintiff fails to comply. Only rental losses after the date specified in the order for depositing the probable compensation are recoverable under Section 1255.050. Compare *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972) (rental losses may be recovered in cases of unreasonable delay in instituting the eminent domain proceeding or other unreasonable conduct by plaintiff). Nothing in Section 1255.050 limits the application of *Klopping*.

Section 1255.050 incorporates the procedures and conditions of the motion for deposit under Section 1255.040 (deposit for relocation purposes). Under the latter section, the sanction for failure to comply is accrual of interest; Section 1255.050 does not incorporate this sanction but instead provides for recovery of rental loss in case of failure to comply.

§ 1255.060. Limitation on use of evidence submitted in connection with deposit

1255.060. The amount deposited pursuant to this article shall not be given in evidence or referred to in the trial of the issue of compensation.

Comment. Section 1255.060 restates the substance of a portion of subdivision (e) of former Section 1243.5. Cf. Section 1255.270 (amount withdrawn). Its purpose is to encourage the plaintiff to make an adequate deposit by preventing the amount deposited from being given in evidence on the issue of compensation. This section does not prevent the defense either from using the appraisal data for impeachment purposes or from calling the appraiser as an expert witness on its own behalf. See *People v. Cowan*, 1 Cal. App.3d 1001, 81 Cal. Rptr. 713 (1969); *People v. Douglas*, 15 Cal. App.3d 814, 93 Cal. Rptr. 644 (1971).

§ 1255.070. Deposit in State Treasury unless otherwise required

1255.070. When money is deposited as provided in this article, the court shall order the money to be deposited in the State Treasury or, upon written request of the plaintiff filed with the deposit, in the county treasury. If money is deposited in the State Treasury pursuant to this section, it

shall be held, invested, deposited, and disbursed in the manner specified in Article 10 (commencing with Section 16429.1) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code, and interest earned or other increment derived from its investment shall be apportioned and disbursed in the manner specified in that article. As between the parties to the proceeding, money deposited pursuant to this article shall remain at the risk of the plaintiff until paid or made payable to the defendant by order of the court.

Comment. The first two sentences of Section 1255.070 are the same in substance as former Section 1243.6. The last sentence is based on the first two sentences of subdivision (h) of former Section 1254. For a comparable provision, see Section 1268.150.

§ 1255.080. Deposit does not affect other rights

1255.080. By depositing the probable compensation pursuant to this article, the plaintiff does not waive the right to appeal from the judgment, the right to move to abandon, or the right to request a new trial.

Comment. Section 1255.080 is new. For comparable provisions, see Sections 1255.470 (possession prior to judgment) and 1268.170 (deposit of amount of award after judgment).

Article 2. Withdrawal of Deposit

§ 1255.210. Application for withdrawal of deposit

1255.210. Prior to entry of judgment, any defendant who has an interest in the property for which a deposit has been made under this chapter may apply to the court for the withdrawal of all or any portion of the amount deposited. The application shall be verified, set forth the applicant's interest in the property, and request withdrawal of a stated amount. The applicant shall serve a copy of the application on the plaintiff.

Comment. Section 1255.210 is derived from subdivisions (a) and (c) of former Section 1243.7. After entry of judgment, deposits made under this chapter may be withdrawn pursuant to Section 1268.140. See Section 1268.010 (upon entry of

judgment deposit made pursuant to this chapter deemed to be deposit made pursuant to Section 1268.110).

§ 1255.220. Order permitting withdrawal

1255.220. Subject to the requirements of this article, the court shall order the amount requested in the application, or such portion of that amount as the applicant may be entitled to receive, to be paid to the applicant.

Comment. Section 1255.220 continues the substance of the second sentence of subdivision (a) of former Section 1243.7.

§ 1255.230. Objections to withdrawal

1255.230. (a) No withdrawal may be ordered until 20 days after service on the plaintiff of a copy of the application or until the time for all objections has expired, whichever is later.

(b) Within the 20-day period, the plaintiff may file objections to withdrawal on any one or more of the following grounds:

(1) Other parties to the proceeding are known or believed to have interests in the property.

(2) An undertaking should be filed by the applicant as provided in Section 1255.240 or 1255.250.

(3) The amount of an undertaking filed by the applicant under this chapter or the sureties thereon are insufficient.

(c) If an objection is filed on the ground that other parties are known or believed to have interests in the property, the plaintiff shall serve or attempt to serve on such other parties a notice that they may appear within 10 days after such service and object to the withdrawal. The notice shall advise such parties that their failure to object will result in waiver of any rights against the plaintiff to the extent of the amount withdrawn. The notice shall be served in the manner provided in Section 1255.450 for service of an order for possession. The plaintiff shall file, and serve on the applicant, a report setting forth (1) the names of the parties upon whom the notice was served and the dates of service and (2) the names and last known addresses of the other parties who are known or believed

to have interests in the property but who were not so served. The applicant may serve parties whom the plaintiff has been unable to serve. Parties served in the manner provided in Section 1255.450 shall have no claim against the plaintiff for compensation to the extent of the amount withdrawn by all applicants. The plaintiff shall remain liable to parties having an interest of record who are not so served but, if such liability is enforced, the plaintiff shall be subrogated to the rights of such parties under Section 1255.280.

(d) If any party objects to the withdrawal, or if the plaintiff so requests, the court shall determine, upon hearing, the amounts to be withdrawn, if any, and by whom.

Comment. Section 1255.230 continues portions of subdivisions (c), (d), (e), and (f) of former Section 1243.7. Unlike the provisions on which it is based, Section 1255.230 does not forbid withdrawal of the deposit if notice of the application cannot be personally served upon all parties; it authorizes the court to exercise its discretion as to the amount to be withdrawn in such cases.

Nothing in this section precludes withdrawal of the deposit upon stipulation of all parties having an interest in the property for which the deposit was made.

§ 1255.240. Security where conflicting claims to amount withdrawn

1255.240. (a) If the court determines that an applicant is entitled to withdraw any portion of a deposit that another party claims or to which another person may be entitled, the court may require the applicant, before withdrawing such portion, to file an undertaking. The undertaking shall secure payment to such party or person of any amount withdrawn that exceeds the amount to which the applicant is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding, together with interest as provided in Section 1255.280. If withdrawal is permitted notwithstanding the lack of personal service of the application for withdrawal upon any party to the proceeding, the court may also require that the undertaking indemnify the plaintiff against any liability it

may incur under Section 1255.230. The undertaking shall be in such amount as is fixed by the court, but if executed by an admitted surety insurer the amount shall not exceed the portion claimed by the adverse claimant or appearing to belong to another person. The undertaking may be executed by two or more sufficient sureties approved by the court, and in such case the amount shall not exceed double such portion.

(b) Unless the undertaking is required primarily because of an issue as to title between the applicant and another party or person, if the undertaking is executed by an admitted surety insurer, the applicant filing the undertaking is entitled to recover the premium reasonably paid for the undertaking as a part of the recoverable costs in the eminent domain proceeding.

Comment. Section 1255.240 continues the substance of subdivision (f) of former Section 1243.7. Subdivision (a) of Section 1255.240 permits the court to exercise its discretion whether to require an undertaking in cases where there are conflicting claims to the amount to be withdrawn.

Subdivision (b) permits recovery of the bond premium as costs in the proceeding unless the necessity for the undertaking arises primarily from an issue of title. For use of the same distinction in assessing the costs of apportionment proceedings, see Section 1268.710 and *People v. Nogarr*, 181 Cal. App.2d 312, 5 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1960).

§ 1255.250. Security when amount in excess of original deposit is withdrawn

1255.250. (a) If the amount originally deposited is increased pursuant to Section 1255.030 and the total amount sought to be withdrawn exceeds the amount of the original deposit, the applicant, or each applicant if there are two or more, shall file an undertaking. The undertaking shall be in favor of the plaintiff and shall secure repayment of any amount withdrawn that exceeds the amount to which the applicant is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding, together with interest as provided in Section 1255.280. If the undertaking is executed by an admitted surety insurer, the undertaking shall be in the amount by which the total

amount to be withdrawn exceeds the amount originally deposited. The undertaking may be executed by two or more sufficient sureties approved by the court, and in such case the undertaking shall be in double such amount, but the maximum amount that may be recovered from such sureties is the amount by which the total amount to be withdrawn exceeds the amount originally deposited.

(b) If there are two or more applicants, the applicants, in lieu of filing separate undertakings, may jointly file a single undertaking in the amount required by subdivision (a).

(c) The plaintiff may waive the undertaking required by this section or may consent to an undertaking that is less than the amount stated by this section.

(d) If the undertaking is executed by an admitted surety insurer, the applicant filing the undertaking may recover the premium reasonably paid for the undertaking as a part of the costs in the eminent domain proceeding.

Comment. Section 1255.250 is the same in substance as subdivision (b) of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1243.7 except that the former two-percent limitation of the amount recoverable for a premium on an undertaking has been replaced by the "reasonably paid" limitation. Withdrawal by one or more defendants of an amount in excess of the original deposit is possible if the deposit has been increased as provided for by Section 1255.030.

§ 1255.260. Withdrawal waives all defenses except claim to greater compensation

1255.260. If any portion of the money deposited pursuant to this chapter is withdrawn, the receipt of any such money shall constitute a waiver by operation of law of all claims and defenses in favor of the persons receiving such payment except a claim for greater compensation.

Comment. Section 1255.260 restates the substance of subdivision (g) of former Section 1243.7. In addition to the defendant's waiving claims and defenses other than the claim to greater compensation, withdrawal of the deposit may also entitle the plaintiff to an order for possession. See Section 1255.460. *Cf. People v. Gutierrez*, 207 Cal. App.2d 759, 24 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1962). Any amount withdrawn is credited upon the

judgment in the eminent domain proceeding. See Section 1268.010.

§ 1255.270. Limitation on use of evidence submitted in connection with deposit

1255.270. No amount withdrawn pursuant to this article shall be given in evidence or referred to in the trial of the issue of compensation.

Comment. Section 1255.270 restates the substance of a portion of subdivision (e) of former Section 1243.5. See Section 1255.060 and Comment thereto.

§ 1255.280. Repayment of amount of excess withdrawal

1255.280. (a) Any amount withdrawn by a party pursuant to this article in excess of the amount to which he is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding shall be paid to the parties entitled thereto. The court shall enter judgment accordingly.

(b) The judgment so entered shall not include interest except in the following cases:

(1) Any amount that is to be paid to a defendant shall include legal interest from the date of its withdrawal by another defendant.

(2) If the amount originally deposited by a plaintiff was increased pursuant to Section 1255.030 on motion of a party obligated to pay under this section, any amount that is attributable to such increase and that is to be repaid to the plaintiff shall include legal interest from the date of its withdrawal.

(c) If the judgment so entered is not paid within 30 days after its entry, the court may, on motion, enter judgment against the sureties, if any, for the amount of such judgment.

(d) The court may, in its discretion, grant a party obligated to pay under this section a stay of execution for any amount to be paid to a plaintiff. Such stay of execution shall not exceed one year following entry of judgment under this section.

Comment. Section 1255.280 supersedes subdivision (h) of former Section 1243.7. Unlike former Section 1243.7, which required the payment of interest upon the return of excess amounts withdrawn, Section 1255.280 requires payment of interest only where the excess is to be redistributed among defendants or where the excess is to be repaid to a plaintiff to the extent the excess was procured upon motion for increased deposit by a defendant.

Section 1255.280 also provides for a stay of execution on the return of the excess for a period of up to one year. See subdivision (d). It should be noted, however, that the stay is available only as against amounts to be repaid to a plaintiff. Moreover, because the judgment has been stayed, interest will accrue during the period of the stay regardless of the means by which the excess was obtained. *Cf. Bellflower City School Dist. v. Skaggs*, 52 Cal.2d 278, 282, 339 P.2d 848, 851 (1959).

Section 1255.280 requires repayment of excess amounts withdrawn only after the judgment in an eminent domain proceeding is final. See also Section 1255.030(c) (court may not redetermine probable compensation to be less than amount withdrawn). For a comparable provision, see Section 1268.160.

Article 3. Possession Prior to Judgment

§ 1255.410. Order for possession prior to judgment

1255.410. (a) At the time of filing the complaint or at any time after filing the complaint and prior to entry of judgment, the plaintiff may apply ex parte to the court for an order for possession under this article, and the court shall make an order authorizing the plaintiff to take possession of the property if the plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain and has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.

(b) The order for possession shall describe the property of which the plaintiff is authorized to take possession, which description may be by reference to the complaint, and shall state the date after which the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property.

Comment. Section 1255.410 states the requirements for an order for possession of property prior to judgment and describes the content of the order. With respect to the relief available

from an order for possession prior to judgment, see Sections 1255.420–1255.440.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a), like subdivision (a) of former Section 1243.5, provides an ex parte procedure for obtaining an order for possession prior to judgment.

Subdivision (a) states two prerequisites to issuance of an order for possession:

(1) The plaintiff must be entitled to take the property by eminent domain. This requirement is derived from subdivision (b) of former Section 1243.5. However, under former Section 1243.4, possession prior to judgment was permitted only if the taking was for right of way or reservoir purposes. This limitation is not continued. Likewise, the requirement found in subdivision (b) of former Section 1243.5 that the plaintiff was authorized to take possession prior to judgment is no longer continued since any person authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain may now take possession prior to judgment in any case in which he is entitled to take by eminent domain. Contrast former Section 1243.4 (right to early possession limited to certain public entities).

(2) The plaintiff must have made the deposit required by Article 1. This requirement is derived from subdivision (b) of former Section 1243.5.

The issue of the plaintiff's need for possession prior to judgment is a matter that is incorporated in the provisions of Section 1255.420. Section 1255.410 does not affect any other prerequisite that may exist for taking possession of property. *Cf. 815 Mission Corp. v. Superior Court*, 22 Cal. App.3d 604, 99 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1971) (provision of relocation assistance is not necessarily prerequisite to an order for possession).

It should be noted that the determination of the plaintiff's right to take the property by eminent domain is preliminary only. The granting of an order for possession does not prejudice the defendant's right to demur to the complaint or to contest the taking. Conversely, the denial of an order for possession does not require a dismissal of the proceeding and does not prejudice the plaintiff's right to fully litigate the issue if raised by the defendant.

Under former statutes, judicial decisions held that an appeal may not be taken from an order authorizing or denying possession prior to judgment. Mandamus, prohibition, or certiorari was held to be the appropriate remedy. See *Central Contra Costa Sanitary Dist. v. Superior Court*, 34 Cal.2d 845, 215 P.2d 462 (1950); *Weiler v. Superior Court*, 188 Cal. 729, 207 P. 247 (1922); *State v. Superior Court*, 208 Cal. App.2d 659, 25 Cal.

Rptr. 363 (1962); *City of Sierra Madre v. Superior Court*, 191 Cal. App.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1961). However, an order for possession following entry of judgment has been held to be an appealable order. *San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. Hong Mow*, 123 Cal. App.2d 668, 267 P.2d 349 (1954). No change is made in these rules as to orders made under Section 1255.410 or Article 3 (commencing with Section 1268.210) of Chapter 11.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) describes the contents of an order for possession. The contents are substantially the same as those of subdivision (b) of former Section 1243.5. However, the requirement that the order state the amount of the deposit has been eliminated since Section 1255.020 requires that a notice of the making of a deposit be served on interested parties. The requirement that the order state the purpose of the condemnation has been omitted since possession prior to judgment is now authorized for any public use by an authorized condemnor. And, the requirement that the order describe the "estate or interest" sought to be acquired has been omitted as unnecessary since the term "property" includes rights and interests therein. See Section 1235.170 (defining "property").

Subdivision (b) is limited by the requirement of a 30-day or 90-day period following the service of the order before possession can be physically assumed. See Section 1255.450.

It should be noted that the court may, under subdivision (b), authorize possession of all, or any portion or interest, of the property sought to be taken by eminent domain.

§ 1255.420. Stay of order for hardship

1255.420. At any time after the plaintiff has been authorized to take possession of property under Section 1255.410, any defendant or occupant of the property may move for relief from the order if the hardship to him of having possession taken at the time specified in the order is substantial. If the court determines that the hardship to the defendant or occupant is substantial, the court may stay the order or impose terms and conditions limiting its operation unless, upon considering all relevant facts (including the schedule or plan of operation for execution of the public improvement and the situation of the property with respect to such schedule or plan), the court further determines (a) that the plaintiff needs possession of the property within the time specified in the order for possession and (b) that the hardship the plaintiff would

suffer as a result of a stay or limitation of the order would be substantial.

Comment. Section 1255.420 is new. It permits the court to stay an order for possession issued *ex parte* under Section 1255.410 or to limit the operation of the order by fixing terms and conditions of the plaintiff's possession. The court may do this only after making a dual finding of fact. The court must first find that having possession of the property specified in the order taken at the time specified in the order would be a substantial hardship to the defendant. If the court finds this fact, it next looks to the plaintiff's interest in early possession of the property. If it finds both that the plaintiff needs possession of the property at the time specified and that the plaintiff would suffer substantial (as distinguished from trivial) injury from a stay or other limitation of the order, the court may not stay or limit the order.

Section 1255.420 gives the court broad authority to draft an order that is appropriate to the circumstances. The court may, for example, impose limitations on the order that will permit the plaintiff and defendant to have possession of portions of the property or to use the property jointly.

§ 1255.430. Stay of order where right to take contested

1255.430. If the plaintiff has been authorized to take possession of property under Section 1255.410 and the defendant has objected to the plaintiff's right to take the property by eminent domain, the court, if it finds there is a reasonable probability the defendant will prevail, shall stay the order for possession until it has ruled on the defendant's objections.

Comment. Section 1255.430 is new. It is intended to permit the court to mitigate the effect of an order for possession pending resolution of the defendant's objections in a case where the court believes there is merit to the objections. Because objections to the right to take are expeditiously resolved in the normal course of events (see Article 2 (commencing with Section 1260.110) of Chapter 8), a stay will not be necessary unless the objections are not finally resolved by the date of possession specified in the order.

§ 1255.440. Vacating order for possession

1255.440. If an order has been made under Section 1255.410 authorizing the plaintiff to take possession of property and the court subsequently determines that the conditions specified in Section 1255.410 for issuance of the order are not satisfied, the court shall vacate the order.

Comment. Because the order for possession is issued following an ex parte application by the plaintiff, Section 1255.440 expressly authorizes the court to vacate an order for possession prior to judgment if it subsequently determines, whether upon motion of the defendant or upon its own motion, that the requirements of Section 1255.410 are not satisfied.

§ 1255.450. Service of order

1255.450. (a) As used in this section, "record owner" means the owner of the legal or equitable title to the fee or any lesser interest in property as shown by recorded deeds or other recorded instruments.

(b) The plaintiff shall serve a copy of the order for possession issued under Section 1255.410 on the record owner of the property and on the occupants, if any. If the property is lawfully occupied by a person dwelling thereon or by a farm or business operation, service shall be made not less than 90 days prior to the time possession is to be taken pursuant to the order. In all other cases, service shall be made not less than 30 days prior to the time possession is to be taken pursuant to the order. Service may be made with or following service of summons.

(c) At least 30 days prior to the time possession is taken pursuant to an order for possession made pursuant to Section 1255.040, 1255.050, or 1255.460, the plaintiff shall serve a copy of the order on the record owner of the property and on the occupants, if any.

(d) Service of the order shall be made by personal service except that:

(1) If the person on whom service is to be made has previously appeared in the proceeding or been served with summons in the proceeding, service of the order may be made by mail upon such person and his attorney of record, if any.

(2) If the person on whom service is to be made resides out of the state, or has departed from the state or cannot with due diligence be found within the state, service of the order may be made by registered or certified mail addressed to such person at his last known address.

(e) The court may, for good cause shown on ex parte application, authorize the plaintiff to take possession of the property without serving a copy of the order for possession upon a record owner not occupying the property.

(f) A single service upon or mailing to one of several persons having a common business or residence address is sufficient.

Comment. Section 1255.450 is derived from subdivision (c) of former Section 1243.5.

Subdivision (a). The definition of "record owner" is broadened to include persons not included under the definition found in subdivision (c) of former Section 1243.5. Under the former provision, "record owner" was defined to include only the persons in whose name the legal title to the fee appeared as of record and the persons in possession of the property under a recorded lease or agreement of purchase.

Subdivision (b). The requirement that, in certain instances, service be made not less than 90 days before possession is to be taken conforms to the requirement of Government Code Section 7267.3 (notice under land acquisition guidelines). Under subdivision (c) of former Section 1243.5, only 20 days' notice was required; and the court, for good cause shown, could shorten this time to not less than three days.

Because the order is obtained ex parte rather than on noticed motion, the time periods under subdivision (b) are computed from the date of service rather than the date of the order. The plaintiff may, of course, obtain a specific date of possession later than the 90-day or 30-day date in his request for an order for possession.

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) prescribes the time for service where the order for possession is granted under Section 1255.040 (deposit for relocation purposes), 1255.050 (deposit in case of rental property), or 1255.460 (possession after vacation of property or withdrawal of deposit). No comparable provision was found in former law because the procedures provided by Sections 1255.040, 1255.050, and 1255.460 are new.

Subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) requires personal service except in certain limited situations. Paragraphs (1) and (2) of subdivision (d) specify the situations where personal service need not be made. These paragraphs continue provisions of subdivision (c) of former Section 1243.5. The requirement that an affidavit be filed concerning the reason personal service was not made has been eliminated.

Subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) continues the substance of a provision of subdivision (c) of former Section 1243.5.

Subdivision (f). Subdivision (f) continues the substance of a provision of subdivision (c) of former Section 1243.5. The term "address" refers to a single residential unit or place of business rather than to several such units or places that may happen to have the same street or post office "address." For example, each apartment is regarded as having a separate address although the entire apartment house may have a single street address.

§ 1255.460. Right of plaintiff to take possession after defendant's consent or withdrawal of deposit

1255.460. (a) Upon ex parte application, the court shall make an order authorizing the plaintiff to take possession of the property if the court determines that the plaintiff has deposited probable compensation pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) and that each of the defendants entitled to possession has done either of the following:

(1) Expressed in writing his willingness to surrender possession of the property on or after a stated date.

(2) Withdrawn any portion of the deposit.

(b) The order for possession shall:

(1) Recite that it has been made under this section.

(2) Describe the property to be acquired, which description may be by reference to the complaint.

(3) State the date after which plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property. Unless the plaintiff requests a later date, such date shall be the date stated by the defendant or, if a portion of the deposit is withdrawn, the earliest date on which the plaintiff would be entitled to take possession of the property under subdivision (c) of Section 1255.450.

Comment. Section 1255.460 is new. Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) permits the plaintiff to deposit probable compensation whether or not it obtains an order for possession. This section makes applicable to withdrawal of a deposit made prior to judgment the analogous rule that applies when a deposit made after judgment is withdrawn. *Cf. People v. Gutierrez*, 207 Cal. App.2d 759, 24 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1962). It also permits the plaintiff to take possession of the property after each of the defendants entitled to possession has in writing expressed his willingness to surrender it on or after a date certain. Service of the order for possession is required by subdivision (c) of Section 1255.450.

§ 1255.470. Taking possession does not affect other rights

1255.470. By taking possession pursuant to this chapter, the plaintiff does not waive the right to appeal from the judgment, the right to move to abandon, or the right to request a new trial.

Comment. Section 1255.470 is the same in substance as subdivision (f) of former Section 1243.5. The language has been changed to preclude implied waiver of appeal, right to move to abandon, or right to new trial by taking possession pursuant to any order obtained under this chapter, including orders under Sections 1255.040 and 1255.050. Under Section 1255.260, the defendant also retains his right to appeal or to request a new trial upon the issue of compensation even though he withdraws the deposit made by the plaintiff. However, such withdrawal does waive all claims and defenses other than the claim to compensation. For a comparable provision, see Section 1268.230.

§ 1255.480. Police power not affected

1255.480. Nothing in this article limits the right of a public entity to exercise its police power in emergency situations.

Comment. Section 1255.480 is new. It makes clear that the requirements of this article—such as obtaining and serving an order for possession—do not limit the exercise of the police power. See *Surocco v. Geary*, 3 Cal. 69 (1853). See generally Van Alstyne, *Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction*, 20 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1968), reprinted in Van Alstyne, *California Inverse*

Condemnation Law, 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 111 (1971). For a comparable provision, see Section 1268.240.

CHAPTER 7. DISCOVERY; EXCHANGE OF VALUATION DATA

Article 1. Discovery

§ 1258.010. Use of discovery procedures

1258.010. The provisions of this chapter supplement but do not replace, restrict, or prevent the use of discovery procedures or limit the matters that are discoverable in eminent domain proceedings.

Comment. Section 1258.010 supersedes former Section 1272.08 and makes clear that the special provisions of this chapter relating to exchange of valuation data (Article 2) and further discovery following exchange (Section 1258.020) do not limit the availability of discovery generally in eminent domain. See Section 1230.040 and Comment thereto (rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings).

§ 1258.020. Discovery following exchange of valuation data

1258.020. (a) Notwithstanding any other law or court rule relating to discovery, proceedings pursuant to subdivision (b) may be had without requirement of court order and may proceed until not later than 20 days prior to the day set for trial of the issue of compensation.

(b) A party to an exchange of lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 1258.210) or pursuant to court rule as provided in Section 1258.300 may after the time of the exchange obtain discovery from the other party to the exchange and from any person listed by him as an expert witness.

(c) The court, upon noticed motion by the person subjected to discovery pursuant to subdivision (b), may make any order that justice requires to protect such person from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression.

Comment. Section 1258.020 is new. It permits discovery without requirement of a court order but provides for court relief of any person to protect him from annoyance, embarrassment, or oppression. Section 1258.020 permits

discovery proceedings to within 20 days prior to trial despite the general provision of Rule 222 of the California Rules of Court limiting discovery within 30 days of trial. The liberal discovery provisions of Section 1258.020 apply only after an exchange pursuant to Article 2 or a comparable exchange of valuation data and lists of experts has taken place. Section 1258.020 does not, however, preclude use of the ordinary discovery procedures prior to the exchange. See Section 1258.010.

The expenses of an expert deposed under this section may be compensable. See GOVT. CODE § 68092.5.

§ 1258.030. Admissibility of evidence

1258.030. Nothing in this chapter makes admissible any evidence that is not otherwise admissible or permits a witness to base an opinion on any matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion.

Comment. Section 1258.030 is the same as former Section 1272.09 but makes clear that not only the exchange provisions of Article 2 but also the discovery provisions of Article 1 do not affect or alter the rules on admissibility of evidence. The admission of evidence in eminent domain proceedings is governed by the Evidence Code.

Article 2. Exchange of Valuation Data

§ 1258.210. Demand for exchange

1258.210. (a) Not later than the tenth day after the trial date is selected, any party may file and serve on any other party a demand to exchange lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data. Thereafter, the court may, upon noticed motion and a showing of good cause, permit any party to serve such a demand upon any other party.

(b) The demand shall:

(1) Describe the property to which it relates, which description may be by reference to the complaint.

(2) Include a statement in substantially the following form: "You are required to serve and deposit with the clerk of court a list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data in compliance with Article 2 (commencing with Section 1258.210) of Chapter 7 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure not later than the date of

exchange to be set in accordance with that article. Except as otherwise provided in that article, your failure to do so will constitute a waiver of your right to call unlisted expert witnesses during your case in chief and of your right to introduce on direct examination during your case in chief any matter that is required to be, but is not, set forth in your statements of valuation data."

Comment. Section 1258.210 supersedes subdivisions (a)–(c) of former Section 1272.01. The simplified procedure provided by this article for exchanging valuation information is not mandatory in all cases; it applies only if invoked by a party to the proceeding. Moreover, the procedure provided by this article is not applicable in counties which provide an adequate substitute. See Section 1258.300.

Subdivision (a) of Section 1258.210 changes the time for making a demand to exchange from 50 days prior to trial to not later than the tenth day after the date at which a trial date is selected with provision for a later demand where good cause is shown. This change will enable an earlier exchange, thereby permitting additional discovery, if necessary, based on information exchanged. See Section 1258.020 (further discovery following exchange). It will also remove the uncertainty of the 50-day time limit prior to trial in cases where the trial date is known only 30 days prior to trial.

Where a party makes a demand to exchange data, that party must himself provide his own data to the party on whom the demand was served. See Section 1258.230(a).

Subdivision (b) of Section 1258.210 is the same in substance as former Section 1272.01(c).

Subdivision (b) of the former section—permitting cross-demands within 40 days prior to trial—is deleted because it gave rise to confusion that a person serving a demand need not exchange his own data unless a cross-demand is served on him. The deleted provision is unnecessary in light of the provision in subdivision (a) for relief from the time limits for serving a demand upon a showing of good cause.

§ 1258.220. Date of exchange

1258.220. For the purposes of this article, the “date of exchange” is the date agreed to for the exchange of their lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data by the party who served a demand and the party on whom the demand was served or, failing such agreement, a date

40 days prior to commencement of the trial on the issue of compensation or the date set by the court on noticed motion of either party establishing good cause therefor.

Comment. Section 1258.220, defining the date of exchange, supersedes the exchange date—20 days prior to trial—prescribed by former Section 1272.01(d). The exchange date is to be the date selected by the parties to the exchange or, failing agreement, either 40 days prior to trial or such other date selected by the court. This earlier exchange date will enable subsequent discovery. See Section 1258.020 (further discovery following exchange).

§ 1258.230. Exchange of lists and statements

1258.230. (a) Not later than the date of exchange:

(1) Each party who served a demand and each party upon whom a demand was served shall deposit with the clerk of the court a list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data.

(2) A party who served a demand shall serve his list and statements upon each party on whom he served his demand.

(3) Each party on whom a demand was served shall serve his list and statements upon the party who served the demand.

(b) The clerk of the court shall make an entry in the register of actions for each list of expert witnesses and statement of valuation data deposited with him pursuant to this article. The lists and statements shall not be filed in the proceeding, but the clerk shall make them available to the court at the commencement of the trial for the limited purpose of enabling the court to apply the provisions of this article. Unless the court otherwise orders, the clerk shall, at the conclusion of the trial, return all lists and statements to the attorneys for the parties who deposited them. Lists or statements ordered by the court to be retained may thereafter be destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the provisions of law governing the destruction or disposition of exhibits introduced in the trial.

Comment. Section 1258.230 is the same in substance as former Section 1272.01(d)–(e).

Subdivision (b) requires that deposits with the clerk of lists and statements be entered in the register of actions. With respect to maintenance of the register, see GOVT. CODE § 69845. Such entries will permit the court to determine whether a list and statements have been deposited in compliance with this article. However, the statements or appraisal reports used as statements (see Section 1258.260) will not necessarily be in the form prescribed by court rules for papers to be filed. Also, the copies deposited with the clerk serve the limited purpose of enabling the trial court to rule under Section 1258.280. Hence, the subdivision does not require or permit the filing of lists and statements but instead requires the clerk to maintain custody of them and make them available to the trial court at the commencement of the trial. In the usual case, the copies furnished to the court will have served their only purpose at the conclusion of evidence. The subdivision therefore permits them to be returned to the attorneys. For those instances in which the copies might be of significance in connection with an appeal or posttrial motion, the court, on its own initiative or on request of a party, may order them retained. In this event, the copies retained may thereafter be disposed of in the manner of exhibits introduced in the trial.

§ 1258.240. Contents of list of expert witnesses

1258.240. The list of expert witnesses shall include the name, business or residence address, and business, occupation, or profession of each person intended to be called as an expert witness by the party and a statement of the subject matter to which his testimony relates.

Comment. Section 1258.240 is the same as former Section 1272.03. It requires inclusion of all persons to be called as experts, not merely those to be called as valuation experts. See EVID. CODE §§ 813(b), 814. In addition to naming each proposed expert witness, the list must identify the subject matter of his testimony, e.g., "valuation testimony," "existence of oil on subject property," and the like. This further information is necessary to apprise the adverse party of the range and general nature of the expert testimony to be presented at the trial.

Unlike Section 1258.260 (contents of statement of valuation data), this section does not require that the particulars of the expert opinion be stated or that the supporting factual data be set forth. In such case, normal discovery techniques can be used

to obtain the particulars of the opinion and supporting factual data. See Section 1258.020 (further discovery after exchange) and Government Code Section 68092.5 (costs of deposition of expert witness). See also Section 1258.010 (use of discovery procedures).

§ 1258.250. Persons for whom statements of valuation data must be exchanged

1258.250. A statement of valuation data shall be exchanged for each person the party intends to call as a witness to testify to his opinion as to any of the following matters:

- (a) The value of the property being taken.
- (b) The amount of the damage, if any, to the remainder of the larger parcel from which such property is taken.
- (c) The amount of the benefit, if any, to the remainder of the larger parcel from which such property is taken.
- (d) The amount of any other compensation required to be paid by Chapter 9 (commencing with Section 1263.010) or Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 1265.010).

Comment. Section 1258.250 is the same in substance as subdivision (a) of former Section 1272.02 with conforming changes made to reflect the compensation provisions of Chapters 9 (commencing with Section 1263.010) and 10 (commencing with Section 1265.010).

Section 1258.250 requires that a statement of valuation data be provided for each person who is to testify to his opinion as to one or more of the matters listed in the section whether or not that person is to qualify as an expert. For example, a statement must be provided for the owner of the property if he is to testify concerning value, damages, benefits, or other items of compensation.

§ 1258.260. Contents of statement of valuation data

1258.260. (a) The statement of valuation data shall give the name and business or residence address of the witness and shall include a statement whether the witness will testify to an opinion as to any of the matters listed in Section 1258.250 and, as to each such matter upon which he will give an opinion, what that opinion is and the following items to the extent that the opinion on such matter is based thereon:

- (1) The estate or interest being valued.
- (2) The date of valuation used by the witness.
- (3) The highest and best use of the property.
- (4) The applicable zoning and the opinion of the witness as to the probability of any change in such zoning.
- (5) The sales, contracts to sell and purchase, and leases supporting the opinion.

(6) The cost of reproduction or replacement of the existing improvements on the property, the depreciation or obsolescence the improvements have suffered, and the method of calculation used to determine depreciation.

(7) The gross income from the property, the deductions from gross income, and the resulting net income; the reasonable net rental value attributable to the land and existing improvements thereon, and the estimated gross rental income and deductions therefrom upon which such reasonable net rental value is computed; the rate of capitalization used; and the value indicated by such capitalization.

(8) If the property is a portion of a larger parcel, a description of the larger parcel and its value.

(b) With respect to each sale, contract, or lease listed under paragraph (5) of subdivision (a), the statement of valuation data shall give:

(1) The names and business or residence addresses, if known, of the parties to the transaction.

(2) The location of the property subject to the transaction.

(3) The date of the transaction.

(4) If recorded, the date of recording and the volume and page or other identification of the record of the transaction.

(5) The price and other terms and circumstances of the transaction. In lieu of stating the terms contained in any contract, lease, or other document, the statement may, if the document is available for inspection by the adverse party, state the place where and the times when it is available for inspection.

(c) If any opinion referred to in Section 1258.250 is based in whole or in substantial part upon the opinion of another person, the statement of valuation data shall

include the name and business or residence address of such other person, his business, occupation, or profession, and a statement as to the subject matter to which his opinion relates.

(d) Except when an appraisal report is used as a statement of valuation data as permitted by subdivision (e), the statement of valuation data shall include a statement, signed by the witness, that the witness has read the statement of valuation data and that it fairly and correctly states his opinions and knowledge as to the matters therein stated.

(e) An appraisal report that has been prepared by the witness which includes the information required to be included in a statement of valuation data may be used as a statement of valuation data under this article.

Comment. Section 1258.260 is the same in substance as former Section 1272.02(b)-(f).

Subdivision (a) requires the setting forth of the specified data to the extent that any opinion is based thereon. *Cf. EVID. CODE §§ 814-821.* It does not require that the specified data be set forth if the witness' opinion is not based thereon even though such data may have been compiled or ascertained by the witness. Also, the supporting data required by subdivision (a) commonly will pertain to the witness' opinion as to value, and the same data will be considered by the witness to support his opinion as to damages and benefits. In this case, the statement or appraisal report may simply recite that the opinion as to damages or benefits is supported by the same data as the opinion as to value. Where the required information, however, is not identical with respect to all opinions of the witness, subdivision (a) requires that the item of supporting data be separately stated with respect to each opinion of the witness.

Subdivision (c) requires that each valuation statement give information regarding any person who will not be called as a witness but upon whose opinion the testimony of the valuation witness will be based in whole or substantial part. This information is needed by the adverse party not only for the general purpose of properly preparing for trial but also to enable him to utilize his right under Section 804 of the Evidence Code to call the other expert and examine him as an adverse witness concerning his opinion. The subdivision also requires a statement of the subject matter of the supporting opinion. As to

this requirement, and the parallel requirement under Section 1258.240, see the Comment to Section 1258.240.

§ 1258.270. Supplementation of lists and statements

1258.270. (a) A party who is required to exchange lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data shall diligently give notice to the parties upon whom his list and statements were served if, after service of his list and statements, he:

(1) Determines to call an expert witness not included in his list of expert witnesses to testify on direct examination during his case in chief;

(2) Determines to have a witness called by him testify on direct examination during his case in chief to any opinion or data required to be listed in the statement of valuation data for that witness but which was not so listed; or

(3) Discovers any data required to be listed in a statement of valuation data but which was not so listed.

(b) The notice required by subdivision (a) shall include the information specified in Sections 1258.240 and 1258.260 and shall be in writing; but such notice is not required to be in writing if it is given after the commencement of the trial.

Comment. Section 1258.270 is the same in substance as former Section 1272.04. Although Section 1258.270 requires supplementation of lists and statements exchanged, compliance with the section does not insure that the party will be permitted to call the witness or have a witness testify as to the opinion or data. See Sections 1258.280 and 1258.290.

§ 1258.280. Limitations upon calling witnesses and testimony by witnesses

1258.280. Except as provided in Section 1258.290, upon objection of a party who has served his list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data in compliance with Section 1258.230:

(a) No party required to serve a list of expert witnesses on the objecting party may call an expert witness to testify on direct examination during his case in chief unless the

information required by Section 1258.240 for such witness is included in the list served.

(b) No party required to serve statements of valuation data on the objecting party may call a witness to testify on direct examination during his case in chief to his opinion on any matter listed in Section 1258.250 unless a statement of valuation data for such witness was served.

(c) No witness called by a party required to serve statements of valuation data on the objecting party may testify on direct examination during the case in chief of the party who called him to any opinion or data required to be listed in the statement of valuation data for such witness unless such opinion or data is listed in the statement served except that testimony that is merely an explanation or elaboration of data so listed is not inadmissible under this subdivision.

Comment. Section 1258.280 is the same in substance as former Section 1272.05. Section 1258.280 provides a sanction calculated to insure that the parties make a good faith exchange of lists of expert witnesses and essential valuation data. For applications of the same sanction to other required pretrial disclosures, see Sections 454 (copies of accounts) and 2032 (physicians' statements). Although the furnishing of a list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data is analogous to responding to interrogatories or a request for admissions, the consequences specified by Section 2034 for failure or refusal to make discovery are not made applicable to a failure to comply with the requirements of this article. Existence of the sanction provided by Section 1258.280 does not, of course, prevent those consequences from attaching to a failure to make discovery when regular discovery techniques are invoked in the proceeding.

Under exceptional circumstances, the court is authorized to permit the use of a witness or of valuation data not included in the list or statements. See Section 1258.290 and the Comment to that section.

Section 1258.280 limits only the calling of a witness, or the presentation of testimony, during the case in chief of the party calling the witness or presenting the testimony. The section does not preclude a party from calling a witness in rebuttal or having a witness give rebuttal testimony that is otherwise proper. See *City & County of San Francisco v. Tillman Estate Co.*, 205 Cal. 651, 272 P. 585 (1928); *State v. Loop*, 127 Cal.

App.2d 786, 274 P.2d 885 (1954). The section also does not preclude a party from bringing out additional data on redirect examination where it is necessary to meet matters brought out on the cross-examination of his witness. However, the court should take care to confine a party's rebuttal case and his redirect examination of his witnesses to their purpose of meeting matters brought out during the adverse party's case or cross-examination of his witnesses. A party should not be permitted to defeat the purpose of this article by reserving witnesses and valuation data for use in rebuttal where such witnesses should have been called and such valuation data presented on the direct examination during the case in chief.

Application of the concept of "case in chief" to the presentation of evidence by the plaintiff requires particular attention. The defendant presents his case in chief first in the order of the trial. Therefore, the following presentation by the plaintiff may include evidence of two kinds; *i.e.*, evidence comprising the case in chief of the plaintiff and evidence in rebuttal of evidence previously presented by the defendants. If the evidence offered in rebuttal is proper as such, this section does not prevent its presentation at that time.

§ 1258.290. Relief from limitations on calling witness or testimony by witness

1258.290. (a) The court may, upon such terms as may be just (including but not limited to continuing the trial for a reasonable period of time and awarding costs and expenses), permit a party to call a witness, or permit a witness called by a party to testify to an opinion or data on direct examination, during the party's case in chief where such witness, opinion, or data is required to be, but is not, included in such party's list of expert witnesses or statements of valuation data if the court finds that such party has made a good faith effort to comply with Sections 1258.210 to 1258.260, inclusive, that he has complied with Section 1258.270, and that by the date of exchange he:

(1) Would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call such witness or discovered or listed such opinion or data; or

(2) Failed to determine to call such witness or to discover or list such opinion or data through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

(b) In making a determination under this section, the court shall take into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied upon the list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data and will be prejudiced if the witness is called or the testimony concerning such opinion or data is given.

Comment. Section 1258.290 is the same in substance as former Section 1272.06 and allows the court to permit a party who has made a good faith effort to comply with this article to call a witness or use valuation data that was not included in his list of expert witnesses or statements of valuation data. The standards set out in Section 1258.290 are similar to those applied under Section 657 (granting a new trial upon newly discovered evidence) and Section 473 (relieving a party from default). The court should apply the same standards in making determinations under this section. The consideration listed in subdivision (b) is important but is not necessarily the only consideration to be taken into account in making determinations under this section.

§ 1258.300. Applicability of article

1258.300. The superior court in any county may provide by court rule a procedure for the exchange of valuation data which shall be used in lieu of the procedure provided by this article if the Judicial Council finds that such procedure serves the same purpose and is an adequate substitute for the procedure provided by this article.

Comment. Section 1258.300 supersedes former Section 1272.07, which provided that the statutory exchange provisions did not apply to an eminent domain proceeding in Los Angeles County. Section 1258.300 supplants the special provision relating to Los Angeles County by the general principle that any county that has adopted adequate rules that are approved by the Judicial Council is exempt from the provisions of this article. Under this general standard, a system for disclosing valuation data under judicial supervision such as that in Los Angeles County would qualify for approval by the Judicial Council. See Policy Memorandum, Eminent Domain (Including Inverse Condemnation), Superior Court, County of Los Angeles (dated February 7, 1973); *Swartzman v. Superior Court*, 231 Cal. App.2d 195, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1964).

CHAPTER 8. PROCEDURES FOR DETERMINING RIGHT TO TAKE AND COMPENSATION

Article 1. General Provisions

§ 1260.010. Trial preference

1260.010. Proceedings under this title take precedence over all other civil actions in the matter of setting the same for hearing or trial in order that such proceedings shall be quickly heard and determined.

Comment. Section 1260.010 reenacts the substance of former Section 1264.

§ 1260.020. Determination of compatibility and more necessary public use where separate proceedings are consolidated

1260.020. (a) If proceedings to acquire the same property are consolidated, the court shall first determine whether the public uses for which the property is sought are compatible within the meaning of Article 6 (commencing with Section 1240.510) of Chapter 3. If the court determines that the uses are compatible, it shall permit the proceeding to continue with the plaintiffs acting jointly. The court shall apportion the obligation to pay any award in the proceeding in proportion to the use, damage, and benefits attributable to each plaintiff.

(b) If the court determines pursuant to subdivision (a) that the uses are not all compatible, it shall further determine which of the uses is the more necessary public use within the meaning of Article 7 (commencing with Section 1240.610) of Chapter 3. The court shall permit the plaintiff alleging the more necessary public use, along with any other plaintiffs alleging compatible public uses under subdivision (a), to continue the proceeding. The court shall dismiss the proceeding as to the other plaintiffs.

Comment. Section 1260.020 deals with the issues of compatibility and more necessary public use where two proceedings to acquire the same property are consolidated pursuant to Section 1048. Section 1260.020 does not deal with whether consolidation is proper; that is a matter dealt with by

Section 1048. Moreover, nothing in this section is intended to limit the authority of the court to consolidate proceedings or sever issues for trial under the latter section. However, where consolidation of two proceedings to acquire the same property is ordered, subdivision (a) requires the court to determine first whether the public uses for which the property is sought are compatible and, if so, to take the action indicated. Under subdivision (b), if the public uses are not all compatible, the court must determine which are "more necessary" and again take the appropriate action. For reimbursement of expenses and damages on dismissal, see Sections 1268.610 and 1268.620.

Article 2. Contesting Right to Take

§ 1260.110. Priority for hearing

1260.110. (a) Where objections to the right to take are raised, unless the court orders otherwise, they shall be heard and determined prior to the determination of the issue of compensation.

(b) The court may, on motion of any party, after notice and hearing, specially set such objections for trial.

Comment. Section 1260.110 makes provision for bringing to trial the objections, if any, that have been raised against the plaintiff's right to take. See Sections 1250.350–1250.370. Under subdivision (a), disposition of the right to take is generally a prerequisite to trial of the issue of just compensation. However, this does not preclude such activities as depositions and other discovery, and the court may order a different order of trial. See also Section 1048. *Cf. City of Los Angeles v. Keck*, 14 Cal. App.3d 920, 92 Cal. Rptr. 599 (1971) (parties stipulated to determination of compensation and tried only issues of public use and necessity).

Subdivision (b) makes clear that the determination of the objections to the right to take may be specially set for trial. See Rule 225 of the California Rules of Court and *Swartzman v. Superior Court*, 231 Cal. App.2d 195, 198–199, 41 Cal. Rptr. 721, 724–725 (1964).

§ 1260.120. Disposition of defendant's objections to right to take

1260.120. (a) The court shall hear and determine all objections to the right to take.

(b) If the court determines that the plaintiff has the right to acquire by eminent domain the property described in the complaint, the court shall so order.

(c) If the court determines that the plaintiff does not have the right to acquire by eminent domain any property described in the complaint, it shall order either of the following:

(1) Immediate dismissal of the proceeding as to that property.

(2) Conditional dismissal of the proceeding as to that property unless such corrective and remedial action as the court may prescribe has been taken within the period prescribed by the court in the order. An order made under this paragraph may impose such limitations and conditions as the court determines to be just under the circumstances of the particular case including the requirement that the plaintiff pay to the defendant all or part of the reasonable litigation expenses necessarily incurred by the defendant because of the plaintiff's failure or omission which constituted the basis of the objection to the right to take.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1260.120 provides for a court determination of right to take issues (see Sections 1250.350–1250.370). This is consistent with the California Constitution and with prior law. See Comment to Section 1230.040 (rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings: trial).

The form of review of a determination that the plaintiff may condemn the defendant's property is governed by the rules of procedure generally. See Section 904.1 (appeal); *Harden v. Superior Court*, 44 Cal.2d 630, 284 P.2d 9 (1955) (review by writ).

A determination that the plaintiff has no right to condemn the defendant's property ordinarily requires an order of dismissal. Paragraph (1) of subdivision (c). However, where the complaint alleges alternative grounds for condemnation, a finding which would require dismissal as to one ground does not preclude a finding of right to take on another ground, and the proceeding may continue to be prosecuted on that basis. As to whether an order of dismissal is appealable, see Section 904.1. See also *People v. Rodoni*, 243 Cal. App.2d 771, 52 Cal. Rptr. 857 (1966). As to the recovery of litigation expenses following dismissal, see Section 1268.610.

Paragraph (2) of subdivision (c) is designed to ameliorate the all-or-nothing effect of paragraph (1). The court is authorized in its discretion to dispose of an objection in a just and equitable manner. This authority does not permit the court to create a right to acquire where none exists, but it does authorize the court to grant leave to the plaintiff to amend pleadings or take other corrective action that is just in light of all of the circumstances of the case. The court may frame its order in whatever manner may be desirable, and subdivision (c) makes clear that the order may include the awarding of attorney's fees to the defendant. For example, if the resolution of necessity was not properly adopted, the court may, where appropriate, order that such a resolution be properly adopted within such time as is specified by the court and that, if a proper resolution has not been adopted within the time specified, the proceeding is dismissed. The plaintiff is not required to comply with an order made under paragraph (2), but a failure to comply results in a dismissal of the proceeding as to that property which the court has determined the plaintiff lacks the right to acquire.

Article 3. Procedures Relating to Determination of Compensation

§ 1260.210. Order of proof and argument; burden of proof

1260.210. (a) The defendant shall present his evidence on the issue of compensation first and shall commence and conclude the argument.

(b) Neither the plaintiff nor the defendant has the burden of proof on the issue of compensation.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1260.210 requires the defendant to present his evidence on the issue of compensation first and to commence and conclude the argument. This continues former law. See former Section 1256.1 ("the defendant shall commence and conclude the argument"); *City & County of San Francisco v. Tillman Estate Co.*, 205 Cal. 651, 272 P. 585 (1928) (order of proof).

The rule as to burden of proof provided by subdivision (b) changes former law. Compare *City & County of San Francisco v. Tillman Estate Co.*, *supra*. Assignment of the burden of proof in the context of an eminent domain proceeding is not appropriate. The trier of fact generally is presented with conflicting opinions of value and supporting data and is required to fix value based on the weight it gives to the opinions

and supporting data. See, e.g., *City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church*, 1 Cal. App.3d 384, 408-410, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1, 16-18 (1969); *People v. Jarvis*, 274 Cal. App.2d 217, 79 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969). See also *State v. 45,621 Square Feet of Land*, 475 P.2d 553 (Alaska 1970); *State v. Amunisis*, 61 Wash.2d 160, 377 P.2d 462 (1963). Absent the production of evidence by one party, the trier of fact will determine compensation solely from the other party's evidence, but neither party should be made to appear to bear some greater burden of persuasion than the other. Subdivision (b) therefore so provides. Compare ORE. REV. STAT. § 35.305(2).

§ 1260.220. Procedure where there are divided interests

1260.220. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), where there are divided interests in property acquired by eminent domain, the value of each interest and the injury, if any, to the remainder of such interest shall be separately assessed and compensation awarded therefor.

(b) The plaintiff may require that the amount of compensation be first determined as between plaintiff and all defendants claiming an interest in the property. Thereafter, in the same proceeding, the trier of fact shall determine the respective rights of the defendants in and to the amount of compensation awarded and shall apportion the award accordingly. Nothing in this subdivision limits the right of a defendant to present during the first stage of the proceeding evidence of the value of, or injury to, his interest in the property; and the right of a defendant to present evidence during the second stage of the proceeding is not affected by his failure to exercise his right to present evidence during the first stage of the proceeding.

Comment. Section 1260.220 retains the existing California scheme of permitting a plaintiff the option of having the interests in property valued separately or as a whole. Subdivision (a) retains the procedure formerly provided by Section 1248(1)-(3). Subdivision (b) retains the procedure formerly provided by the first sentence of Section 1246.1. It is intended as procedural only. It does not, for example, affect the rule that, where the plaintiff elects the two-stage proceeding, the value of the property includes any enhanced value created by the existence of a favorable lease on the property. See *People*

v. Lynbar, Inc., 253 Cal. App.2d 870, 62 Cal. Rptr. 320 (1967). See also Section 1263.310 (compensation for property taken).

The last sentence of subdivision (b) is an elaboration of the introductory clause of former Section 1248.

§ 1260.230. Separate assessment of elements of compensation

1260.230. As far as practicable, the trier of fact shall assess separately each of the following:

(a) Compensation for the property taken as required by Article 4 (commencing with Section 1263.310) of Chapter 9.

(b) Where the property acquired is part of a larger parcel:

(1) The amount of the damage, if any, to the remainder as required by Article 5 (commencing with Section 1263.410) of Chapter 9.

(2) The amount of the benefit, if any, to the remainder as required by Article 5 (commencing with Section 1263.410) of Chapter 9.

(c) Compensation for loss of goodwill, if any, as required by Article 6 (commencing with Section 1263.510) of Chapter 9.

Comment. Section 1260.230 continues the separate assessment requirement of subdivisions 1-3 and 7 of former Section 1248. The section does not affect the right of a party to request special interrogatories to the jury on these issues or on any other issues, including those where a separate finding on an element of compensation not listed in Section 1260.230 would be useful. For example, a party may desire a special finding on the amount of compensation required under Section 1263.620 for performance of work to protect the public from injury from a partially completed improvement.

§ 1260.240. Court determination of compensation for deceased and unknown persons

1260.240. Where any persons unknown or any deceased persons or the heirs and devisees of any deceased persons have been properly joined as defendants but have not appeared either personally or by a personal representative, the court shall determine the extent of the

interests of such defendants in the property taken or damaged and the compensation to be awarded for such interests. The court may determine the extent and value of the interests of all such defendants in the aggregate without apportionment between the respective defendants. In any event, in the case of deceased persons, the court shall determine only the extent and value of the interest of the decedent and shall not determine the extent and value of the separate interests of the heirs and devisees in such decedent's interest.

Comment. Section 1260.240 is based on a portion of former Section 1245.3 which provided for the court determination of the compensation to be awarded deceased and unknown persons; however, Section 1260.240 authorizes the court to make a lump sum award where such persons have not appeared. Former law was not clear on this point. For provisions authorizing joinder of deceased persons and persons unknown, see Section 1250.220.

§ 1260.250. Compensation for appraisers, referees, commissioners, and others

1260.250. In any action or proceeding for the purpose of condemning property where the court may appoint appraisers, referees, commissioners, or other persons for the purpose of determining the value of such property and fixing the compensation thereof, and may fix their fees or compensation, the court may set such fees or compensation in an amount as determined by the court to be reasonable.

Comment. Section 1260.250 is identical to former Section 1266.2 except that the last clause of Section 1266.2—which provided that “such fees shall not exceed similar fees for similar services in the community where such services are rendered”—is deleted. The former limitation on the court’s power to fix fees is deleted because, where there was no expert available in the immediate community, the court’s inability to pay an expert from outside of the community his reasonable fee could prevent the court from obtaining the best qualified expert.

CHAPTER 9. COMPENSATION

Article 1. General Provisions

§ 1263.010. Right to compensation

1263.010. (a) The owner of property acquired by eminent domain is entitled to compensation as provided in this chapter.

(b) Nothing in this chapter affects any rights the owner of property acquired by eminent domain may have under any other statute. In any case where two or more statutes provide compensation for the same loss, the person entitled to compensation may recover only once for that loss.

Comment. This chapter, relating to compensation, supersedes various provisions formerly found in the eminent domain title of the Code of Civil Procedure. The elements of compensation provided in this chapter include compensation for property taken (Section 1263.310), injury to the remainder (Section 1263.410), and loss of goodwill (Section 1263.510). In connection with compensation, see also Chapter 10 (commencing with Section 1265.010) (divided interests), Section 1268.610 (litigation expenses). See also Section 1235.170 (defining "property" to include any right or interest in property). For related provisions, see Article 1 (commencing with Section 1245.010) of Chapter 4 (damages from preliminary location, survey, and tests) and Section 1268.620 (damages caused by possession when proceeding dismissed or right to take defeated).

Subdivision (b) of Section 1263.010 makes clear that this chapter does not affect any statute providing for additional compensation such as compensation for relocation of public utility facilities. See discussion in *A Study Relating to Sovereign Immunity*, 5 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 1, 78-96 (1963). See also GOVT. CODE § 7260 *et seq.* (relocation assistance).

Likewise, this chapter in no way limits additional amounts that may be required by Article I, Section 14, the "just compensation" clause of the California Constitution. On the other hand, the fact that the "just compensation" clause may not require payments as great as those provided in this chapter does not limit the compensation required by this chapter. This

chapter is intended to provide rules of compensation for eminent domain proceedings; whether any of its provisions apply in inverse condemnation actions is a matter for court decision. See Section 1230.020 and Comment thereto (law governing exercise of eminent domain power).

The second sentence of subdivision (b), prohibiting double recovery for the same loss, applies only to statutes that purport to compensate for the same loss. Thus, for example, a person who suffers a business loss would not be entitled to compensation for that loss under both Section 1263.510 (loss of goodwill) and Government Code Section 7262(c) (relocation or in-lieu payment). This prohibition on double recovery in no way limits compensation under different statutes for separate and distinct losses such as the fair market value of property taken, injury to the remainder, rental losses, moving expense, court costs, and the like.

§ 1263.020. Accrual of right to compensation

1263.020. Except as otherwise provided by law, the right to compensation shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of filing the complaint.

Comment. Section 1263.020 continues the substance of a portion of former Section 1249, but the date of filing the complaint rather than the date of issuance of summons is used to determine the accrual of the right to compensation since the filing of the complaint is the factor that establishes the jurisdiction of the court over the property. See Section 1250.110 and Comment thereto (complaint commences proceeding).

The rule stated in Section 1263.020 is subject to exceptions created by statutory or decisional law. Thus, for example, if an interest in existence at the time of filing the complaint (such as a lease) is extinguished or partially dissipated before entry of judgment (such as by expiration or partial expiration of the term of the lease), the owner of the interest may not have a right to compensation to the extent of such extinction or dissipation. See, e.g., *People v. Hartley*, 214 Cal. App.2d 378, 29 Cal. Rptr. 502 (1963). And, the right of the owner of an interest may accrue even if a complaint is never filed. See, e.g., *Concrete Service Co. v. State*, 274 Cal. App.2d 142, 78 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1969) (lessee entitled to compensation for fixtures where public entity acquired lessor's interest and terminated lease). See also *Redevelopment Agency v. Diamond Properties*, 271 Cal. App.2d 315, 76 Cal. Rptr. 269 (1969).

Article 2. Date of Valuation

Comment. Article 2 (commencing with Section 1263.110) supersedes those portions of former Section 1249 that specified two alternative dates of valuation. Article 2 provides a date of valuation for all eminent domain proceedings other than certain proceedings by political subdivisions to take property of public utilities. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1411 (date of valuation is date of filing petition); cf. *Citizen's Util. Co. v. Superior Court*, 59 Cal.2d 805, 382 P.2d 356, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1963); *Marin Municipal Water Dist. v. Marin Water & Power Co.*, 178 Cal. 308, 173 P. 469 (1918).

§ 1263.110. Date of valuation fixed by deposit

1263.110. (a) Unless an earlier date of valuation is applicable under this article, if the plaintiff deposits the probable compensation in accordance with Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6, the date of valuation is the date on which the deposit is made.

(b) Whether or not the plaintiff has taken possession of the property or obtained an order for possession, if the court determines pursuant to Section 1255.030 that the probable amount of compensation exceeds the amount previously deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 and the amount on deposit is not increased accordingly within 30 days from the date of the court's order, no deposit shall be deemed to have been made for the purpose of this section.

Comment. Section 1263.110 permits the plaintiff, by making a deposit, to establish the date of valuation no later than the date the deposit is made. The rule under the language contained in former Section 1249 was to the contrary; neither the making of a deposit nor the taking of possession had any bearing on the date of valuation. See *City of Los Angeles v. Tower*, 90 Cal. App.2d 869, 204 P.2d 395 (1949). The date of valuation may be earlier than the date of the deposit (see Section 1263.120), and subsequent events may cause such an earlier date of valuation to shift to the date of deposit (see Section 1263.130). But a date of valuation established by a deposit cannot be shifted to a later date by any of the circumstances, including subsequent retrial, mentioned in the following sections.

Although the making of a deposit prior to judgment establishes the date of valuation unless an earlier date is applicable, subdivision (b) denies that effect if the amount deposited is determined by the court to be inadequate and is not increased in keeping with the determination. *Cf.* Section 1255.030(b) (when failure to increase deposit may result in abandonment).

§ 1263.120. Trial within one year

1263.120. If the issue of compensation is brought to trial within one year after commencement of the proceeding, the date of valuation is the date of commencement of the proceeding.

Comment. Section 1263.120 continues the substance of the rule provided in former Section 1249, but the date of commencement of the proceeding—rather than the date of the issuance of summons—is used in determining the date of valuation. See Sections 411.10 and 1250.110 (filing of complaint commences proceeding). Ordinarily, the dates are the same, but this is not always the case. See *Harrington v. Superior Court*, 194 Cal. 185, 228 P. 15 (1924). As the issuance of summons is not essential to establish the court's jurisdiction over the property (see *Harrington v. Superior Court, supra*, and *Dresser v. Superior Court*, 231 Cal. App.2d 68, 41 Cal. Rptr. 473 (1964)), the date of commencement of the proceeding is a more appropriate date.

§ 1263.130. Trial not within one year

1263.130. If the issue of compensation is not brought to trial within one year after commencement of the proceeding, the date of valuation is the date of the commencement of the trial unless the delay is caused by the defendant, in which case the date of valuation is the date of commencement of the proceeding.

Comment. Section 1263.130 establishes the date of valuation where that date is not established by an earlier deposit (Section 1263.110) or by the commencement of the proceeding (Section 1263.120). See Sections 411.10 and 1250.110 (filing of complaint commences proceeding). Section 1263.130, which continues in effect a proviso contained in former Section 1249, retains the date specified in Section 1263.120 as the date of valuation in any

case in which the delay in reaching trial is caused by the defendant.

With respect to the date that a trial is commenced, see Evidence Code Section 12 and the Comment to that section.

If a new trial is ordered or a mistrial is declared and the new trial or retrial is not commenced within one year after the filing of the complaint, the date of valuation is determined under Section 1263.140 or Section 1263.150 rather than Section 1263.130. However, if the new trial or retrial is commenced within one year after commencement of the proceeding, the date of valuation is determined by Section 1263.120.

§ 1263.140. New trial

1263.140. (a) If a new trial is ordered by the trial or appellate court and the new trial is not commenced within one year after the commencement of the proceeding, the date of valuation is the date of the commencement of such new trial.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the date of valuation in the new trial is the same date as the date of valuation in the previous trial if either of the following is shown:

(1) The plaintiff deposited the amount of the judgment in accordance with Section 1268.110 within 30 days after the entry of judgment.

(2) A motion for new trial or to vacate or set aside the judgment was made and the plaintiff deposited the probable compensation in accordance with Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 within 30 days after disposition of such motion.

Comment. Section 1263.140 deals with the date of valuation where a new trial is ordered. Generally, the date of valuation is the date of valuation used in the previous trial if the deposit is made within 30 days after entry of judgment or, if a motion for a new trial or to vacate or set aside the judgment has been made, within 30 days after disposition of such motion. If the deposit is made thereafter but prior to the commencement of the new trial, the date of valuation is the date of deposit. See Section 1263.110. Section 1263.140 does not apply where an earlier date of valuation has been established by a deposit prior to judgment. See Section 1263.110.

Under the language contained in former Section 1249, the question arose whether the original date of valuation or the date of the new trial should be employed in new trials in eminent domain proceedings. The Supreme Court of California ultimately held that the date of valuation established in the first trial, rather than the date of the new trial, should normally be used. See *People v. Murata*, 55 Cal.2d 1, 357 P.2d 833, 9 Cal. Rptr. 601 (1960). To avoid injustice to the condemnee in a rising market, Section 1263.140 changes the result of that decision unless the date of valuation has been established by the deposit of the amount of the judgment in accordance with Section 1268.110. The section applies whether the new trial is granted by the trial court or by an appellate court. However, if a mistrial is declared, further proceedings are not considered a "new trial," and the date of valuation is determined under Section 1263.150 rather than under Section 1263.140.

§ 1263.150. Mistrial

1263.150. (a) If a mistrial is declared and the retrial is not commenced within one year after the commencement of the proceeding, the date of valuation is the date of the commencement of the retrial of the case.

(b) Notwithstanding subdivision (a), the date of valuation in the retrial is the same date as the date of valuation in the trial in which the mistrial was declared if the plaintiff deposits the probable compensation in accordance with Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 within 30 days after the declaration of mistrial.

Comment. Section 1263.150 deals with the date of valuation where a mistrial is declared. Under the language contained in former Section 1249, the effect, if any, of a mistrial upon the date of valuation was uncertain. Section 1263.150 clarifies the law by adopting the principle established by Section 1263.140 which governs the date of valuation when a new trial is ordered. For the distinction between a retrial following a mistrial and a new trial following an appeal or a motion for new trial granted under Code of Civil Procedure Section 657, see 5 B. WITKIN, CALIFORNIA PROCEDURE *Attack on Judgment in Trial Court* § 54 at 3630-3631 (2d ed. 1971).

Article 3. Compensation for Improvements

§ 1263.210. Compensation for improvements pertaining to the realty

1263.210. (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, all improvements pertaining to the realty shall be taken into account in determining compensation.

(b) Subdivision (a) applies notwithstanding the right or obligation of a tenant, as against the owner of any other interest in real property, to remove such improvement at the expiration of his term.

Comment. Section 1263.210 continues the substance of portions of former Sections 1248(1) (compensation shall be awarded for the property taken "and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty") and 1249.1 ("All improvements pertaining to the realty that are on the property at the time of the service of summons and which affect its value shall be considered in the assessment of compensation . . ."). For exceptions to the rule provided in Section 1263.210, see Sections 1263.230 (improvements removed or destroyed) and 1263.240 (improvements made after service of summons). Cf. Section 1263.250 (growing crops).

Subdivision (a) requires that the property taken by eminent domain be valued as it stands improved. If the improvements serve to enhance the value of the property over its unimproved condition, the property receives the enhanced value; if the improvements serve to decrease the value of the property below its unimproved condition, the property suffers the decreased value. See, e.g., *City of Los Angeles v. Sabatasso*, 3 Cal. App.3d 973, 83 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1970) (lessee may recover severance damages for reduction in value of equipment used in place on remainder).

Subdivision (b) of Section 1263.210, which adopts the language of Section 302(b)(1) of the Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4652(b)(1) (1971), continues prior California law. See *People v. Klopstock*, 24 Cal.2d 897, 151 P.2d 641 (1944); *Concrete Service Co. v. State*, 274 Cal. App.2d 142, 78 Cal. Rptr. 923 (1969). Cf. *City of Los Angeles v. Klinker*, 219 Cal. 198, 25 P.2d 826 (1933).

§ 1263.220. Business equipment

1263.220. Equipment designed for business purposes that is installed for use on the property taken or damaged and cannot be removed without a substantial loss in value shall be deemed to be an improvement pertaining to the realty for the purposes of compensation regardless of the method of installation.

Comment. Section 1263.220 requires that business equipment installed for use on the particular property be taken into account in determining compensation. See Section 1263.210. Section 1263.220 creates a special category of improvements pertaining to the realty for certain equipment without regard to the classification of the equipment under the general provisions of Section 1263.210.

Section 1263.220 supersedes the provisions of former Section 1248b which applied only to equipment designed for manufacturing or industrial purposes. Section 1263.220 applies to equipment designed for "business purposes" in its most general sense and thus applies to commercial as well as to manufacturing and industrial enterprises.

The basic test under Section 1263.220 to determine if business equipment installed for use on the property taken or damaged must be taken into account for purposes of determining compensation is whether the equipment can be removed without a substantial loss in value. If the equipment can be removed without substantial impairment of its value, the equipment is not classified as an improvement pertaining to the realty under this section even though its removal may damage the structure in which it is installed. In such a case it may, however, be classified as an improvement pertaining to the realty under Section 1263.210. See also Sections 1263.270, 1263.280.

One effect of classification of equipment as an improvement pertaining to the realty is that such equipment located on the property taken must also be taken and paid for by the condemnor of the realty. As a consequence, the condemnor acquires title to the equipment rather than merely paying for loss of value on removal and has the right to realize any salvage value the equipment may have and must bear the resultant burden. Where such equipment is located on the remainder, it may receive severance damages. See, e.g., *City of Los Angeles v. Sabatasso*, 3 Cal. App.3d 973, 83 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1970).

Losses on personal property used in a discontinued business may be recoverable under Government Code Section 7262.

§ 1263.230. Improvements removed, destroyed, or damaged

1263.230. (a) Improvements pertaining to the realty shall not be taken into account in determining compensation to the extent that they are removed or destroyed before the earliest of the following times:

- (1) The time the plaintiff takes title to the property.
- (2) The time the plaintiff takes possession of the property.

(3) If the defendant moves from the property in compliance with an order for possession, the date specified in the order; except that, if the defendant so moves prior to such date and gives the plaintiff written notice thereof, the date 24 hours after such notice is received by the plaintiff.

(b) Where improvements pertaining to the realty are removed or destroyed by the defendant at any time, such improvements shall not be taken into account in determining compensation. Where such removal or destruction damages the remaining property, such damage shall be taken into account in determining compensation to the extent it reduces the value of the remaining property.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1263.230 continues the substance of former Section 1249.1. See also *Redevelopment Agency v. Maxwell*, 193 Cal. App.2d 414, 14 Cal. Rptr. 170 (1961). See also Section 1268.030 (title to property acquired by eminent domain passes upon the date that a certified copy of the final order of condemnation is recorded). Cf. *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 46, 500 P.2d 1345, 1351, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 7 (1972) (dictum) (risk of loss in inverse condemnation). Subdivision (a) also provides that, where a defendant moves from property in compliance with an order for possession prior to the date specified in the order, he may shift the risk of loss to the plaintiff by serving notice that he has moved; such notice may be served prior to the time he moves. The risk of loss does not shift to the plaintiff until 24 hours after the plaintiff receives such notice. As to the authority of the Department of Transportation to secure fire insurance in cases in which property acquired is leased to the former owner, see Government Code Section 11007.1. If removal or destruction serves to decrease the value of the property below its improved

condition, the property is valued accordingly; if removal or destruction serves to increase the value of the property over its improved condition, the property receives the increased value.

Subdivision (b) makes clear that, where the defendant removes or destroys improvements even after the time the risk of loss shifts to the plaintiff, compensation is not awarded for the improvements. Subdivision (b) does not authorize the defendant to remove property or preclude the plaintiff from bringing an independent action against the defendant for conversion where such removal or destruction occurs after valuation of the property.

Where removal or destruction of improvements damages the remaining property, such as a structure in which the improvements were installed, subdivision (b) makes clear that such damage is included in the determination of property value. It should be noted that the defendant may be able to remove improvements without suffering the damage to the structure caused by the removal upon following the procedures provided in Section 1263.280 (improvements whose removal will damage structure).

§ 1263.240. Improvements made after service of summons

1263.240. Improvements pertaining to the realty made subsequent to the date of service of summons shall not be taken into account in determining compensation unless one of the following is established:

(a) The improvement is one required to be made by a public utility to its utility system.

(b) The improvement is one made with the written consent of the plaintiff.

(c) The improvement is one authorized to be made by a court order issued after a noticed hearing and upon a finding by the court that the hardship to the defendant of not permitting the improvement outweighs the hardship to the plaintiff of permitting the improvement. No order may be issued under this subdivision after the plaintiff has deposited the amount of probable compensation in accordance with Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6. A deposit of probable compensation subsequent to issuance of an order under this subdivision shall operate neither to preclude the

defendant from completing the authorized improvement nor to deny compensation based thereon.

Comment. Section 1263.240 in no way limits the right of the property owner to make improvements on his property following service of summons; it simply states the general rule that the subsequent improvements will not be taken into account in valuing the property and specifies those instances in which subsequent improvements will be considered in valuing the property. It should be noted that, although subsequent improvements may be precluded from consideration in valuing the property under this section, if the improvements were necessary to protect the public from risk of injury, their cost may be recoverable as a separate item of compensation under Section 1263.620.

The introductory portion of Section 1263.240, which adopts the substance of the last sentence of former Section 1249, requires that, as a general rule, subsequent improvements be uncompensated regardless of whether they are made in good faith or bad. See *City of Santa Barbara v. Petras*, 21 Cal. App.3d 506, 98 Cal. Rptr. 635 (1971). For exceptions to this rule, see subdivisions (a)–(c) and Section 1263.250 (harvesting and marketing of crops).

Subdivision (a) codifies a judicially recognized exception to the general rule. *Citizen's Util. Co. v. Superior Court*, 59 Cal.2d 805, 382 P.2d 356, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1963).

Subdivision (b), allowing compensation for subsequent improvements made with the consent of the plaintiff, is new. It permits the parties to work out a reasonable solution rather than forcing them into court and makes clear that the condemnor has authority to make an agreement that will deal with the problem under the circumstances of the particular case.

Subdivision (c) is intended to provide the defendant with the opportunity to make improvements that are demonstrably in good faith and not made to enhance the amount of compensation payable. The subsequent improvements might be compensable under the balancing of hardships test, for example, where an improvement is near completion, the date of public use of the property is distant, and the additional work will permit profitable use of the property during the period prior to the time it is actually taken for public use.

§ 1263.250. Harvesting and marketing of crops

1263.250. (a) Subject to subdivisions (b) and (c), the acquisition of property by eminent domain shall not prevent the defendant from harvesting and marketing crops planted before or after the service of summons.

(b) In the case of crops planted before service of summons, if the plaintiff takes possession of the property at a time that prevents the defendant from harvesting and marketing the crops, the reasonable value of the material and labor reasonably expended in connection with the crops up to the date the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property shall be included in the compensation awarded for the property taken.

(c) In the case of crops planted after the service of summons, if the plaintiff takes possession of the property at a time that prevents the defendant from harvesting and marketing the crops, the compensation specified in subdivision (b) is required only if the plaintiff has previously consented to the planting and harvesting.

Comment. Section 1263.250 supersedes former Section 1249.2. Despite the contrary implication of former Section 1249.2, subdivision (a) makes clear that the defendant has the right to grow and harvest crops and to retain the profit for his own benefit up to the time the property is actually taken. Where possession is taken and the defendant is prevented from realizing the value of his crops, he is entitled to the reasonable value of his labor and material reasonably expended in connection with the crops up to the date the plaintiff is authorized to take possession, provided they were planted prior to service of summons. Subdivision (b). The defendant is not entitled to compensation for unharvested crops planted after service of summons unless the plaintiff has agreed to planting and harvest. Failure of the plaintiff to agree, where there will be an unreasonable delay in acquisition, may subject the plaintiff to liability in inverse condemnation. See *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972).

§ 1263.260. Removal of improvements pertaining to realty

1263.260. Notwithstanding Section 1263.210, the owner of improvements pertaining to the realty may elect to remove any or all such improvements by serving on the plaintiff within 60 days after service of summons written notice of such election. If the plaintiff fails within 30 days thereafter to serve on the owner written notice of refusal to allow removal of such improvements, the owner may remove such improvements and shall be compensated for their reasonable removal and relocation cost not to exceed the market value of the improvements.

Comment. Section 1263.260 is new. It provides a means whereby the defendant may convert improvements pertaining to the realty to personalty and receive the moving cost for such personalty. *Cf.* GOVT. CODE § 7262 (moving expense of personal property). Where the owner of improvements pertaining to the realty makes the election provided in this section, compensation is not awarded for the property removed. See Section 1263.230 (improvements removed or destroyed). For a comparable provision, see Pennsylvania Eminent Domain Code § 1-607 (1964).

§ 1263.270. Removal of improvements for storage in case of dispute

1263.270. If there is a dispute between plaintiff and defendant whether particular improvements are improvements pertaining to the realty, the defendant may serve on the plaintiff written notice that he claims such improvements are improvements pertaining to the realty and that he intends to remove and store such improvements pending determination of the issue. If, within 30 days after such service the plaintiff serves on the defendant notice of refusal to allow removal for storage, the defendant may not remove and store the improvements and the plaintiff's refusal shall be deemed an admission that the improvements are improvements pertaining to the realty. If the plaintiff does not serve such notice on the defendant within the time specified, the defendant may remove and store the improvements; upon a subsequent determination that the improvements are

improvements pertaining to the realty, the defendant shall promptly restore the improvements to the plaintiff and may recover the reasonable cost of removal and storage. In such a case, the improvements pertaining to the realty shall be taken into account in determining compensation as if they had not been removed.

Comment. Section 1263.270 provides a method whereby the defendant can protect property from damage in a situation where it is not clear whether the property must be taken by the plaintiff as part of the realty or salvaged by the defendant as part of his personality. Section 1263.270 permits the defendant, upon following the prescribed procedures, to remove and store the property and, if it subsequently appears that the property is an improvement pertaining to the realty, have the property taken into account in determining compensation as if it had not been removed.

§ 1263.280. Improvements whose removal may damage structure

1263.280. In any case where the removal of improvements may damage the structure in which the improvements are located, the defendant may serve on the plaintiff written notice that he intends to remove such improvements and that the removal may cause damage to the structure. If, within 30 days after such service, the plaintiff serves on the defendant notice of refusal to allow removal, the defendant may not remove the improvements and the plaintiff's refusal shall be deemed an admission that the improvements are improvements pertaining to the realty. If the plaintiff does not serve such notice on the defendant within the time specified, the defendant may remove the improvements causing no more damage to the structure than is reasonably necessary, and the structure shall be valued as if the removal had caused no damage to the structure.

Comment. Section 1263.280 is new. Where the removal of improvements may damage the structure in which they are located, Section 1263.280 provides a means whereby the defendant may accomplish the removal without being charged with the damage to the structure reasonably incurred in effecting the removal. *Cf.* Section 1263.230(b). Should the plaintiff refuse to allow removal under the procedures of this

section, the refusal is deemed an admission that the improvements are improvements pertaining to the realty, and the plaintiff must compensate the defendant for their taking. See Section 1263.210.

Article 4. Measure of Compensation for Property Taken

§ 1263.310. Compensation for property taken

1263.310. Compensation shall be awarded for the property taken. The measure of this compensation is the fair market value of the property taken.

Comment. Section 1263.310 provides the basic rule that compensation for property taken by eminent domain is the fair market value of the property. Compensation for the property taken, however, is only one element of the damages to which a property owner may be entitled under this chapter. See Section 1263.010 and the Comment thereto (right to compensation). See also Section 1263.410 (injury to remainder) and Section 1263.510 (goodwill).

§ 1263.320. Fair market value

1263.320. The fair market value of the property taken is the price on the date of valuation that would be agreed to by a seller, being willing to sell but under no particular or urgent necessity for so doing, nor obliged to sell, and a buyer, being ready, willing, and able to buy but under no particular necessity for so doing, each dealing with the other with full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable and available.

Comment. Section 1263.320 is new. It codifies the definition of fair market value that has developed through the case law. See, e.g., *Sacramento etc. R.R. v. Heilbron*, 156 Cal. 408, 409, 104 P. 979, 980 (1909); *Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp.*, 176 Cal. App.2d 255, 263, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250, 255–256 (1959). Although the phrase “the highest price estimated in terms of money” has been utilized in the case law definitions of fair market value, Section 1263.320 omits this phrase because it is confusing. No substantive change is intended by this omission.

The phrase “in the open market” has been deleted from the definition of fair market value because there may be no open market for some types of special purpose properties such as

schools, churches, cemeteries, parks, utilities, and similar properties. No substantive change is intended by this deletion. All properties, special as well as general, are valued at their fair market value. Within the limits of Article 2 (commencing with Section 810) of Chapter 1 of Division 7 of the Evidence Code, fair market value may be determined by reference to (1) the market data (or comparable sales) approach, (2) the income (or capitalization) method, and (3) the cost analysis (or reproduction less depreciation) formula.

The standard provided in Section 1263.320 is the usual standard normally applied to valuation of property whether for eminent domain or for any other purpose. The evidence admissible to prove fair market value is governed by the provisions of the Evidence Code. See especially EVID. CODE § 810 *et seq.* Where comparable sales are used to determine the fair market value of property, the terms and conditions of such sales may be shown in an appropriate case. See EVID. CODE § 816.

For an adjustment to this basic fair market value standard in case of changes in value prior to the date of valuation, see Section 1263.330.

§ 1263.330. Changes in property value due to imminence of project

1263.330. The fair market value of the property taken shall not include any increase or decrease in the value of the property that is attributable to any of the following:

- (a) The project for which the property is taken.
- (b) The eminent domain proceeding in which the property is taken.
- (c) Any preliminary actions of the plaintiff relating to the taking of the property.

Comment. Section 1263.330 is an adjustment to the basic definition of fair market value in Section 1263.320 and requires that the compensation for property taken by eminent domain be determined as if there had been no enhancement or diminution in the value of property due to the imminence of the eminent domain proceeding or the project for which the property is taken. For related provisions of state and federal law that apply to offers for voluntary acquisition of property, see Government Code Section 7267.2 and Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4651(3) (1971) (excluding from consideration the

effect of the "public improvement" for which the property is acquired).

Prior case law held that, in general, increases in the value of the property caused by the project may not be included in the compensation. See, e.g., *County of San Luis Obispo v. Bailey*, 4 Cal.3d 518, 483 P.2d 27, 93 Cal. Rptr. 859 (1971). The effect of Section 1263.330(a) is to codify this rule. It should be noted that *Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, 4 Cal.3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971), stated an exception to the rule of exclusion of enhancement from market value where the property was not originally included within the scope of the project; this exception is discussed below under the "scope of the project" rule.

Prior case law was uncertain respecting the treatment of any decrease in value due to such factors as general knowledge of the pendency of the public project. Several decisions indicated that the rules respecting enhancement and diminution were not parallel and that value was to be determined as of the date of valuation notwithstanding that such value reflects a decrease due to general knowledge of the pendency of the public project. See *City of Oakland v. Partridge*, 214 Cal. App.2d 196, 29 Cal. Rptr. 388 (1963); *People v. Lucas*, 155 Cal. App.2d 1, 317 P.2d 104 (1957); and *Atchison, T. & S.F. R.R. v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 13 Cal. App.2d 505, 57 P.2d 575 (1936). Seemingly to the contrary were *People v. Lillard*, 219 Cal. App.2d 368, 33 Cal. Rptr. 189 (1963), and *Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp.*, 176 Cal. App.2d 255, 1 Cal. Rptr. 250 (1959). The Supreme Court case of *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 500 P.2d 1345, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1972), cited the *Lillard* and *Metrim* approach while disapproving the *Partridge*, *Lucas*, and *Atchison* approach in the inverse condemnation context. The *Klopping* case, however, does not make clear the approach the court would take in a direct condemnation case. See 8 Cal.3d at 45 n.1, 51 n.3, 500 P.2d at 1350 n.1, 1354 n.3, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 6 n.1, 10 n.3; cf. *Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, 4 Cal.3d at 483 n.1, 483 P.2d at 3 n.1, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 835 n.1. Section 1263.330(a) is intended to make the rules respecting appreciation and depreciation parallel by codifying the views expressed in the *Lillard* and *Metrim* decisions. See Anderson, *Consequences of Anticipated Eminent Domain Proceedings—Is Loss of Value a Factor?*, 5 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 35 (1964).

Subdivision (a) of Section 1263.330 is also intended to codify the proposition that any increase or decrease in value resulting from the use which the condemnor is to make of the property must be eliminated in determining compensable market value.

See *Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, 4 Cal.3d at 490–491, 483 P.2d at 12–14, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 841–842. If, however, the condemnor's proposed use is one of the highest and best uses of the property, the adaptability of the property for that purpose may be shown by the property owner. See *San Diego Land & Town Co. v. Neale*, 78 Cal. 63, 20 P. 372 (1888).

While Section 1263.330(a) provides that changes in value caused by the project for which the property is taken may not be included in the compensation, this exclusionary provision is not intended to apply to value changes that are beyond the scope of the "project." Thus, where changes in value are caused by a project other than the one for which the property is taken, even though the two projects may be related, the property owner may enjoy the benefit or suffer the detriment caused by the other project. See, e.g., *People v. Cramer*, 14 Cal. App.3d 513, 92 Cal. Rptr. 401 (1971). Likewise, if property is affected by a project but is not to be taken for that project and subsequently the scope of the project is changed or expanded and the property is acquired for the changed or expanded project, the property should be valued as affected by the original project up to the change in scope. See, e.g., *People v. Miller*, 21 Cal. App.3d 467, 98 Cal. Rptr. 539 (1971), and *Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, *supra* ("increases in value, attributable to a project but reflecting a reasonable expectation that property will not be taken for the improvement, should properly be considered in determining 'just compensation.'") [4 Cal.3d at 495, 483 P.2d at 12, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 844]); cf. *United States v. Miller*, 317 U.S. 369 (1943), and Annot., 14 A.L.R. Fed. 806 (1973).

Subdivision (b) of Section 1263.330 requires that value changes caused by the fact that the property will be taken by eminent domain must be excluded from fair market value. Changes based on conjecture of a favorable or unfavorable award are not a proper element of compensation. See *Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, 4 Cal.3d at 491–492, 483 P.2d at 9, 93 Cal. Rptr. at 841–842.

Subdivision (c) of Section 1263.330 requires that preliminary actions on the part of the condemnor related to the taking of the property should not be allowed to affect the compensation. See *Buena Park School Dist. v. Metrim Corp.*, *supra*.

Article 5. Compensation for Injury to Remainder

§ 1263.410. Compensation for injury to remainder

1263.410. (a) Where the property acquired is part of a larger parcel, in addition to the compensation awarded pursuant to Article 4 (commencing with Section 1263.310) for the part taken, compensation shall be awarded for the injury, if any, to the remainder.

(b) Compensation for injury to the remainder is the amount of the damage to the remainder reduced by the amount of the benefit to the remainder. If the amount of the benefit to the remainder equals or exceeds the amount of the damage to the remainder, no compensation shall be awarded under this article. If the amount of the benefit to the remainder exceeds the amount of damage to the remainder, such excess shall not be deducted from the compensation required to be awarded for the property taken or from the other compensation required by this chapter.

Comment. Section 1263.410 provides the measure of compensation for injury to the remainder in a partial taking. It supersedes subdivisions 2 and 3 of former Section 1248. The phrase "damage to the remainder" is defined in Section 1263.420; "benefit to the remainder" is defined in Section 1263.430.

§ 1263.420. Damage to remainder

1263.420. Damage to the remainder is the damage, if any, caused to the remainder by either or both of the following:

(a) The severance of the remainder from the part taken.

(b) The construction and use of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff whether or not the damage is caused by a portion of the project located on the part taken.

Comment. Section 1263.420 continues prior law as to the damage to the remainder compensable in an eminent domain proceeding. See former Section 1248(2). Section 1263.420 does not abrogate any court-developed rules relating to the compensability of specific elements of damage, nor does it

impair the ability of the courts to continue to develop the law in this area. See *Eachus v. Los Angeles Consol. Elec. Ry.*, 103 Cal. 614, 37 P. 750 (1894) (damage that causes "mere inconvenience" not compensable); *City of Berkeley v. Von Adelung*, 214 Cal. App.2d 791, 29 Cal. Rptr. 802 (1963) ("general" damage not compensable); *People v. Volunteers of America*, 21 Cal. App.3d 111, 98 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971) (test of compensability is whether the condemnee is obligated to bear more than his "proper share" of the burden of the public improvement).

Prior law was not clear whether damage to the remainder caused by the construction and use of the project were recoverable if the damage-causing portion of the project was not located on the property from which the remainder was severed. Compare *People v. Symons*, 54 Cal.2d 855, 357 P.2d 451, 9 Cal. Rptr. 363 (1960), with *People v. Ramos*, 1 Cal.3d 261, 460 P.2d 992, 81 Cal. Rptr. 792 (1969), and *People v. Volunteers of America*, 21 Cal. App.3d 111, 98 Cal. Rptr. 423 (1971). Subdivision (b) abrogates the rule in *Symons* by allowing recovery for damages to the remainder caused by the project regardless of the precise location of the damage-causing portion of the project if the damages are otherwise compensable.

§ 1263.430. Benefit to remainder

1263.430. Benefit to the remainder is the benefit, if any, caused by the construction and use of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff whether or not the benefit is caused by a portion of the project located on the part taken.

Comment. Section 1263.430 codifies prior law by defining the benefit to the remainder that may be offset against damage to the remainder in an eminent domain proceeding. See former Section 1248(3). Section 1263.430 does not abrogate any court-developed rules relating to the offset of benefits nor does it impair the ability of the courts to continue to develop the law in this area. See *Beveridge v. Lewis*, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902) (only "special" benefits may be offset); *People v. Giumarra Farms, Inc.*, 22 Cal. App.3d 98, 99 Cal. Rptr. 272 (1971) (increased traffic a special benefit); but see *People v. Ayon*, 54 Cal.2d 217, 352 P.2d 519, 5 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1960) (increased or decreased traffic not a proper item of damage).

As with damage to the remainder (Section 1263.420 and Comment thereto), benefits created by the construction and use of the project need not be derived from the portion of the project located on property from which the remainder was severed. This continues existing law. See *People v. Hurd*, 205 Cal. App.2d 16, 23 Cal. Rptr. 67 (1962).

§ 1263.440. Computing damage and benefit to remainder

1263.440. (a) The amount of any damage to the remainder and any benefit to the remainder shall reflect any delay in the time when the damage or benefit caused by the construction and use of the project in the manner proposed by the plaintiff will actually be realized.

(b) The value of the remainder on the date of valuation, excluding prior changes in value as prescribed in Section 1263.330, shall serve as the base from which the amount of any damage and the amount of any benefit to the remainder shall be determined.

Comment. Section 1263.440 embodies two rules for computing the damage and benefit to the remainder that represent departures from prior law. It has been held that damage and benefit must be based on the assumption that the improvement is completed. See, e.g., *People v. Schultz Co.*, 123 Cal. App.2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954). Subdivision (a) alters this rule and requires that compensation for damage to the remainder (and the amount of benefit offset) be computed in a manner that will take into account any delay in the accrual of the damage and benefit under the project as proposed. If there is a subsequent change in plans so that the damage and benefit do not occur as the plaintiff proposed, the property owner may recover any additional damage in a subsequent action. See *People v. Adamson*, 118 Cal. App.2d 714, 722, 258 P.2d 1020, 1025 (1953).

Whether changes in the value of the remainder caused by imminence of the project prior to the date of valuation should be included in the computation of damage and benefit to the remainder was unclear under prior law. Subdivision (b) adopts the position that it is the value of the remainder in the before condition, unaffected by any enhancement or blight, that is to be used as the basis in computing damages and benefits that will be caused by the project. See Section 1263.330 and the Comment thereto.

§ 1263.450. Compensation to reflect project as proposed

1263.450. Compensation for injury to the remainder shall be based on the project as proposed. Any features of the project which mitigate the damage or provide benefit to the remainder, including but not limited to easements, farm or private crossings, underpasses, access roads, fencing, and cattle guards, shall be taken into account in determining the compensation for injury to the remainder.

Comment. Section 1263.450 makes clear that any “physical solutions” provided by the plaintiff to mitigate damages are to be considered in the assessment of damages.

Section 1263.450 supersedes former Section 1248(5), relating to the cost of fencing, cattle guards, and crossings. The cost of fencing, cattle guards, and crossings is an element of damage only if lack of fencing, cattle guards, or crossings would damage the remainder; if the fencing, cattle guards, or crossings are to be supplied by the plaintiff as part of its project as designed, this fact should be taken into consideration in determining the damage, if any, to the remainder. Cf. former Section 1251 (plaintiff may elect to build fencing, cattle guards, and crossings in lieu of payment of damages).

If the plaintiff has no specific proposal for the manner of construction and use of the project, damages will be assessed on the basis of the most injurious lawful use reasonably possible. *People v. Schultz Co.*, 123 Cal. App.2d 925, 268 P.2d 117 (1954).

Article 6. Loss of Goodwill

§ 1263.510. Loss of goodwill

1263.510. The owner of a business conducted on property acquired by eminent domain, or on the remainder if such property is part of a larger parcel, shall be compensated for the loss of goodwill to the extent that such loss is caused by the acquisition of the property or the injury to the remainder and cannot reasonably be prevented by a relocation of the business and by taking those steps and adopting those procedures that a reasonably prudent person would take and adopt in preserving the goodwill.

Comment. Section 1263.510 is new to California eminent domain law. Under prior court decisions, compensation for business losses in eminent domain was not allowed. See, e.g., *City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co.*, 171 Cal. 392, 153 P. 705 (1915). Section 1263.510 provides compensation for loss of goodwill in both a whole or a partial taking. See BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14100 (goodwill is the expectation of continued public patronage). Goodwill loss is recoverable under Section 1263.510 only to the extent it cannot reasonably be prevented by relocation or other efforts by the owner to mitigate.

The determination of loss of goodwill is governed by the rules of evidence generally applicable to such a determination and not by the special rules relating to valuation in eminent domain contained in Article 2 (commencing with Section 810) of Chapter 1 of Division 7 of the Evidence Code. See EVID. CODE § 811 and Comment thereto. Thus, the provisions of Evidence Code Sections 817 and 819 that restrict admissibility of income from a business for the determination of value, damage, and benefit in no way limit admissibility of income from a business for the determination of loss of goodwill.

Section 1263.510 compensates for goodwill loss only to the extent such loss is not compensated by Government Code Section 7262 (moving expense and moving losses for relocated business or farm operations; in-lieu payments for business or farm operation that cannot be relocated without a substantial loss of patronage). See Section 1263.010 (no double recovery).

Article 7. Miscellaneous Provisions

§ 1263.610. Performance of work to reduce compensation

1263.610. A public entity and the owner of property to be acquired for public use may make an agreement that the public entity will:

(a) Relocate for the owner any structure if such relocation is likely to reduce the amount of compensation otherwise payable to the owner by an amount equal to or greater than the cost of such relocation.

(b) Carry out for the owner any work on property not taken, including work on any structure, if the performance of the work is likely to reduce the amount of compensation otherwise payable to the owner by an amount equal to or greater than the cost of the work.

Comment. Section 1263.610 generalizes former Section 970 of the Streets and Highways Code, which related to certain types of work in connection with an acquisition for opening or widening a county highway. As to the authority of the Department of Transportation to contract for relocation of structures outside the State Contract Act (GOVT. CODE §§ 14250–14424), see STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 135 and 136.5.

The phrase "any work" is used without qualification so as to have the broadest possible meaning. It would include any physical or structural operation whatsoever. Thus, it would cover such things as screening off roads or canals or soundproofing buildings adjacent to highways as well as constructing rights of way, fences, driveways, sidewalks, retaining walls, and drainage or utility connections, all of which latter operations were specifically listed in former Section 970.

Nothing in Section 1263.610 precludes the public entity from including features in the design of the public project that will have the effect of mitigating damages. See Section 1263.450.

§ 1263.620. Partially completed improvements; performance of work to protect public from injury

1263.620. (a) Where construction of an improvement is in progress on the property taken or damaged at the time of service of summons and the owner of such property ceases the construction due to such service and the uncompleted improvement creates a risk of injury to persons or to other property, the owner shall be compensated for any expenses reasonably incurred for work necessary to protect against such risk.

(b) The plaintiff may agree with the owner as to the amount of compensation payable under this section.

(c) The plaintiff may agree with the owner that the plaintiff will perform work necessary for the purposes of this section.

Comment. Section 1263.620 provides that the owner of property on which construction is interrupted by eminent domain may be compensated for any expenses reasonably incurred for work necessary to protect the public against injury without requirement of prior approval by the plaintiff or the court. *Cf.* Section 1263.240 (improvements made after service of summons). In addition, Section 1263.620 authorizes public

entities to agree with the owner to perform the work or as to the amount of compensation payable for such work.

It should be noted that the measure of compensation under Section 1263.620 is the amount of "expenses reasonably incurred for work necessary to protect against such risk." The amount, if any, by which such improvements enhance the value of the property is not the measure of value and is not considered in determining compensation under Section 1263.620. If compensation is sought on the basis of the enhanced value of the property, the improvement must be one that may be taken into account under Section 1263.240.

CHAPTER 10. DIVIDED INTERESTS

Article 1. General Provisions

§ 1265.010. Scope of chapter

1265.010. Although this chapter provides rules governing compensation for particular interests in property, it does not otherwise limit or affect the right to compensation for any other right, title, or interest in property.

Comment. Section 1265.010 makes clear that this chapter is intended to deal only with particular aspects of compensation for divided interests and is not intended to deal with the subject in a comprehensive manner. The law generally applicable to compensation for particular interests under California Constitution, Article I, Section 14 and Section 1263.010 (owner of property entitled to compensation) remains unaffected absent a specific provision in this chapter giving greater rights. Thus, for example, compensation for such interests in property as easements and restrictive covenants remains unaffected by this chapter. See, e.g., *Southern Cal. Edison Co. v. Bourgerie*, 9 Cal.3d 169, 507 P.2d 964, 107 Cal. Rptr. 76 (1973) (restrictive covenants).

Article 2. Leases

§ 1265.110. Termination of lease in whole taking

1265.110. Where all the property subject to a lease is acquired for public use, the lease terminates.

Comment. Section 1265.110 codifies the rule that the taking of the entire demised premises for public use by eminent domain or agreement operates to release the tenant from liability for subsequently accruing rent. See *City of Pasadena v. Porter*, 201 Cal. 381, 387, 257 P. 526, 528 (1927); *Carlstrom v. Lyon Van & Storage Co.*, 152 Cal. App.2d 625, 313 P.2d 645 (1957). This section does not affect the right of a lessee, if any, to compensation for the impairment of his leasehold interest. See Section 1265.150. Nor does this section apply where there is a valid provision to the contrary in the lease. See Section 1265.160.

§ 1265.120. Partial termination of lease in partial taking

1265.120. Except as provided in Section 1265.130, where part of the property subject to a lease is acquired for public use, the lease terminates as to the part taken and remains in force as to the remainder, and the rent reserved in the lease that is allocable to the part taken is extinguished.

Comment. Section 1265.120 abrogates the rule in *City of Pasadena v. Porter*, 201 Cal. 381, 257 P. 526 (1927), and numerous cases following it that required continuation of the lessee's full rental obligation for the duration of the lease in cases of a partial taking of property subject to a lease. Section 1265.120 requires a pro rata abatement of the rental obligation. For a comparable provision, see W. VA. CODE § 37-6-29 (1966). The requirements of Section 1265.120 do not apply where there is a valid provision to the contrary in the lease. See Section 1265.160. Nor does this section affect the right of a lessee, if any, to compensation for the impairment of his leasehold interest. See Section 1265.150.

§ 1265.130. Termination of lease in partial taking

1265.130. Where part of the property subject to a lease is acquired for public use, the court may, upon petition of any party to the lease, terminate the lease if the court determines that an essential part of the property subject to the lease is taken or that the remainder of the property subject to the lease is no longer suitable for the purposes of the lease. Upon such termination, compensation shall be determined as if there were a taking of the entire leasehold.

Comment. Section 1265.130 is new to California law. It provides for termination of a lease in a partial taking case where the taking in effect destroys the value or utility of the lease for either of the parties and requires compensation by the condemnor accordingly. Section 1265.130 is not applicable in cases where there is a valid provision in the lease covering the situation. See Section 1265.160.

§ 1265.140. Time of termination or partial termination

1265.140. The termination or partial termination of a lease pursuant to this article shall be at the earlier of the following times:

(a) The time title to the property is taken by the person who will put it to the public use.

(b) The time the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property as stated in an order for possession.

Comment. Section 1265.140 makes clear the time of partial termination (Section 1265.120) or termination (Sections 1265.110 and 1265.130) of a lease.

§ 1265.150. Remedies of parties not affected

1265.150. Nothing in this article affects or impairs any right a lessee may have to compensation for the taking of his lease in whole or in part or for the taking of any other property in which he has an interest.

Comment. Section 1265.150 is added to assure that partial termination or termination of a lease pursuant to this article does not preclude a lessee's recovery of compensation for the value of his leasehold interest, if any, and any of his property taken in the eminent domain proceeding. See Sections 1263.010 (right of owner of property to compensation) and 1263.210 (improvements pertaining to realty).

§ 1265.160. Rights under lease not affected

1265.160. Nothing in this article affects or impairs the rights and obligations of the parties to a lease to the extent that the lease provides for such rights and obligations in the event of the acquisition of all or a portion of the property for public use.

Comment. While this article provides rules that govern the rights of parties to a lease of property taken by eminent domain, Section 1265.160 makes clear that these rules apply only absent a valid provision in the lease covering the situation.

Article 3. Encumbrances

§ 1265.210. “Lien” defined

1265.210. As used in this article, “lien” means a mortgage, deed of trust, or other security interest in property whether arising from contract, statute, common law, or equity.

Comment. The definition of “lien” provided in Section 1265.210 is new. It is intended to include security interests of all types, not merely types similar to the specifically mentioned mortgage and deed of trust. As used in this article, the definition of “lien” thus may expand the coverage of former Sections 1248(8), 1248(9), and 1246.2, which are continued as Sections 1265.220–1265.240. The former provisions may have been limited to mortgages, deed of trust, and liens similar thereto.

§ 1265.220. Acquisition of property subject to encumbrances

1265.220. Where property acquired by eminent domain is encumbered by a lien and the indebtedness secured thereby is not due at the time of the entry of judgment, the amount of such indebtedness may be, at the option of the plaintiff, deducted from the judgment and the lien shall be continued until such indebtedness is paid; but the amount for which, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff is liable under Article 5 (commencing with Section 1268.410) of Chapter 11 may not be deducted from the judgment.

Comment. Section 1265.220 is the same in substance as former Section 1248(8). *But see* the Comment to Section 1265.210 (defining “lien”).

§ 1265.230. Allocation of award among encumbrancers in partial taking

1265.230. (a) This section applies only where there is a partial taking of property encumbered by a lien and the part taken or some portion of it is also encumbered by a junior lien that extends to only a portion of the property encumbered by the senior lien. This section provides only for allocation of the portion of the award, if any, that will be available for payment to the junior and senior

lienholders and does not provide for determination of the amount of such portion.

(b) As used in this section, "impairment of security" means the security of the lienholder remaining after the taking, if any, is of less value in proportion to the remaining indebtedness than the value of the security before the taking was in proportion to the indebtedness secured thereby.

(c) The portion of the award that will be available for payment to the senior and junior lienholders shall be allocated first to the senior lien up to the full amount of the indebtedness secured thereby and the remainder, if any, to the junior lien.

(d) If the allocation under subdivision (c) would result in an impairment of the junior lienholder's security, the allocation to the junior lien shall be adjusted so as to preserve the junior lienholder's security to the extent that the remaining amount allocated to the senior lien, if paid to the senior lienholder, would not result in an impairment of the senior lienholder's security.

(e) The amounts allocated to the senior and junior liens by this section are the amounts of indebtedness owing to such senior and junior lienholders that are secured by their respective liens on the property taken, and any other indebtedness owing to the senior or junior lienholders shall not be considered as secured by the property taken. If the plaintiff makes the election provided in Section 1265.220, the indebtedness that is deducted from the judgment is the indebtedness so determined, and the lien shall continue until that amount of indebtedness is paid.

Comment. Section 1265.230 continues the substance of former Section 1248(9) which was designed to meet the problems that arise when a parcel is encumbered with a first trust deed, or other senior lien, and a portion is encumbered with a subordinate lien as well. In this situation, condemnation of all or part of the smaller portion may result in an award inadequate to satisfy both liens. Section 1265.230 prescribes a procedure for allocating eminent domain awards between senior and junior lienholders of condemned property. The scope of former Section 1248(9) may be somewhat expanded by the broad definition of "lien" in Section 1265.210. See the Comment to that section.

The allocation procedure of Section 1265.230 is designed to allow adjustment of the portion of the condemnation award available to the lienholders so that both the senior and junior lienholders will retain security interests proportionate to those existing before the taking. If the amount is not sufficient to pay both in full, it will be initially allocated to pay the full amount of the senior lien with any balance to the junior. At that time, the court will determine the adequacy of the remaining property to secure the junior lien. If it determines that the junior lienholder's security is disproportionately low, the court may make adjustments as to the initial allocation to place the junior in the same relative position as before the taking. The adjustment, made by reducing the allocation to the senior and adding to that of the junior, is permissible only if it preserves the proportional security of the senior lienholder.

Section 1265.230 is not intended to affect any rules precluding recovery by a lienholder of any part of the award where there is no impairment of security. See, e.g., *Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Truslow*, 125 Cal. App.2d 478, 270 P.2d 928 (1954).

§ 1265.240. Prepayment penalty

1265.240. Where the property acquired for public use is encumbered by a lien, the amount payable to the lienholder shall not include any penalty for prepayment.

Comment. Section 1265.240 continues the substance of former Section 1246.2. Section 1265.240 is intended to apply to penalties for prepayment of liens of all kinds (see Section 1265.210 defining "lien") including but not limited to prepayment penalties under mortgages and deeds of trust and redemption premiums under Streets and Highways Code Sections 6447 and 6464.

Article 4. Options

§ 1265.310. Unexercised options

1265.310. Unless the option expressly provides otherwise, an unexercised option to acquire an interest in property taken by eminent domain is terminated as to that property, and the option holder is entitled to compensation for its value, if any, as of the time of the filing of the complaint in the eminent domain proceeding.

Comment. Section 1265.310 reverses prior case law that the holder of an unexercised option to purchase property has no right to share in the award when that property has been condemned. See *East Bay Mun. Util. Dist. v. Kieffer*, 99 Cal. App. 240, 278 P. 476 (1929). See also *People v. Ocean Shore R.R.*, 90 Cal. App. 2d 464, 203 P.2d 579 (1949). The measure of compensation for the loss of the option is the fair market value of the option. See Section 1263.310. Section 1265.310 applies to options other than options in a lease; options in a lease are considered in determining the value of the lease. Such options may not be compensated both under this section and as part of a lease. See Section 1263.010(b) (no double recovery).

It should be noted that, while the price at which the option may be exercised is admissible to show the value of the option, it may not be admissible to show the value of the property to which it relates. See EVID. CODE § 822(b) (option price inadmissible to show value of property except as an admission of a party).

Article 5. Future Interests

§ 1265.410. Contingent future interests

1265.410. (a) Where the acquisition of property for public use violates a use restriction coupled with a contingent future interest granting a right to possession of the property upon violation of the use restriction:

(1) If violation of the use restriction was otherwise reasonably imminent, the owner of the contingent future interest is entitled to compensation for its value, if any.

(2) If violation of the use restriction was not otherwise reasonably imminent but the benefit of the use restriction was appurtenant to other property, the owner of the contingent future interest is entitled to compensation to the extent that the failure to comply with the use restriction damages the dominant premises to which the restriction was appurtenant and of which he was the owner.

(b) Where the acquisition of property for public use violates a use restriction coupled with a contingent future interest granting a right to possession of the property upon violation of the use restriction but the contingent future interest is not compensable under subdivision (a), if the use restriction is that the property be devoted to a

particular charitable or public use, the compensation for the property shall be devoted to the same or similar use coupled with the same contingent future interest.

Comment. Section 1265.410 makes clear that, where there are contingent future interests in property acquired by eminent domain, such interests may be entitled to compensation despite any implications to the contrary in such cases as *Romero v. Department of Public Works*, 17 Cal.2d 189, 109 P.2d 662 (1941); *People v. City of Fresno*, 210 Cal. App.2d 500, 26 Cal. Rptr. 853 (1962); *People v. City of Los Angeles*, 179 Cal. App.2d 558, 4 Cal. Rptr. 531 (1960); *City of Santa Monica v. Jones*, 104 Cal. App.2d 463, 232 P.2d 55 (1951).

The test stated in subdivision (a)—“reasonably imminent”—is derived from 1 RESTATEMENT OF PROPERTY § 53(c) (1936). The reference to “public use” in subdivision (b) is intended to include all uses, including public utility purposes, for which the power of eminent domain might be exercised. See Section 1240.010 (public use limitation).

§ 1265.420. Property subject to life tenancy

1265.420. Where property acquired for public use is subject to a life tenancy, upon petition of the life tenant or any other person having an interest in the property, the court may order any of the following:

- (a) An apportionment and distribution of the award based on the value of the interest of life tenant and remainderman.
- (b) The compensation to be used to purchase comparable property to be held subject to the life tenancy.
- (c) The compensation to be held in trust and invested and the income (and, to the extent the instrument that created the life tenancy permits, principal) to be distributed to the life tenant for the remainder of the tenancy.
- (d) Such other arrangement as will be equitable under the circumstances.

Comment. Section 1265.420 provides the court express statutory authority to devise an equitable solution where property subject to a life tenancy is taken and an outright division of the award would not result in substantial justice under the circumstances of the particular case. See *Estate of*

Giacomelos, 192 Cal. App.2d 244, 13 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1961) (trust imposed on proceeds).

CHAPTER 11. POSTJUDGMENT PROCEDURE

Article 1. Payment of Judgment; Final Order of Condemnation

§ 1268.010. Payment of Judgment

1268.010. (a) Not later than 30 days after final judgment, the plaintiff shall pay the full amount required by the judgment.

(b) Payment shall be made by either or both of the following methods:

(1) Payment of money directly to the defendant. Any amount which the defendant has previously withdrawn pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 1255.210) of Chapter 6 shall be credited as a payment to him on the judgment.

(2) Deposit of money with the court pursuant to Section 1268.110. Upon entry of judgment, a deposit made pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 is deemed to be a deposit made pursuant to Section 1268.110 if it is in the full amount required by the judgment.

Comment. Section 1268.010 retains the rule under former Section 1251 that the plaintiff must pay the full amount of the judgment not later than 30 days after final judgment. See Section 1235.120 (defining "final judgment"). See also Section 1268.110 (deposit of full amount of award, together with interest then due thereon, less amounts previously paid or deposited). Section 1268.010 omits the provision of former Section 1251 that extended the 30-day time by one year where necessary to permit bonds to be issued and sold.

Subdivision (b) of Section 1268.010 specifies the manner in which payment may be made and supersedes the first sentence of former Section 1252. The payment can be made directly to the defendant or defendants, or the plaintiff may pay the money into court as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110). See the Comment to Section 1268.110. The provision that amounts previously withdrawn are credited as payment is derived from former Section 1243.7(g).

§ 1268.020. Remedies of defendant if judgment not paid

1268.020. (a) If the plaintiff fails to pay the full amount required by the judgment within the time specified in Section 1268.010, the defendant may have execution as in a civil case.

(b) Upon noticed motion of the defendant, the court shall enter judgment dismissing the eminent domain proceeding if all of the following are established:

(1) The plaintiff failed to pay the full amount required by the judgment within the time specified in Section 1268.010.

(2) The defendant has filed in court and served upon the plaintiff, by registered or certified mail, a written notice of the plaintiff's failure to pay the full amount required by the judgment within the time specified in Section 1268.010.

(3) The plaintiff has failed for 20 days after service of the notice under paragraph (2) to pay the full amount required by the judgment in the manner provided in subdivision (b) of Section 1268.010.

(c) The defendant may elect to exercise the remedy provided by subdivision (b) without attempting to use the remedy provided by subdivision (a).

Comment. Section 1268.020, which generally continues the substance of portions of former Sections 1252 and 1255a, provides remedies for the defendant if the plaintiff does not pay the judgment as required; the defendant may enforce the plaintiff's obligation to pay by execution or, at the defendant's election, may obtain a dismissal of the proceeding with its attendant award of litigation expenses. See Section 1268.610. Under former Section 1252, these remedies were provided, but the section required that the defendant resort first to execution and, if unsuccessful, he could have the proceeding dismissed. However, former Section 1255a, a later enactment, provided that failure to pay the judgment within the required time constituted an implied abandonment of the proceeding. The two sections were construed together to give the defendant the option of resorting to execution or to having the proceeding dismissed as impliedly abandoned. See, e.g., *County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett*, 223 Cal. App.2d 353, 36 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1963). Under the former law, it was possible that an inadvertent failure to pay the judgment within the time specified might result in

an implied abandonment even though the plaintiff did not intend to abandon the proceeding. See, e.g., *County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett, supra*. To protect the plaintiff against this possibility, Section 1268.020 requires that notice of the failure to pay the judgment within the time specified be given to the plaintiff and that he be given 20 days to pay the judgment before the proceeding can be dismissed upon motion of the defendant.

§ 1268.030. Final order of condemnation

1268.030. (a) Upon application of any party, the court shall make a final order of condemnation if the court finds both of the following:

(1) The judgment authorizing the taking of the property is a final judgment.

(2) The full amount of the judgment has been paid as required by Section 1268.010 or satisfied pursuant to Section 1268.020.

(b) The final order of condemnation shall describe the property taken and identify the judgment authorizing the taking.

(c) The party upon whose application the order was made shall serve notice of the making of the order on all other parties affected thereby. Any party affected by the order may thereafter record a certified copy of the order in the office of the recorder of the county in which the property is located and shall serve notice of recordation upon all other parties affected thereby. Title to the property vests in the plaintiff upon the date of recordation.

Comment. Section 1268.030 supersedes former Section 1253. The requirement that the judgment be final before the final order of condemnation may be issued appears to codify prior law. See *Arechiga v. Housing Authority*, 183 Cal. App.2d 835, 7 Cal. Rptr. 338 (1960) (*semble*); but see former Section 1253 (no express statutory requirement of final judgment).

Article 2. Deposit and Withdrawal of Award

§ 1268.110. Deposit after judgment

1268.110. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), the plaintiff may, at any time after entry of judgment, deposit with the court for the persons entitled thereto the

full amount of the award, together with interest then due thereon, less any amounts previously paid directly to the defendants or deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6.

(b) A deposit may be made under this section notwithstanding an appeal, a motion for a new trial, or a motion to vacate or set aside the judgment but may not be made after the judgment has been reversed, vacated, or set aside.

(c) Any amount deposited pursuant to this article on a judgment that is later reversed, vacated, or set aside shall be deemed to be an amount deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6.

Comment. This article (commencing with Section 1268.110) provides a uniform scheme for postjudgment deposits, superseding portions of former Sections 1245.3, 1252, and 1254.

Subdivision (a) of Section 1268.110 is similar to subdivision (a) of former Section 1254. However, the deposit provided for in this subdivision consists only of the amount of the judgment and accrued interest (less amounts previously deposited or paid to defendants); the former provision for an additional sum to secure payment of further compensation and costs is superseded by Section 1268.130. In addition, a deposit may be made under this section without regard to whether an order for possession is sought.

In case the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside, there is no longer a judgment for deposit and possession purposes; subsequent proceedings are under the provisions relating to deposit and possession prior to judgment. See Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1255.010). Any amount deposited under Section 1268.110 or Section 1268.130 is deemed to be an amount deposited under Chapter 6 if the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside; after the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside, the procedure for increasing or decreasing the amount of the deposit and withdrawal of the deposit is governed by the provisions of Chapter 6. See subdivision (c) and Section 1268.140(d).

§ 1268.120. Notice of deposit

1268.120. If the deposit is made under Section 1268.110 prior to apportionment of the award, the plaintiff shall serve a notice that the deposit has been made on all of the parties to the proceeding who claim an interest in the property taken. If the deposit is made after apportionment of the award, the plaintiff shall serve a notice that the deposit has been made on all of the parties to the proceeding determined by the order apportioning the award to have an interest in the money deposited. The notice of deposit shall state that a deposit has been made and the date and the amount of the deposit. Service of the notice shall be made in the manner provided in Section 1268.220 for the service of an order for possession. Service of an order for possession under Section 1268.220 is sufficient compliance with this section.

Comment. Section 1268.120 is new. In requiring that notice of the deposit be given, it parallels Section 1255.020 which requires that notice of a prejudgment deposit be sent to the parties having an interest in the property for which the deposit is made. Under former Section 1254, the defendant received notice that the deposit had been made only when served with an order for possession.

§ 1268.130. Increase or decrease in amount of deposit

1268.130. At any time after the plaintiff has made a deposit upon the award pursuant to Section 1268.110, the court may, upon motion of any defendant, order the plaintiff to deposit such additional amount as the court determines to be necessary to secure payment of any further compensation, costs, or interest that may be recovered in the proceeding. After the making of such an order, the court may, on motion of any party, order an increase or a decrease in such additional amount.

Comment. Section 1268.130 supersedes subdivisions (a) and (d) of former Section 1254. The additional amount referred to in Section 1268.130 is the amount determined by the court to be necessary, in addition to the amount of the judgment and the interest then due thereon, to secure payment of any further compensation, costs, or interest that may be recovered in the

proceeding. Deposit of the amount of the award itself after entry of judgment is provided for by Section 1268.110.

Former Section 1254 was construed to make the amount, if any, to be deposited in addition to the award discretionary with the trial court. *Orange County Water Dist. v. Bennett*, 156 Cal. App.2d 745, 320 P.2d 536 (1958). This construction is continued under Section 1268.130.

§ 1268.140. Withdrawal of deposit

1268.140. (a) After entry of judgment, any defendant who has an interest in the property for which a deposit has been made may apply for and obtain a court order that he be paid from the deposit the amount to which he is entitled upon his filing either of the following:

(1) A satisfaction of the judgment.

(2) A receipt for the money which shall constitute a waiver by operation of law of all claims and defenses except a claim for greater compensation.

(b) If the award has not been apportioned at the time the application is made, the applicant shall give notice of the application to all the other defendants who have appeared in the proceeding and who have an interest in the property. If the award has been apportioned at the time the application is made, the applicant shall give such notice to the other defendants as the court may require.

(c) Upon objection to the withdrawal made by any party to the proceeding, the court, in its discretion, may require the applicant to file an undertaking in the same manner and upon the conditions described in Section 1255.240 for withdrawal of a deposit prior to entry of judgment.

(d) If the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside, a defendant may withdraw a deposit only pursuant to Article 2 (commencing with Section 1255.210) of Chapter 6.

Comment. Section 1268.140 is based on subdivision (f) of former Section 1254 but provides notice requirements to protect the other defendants where money is to be withdrawn.

Former Section 1254 was construed to permit the defendant to withdraw any amount paid into court upon the judgment whether or not the plaintiff applied for or obtained an order for possession. See *People v. Gutierrez*, 207 Cal. App.2d 759, 24 Cal.

Rptr. 781 (1962); *San Francisco Bay Area Rapid Transit Dist. v. Fremont Meadows, Inc.*, 20 Cal. App.3d 797, 97 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1971). That construction is continued in effect by Section 1268.140.

For purposes of withdrawal of deposits, a judgment that is reversed, vacated, or set aside has no effect; withdrawal may be made only under the procedures provided for withdrawing deposits prior to entry of judgment. This is made clear by subdivision (d).

Under Section 1268.140, the defendant may retain his right to appeal or to request a new trial upon the issue of compensation even though he withdraws the deposit. This may be accomplished by filing a receipt which constitutes a waiver of all claims and defenses except the claim to greater compensation. See subdivision (a). Cf. *People v. Gutierrez*, 207 Cal. App.2d 759, 24 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1962).

§ 1268.150. Deposit in State Treasury unless otherwise required

1268.150. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), when money is deposited as provided in this article, the court shall order the money to be deposited in the State Treasury or, upon written request of the plaintiff filed with the deposit, in the county treasury. If the money is deposited in the State Treasury pursuant to this subdivision, it shall be held, invested, deposited, and disbursed in the manner specified in Article 10 (commencing with Section 16429.1) of Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code, and interest earned or other increment derived from its investment shall be apportioned and disbursed in the manner specified in that article. As between the parties to the proceeding, money deposited pursuant to this subdivision shall remain at the risk of the plaintiff until paid or made payable to the defendant by order of the court.

(b) If after entry of judgment but prior to apportionment of the award the defendants are unable to agree as to the withdrawal of all or a portion of any amount deposited, the court shall upon motion of any defendant order that the amount deposited be invested in United States Government obligations or interest-bearing

accounts insured by an agency of the federal government for the benefit of the defendants who shall be entitled to the interest earned on the accounts in proportion to the amount of the award they receive when the award is apportioned.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1268.150 is the same in substance as former Section 1243.6 and a portion of subdivision (h) of former Section 1254. For a comparable section, see Section 1255.070.

Subdivision (b) is new. It provides a means whereby a defendant may avoid the loss of interest earnings on amounts held on deposit pending resolution of an apportionment dispute. *Cf.* Section 1268.320 (interest ceases to accrue on judgment upon deposit). Subdivision (b) does not preclude a voluntary agreement among all defendants to draw down the award and place it in an interest-bearing trust fund pending resolution of apportionment issues.

§ 1268.160. Repayment of excess withdrawal

1268.160. (a) Any amount withdrawn by a party pursuant to this article in excess of the amount to which he is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding shall be paid to the parties entitled thereto. The court shall enter judgment accordingly.

(b) The judgment so entered shall not include interest except that any amount that is to be paid to a defendant shall include legal interest from the date of its withdrawal by another defendant.

(c) If the judgment so entered is not paid within 30 days after its entry, the court may, on motion, enter judgment against the sureties, if any, for the amount of such judgment.

(d) The court may, in its discretion, grant a party obligated to pay under this section a stay of execution for any amount to be paid to a plaintiff. Such stay of execution shall not exceed one year following entry of judgment under this section.

Comment. Section 1268.160 supersedes subdivision (g) of former Section 1254. Unlike Section 1254, which did not require the payment of interest where excess amounts were withdrawn, Section 1268.160 requires payment of interest where the excess is to be redistributed among defendants but not where the

excess is to be paid to the plaintiff. For a comparable provision, see Section 1255.280.

§ 1268.170. Making deposit does not affect other rights

1268.170. By making a deposit pursuant to this article, the plaintiff does not waive the right to appeal from the judgment, the right to move to abandon, or the right to request a new trial.

Comment. Section 1268.170 continues the substance of a portion of subdivision (e) of former Section 1254. For a comparable provision permitting the defendant to withdraw the deposit without waiving his right to seek greater compensation, see Section 1268.140(a).

Article 3. Possession After Judgment

§ 1268.210. Order for possession

1268.210. (a) If the plaintiff is not in possession of the property to be taken, the plaintiff may, at any time after entry of judgment, apply ex parte to the court for an order for possession, and the court shall authorize the plaintiff to take possession of the property pending conclusion of the litigation if:

(1) The judgment determines that the plaintiff is entitled to take the property; and

(2) The plaintiff has paid to or deposited for the defendants, pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 or Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110), an amount not less than the amount of the award, together with the interest then due thereon.

(b) The court's order shall state the date after which the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property. Where deposit is made, the order shall state such fact and the date and the amount of the deposit.

(c) Where the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside, the plaintiff may obtain possession of the property only pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6.

Comment. Section 1268.210 restates the substance of portions of subdivisions (a) and (b) of former Section 1254. Where the requirements of subdivision (a) are satisfied, the court must grant the order of possession. See *Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Superior Court*, 33 Cal. App.3d 321, 109 Cal. Rptr. 10 (1973). The time for possession is lengthened, however, from 10 to 30 days after the order for possession where the property is occupied. See Section 1268.220. For purposes of possession, a judgment that is reversed, vacated, or set aside has no effect; the plaintiff must utilize procedures for obtaining possession prior to entry of judgment.

§ 1268.220. Service of order

1268.220. (a) The plaintiff shall serve a copy of the order for possession upon each defendant and his attorney, either personally or by mail:

(1) At least 30 days prior to the date possession is to be taken of property lawfully occupied by a person dwelling thereon or by a farm or business operation.

(2) At least 10 days prior to the date possession is to be taken in any case not covered by paragraph (1).

(b) A single service upon or mailing to one of several persons having a common business or residence address is sufficient.

Comment. Section 1268.220 is the same in substance as subdivisions (b) and (c) of former Section 1254 except that the 10-day notice period is lengthened to 30 days where the property is occupied. With respect to subdivision (b), see the Comment to Section 1255.450.

§ 1268.230. Taking possession does not affect other rights

1268.230. By taking possession pursuant to this article, the plaintiff does not waive the right to appeal from the judgment, the right to move to abandon, or the right to request a new trial.

Comment. Section 1268.230 is the same in substance as a portion of subdivision (e) of former Section 1254. For a comparable provision, see Section 1255.470.

§ 1268.240. Police power not affected

1268.240. Nothing in this article limits the right of a public entity to exercise its police power in emergency situations.

Comment. Section 1268.240 is new. It makes clear that the requirements of this article—such as obtaining and serving an order for possession—do not limit the exercise of the police power. See *Surocco v. Geary*, 3 Cal. 69 (1853). See generally Van Alstyne, *Statutory Modification of Inverse Condemnation: Deliberately Inflicted Injury or Destruction*, 20 STAN. L. REV. 617 (1968), reprinted in Van Alstyne, *California Inverse Condemnation Law*, 10 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 111 (1971). See also Section 1255.480.

Article 4. Interest**§ 1268.310. Date interest commences to accrue**

1268.310. The compensation awarded in an eminent domain proceeding shall draw legal interest from the earliest of the following dates:

- (a) The date of entry of judgment.
- (b) The date the plaintiff takes possession of the property.
- (c) The date after which the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property as stated in an order for possession.

Comment. Section 1268.310 is the same in substance as subdivision (a) of former Section 1255b except that the phrase “or damage [to the property] occurs” has been deleted from subdivision (2). The deleted phrase was inadvertently included in the 1961 revision of Section 1255b. See *Recommendation and Study Relating to Taking Possession and Passage of Title in Eminent Domain Proceedings*, 3 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS B-1, B-9, B-20 (1961). The 1961 revision was not intended to and has not been construed to require computation of interest on severance damages from a date prior to the earliest date stated in Section 1268.310. The deletion of this phrase is not intended to affect any rules relating to the time of accrual of interest on a cause of action based on inverse condemnation, whether raised in a separate action or by cross-complaint in the eminent domain proceeding. See, e.g., *Youngblood v. Los Angeles County Flood Control Dist.*, 56

Cal.2d 603, 364 P.2d 840, 15 Cal. Rptr. 904 (1961); *Heimann v. City of Los Angeles*, 30 Cal.2d 746, 185 P.2d 597 (1947). For an exception to the rules stated in Section 1268.310, see Section 1255.040 (deposit for relocation purposes on motion of certain defendants).

§ 1268.320. Date interest ceases to accrue

1268.320. The compensation awarded in an eminent domain proceeding shall cease to draw interest at the earliest of the following dates:

(a) As to any amount deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 (deposit of probable compensation prior to judgment), the date such amount is withdrawn by the person entitled thereto.

(b) As to the amount deposited in accordance with Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110) (deposit of amount of award), the date of such deposit.

(c) As to any amount paid to the person entitled thereto, the date of such payment.

Comment. Section 1268.320 continues the substance of subdivision (c) of former Section 1255b. For an exception to the rule stated in subdivision (a), see Section 1255.040 (deposit for relocation purposes on motion of certain defendants). Subdivision (b) of Section 1268.320 supersedes paragraphs (2) and (4) of subdivision (c) of former Section 1255b. Unlike the former law, there is now only one procedure for payments into court after entry of judgment. See Section 1268.110 and Comment thereto.

It should be noted that, if a prejudgment deposit is made and the deposit is not withdrawn, interest does not cease to accrue upon entry of judgment unless the amount of the deposit is in the full amount required by the judgment. See subdivision (b) and Section 1268.010(b)(2) (such a deposit deemed a postjudgment deposit on entry of judgment). Where the amount of the prejudgment deposit is not in the full amount required by the judgment, interest does not cease to accrue until an amount sufficient to bring it up to the full amount of the judgment is added. See subdivision (b) and Section 1268.110(a) (postjudgment deposit must be in full amount of judgment less amounts previously deposited).

§ 1268.330. Offsets against interest

1268.330. If, after the date that interest begins to accrue, the defendant:

(a) Continues in actual possession of the property, the value of such possession shall be offset against the interest.

(b) Receives rents or other income from the property attributable to the period after interest begins to accrue, the net amount of such rents and other income shall be offset against the interest.

Comment. Section 1268.330 supersedes subdivision (b) of former Section 1255b. Revisions have been made to clarify the meaning of the former language. See also GOVT. CODE § 7267.4 (“If the public entity permits an owner or tenant to occupy the real property acquired on a rental basis for a short term, or for a period subject to termination by the public entity on short notice, the amount of rent required shall not exceed the fair rental value of the property to a short-term occupier.”). For an exception to the rule stated in Section 1268.330, see Section 1255.040 (deposit for relocation purposes on motion of certain defendants).

§ 1268.340. Interest to be assessed by court

1268.340. Interest, including interest accrued due to possession of property by the plaintiff prior to judgment, and any offset against interest as provided in Section 1268.330, shall be assessed by the court rather than by jury.

Comment. Section 1268.340 is new. It clarifies former law by specifying that the court, rather than the jury, shall assess interest, including interest required to satisfy the defendant’s constitutional right to compensation for possession of his property prior to conclusion of the eminent domain proceeding. See *Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams*, 16 Cal.2d 676, 107 P.2d 618 (1940); *People v. Johnson*, 203 Cal. App.2d 712, 22 Cal. Rptr. 149 (1962); *City of San Rafael v. Wood*, 144 Cal. App.2d 604, 301 P.2d 421 (1956). Section 1268.340 also resolves a further uncertainty by specifying that the amount of the offset against interest provided by Section 1268.330 is likewise assessed by the court, thus requiring that any evidence on that issue is to be heard by the court rather than the jury. Compare *People v. McCoy*, 248 Cal. App.2d 27, 56 Cal. Rptr. 352 (1967), with *People v. Giumarra Vineyards Corp.*, 245 Cal. App.2d 309, 53 Cal. Rptr. 902 (1966).

Article 5. Proration of Property Taxes

§ 1268.410. Liability for taxes

1268.410. As between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff is liable for any ad valorem taxes, penalties, and costs upon property acquired by eminent domain that would be subject to cancellation under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 4986) of Part 9 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code if the plaintiff were a public entity and if such taxes, penalties, and costs had not been paid, whether or not the plaintiff is a public entity.

Comment. Section 1268.410 is the same in substance as the first paragraph of former Section 1252.1.

§ 1268.420. Application for separate valuation of property

1268.420. If property acquired by eminent domain does not have a separate valuation on the assessment roll, any party to the eminent domain proceeding may, at any time after the taxes on such property are subject to cancellation pursuant to Section 4986 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, apply to the tax collector for a separate valuation of such property in accordance with Article 3 (commencing with Section 2821) of Chapter 3 of Part 5 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code notwithstanding any provision in such article to the contrary.

Comment. Section 1268.420 is the same in substance as former Section 1252.2.

§ 1268.430. Reimbursement for taxes

1268.430. (a) If the defendant has paid any amount for which, as between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff is liable under this article, the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant a sum equal to such amount.

(b) The amount the defendant is entitled to be paid under this section shall be claimed in the manner provided for claiming costs and at the following times:

(1) If the plaintiff took possession of the property prior to judgment, at the time provided for claiming costs.

(2) If the plaintiff did not take possession of the property prior to judgment, not later than 30 days after the plaintiff took title to the property.

Comment. Section 1268.430 is the same in substance as the final two paragraphs of former Section 1252.1.

Article 6. Abandonment

§ 1268.510. Abandonment

1268.510. (a) At any time after the filing of the complaint and before the expiration of 30 days after final judgment, the plaintiff may wholly or partially abandon the proceeding by serving on the defendant and filing in court a written notice of such abandonment.

(b) The court may, upon motion made within 30 days after the filing of such notice, set the abandonment aside if it determines that the position of the moving party has been substantially changed to his detriment in justifiable reliance upon the proceeding and such party cannot be restored to substantially the same position as if the proceeding had not been commenced.

(c) Upon denial of a motion to set aside such abandonment or, if no such motion is filed, upon the expiration of the time for filing such a motion, the court shall, on motion of any party, enter judgment wholly or partially dismissing the proceeding.

Comment. Section 1268.510 is the same in substance as portions of former Section 1255a: subdivision (a) is the same in substance as the first sentence of former Section 1255a; subdivision (b) is the same in substance as subdivision (b) of former Section 1255a; subdivision (c) is the same in substance as the first sentence of subdivision (c) of former Section 1255a. For recovery of litigation expenses and damages on dismissal, see Sections 1268.610 and 1268.620.

Article 7. Litigation Expenses and Damages Upon Dismissal or Defeat of Right to Take

§ 1268.610. Litigation expenses

1268.610. (a) As used in this section, "litigation expenses" includes both of the following:

(1) All expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in the eminent domain proceeding in preparing for trial, during trial, and in any subsequent judicial proceedings.

(2) Reasonable attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and fees for the services of other experts where such fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred to protect the defendant's interests in the eminent domain proceeding in preparing for trial, during trial, and in any subsequent judicial proceedings whether such fees were incurred for services rendered before or after the filing of the complaint.

(b) Subject to subdivision (c), the court shall award the defendant his litigation expenses whenever:

(1) An eminent domain proceeding is wholly or partly dismissed for any reason; or

(2) Final judgment in the eminent domain proceeding is that the plaintiff cannot acquire property it sought to acquire in the proceeding.

(c) Where there is a partial dismissal or a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire a portion of the property originally sought to be acquired, or a dismissal of one or more plaintiffs pursuant to Section 1260.020, the court shall award the defendant only those litigation expenses, or portion thereof, that would not have been incurred had the property sought to be acquired following the dismissal or judgment been the property originally sought to be acquired.

(d) Litigation expenses under this section shall be claimed in and by a cost bill to be prepared, served, filed, and taxed as in a civil action. If the proceeding is dismissed upon motion of the plaintiff, the cost bill shall be filed within 30 days after notice of entry of judgment.

Comment. Section 1268.610 deals with the litigation expenses that a defendant may recover when an eminent domain proceeding is dismissed for any reason or there is a final judgment that the plaintiff does not have the right to take. The section is based primarily on former Section 1255a but expands the scope of protection afforded the defendant to cover dismissal for any reason. Compare *Alta Bates Hosp. v. Mertle*, 31 Cal. App.3d 349, 107 Cal. Rptr. 277 (1973).

To a large extent, Section 1268.610 continues provisions of former Section 1255a. Thus, as formerly was the rule under Section 1255a, the plaintiff must reimburse the defendant:

(1) When the plaintiff voluntarily abandons the proceeding. See also Section 1268.510.

(2) When there is an implied abandonment of the proceeding such as abandonment resulting from failure to pay the judgment. See Section 1268.020. See *County of Los Angeles v. Bartlett*, 223 Cal. App.2d 353, 36 Cal. Rptr. 193 (1963); *Capistrano Union High School Dist. v. Capistrano Beach Acreage Co.*, 188 Cal. App.2d 612, 10 Cal. Rptr. 750 (1961).

(3) When there is a "partial abandonment" of the proceeding (see Section 1250.340) by an amendment of the complaint to significantly reduce the property or property interest being taken. (Reimbursement of defendant's litigation expenses when the complaint is amended to add additional property is not covered by Section 1268.610; this is covered by Section 1250.340.)

Section 1268.610 also continues the rule under former Section 1246.4 that public-entity plaintiffs must reimburse the defendant when there is a final judgment that the plaintiff does not have a right to take the property sought to be acquired and expands this rule to apply to nonpublic-entity plaintiffs. See also federal Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real Property Acquisition Policies Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C. § 4654 (1971).

Section 1268.610 also changes prior law to require reimbursement of the defendant where the eminent domain proceeding is dismissed for failure to prosecute. Under prior law, the defendant was not entitled to reimbursement upon such failure. See *City of Industry v. Gordon*, 29 Cal. App.3d 90, 105 Cal. Rptr. 206 (1972); *Bell v. American States Water Service Co.*, 10 Cal. App.2d 604, 52 P.2d 503 (1935). But see *Alta Bates Hosp. v. Mertle, supra*.

Subdivision (a) is the same in substance as the second sentence of former Section 1255a(c).

The "partial dismissal" provision of subdivision (c) continues the rule that litigation expenses do not include any items that would have been incurred notwithstanding a partial abandonment. See the third sentence of former Section 1255a(c). Subdivision (c) expands this rule to make it applicable where a final judgment determines that the plaintiff does not have the right to take a portion of the property it originally sought to acquire in the eminent domain proceeding and where there is a dismissal of one or more plaintiffs pursuant to Section

1260.020 (determination of more necessary public use where separate proceedings are consolidated).

Subdivision (d) is the same in substance as the fourth and fifth sentences of former Section 1255a(c).

§ 1268.620. Damages caused by possession

1268.620. If, after the defendant moves from property in compliance with an order or agreement for possession, the proceeding is dismissed with regard to the property for any reason or there is a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire the property, the court shall:

(a) Order the plaintiff to deliver possession of the property to the persons entitled to it; and

(b) Make such provision as shall be just for the payment of (1) damages arising out of the plaintiff's taking and use of the property and (2) damages for any loss or impairment of value suffered by the land and improvements. Such damages shall be measured from the time the plaintiff took possession of or the defendant moved from the property in compliance with an order or agreement for possession, whichever is earlier.

Comment. Section 1268.620 provides for restoration of possession of the property and damages where the plaintiff took possession of property prior to a dismissal or a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot acquire the property. Section 1268.620 is not intended to limit any remedies the defendant may have on an inverse condemnation theory for damage to the property during litigation.

The provision on restoration of possession of the property supersedes the final portion of the second sentence of former Section 1252 and a portion of subdivision (d) of former Section 1255a. Whereas the prior provisions required possession to be restored to the defendants when the plaintiff failed to deposit the award in a condemnation proceeding, abandoned the proceeding, or because the right to take was defeated, Section 1268.620 requires restoration in any case where the proceeding is dismissed or there is a final judgment that the plaintiff cannot take the property, thus covering, for example, a case where the proceeding is dismissed for delay in bringing it to trial.

The provision relating to the payment of damages supersedes subdivision (d) of former Section 1255a. Whereas the prior provision required payment of damages when the plaintiff abandoned or the right to take was defeated, subdivision (b)

makes clear that this rule applies as well where the proceeding is dismissed, *e.g.*, because the plaintiff fails to prosecute.

Article 8. Costs

§ 1268.710. Court costs

1268.710. The defendants in an eminent domain proceeding shall be allowed their costs, including the costs of determining the apportionment of the award made pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 1260.220, except that the costs of determining any issue as to title between two or more defendants shall be borne by the defendants in such proportion as the court may direct.

Comment. Section 1268.710 restates prior law relating to the allowance of costs in the trial court. See Section 1268.720 for costs on appeal and Section 1268.610 (litigation expenses on dismissal). Former Section 1255 provided that, in eminent domain proceedings, "costs may be allowed or not, and if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides, in the discretion of the court." See also Section 1032. However, very early, the California Supreme Court held that the power provided by Section 1255 "must be limited by section 14 of article I of the constitution, which provides that 'private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having been first made to or paid into court for the owner.' . . . To require the defendants in [an eminent domain] case to pay any portion of their costs necessarily incidental to the trial of the issues on their part, or any part of the costs of the plaintiff, would reduce the just compensation awarded by the jury, by a sum equal to that paid by them for such costs." *City & County of San Francisco v. Collins*, 98 Cal. 259, 262, 33 P. 56, 57 (1893). Accordingly, the defendant in an eminent domain proceeding has as a rule been allowed his ordinary court costs. This rule is subject to the procedural limitation that defendants with a single, unified interest may be allowed only a single cost bill. See generally *City of Downey v. Gonzales*, 262 Cal. App.2d 563, 69 Cal. Rptr. 34 (1968). Moreover, the costs of determining title as between two or more defendants has been borne by such defendants. See former Section 1246.1. See also *Housing Authority v. Pirrone*, 68 Cal. App.2d 30, 156 P.2d 39 (1945). This rule is continued.

Subdivision (k) of former Section 1254 provided that, where a defendant obtained a new trial, he had to be successful in increasing the amount originally awarded or the cost of the new

trial would be taxed against him. *Los Angeles, Pasadena & Glendale Ry. v. Rumpp*, 104 Cal. 20, 37 P. 859 (1894). Section 1268.710 eliminates this exception.

§ 1268.720. Costs on appeal

1268.720. Except as provided by rules adopted by the Judicial Council specifically applicable to eminent domain proceedings, whether or not he is the prevailing party, the defendant in an eminent domain proceeding shall be allowed his costs on appeal.

Comment. Section 1268.720 states the basic rule that the defendant is allowed his costs on appeal in an eminent domain case. This basic rule is an exception to the rule that the prevailing party is entitled to his costs on appeal. Compare CAL. R. CT. 26 (costs on appeal). The basic rule continues case law that the general constitutional principle of "just compensation" requires that the plaintiff-condemnor bear the costs of all parties to the action in case of an appeal. See, e.g., *Sacramento & San Joaquin Drainage Dist. v. Reed*, 217 Cal. App.2d 611, 31 Cal. Rptr. 754 (1963) (defendant entitled to costs on plaintiff's appeal even if the plaintiff prevails); *Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Morris*, 12 Cal. App.3d 679, 90 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1970) (defendant entitled to costs on defendant's appeal where defendant prevails).

Where the defendant is the appellant and loses, the former law was not clear. The trend in recent years was to award the defendant-appellant his costs whether or not he prevailed. See *City of Baldwin Park v. Stoskus*, 8 Cal.3d 563, 743a, 503 P.2d 1333, 1338, 105 Cal. Rptr. 325, 330 (1972); *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 59, 500 P.2d 1345, 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 16 (1972); *People v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp.*, 26 Cal. App.3d 549, 103 Cal. Rptr. 63 (1972). See also *In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill*, 61 Cal.2d 21, 68-71, 389 P.2d 538, 568-570, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 104-106 (1964). However, such action apparently was discretionary with the reviewing court. See *City of Oakland v. Pacific Coast Lumber & Mill Co.*, 172 Cal. 332, 156 P. 468 (1916) (not unconstitutional to award costs to plaintiff-respondent where he is the prevailing party). See also *Stafford v. County of Los Angeles*, 219 Cal. App.2d 770, 33 Cal. Rptr. 475 (1963) (plaintiff in inverse condemnation case taxed costs for frivolous appeal). Moreover, the defendant was not entitled to costs where the issue involved title as between two or more

defendants. See former Section 1246.1; Section 1268.710(b) and Comment thereto.

Section 1268.720 preserves the rule allowing defendant costs and makes clear that this rule applies in the event of an appeal by the defendant that fails. The section authorizes the Judicial Council to deviate from this principle by court rule made specifically applicable to eminent domain proceedings. Unless and until such a rule is adopted, there will be no exception to the basic rule stated in Section 1268.720.

CHAPTER 12. ARBITRATION OF COMPENSATION IN ACQUISITIONS OF PROPERTY FOR PUBLIC USE

Comment. Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 1273.010) continues without substantive change the provisions of former Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 1273.01) of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. For background, see *Recommendation Relating to Arbitration of Just Compensation*, 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 123 (1969).

§ 1273.010. Arbitration of amount of compensation authorized

1273.010. (a) Any person authorized to acquire property for public use may enter into an agreement to arbitrate any controversy as to the compensation to be made in connection with the acquisition of the property.

(b) Where property is already appropriated to a public use, the person authorized to compromise or settle the claim arising from a taking or damaging of such property for another public use may enter into an agreement to arbitrate any controversy as to the compensation to be made in connection with such taking or damaging.

(c) For the purposes of this section, in the case of a public entity, "person" refers to the particular department, officer, commission, board, or governing body authorized to acquire property on behalf of the public entity or to compromise or settle a claim arising from the taking or damaging of the entity's property.

Comment. Section 1273.010, which supersedes former Section 1273.02, authorizes arbitration in connection with the acquisition of property for public use.

The phrase "compensation to be made in connection with the acquisition of the property" is intended to encompass any amounts that may be assessed or awarded in a condemnation proceeding and, specifically, to include severance or other damages.

The term "controversy" is defined, for purposes of arbitration, in subdivision (c) of Section 1280.

The enactment of this chapter does not imply that public entities authorized to purchase, but not to condemn, property are not authorized to agree to arbitration. See Section 1273.030(d).

This chapter contains no provisions comparable to Sections 1250.220, 1250.230, and 1260.220, which require that *all* persons having an interest in the property be named as defendants in the condemnation complaint, permit any unnamed interest holder to appear as a defendant in the proceeding, and provide for allocation of the award among holders of various interests. The chapter assumes that prudence on the part of the acquiring agency will assure that it agrees to arbitrate with the person who owns the interest it seeks to acquire. Also, the interests of persons other than parties to the arbitration would be unaffected by the arbitration agreement or the carrying out of that agreement. In short, an arbitration agreement and award operates only as a contract and conveyance between the parties to the particular agreement.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) authorizes any acquirer of property for public use to agree to arbitrate the question of compensation and to act in accordance with the agreement. The subdivision does not imply that the public entity must have complied with the formalities (such as the adoption of a formal condemnation resolution) prescribed as conditions precedent to the commencement of an eminent domain proceeding. Rather, the subdivision contemplates that the question of compensation may be submitted to arbitration whenever acquisition has been authorized in the manner required of the particular entity or agency. As the arbitration agreement ordinarily would commit the public entity to purchase the property at the amount of the award (see Section 1273.040), the agreement should be approved and executed in the same manner as a contract to purchase property. *Cf. Santa Monica Unified School Dist. v. Persh*, 5 Cal. App.3d 945, 85 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1970).

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) authorizes "persons" who own, hold, or control public property that may be taken by eminent domain proceedings to agree to arbitrate the amount of compensation. Public property may be taken by eminent domain proceedings whether or not it is already "appropriated to a public use" (see Sections 1240.510 and 1240.610), and condemnation by one public entity of property already devoted to a public use by another public entity is a fairly common occurrence.

§ 1273.020. Expenses of arbitration

1273.020. (a) Notwithstanding Sections 1283.2 and 1284.2, the party acquiring the property shall pay all of the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator and the statutory fees and mileage of all witnesses subpoenaed in the arbitration, together with other expenses of the arbitration incurred or approved by the neutral arbitrator, not including attorney's fees or expert witness fees or other expenses incurred by other parties for their own benefit.

(b) An agreement authorized by this chapter may require that the party acquiring the property pay reasonable attorney's fees or expert witness fees, or both, to any other party to the arbitration. If the agreement requires the payment of such fees, the amount of the fees is a matter to be determined in the arbitration proceeding unless the agreement prescribes otherwise.

(c) The party acquiring the property may pay the expenses and fees referred to in subdivisions (a) and (b) from funds available for the acquisition of the property or other funds available for the purpose.

Comment. Section 1273.020 supersedes former Section 1273.03. Subdivision (a) of Section 1273.020 is consistent with the rule applicable to eminent domain proceedings that the condemnee is entitled to recover all "court costs." See Section 1268.710 and Comment thereto. Subdivision (a) precludes the parties by agreement from imposing costs of this nature on the party from whom the property is being acquired.

Subdivision (b), on the other hand, does permit the parties to provide in the arbitration agreement that the party acquiring the property will pay reasonable attorney's fees or expert witness fees incurred by other parties to the agreement. Absent such provision in the agreement, the party from whom the property is being acquired must pay his own attorney's fees and expert witness fees.

§ 1273.030. Effect and enforceability of agreements

1273.030. (a) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, agreements authorized by this chapter are subject to Title 9 (commencing with Section 1280) of this part.

(b) An agreement authorized by this chapter may be made whether or not an eminent domain proceeding has been commenced to acquire the property. If an eminent domain proceeding has been commenced or is commenced, any petition or response relating to the arbitration shall be filed and determined in the eminent domain proceeding.

(c) Notwithstanding Section 1281.4, an agreement authorized by this chapter does not waive or restrict the power of any person to commence and prosecute an eminent domain proceeding, including the taking of possession prior to judgment, except that, upon motion of a party to the eminent domain proceeding, the court shall stay the determination of compensation until any petition for an order to arbitrate is determined and, if arbitration is ordered, until arbitration is had in accordance with the order.

(d) The effect and enforceability of an agreement authorized by this chapter is not defeated or impaired by contention or proof by any party to the agreement that the party acquiring the property pursuant to the agreement lacks the power or capacity to take the property by eminent domain proceedings.

(e) Notwithstanding the rules as to venue provided by Sections 1292 and 1292.2, any petition relating to arbitration authorized by this chapter shall be filed in the superior court in the county in which the property, or any portion of the property, is located.

Comment. Section 1273.030 supersedes former Section 1273.04. Although Section 1273.030 provides that arbitration under this chapter is governed by the general arbitration statute (Sections 1280–1294.2), a few minor modifications in the procedure provided by the general statute are desirable when arbitration is used to determine the compensation for property acquired for public use.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) makes clear that, in general, agreements to arbitrate under this chapter are subject to the general arbitration statute. See, in particular, Sections 1285–1288.8 (enforcement of the award) and 1290–1294.2 (judicial proceedings relating to the arbitration or the award).

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) makes clear that it is not necessary to commence an eminent domain proceeding in order to arbitrate under this chapter and also provides a special rule concerning the court in which any petition or response relating to the arbitration shall be filed and determined when an eminent domain proceeding is pending.

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) makes clear that an eminent domain proceeding may be begun and prosecuted notwithstanding an agreement to arbitrate the question of compensation and that such an agreement does not impair the condemnor's power to take possession prior to judgment. There is, of course, nothing to preclude the parties from including a provision in the arbitration agreement that permits the condemnor to take possession of the property prior to the award in the arbitration proceeding. Subdivision (c) also provides for staying the determination of compensation in an eminent domain proceeding pending an agreed arbitration—a practice provided for as to other arbitrations by Section 1281.4.

Subdivision (d). Subdivision (d) makes clear that an agreement to arbitrate and to purchase and sell at the amount of the award does not require, and is not impaired by the acquirer's lack of, power to take the property by eminent domain.

Subdivision (e). Subdivision (e) requires that petitions relating to arbitration be filed in the county in which the property lies. The venue provided by this subdivision corresponds with the rule as to venue for eminent domain proceedings. See Section 1250.020.

§ 1273.040. Abandonment of acquisition

1273.040. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), an agreement authorized by this chapter may specify the terms and conditions under which the party acquiring the property may abandon the acquisition, the arbitration proceeding, and any eminent domain proceeding that may have been, or may be, filed. Unless the agreement provides that the acquisition may not be abandoned, the party acquiring the property may abandon the acquisition, the arbitration proceeding, and any eminent domain proceeding at any time not later than the time for filing and serving a petition or response to vacate an arbitration award under Sections 1288, 1288.2, and 1290.6.

(b) If the proceeding to acquire the property is abandoned after the arbitration agreement is executed, the party from whom the property was to be acquired is entitled to recover (1) all expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred (i) in preparing for the arbitration proceeding and for any judicial proceedings in connection with the acquisition of the property, (ii) during the arbitration proceeding and during any judicial proceedings in connection with the acquisition, and (iii) in any subsequent judicial proceedings in connection with the acquisition and (2) reasonable attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and fees for the services of other experts where such fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred to protect his interests in connection with the acquisition of the property. Unless the agreement otherwise provides, the amount of such expenses and fees shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the agreement.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1273.040 supersedes former Section 1273.05. It permits the parties to the agreement to provide whether and under what conditions the acquirer may abandon the acquisition. If the agreement does not so provide, the party who was to have acquired the property may abandon the acquisition within the time within which a petition or response to vacate an arbitration award may be filed and served. This period is generally 100 days after service of the award (Sections 1288-1288.2) but is further limited by Section 1290.6 which limits the time for response to a petition. See *Coordinated Constr., Inc. v. Canoga Big "A," Inc.*, 238 Cal. App.2d 313, 47 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1965).

Subdivision (b) makes clear that the *right* of the "condemnee" to recover certain expenses in the event of abandonment is not subject to modification under the arbitration agreement but the *amount* of such expenses is to be determined by arbitration unless the agreement otherwise provides. This subdivision is consistent with Section 1268.610 (rules governing litigation expenses upon dismissal of judicial condemnation proceeding).

§ 1273.050. Recordation of agreements

1273.050. (a) An agreement authorized by this chapter may be acknowledged and recorded, and rerecorded, in the same manner and with the same effect

as a conveyance of real property except that two years after the date the agreement is recorded, or rerecorded, the record ceases to be notice to any person for any purpose.

(b) In lieu of recording the agreement, there may be recorded a memorandum thereof, executed by the parties to the agreement, containing at least the following information: the names of the parties to the agreement, a description of the property, and a statement that an arbitration agreement affecting such property has been entered into pursuant to this chapter. Such memorandum when acknowledged and recorded, or rerecorded, in the same manner as a conveyance of real property has the same effect as if the agreement itself were recorded or rerecorded.

Comment. Section 1273.050 supersedes former Section 1273.06. Section 1273.050 permits an agreement authorized by this chapter, or a memorandum thereof, to be acknowledged and recorded to afford "constructive notice" to subsequent purchasers and lienors. Arbitration rules may provide for the escrowing of an instrument of transfer (see, e.g., Sections 1, 44, and 45 of the Eminent Domain Arbitration Rules of the American Arbitration Association (June 1, 1968)), but such an escrow would not, of itself, protect the "condemnor" against subsequent transferees. Section 1273.050 provides a means for obtaining such protection (see Civil Code Sections 1213-1220) and is calculated to make unnecessary the filing of an eminent domain proceeding solely to obtain the effect of a lis pendens.

AMENDMENTS, ADDITIONS, AND REPEALS DELEGATION OF CONDEMNATION AUTHORITY

Civil Code § 1001 (repealed)

SEC. . . Section 1001 of the Civil Code is repealed
~~1001. Any person may, without further legislative action, acquire private property for any use specified in Section 1238 of the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE either by consent of the owner or by proceedings had under the provisions of Title VII, Part III, of the CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE; and any person seeking to acquire property for any of the uses mentioned in such Title is "an agent of the State," or a "person in charge of such use," within the meaning of those terms as used in such Title. This section shall be in force from and after the fourth day of April, eighteen hundred and seventy two.~~

Comment. Section 1001 and Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure to which it refers are superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240.010 (public use limitation) and 1240.020 (statutory delegation of condemnation authority required) and by specific statements of the condemnation authority of particular persons for particular public uses which are found in the various codes. See Comment to CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.020 and the Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDGES

Code of Civil Procedure § 170 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 170 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

170. No justice or judge shall sit or act as such in any action or proceeding:

1. To which he is a party; or in which he is interested other than as a holder or owner of any capital stock of a corporation, or of any bond, note or other security issued by a corporation;

2. In which he is interested as a holder or owner of any capital stock of a corporation, or of any bond, note or other security issued by a corporation;

3. When he is related to either party, or to an officer of a corporation, which is a party, or to an attorney, counsel, or agent of either party, by consanguinity or affinity within the third degree computed according to the rules of law, or when he is indebted, through money borrowed as a loan, to either party, or to an attorney, counsel or partner of either party, or when he is so indebted to an officer of a corporation or unincorporated association which is a party; provided, however, that if the parties appearing in the action and not then in default, or the petitioner in any probate proceeding, or the executor, or administrator of the estate, or the guardian of the minor or incompetent person, or the commissioner, or the referee, or the attorney for any of the above named, or the party or his attorney in all other or special proceedings, shall sign and file in the action or matter, a stipulation in writing waiving the disqualification mentioned in this subdivision or in subdivision 2 or 4 hereof, the judge or court may proceed with the trial or hearing and the performance of all other duties connected therewith with the same legal effect as if no such disqualification existed;

4. When, in the action or proceeding, or in any previous action or proceeding involving any of the same issues, he has been attorney or counsel for any party; or when he has given advice to any party upon any matter involved in the action or proceeding; or when he has been retained or employed as attorney or counsel for any party within two years prior to the commencement of the action or proceeding;

5. When it is made to appear probable that, by reason of bias or prejudice of such justice or judge a fair and impartial trial cannot be had before him.

Whenever a judge or justice shall have knowledge of any fact or facts, which, under the provisions of this section, disqualify him to sit or act as such in any action or proceeding pending before him, it shall be his duty to declare the same in open court and cause a memorandum thereof to be entered in the minutes or docket. It shall thereupon be the duty of the clerk, or the judge if there be no clerk, to transmit forthwith a copy of such memorandum to each party, or his attorney, who shall

have appeared in such action or proceeding, except such party or parties as shall be present in person or by attorney when the declaration shall be made.

In justice courts when, before the trial, either party makes and files an affidavit that he believes that he cannot have a fair and impartial trial before the judge before which the action is pending, by reason of the interest, prejudice or bias of the judge, the court may order the transfer of the action, and the provisions of Section 398 shall apply to such transfer.

Whenever a judge of a court of record who shall be disqualified under the provisions of this section, to sit or act as such in any action or proceeding pending before him, neglects or fails to declare his disqualification in the manner hereinbefore provided, any party to such action or proceeding who has appeared therein may present to the court and file with the clerk a written statement objecting to the hearing of such matter or the trial of any issue of fact or law in such action or proceeding before such judge, and setting forth the fact or facts constituting the ground of the disqualification of such judge. Copies of such written statement shall forthwith be served by the presenting party on each party, or his attorney, who has appeared in the action or proceeding and on the judge alleged in such statement to be disqualified.

Within 10 days after the filing of any such statement, or 10 days after the service of such statement as above provided, whichever is later in time, the judge alleged therein to be disqualified may file with the clerk his consent in writing that the action or proceeding be tried before another judge, or may file with the clerk his written answer admitting or denying any or all of the allegations contained in such statement and setting forth any additional fact or facts material or relevant to the question of his disqualifications. The clerk shall forthwith transmit a copy of the judge's consent or answer to each party or his attorney who shall have appeared in such action or proceeding. Every such statement and every such answer shall be verified by oath in the manner prescribed by Section 446 for the verification of pleadings. The statement of a party objecting to the judge on the ground of his

disqualification, shall be presented at the earliest practicable opportunity, after his appearance and discovery of the facts constituting the ground of the judge's disqualification, and in any event before the commencement of the hearing of any issue of fact in the action or proceeding before such judge.

No judge of a court of record, who shall deny his disqualification, shall hear or pass upon the question of his own disqualification; but in every such case, the question of the judge's disqualification shall be heard and determined by some other judge agreed upon by the parties who shall have appeared in the action or proceeding, or, in the event of their failing to agree, by a judge assigned to act by the Chairman of the Judicial Council, and, if the parties fail to agree upon a judge to determine the question of the disqualification, within five days after the expiration of the time allowed herein for the judge to answer, it shall be the duty of the clerk then to notify the Chairman of the Judicial Council of that fact; and it shall be the duty of the Chairman of the Judicial Council forthwith, upon receipt of notice from the clerk, to assign some other judge, not disqualified, to hear and determine the question.

If such judge admits his disqualification, or files his written consent that the action or proceeding be tried before another judge, or fails to file his answer within the 10 days herein allowed, or if it shall be determined after hearing that he is disqualified, the action or proceeding shall be heard and determined by another judge or justice not disqualified, who shall be agreed upon by the parties, or, in the event of their failing to agree, assigned by the Chairman of the Judicial Council; provided, however, that when there are two or more judges of the same court, one of whom is disqualified, the action or proceeding may be transferred to a judge who is not disqualified.

A judge who is disqualified may, notwithstanding his disqualification, request another judge, who has been agreed upon by the parties, to sit and act in his place.

6. In an action or proceeding brought in any court by or against the Reclamation Board of the State of California, or any irrigation, reclamation, levee, swampland or

drainage district, or trustee, officer or employee thereof, affecting or relating to any real property, or an easement or right-of-way, levee, embankment, canal, or any work provided for or approved by the Reclamation Board of the State of California, a judge of the superior court of the county, or a judge of the municipal court or justice court of the judicial district, in which such real property, or any part thereof, or such easement or right-of-way, levee, embankment, canal or work, or any part thereof is situated shall be disqualified to sit or act, and such action shall be heard and tried by some other judge assigned to sit therein by the Chairman of the Judicial Council, unless the parties to the action shall sign and file in the action or proceeding a stipulation in writing, waiving the disqualification in this subdivision of this section provided, in which case such judge may proceed with the trial or hearing with the same legal effect as if no such legal disqualification existed. If, however, the parties to the action shall sign and file a stipulation, agreeing upon some other judge to sit or act in place of the judge disqualified under the provisions of this subdivision, the judge agreed upon shall be called by the judge so disqualified to hear and try such action or proceeding; provided, that nothing herein contained shall be construed as preventing the judge of the superior court of such county, or of the municipal court of such judicial district, from issuing a temporary injunction or restraining order, which shall, if granted, remain in force until vacated or modified by the judge designated as herein provided.

7. When, as a judge of a court of record, by reason of permanent or temporary physical impairment, he is unable to properly perceive the evidence or properly conduct the proceedings.

8. Notwithstanding anything contained in subdivision 6 of this section, a judge of the superior court or a judge of the municipal court or justice court of the judicial district, in which any real property is located, shall not be disqualified to hear or determine any matter in which the opposing party shall have failed to appear within the time allowed by law, or as to such of the opposing parties who shall have failed to appear within the time allowed by law, and as to which matter or parties the same shall constitute

purely a default hearing; provided, that nothing in this section contained shall be construed as preventing the judge of the superior court of such county, ~~or of the municipal court of such judicial district~~, from issuing an order for immediate possession *prior to judgment* in proceedings in eminent domain.

Nothing in this section contained shall affect a party's right to a change of the place of trial in the cases provided for in Title 4 (commencing with Section 392) of Part 2 of this code.

Comment. Section 170 is amended to conform to the terminology of the Eminent Domain Law. See Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The reference to the judge of the municipal court is deleted because eminent domain proceedings may be brought only in the superior court. See CODE Civ. PROC. § 1250.010.

CROSS-COMPLAINTS

Code of Civil Procedure § 426.70 (added)

SEC. . . Section 426.70 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to read:

426.70. (a) Notwithstanding subdivision (a) of Section 426.60, this article applies to eminent domain proceedings.

(b) The related cause of action may be asserted by cross-complaint in an eminent domain proceeding whether or not the party asserting such cause of action has presented a claim in compliance with Part 3 (commencing with Section 900) of Division 3.6 of Title 1 of the Government Code to the plaintiff in the original eminent domain proceeding.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 426.70—by making this article applicable to eminent domain proceedings—codifies the principle that a related cause of action must be asserted against the plaintiff in an eminent domain action or it is barred. *Klopping v. City of Whittier*, 8 Cal.3d 39, 58, 500 P.2d 1345, 1360, 104 Cal. Rptr. 1, 16 (1972) (damages caused by precondemnation announcements). The related cause must be asserted as a cross-complaint. See Section 426.30.

Subdivision (b) of Section 426.70 dispenses with the requirement that a claim be presented to a public entity as a condition to bringing a compulsory cross-complaint against the public entity in an eminent domain proceeding. Compare GOVT. CODE §§ 905, 905.2; *County of San Luis Obispo v. Ranchita Cattle Co.*, 16 Cal. App.3d 383, 94 Cal. Rptr. 73 (1971). Accordingly, the cause of action is not barred by mere failure to present the claim within the time specified in the public entity claims statute, and the cause may be asserted by cross-complaint in the eminent domain action whether or not a claim has been presented to the public entity. However, subdivision (b) eliminates the requirement only as against the plaintiff. Actions against third parties are not affected.

Code of Civil Procedure § 428.10 (technical amendment)

SEC. Section 428.10 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

428.10. A party against whom a cause of action has been asserted in a complaint or cross-complaint may file a cross-complaint setting forth either or both of the following:

(a) Any cause of action he has against any of the parties who filed the complaint or cross-complaint against him. Nothing in this subdivision authorizes the filing of a cross-complaint against the plaintiff in an action commenced under Title 7 (commencing with Section ~~1227~~ 1230.010) of Part 3.

(b) Any cause of action he has against a person alleged to be liable thereon, whether or not such person is already a party to the action, if the cause of action asserted in his cross-complaint (1) arises out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of transactions or occurrences as the cause brought against him or (2) asserts a claim, right, or interest in the property or controversy which is the subject of the cause brought against him.

Comment. Section 428.10 is amended to conform to the numbering of the Eminent Domain Law.

ACTION TO ENJOIN DIVERSION OF WATER

Code of Civil Procedure § 534 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 534 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

534. In any action brought by a riparian owner to enjoin the diversion of water appropriated or proposed to be appropriated, or the use thereof, against any person or persons appropriating or proposing to appropriate such waters, the defendant may set up in his answer that the water diverted or proposed to be diverted is for the irrigation of land or other public use, and, in such case, he shall also in such answer set forth the quantity of water desired to be taken and necessary to such irrigation of land or the public use, the nature of such use, the place where the same is used or proposed to be used, the duration and extent of the diversion or the proposed diversion, including the stages of the flow of the stream at and during the time in which the water is to be diverted, and that the same may be diverted without interfering with the actual and necessary beneficial uses of the plaintiff, and that such defendant so answering desires that the court shall ascertain and fix the damages, if any, that will result to the plaintiff or to his riparian lands from the appropriation of the water so appropriated or intended to be appropriated by defendant.

The plaintiff may serve and file a reply to the defendant's answer stating plaintiff's rights to the water and the damage plaintiff will suffer by the defendant's taking of the water, and plaintiff may implead as parties to the action all persons necessary to a full determination of the rights of plaintiff to the water and the damages plaintiff will suffer by the proposed taking by defendant, and the court shall have jurisdiction to hear and determine all the rights to water of the plaintiff and other parties to the action, and said parties shall have a right to state and prove their rights, and shall be bound by the judgment rendered the same as though made parties plaintiff at the commencement of the action.

Upon the trial of the case the court shall receive and hear evidence on behalf of the respective parties, and if the court finds that the allegations of such answer are true as to the aforesaid matters, and that the appropriation and diversion of such waters is for irrigation of land or other public use and that, after allowing sufficient water for the actual and necessary beneficial uses of the plaintiff and other parties, there is water available to be beneficially appropriated by such defendant so answering, the court shall fix the time and manner and extent of such appropriation and the actual damages, if any, resulting to the plaintiff or other parties on account of the same, and in fixing such damages the court shall be guided by ~~paragraph four of section one thousand two hundred forty/eight of this code Article 5 (commencing with Section 1263.410) of Chapter 9 of Title 7 of Part 3~~, and if, upon the ascertainment and fixing of such damages the defendant, within the time allowed in ~~section one thousand two hundred fifty-one of this code Section 1268.010~~ for the payment of damages in proceedings in eminent domain, shall pay into court the amount of damages fixed and the costs adjudged to be paid by such defendant, or give a good and sufficient bond to pay the same upon the final settlement of the case, the injunction prayed for by the plaintiff shall be denied to the extent of the amount the defendant is permitted to appropriate, as aforesaid, and the temporary injunction, if any has been granted, shall be vacated to the extent aforesaid; *provided*, that any of the parties may appeal from such judgment as in other cases; *and provided, further*, that if such judgment is in favor of the defendant and if he upon and pending such appeal shall keep on deposit with the clerk of said court the amount of such damages and costs, or the bond, if it be given, so awarded to be paid to the plaintiff or other parties in the event such judgment shall be affirmed, no injunction against the appropriation of the amount the defendant is permitted to appropriate as aforesaid shall be granted or enforced pending such appeal, and, upon the acceptance by the plaintiff or other parties of such amount so awarded or upon the affirmation of such decision on appeal so that such judgment shall become final, the

defendant shall have the right to divert and appropriate from such stream, against such plaintiff or other parties and his successors in interest, the quantity of water therein adjudged and allowed. Upon the filing of such answer as is herein provided for, the parties plaintiff or other parties and defendant shall be entitled to a jury trial upon the issues as to damages so raised, as provided in ~~title seven; part three of this code Title 7 (commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3~~, applying to ~~actions~~ proceedings in eminent domain.

Comment. Section 534 is amended to replace the references to former Sections 1248 and 1251 with references to the statutory provisions that supersede those sections.

REFEREES

Code of Civil Procedure § 640 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 640 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

640. A reference may be ordered to the person or persons, not exceeding three, agreed upon by the parties. If the parties do not agree, the court or judge must appoint one or more referees, not exceeding three, who reside in the county in which the action or proceeding is triable, and against whom there is no legal objection, or the reference may be made to a court commissioner of the county where the cause is pending ; ~~provided, that in any action brought under Title 7 of Part 3 of this code, if the plaintiff is the State, a county, city and county, or any incorporated city or town, or a municipal water district, the referees are not required to be residents of the county in which the action or proceeding is triable. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as repealing any law of this State giving jurisdiction to the State Railroad Commission to ascertain the just compensation which must be paid in eminent domain proceedings.~~

Comment. The portion of Section 640 relating to the residence of referees in eminent domain proceedings is deleted because it serves no useful purpose and tends unnecessarily to complicate eminent domain law. The last sentence is deleted as

unnecessary. See CAL. CONST., Art. XII, § 23a and PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1401-1421.

GARNISHMENT OF DEBT OWED BY PUBLIC ENTITY

Code of Civil Procedure § 710 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 710 of the Code of Civil Procedure is amended to read:

710. (a) Whenever a judgment for the payment of money is rendered by any court of this state against a defendant to whom money is owing and unpaid by this state or by any county, city and county, city or municipality, quasi-municipality, district or public corporation, the judgment creditor may file a duly authenticated abstract or transcript of such judgment together with an affidavit stating the exact amount then due, owing and unpaid thereon and that he desires to avail himself of the provisions of this section in the manner as follows:

1. If such money, wages or salary is owing and unpaid by this state to such judgment debtor, said judgment creditor shall file said abstract or transcript and affidavit with the state department, board, office or commission owing such money, wages or salary to said judgment debtor prior to the time such state department, board, office or commission presents the claim of such judgment debtor therefor to the State Controller. Said state department, board, office or commission in presenting such claim of such judgment debtor to said State Controller shall note thereunder the fact of the filing of such abstract or transcript and affidavit and state the amount unpaid on said judgment as shown by said affidavit and shall also note any amounts advanced to the judgment debtor by, or which the judgment debtor owes to, the State of California by reason of advances for expenses or for any other purpose. Thereupon the State Controller, to discharge such claim of such judgment debtor, shall pay into the court which issued such abstract or transcript by his warrant or check payable to said court the whole or such portion of the amount due such judgment debtor on such claim, after deducting from such claim an amount

sufficient to reimburse the state department, board, office or commission for any amounts advanced to said judgment debtor or by him owed to the State of California, and after deducting therefrom an amount equal to one-half or such greater portion as is allowed by statute of the United States, of the earnings owing to the judgment debtor for his personal services to the state rendered at any time within 30 days next preceding the filing of such abstract or transcript, as will satisfy in full or to the greatest extent the amount unpaid on said judgment and the balance thereof; if any, to the judgment debtor.

2. If such money, wages or salary is owing and unpaid to such judgment debtor by any county, city and county, city or municipality, quasi-municipality, district or public corporation, said judgment creditor shall file said abstract or transcript and affidavit with the auditor of such county, city and county, city or municipality, quasi-municipality, district or public corporation (and in case there be no auditor then with the official whose duty corresponds to that of auditor). Thereupon said auditor (or other official) to discharge such claim of such judgment debtor shall pay into the court which issued such abstract or transcript by his warrant or check payable to said court the whole or such portion of the amount due on such claim of such judgment debtor, less an amount equal to one-half or such greater portion as is allowed by statute of the United States, of the earnings of the debtor owing by the county, city and county, city, municipality, quasi-municipality, district or public corporation to the judgment debtor for his personal services to such public body rendered at any time within 30 days next preceding the filing of such abstract or transcript, as will satisfy in full or to the greatest extent the amount unpaid on said judgment and the balance thereof, if any, to the judgment debtor.

(b) The judgment creditor upon filing such abstract or transcript and affidavit shall pay a fee of two dollars and fifty cents (\$2.50) to the person or agency with whom the same is filed.

(c) Whenever a court receives any money hereunder, it shall pay as much thereof as is not exempt from execution under this code to the judgment creditor and

the balance thereof, if any, to the judgment debtor. The procedure for determining the claim of exemption shall be governed by the procedure set forth in Section 690.50 of this code, and the court rendering the judgment shall be considered the levying officer for the purpose of that section.

(d) In the event the moneys owing to a judgment debtor by any governmental agency mentioned in this section are owing by reason of an award made in a condemnation proceeding brought by the governmental agency, such governmental agency may pay the amount of the award to the clerk of the court in which such condemnation proceeding was tried, and shall file therewith the abstract or transcript of judgment and the affidavit filed with it by the judgment creditor. Such payment into court shall constitute payment of the condemnation award within the meaning of Section ~~1251~~ of this code 1268.010. Upon such payment into court and the filing with the county clerk of such abstract or transcript of judgment and affidavit, the county clerk shall notify by mail, through their attorneys, if any, all parties interested in said award of the time and place at which the court which tried the condemnation proceeding will determine the conflicting claims to said award. At said time and place the court shall make such determination and order the distribution of the money held by the county clerk in accordance therewith.

(e) The judgment creditor may state in the affidavit any fact or facts tending to establish the identity of the judgment debtor. No public officer or employee shall be liable for failure to perform any duty imposed by this section unless sufficient information is furnished by the abstract or transcript together with the affidavit to enable him in the exercise of reasonable diligence to ascertain such identity therefrom and from the papers and records on file in the office in which he works. The word "office" as used herein does not include any branch or subordinate office located in a different city.

(f) Nothing in this section shall authorize the filing of any abstract or transcript and affidavit against: (1) any wages, or salary owing to the Governor, Lieutenant

Governor, Secretary of State, Controller, Treasurer, and Attorney General, or (2) any overpayment of tax, penalty or interest, or interest allowable with respect to such overpayment, under Part 10 (commencing with Section 17001) or Part 11 (commencing with Section 23001) of Division 2 of the Revenue and Taxation Code.

(g) Any fees received by a state agency under this section shall be deposited to the credit of the fund from which payments were, or would be, made on account of a garnishment under this section. For the purpose of this paragraph, payments from the State Pay Roll Revolving Fund shall be deemed payments made from the fund out of which moneys to meet such payments were transferred to said revolving fund.

(h) (1) In the event the moneys owing to a judgment debtor by any governmental agency mentioned in this section are for wages or salary, the judgment creditor shall mail under a separate cover at the time of filing the affidavit with the governmental agency, in an envelope marked "Personal and Confidential", a copy of the affidavit and a Notice to Judgment Debtor as provided in paragraph (2) of this subdivision, addressed to the judgment debtor at his place of employment.

(2) The Notice to Judgment Debtor shall be in 10-point bold type, and in substantially the following form:

You may be entitled to file a claim exempting your salary or wages from execution. You may seek the advice of any attorney or may, within 10 days from the date your salary or wages were levied upon, deliver an affidavit to the court rendering the judgment to exempt such salary or wages, as provided in Section 690.50 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Comment. Section 710 is amended to substitute in subdivision (d) a reference to the statutory provision that replaced former Section 1251.

LITIGATION EXPENSES IN INVERSE CONDEMNATION PROCEEDINGS

Code of Civil Procedure § 1036 (added)

SEC. . . Section 1036 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to read:

1036. In any inverse condemnation proceeding brought for the taking of any interest in real property, the court rendering judgment for the plaintiff by awarding compensation for such taking, or the attorney representing the public entity who effects a settlement of such proceeding, shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as will, in the opinion of the court or such attorney, reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.

Comment. Section 1036 continues former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1246.3 without change.

GENERAL CONDEMNATION STATUTE

Code of Civil Procedure §§ 1237–1273.06 (repealed)

SEC. . . Title 7 (commencing with Section 1237) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is repealed.

Note. The text of each section in Title 7 is set out in the Appendix. The disposition of each section is indicated in the Comment that follows the text of the section.

SCHOOL DISTRICTS

Education Code § 1047.5 (added)

SEC. . . Section 1047.5 is added to the Education Code, to read:

1047.5. The governing board of any school district may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of the powers or functions of the district.

Comment. Section 1047.5 grants a school district (defined in Section 41) the power of eminent domain to acquire any property necessary to carry out any of the powers or functions of the district. The section supersedes the grant of

condemnation authority formerly contained in subdivision 3 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure (condemnation authorized for "public buildings and grounds for the use . . . of any . . . school district"). It continues the prior authority of school districts to condemn for school purposes. *E.g., Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Madrid*, 234 Cal. App.2d 100, 121, 44 Cal. Rptr. 268, 281 (1965) ("The district had the right to condemn for any school purpose and on acquisition, to change to some other school purpose any time during its ownership of the property."). *Kern County High School Dist. v. McDonald*, 180 Cal. 7, 179 P. 180 (1919). See also *Anaheim Union High School Dist. v. Vieira*, 241 Cal. App.2d 169, 51 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1966) (future use); *Hayward Union High School Dist. v. Madrid*, *supra* (temporary use for school purposes with resale to follow within several years); *Woodland School Dist. v. Woodland Cemetery Ass'n*, 174 Cal. App.2d 243, 344 P.2d 326 (1959) (school purposes may be a more necessary public use than private cemetery).

The authority granted by Section 1047.5 is subject to specific limitations that may be imposed on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See EDUC. CODE § 1048.

In some cases, a particular statute may expressly grant school districts the power of eminent domain for a particular purpose. *E.g.*, EDUC. CODE § 6726 (operation of a technical, agricultural, and natural resource conservation school). These specific grants of condemnation authority are not to be construed to limit the broad grant of such authority under Section 1047.5.

Private schools which are not of the collegiate grade may not exercise the power of eminent domain. *Yeshiva Torath Emeth Academy v. University of So. Cal.*, 208 Cal. App.2d 618, 25 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1962). Likewise, a private citizen may not acquire property by eminent domain for the operation of a public school. *People v. Oken*, 159 Cal. App.2d 456, 324 P.2d 58 (1958).

Education Code § 1048 (added)

SEC. . . . Section 1048 is added to the Education Code, to read:

1048. The governing board of a school district may lease property in an adjoining school district for garage, warehouse, or other utility purposes or may purchase property in an adjoining school district for such purposes and may dispose of such property in the same manner as

property within the boundary of the district is purchased and disposed of.

The power of eminent domain shall not be applicable and such acquisitions by purchase shall be subject to the approval of the governing board of school district in which the property is located.

Comment. Section 1048 continues the substance of former Education Code Section 16003.

Education Code § 15007.5 (repealed)

SEC. . Section 15007.5 of the Education Code is repealed.

15007.5. The governing board of any school district may enter into an agreement with the governing body of any public agency for the joint exercise by such school district and such agency of their respective powers of eminent domain, whether or not possessed in common, for the acquisition of real property as a single parcel. Such agreement shall be entered into and performed pursuant to the provisions of Chapter 5 (commencing with Section 6500) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code; and each public agency therein designated is authorized to enter into such an agreement with the governing board of any school district for such purpose.

Comment. Section 15007.5 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.140.

Education Code § 15009 (amended)

SEC. . Section 15009 of the Education Code is amended to read:

15009. The governing board of a school district may acquire a site for a school building contiguous to the boundaries of the district and upon the acquisition of such site it shall become a part of the district. The site shall not be acquired until the county committee on school district organization of the county or of each of the counties concerned has received the proposal for acquisition of the site and reported its recommendations thereon to the governing boards of the districts concerned and to each county superintendent of schools concerned. The report of

the county committee shall be made within 60 days from the time the proposal for acquisition of the site was submitted to it. *The power of eminent domain may be used for the purposes of this section.*

A school site is contiguous for the purpose of this section although separated from the boundaries of the district by a road, street, stream, or other natural or artificial barrier or right-of-way.

Comment. Section 15009 is amended to make clear that the power of eminent domain may be used to acquire a school site on property contiguous to the district. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.050 (extraterritorial condemnation). Cf. EDUC. CODE § 1048 (power of eminent domain may not be used to acquire property outside district for use as a garage or warehouse or for other utility purpose).

Education Code § 16003 (repealed)

SEC. . . Section 16003 of the Education Code is repealed.

16003. The governing board of a school district may acquire property in an adjoining school district by lease, or purchase and dispose of such property in the same manner as property within the boundary of the district is purchased and disposed of, where the acquisition of such property is deemed necessary by the governing board for use as garages, warehouse, or other utility purposes.

The power of eminent domain shall not be applicable and such acquisitions by purchase shall be subject to the approval of the governing board of school district in which the property is located.

Comment. Section 16003 is superseded by Education Code Section 1048.

NONPROFIT EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS OF COLLEGIATE GRADE

Education Code § 30051 (added)

SEC. . . Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 30051) is added to Division 21 of the Education Code, to read:

CHAPTER 3. EMINENT DOMAIN

30051. Any educational institution of collegiate grade within this state not conducted for profit may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of its powers or functions.

Comment. Section 30051 continues the grant of condemnation authority formerly found in subdivision 2 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure ("Public buildings and grounds for the use of . . . any institution within the State of California which is exempt from taxation under the provisions of Section 1a, of Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of California"). See *University of So. Cal. v. Robbins*, 1 Cal. App.2d 523, 37 P.2d 163 (1934), *cert. denied*, 295 U.S. 738 (1935). Private schools which are not of the collegiate grade may not exercise the power of eminent domain. *Yeshiva Torath Emeth Academy v. University of So. Cal.*, 208 Cal. App.2d 618, 25 Cal. Rptr. 422 (1962).

EVIDENCE

Evidence Code § 811 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 811 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

811. As used in this article, "value of property" means the amount of "just compensation" to be ascertained under Section 14 of Article I of the State Constitution and the amount of value, damage, and benefits to be ascertained under subdivisions 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Section 1248 Articles 4 (commencing with Section 1263.310) and 5 (commencing with Section 1263.410) of Chapter 9 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Comment. Section 811 is amended to conform to the numbering of the Eminent Domain Law.

Section 811 makes clear that this article as applied to eminent domain proceedings governs only evidence relating to the determination of property value and damages and benefits to the remainder. This article does not govern evidence relating to the determination of loss of goodwill (CODE CIV. PROC. § 1263.510). The evidence admissible to prove loss of goodwill is governed by the general provisions of the Evidence Code. Hence, nothing in this article should be deemed a limitation on

the admissibility of evidence to prove loss of goodwill if such evidence is otherwise admissible.

Evidence Code § 812 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 812 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

812. This article is not intended to alter or change the existing substantive law, whether statutory or decisional, interpreting "just compensation" as used in Section 14 of Article I of the State Constitution or the terms "*fair market value*," "damage," or "~~benefits~~" "benefit" as used in ~~Section 1248 Articles 4 (commencing with Section 1263.310) and 5 (commencing with Section 1263.410)~~ of Chapter 9 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Comment. Section 812 is amended to conform to the numbering and terminology of the Eminent Domain Law.

Evidence Code § 813 (amended)

SEC. . Section 813 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

813. (a) The value of property may be shown only by opinion of:

- (1) Witnesses qualified to express such opinions; ~~and~~
- (2) The owner of *any right, title, or interest in the property* ~~or property interest~~ being valued ; ~~and~~

(3) An officer or employee designated by a corporation claiming any right, title, or interest in the property being valued if such person is knowledgeable as to the character and use of the property.

(b) Nothing in this section prohibits a view of the property being valued or the admission of any other admissible evidence (including but not limited to evidence as to the nature and condition of the property and, in an eminent domain proceeding, the character of the improvement proposed to be constructed by the plaintiff) for the limited purpose of enabling the court, jury, or referee to understand and weigh the testimony given under subdivision (a); and such evidence, except evidence of the character of the improvement proposed to

be constructed by the plaintiff in an eminent domain proceeding, is subject to impeachment and rebuttal.

Comment. Section 813(a) (2) is amended to make clear that not only the fee owner of the property, but any person having a compensable interest in the property, may testify as to the value of the property or his interest therein. Cf. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170 ("property" defined) and 1263.010 (right to compensation).

Paragraph (3) is added to Section 813(a) to make clear that, where a corporation owns property being valued, a designated officer or employee who is knowledgeable as to the character and use of the property may testify to his opinion of its value as an owner, notwithstanding any contrary implications in *City of Pleasant Hill v. First Baptist Church*, 1 Cal. App.3d 384, 82 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1969).

Evidence Code § 814 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 814 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

814. The opinion of a witness as to the value of property is limited to such an opinion as is based on matter perceived by or personally known to the witness or made known to him at or before the hearing, whether or not admissible, that is of a type that reasonably may be relied upon by an expert in forming an opinion as to the *fair market* value of *the property and which a willing purchaser and a willing seller, dealing with each other in the open market and with a full knowledge of all the uses and purposes for which the property is reasonably adaptable and available, would take into consideration in determining the price at which to purchase and sell the property or property interest being valued*, including but not limited to the matters listed in Sections 815 to 821, unless a witness is precluded by law from using such matter as a basis for his opinion.

Comment. Section 814 is amended to substitute a general reference to fair market value for the listing of particular matters constituting fair market value that an expert may rely on in forming an opinion as to the value of property. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1263.320 (fair market value). No substantive change is made by this amendment.

It should be noted that the definition of fair market value contained in Section 1263.320 omits the phrase "in the open market" since there may be no open market for some types of special purpose properties such as schools, churches, cemeteries, parks, utilities, and similar properties. All properties, special as well as general, are valued at their fair market value. Within the limits of this article, fair market value may be determined by reference to (1) the market data (or comparable sales) approach, (2) the income (or capitalization) method, and (3) the cost analysis (or production less depreciation) formula. See the Comment to Section 1263.320.

Evidence Code § 816 (amended)

SEC. . Section 816 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

816. (a) When relevant to the determination of the value of property, a witness may take into account as a basis for his opinion the price and other terms and circumstances of any sale or contract to sell and purchase comparable property if the sale or contract was freely made in good faith within a reasonable time before or after the date of valuation.

(b) In order to be considered comparable, the sale or contract must have been made sufficiently near in time to the date of valuation, and the property sold must be located sufficiently near the property being valued, and must be sufficiently alike in respect to character, size, situation, usability, and improvements, to make it clear that the property sold and the property being valued are comparable in value and that the price realized for the property sold may be fairly considered as shedding light on the value of the property being valued.

(c) *The provisions of this section shall be liberally construed to the end that an expert witness is permitted a wide discretion in his selection of comparable sales. Nothing in this section affects the right of the court in its discretion to limit the number of sales used by a witness.*

Comment. Subdivision (c) is added to Section 816 to incorporate a policy of liberal admissibility of sales on the theory that an error of exclusion is more likely to be prejudicial than an error of admission. This policy applies only to expert witnesses. It is not intended to limit the court's discretion in

placing a reasonable limitation upon the number of sales that may be admissible for any appraisal purpose so as to avoid the cumulative effect of such testimony.

It should be noted that existence of project enhancement or blight on comparable sales is one aspect of their relevance under this section. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1263.330 (changes in property value due to imminence of project).

Evidence Code § 817 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 817 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

817. (a) *When Subject to subdivision (b), when* relevant to the determination of the value of property, a witness may take into account as a basis for his opinion the rent reserved and other terms and circumstances of any lease which included the property or property interest being valued or any part thereof which was in effect within a reasonable time before or after the date of valuation.

(b) A witness may take into account a lease providing for a rental fixed by a percentage or other measurable portion of gross sales or gross income from a business conducted on the leased property only for the purpose of arriving at his opinion as to the reasonable net rental value attributable to the property or property interest being valued as provided in Section 819 or determining the value of a leasehold interest.

Comment. Section 817 is amended to make clear that subdivision (b) is a limitation on subdivision (a). It should be noted that Section 817 applies only to the determination of the value of property and not to such matters as loss of goodwill. See Section 811 and Comment thereto and Code of Civil Procedure Section 1263.510 and Comment thereto.

Evidence Code § 822 (amended)

SEC. . Section 822 of the Evidence Code is amended to read:

822. Notwithstanding the provisions of Sections 814 to 821, the following matter is inadmissible as evidence and is not a proper basis for an opinion as to the value of property:

(a) The price or other terms and circumstances of an acquisition of property or a property interest if the acquisition was for a public use for which the property could have been taken by eminent domain.

(b) The price at which an offer or option to purchase or lease the property or property interest being valued or any other property was made, or the price at which such property was optioned, offered, or listed for sale or lease, except that an option, offer, or listing may be introduced by a party as an admission of another party to the proceeding; but nothing in this subdivision permits an admission to be used as direct evidence upon any matter that may be shown only by opinion evidence under Section 813.

(c) The value of any property or property interest as assessed for taxation purposes, but nothing in this subdivision prohibits the consideration of actual or estimated taxes for the purpose of determining the reasonable net rental value attributable to the property or property interest being valued.

(d) An opinion as to the value of any property or property interest other than that being valued.

(e) The influence upon the value of the property or property interest being valued of any noncompensable items of value, damage, or injury.

(f) The capitalized value of the income or rental from any property or property interest other than that being valued.

(g) *A transaction involving the trade or exchange of any property including the property being valued.*

Comment. Subdivision (b) of Section 822, precluding admission of the price of an option to show the value of property, does not preclude admission of the price of the option to show the value of the option under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1265.310 (unexercised options).

Subdivision (g) is added to Section 822 to make clear that transactions involving a trade or exchange of property are not a proper basis for an opinion since use of such transactions requires valuation of property other than the property being valued. See subdivision (d). *Cf. People v. Reardon*, 4 Cal.3d 507, 483 P.2d 20, 93 Cal. Rptr. 852 (1971). It should be noted, however, that subdivision (d) does not prohibit a witness from

testifying to adjustments made in sales of comparable property used as a basis for his opinion. *Cf. Merced Irr. Dist. v. Woolstenhulme*, 4 Cal.3d 478, 483 P.2d 1, 93 Cal. Rptr. 833 (1971).

Section 822 does not prohibit cross-examination of a witness on any matter precluded from admission as evidence if such cross-examination is for the limited purpose of determining whether a witness based his opinion in whole or in part on matter that is not a proper basis for an opinion; such cross-examination may not, however, serve as a means of placing improper matters before the jury. *Cf.* EVID. CODE §§ 721, 802, 803.

GENERAL CONDEMNATION AUTHORIZATION

Government Code § 184 (repealed)

SEC. . . Section 184 of the Government Code is repealed.

~~184. The State may acquire or authorize others to acquire title to property for public use in the cases and in the mode provided by law.~~

Comment. Section 184 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240.010 (public use limitation), 1240.020 (statutory delegation of condemnation authority required).

PROTECTIVE CONDEMNATION,

Government Code §§ 190–196 (repealed)

SEC. . . Article 4.5 (commencing with Section 190) of Chapter 1 of Division 1 of Title 1 of the Government Code is repealed.

Comment. Sections 190–196 of the Government Code, relating to protective condemnation, are superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.120 (right to acquire property to make effective the principal use). Restrictions on the disposition of surplus property are continued in other statutes and in local ordinances and charters. See, e.g., Charter of the City and County of San Francisco § 7.401 (1971).

LIABILITY OF PUBLIC ENTITIES

Government Code § 816 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 816 of the Government Code is amended to read:

816. Notwithstanding Section 821.8, a public entity is liable for actual damage to property or for substantial interference with the possession or use of property where such damage or interference arises from an entry pursuant to ~~Section 1242 or 1242.5 Article 1 (commencing with Section 1245.010) of Chapter 4 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the~~ the Code of Civil Procedure upon the property by the public entity to make studies, surveys, examinations, tests, soundings, or appraisals or to engage in similar activities.

Comment. Section 816 is amended to conform to the numbering of the Eminent Domain Law.

Section 816 was added in 1970 to clarify the application of Division 3.6 (Sections 810–996.6) to claims for damages that may arise from privileged entries upon private property to conduct surveys, examinations, explorations, and similar activities. In general, this section codifies the decisional law that gives content, as to these entries and activities, to the assurance of Section 14 of Article I of the California Constitution that compensation will be made for the “taking” or “damaging” of property. See *Jacobsen v. Superior Court*, 192 Cal. 319, 219 P. 986 (1923).

This section does not *authorize* any entry upon property or the conducting of investigatory activities. Rather, the section provides a “rule of reason” to govern the liability of the public entity where such entries and activities are authorized by other statutory provisions. As to entries upon private property to determine its suitability for acquisition by eminent domain proceedings, see Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1245.010–1245.070.

In cases where a condemnation proceeding eventually is filed to take the property, or a portion of it, the damages mentioned in this section may be recovered only by cross-complaint in the condemnation proceeding. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 426.70 and Comment thereto.

In imposing liability for “actual” damage to property and for “substantial” interference with possession and use of the property, this section provides only a general standard that must be applied with common sense to the facts of the

particular case. The term "actual damage" is commonly used in similar statutory provisions in other states. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 68-2005 (1972); MASS. LAWS ANN., Ch. 81, § 7F (1971); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 163.03 (Page 1969); OKLA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 69, §§ 702, 703 (1969); PA. STAT. ANN., Tit. 26, § 1-409 (Supp. 1969). Judicial decisions from other states have also given sensible applications to the phrase. See, e.g., *Onorato Bros. v. Massachusetts Turnpike Authority*, 336 Mass. 54, 142 N.E.2d 389 (1957); *Wood v. Mississippi Power Co.*, 245 Miss. 103, 146 So.2d 546 (1962). A specific consequence of the use of the term "actual" is to preclude recovery of the purely "nominal" or "constructive" damages that are presumed in tort law to flow from any intentional tort.

Use of the phrase "substantial interference" recognizes that any entry upon private property causes at least a minimal "interference" with the owner's use, possession, and enjoyment of that property. The very presence upon property of uninvited "guests" would be deemed by some property owners to be an interference with their property rights. The term "substantial," however, is intended to exclude liability for entries and activities that, to quote the leading California decision (*Jacobsen v. Superior Court, supra*), "would not in the nature of things seriously impinge upon or impair the rights of the owner to the use and enjoyment of his property." See *Recommendation Relating to Sovereign Immunity: Number 10—Revisions of the Governmental Liability Act*, 9 CAL. L. REVISION COMM'N REPORTS 801, 811 (1969).

ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY BY COUNTY OR CITY FOR OPEN SPACE

Government Code—heading for Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 6950) (amended)

SEC. . . . The heading for Chapter 12 (commencing with Section 6950) of Division 7 of Title 1 of the Government Code is amended to read:

CHAPTER 12. PURCHASE OF INTERESTS AND RIGHTS IN REAL PROPERTY ACQUISITION OF PROPERTY FOR OPEN SPACE

Government Code § 6950 (amended)

SEC. . Section 6950 of the Government Code is amended to read:

6950. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting this chapter to provide a means whereby any county or city may acquire, by purchase, gift, grant, bequest, devise, lease , *condemnation* or otherwise, and through the expenditure of public funds, the fee or any lesser interest or right in real property in order to preserve, through limitation of their future use, open spaces and areas for public use and enjoyment.

Comment. See Comment to Section 6953.

Government Code § 6952 (amended)

SEC. . Section 6952 of the Government Code is amended to read:

6952. The Legislature hereby declares that it is necessary for sound and proper urban and metropolitan development, and in the public interest of the people of this State for any county or city to expend or advance public funds for, or to accept by, purchase, gift, grant, bequest, devise, lease , *condemnation* or otherwise, the fee or any lesser interest or right in real property to acquire, maintain, improve, protect, limit the future use of or otherwise conserve open spaces and areas within their respective jurisdictions.

Comment. See Comment to Section 6953.

Government Code § 6953 (amended)

SEC. . Section 6953 of the Government Code is amended to read:

6953. (a) The Legislature further declares that the acquisition of interests or rights in real property for the preservation of open spaces and areas constitutes a public purpose for which public funds may be expended or advanced ; *and that any* .

(b) Any county or city may acquire, by purchase, gift, grant, bequest, devise, lease , *condemnation* or otherwise, the fee or any lesser interest, development right, easement, covenant or other contractual right necessary

to achieve the purposes of this chapter. *Notwithstanding Section 1245.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure, where property is sought to be acquired under this section by condemnation, the resolution of necessity adopted pursuant to Section 1245.220 of the Code of Civil Procedure is not conclusive on the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure.*

(c) Any county or city may also acquire the fee to any property for the purpose of conveying or leasing said property back to its original owner or other person under such covenants or other contractual arrangements as will limit the future use of the property in accordance with the purposes of this chapter.

Comment. Section 6953 is amended to make clear that a city or county may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for open space use under this chapter. The former law was unclear, but condemnation for open space probably was not authorized. *Compare Note, Property Taxation of Agricultural and Open Space Land*, 8 HARV. J. LEGIS. 158 n.1 (1970) (implying that condemnation was authorized) *with* California Legislative Counsel, Opinion No. 17885 (Eminent Domain) (Oct. 24, 1969) (concluding that condemnation was not authorized). Cities are authorized to acquire "urban open space lands" (GOVT. CODE § 38002) by condemnation (GOVT. CODE § 38010) under the Park and Playground Act of 1909. See Cal. Stats. 1970, Ch. 645. Cf. GOVT. CODE §§ 51058 (last paragraph), 51065. Compare, e.g., PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5540, 5541 (authorizing condemnation by regional park district for "natural areas" and "ecological and open space preserves"); Cal. Stats. 1970, Ch. 268 (Orange County Flood Control Act § 2.4—authorizing condemnation for "natural areas" and "ecological and open space preserves"); Cal. Stats. 1971, Ch. 760 (Marin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act (Cal. Stats. 1953, Ch. 666) § 5(13), (15)—authorizing condemnation "to acquire, preserve, and enhance lands or interests in lands within the County of Marin contiguous to its properties, for the protection and preservation of the scenic beauty and natural environment for such properties or such lands"); Cal. Stats. 1971, Ch. 803 (Los Angeles County Flood Control Act § 2(6)(15)—authorizing condemnation "to acquire, preserve, and enhance lands or interests in lands contiguous to its properties for the protection and preservation of the scenic beauty and natural environment for such properties or such lands."). Where property is acquired

by condemnation under this chapter, the resolution of necessity is not conclusive on the issues of public interest and necessity.

The power of eminent domain provided in Section 6953 will facilitate compliance with Section 65564 (requiring local open space plans to incorporate an “action program” consisting of specific programs the city or county intends to pursue in implementing its open space plan). See also GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5 and 37350.5 (power of cities and counties to condemn to carry out city and county functions). The power of eminent domain will also provide a means to compel open space preservation where zoning fails. See GOVT. CODE § 65912 (open space zoning may not be used to take or damage property for public use without payment of just compensation). Cf. GOVT. CODE §§ 50575–50628 (open space maintenance districts).

For limitations on the right to acquire property under this chapter, see Section 6955.

Government Code § 6955 (added)

SEC. . . Section 6955 is added to the Government Code, to read:

6955. Property may be acquired under this chapter only if its acquisition is consistent with the local open space plan adopted by the city or county pursuant to Section 65563.

Comment. Section 6955 makes clear that cities and counties may acquire open space or open area only if such acquisition is consistent with the local open space plan adopted pursuant to Section 65563 (requiring every city and county to prepare and adopt a local open space plan for the comprehensive and long-range preservation and conservation of open space land within its jurisdiction). Section 6955 is thus merely a specific application of Section 65566 (requiring all acquisitions of open space land to be consistent with the local open space plan). See also Section 65567 (prohibiting issuance of building permits, approval of subdivision maps, or adoption of open space zoning ordinances unless consistent with the local open space plan) and Section 65302 (general plan must contain land use element designating open space use).

Section 6955 parallels Section 65910 (requiring cities and counties to adopt open space zoning ordinances consistent with the local open space plan). By providing that the acquisition of open space—by purchase, condemnation, or otherwise—must be consistent with the local open space plan, Section 6955

recognizes that acquisition of property is an alternative to open space zoning.

Government Code § 6956 (added)

SEC. . . Section 6956 is added to the Government Code, to read:

6956. (a) A city or county may divert property from use as open space or open area only after it has obtained replacement property for the property to be diverted. Any replacement property, whether substituted or received in exchange, shall be substantially equivalent in usefulness and location for permanent open space or open area as the property it replaces and must be held subject to all the provisions of this chapter. Money received for property diverted from use as open space or open area shall be used to acquire the replacement property or shall be held in a trust fund to be used only to acquire other open space or open area subject to the provisions of this chapter.

(b) This section applies only to property acquired under this chapter after December 31, 1976.

(c) This section does not apply where property or a right or interest therein is conveyed or otherwise subjected to uses that are compatible with its character as open space or open area and that do not significantly adversely affect such character.

Comment. Before open space or open area may be diverted to other use, Section 6956 requires that substantially equivalent property be acquired for open space or open area. The equivalent property may be acquired, for example, in exchange for the diverted property, by purchase with funds available for open space acquisition, or (if the city or county uses the open space or open area for its own public project) by public funds available for the project.

It should be noted that the restriction contained in Section 6956 is not the only restriction upon disposal of open space property by cities and counties. Section 65566 requires that acquisition, disposition, restriction, or regulation of open space property be in accordance with the local open space plan. This requirement applies to property acquired for open space under this chapter or under any other provision of law.

Subdivision (a). Subdivision (a) of Section 6956, which requires substitution of equivalent property, adopts the substance of the limitation found in 42 U.S.C. § 1500c (limitation on conversion of open space to another use if federal assistance used to acquire the open space). See also the *1970 Cumulative State Legislative Program* (1969) of the Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, containing suggested state legislation including a similar limitation. For a somewhat comparable provision, see PUB. RES. CODE § 5096.27 (property acquired by local entity with state grant under Cameron-Unruh Beach, Park, Recreational, and Historical Facilities Bond Act of 1964 to be used only for purpose for which state grant funds requested unless otherwise permitted by specific act of the Legislature). Compare PUB. RES. CODE § 5540 (authorization by voters or by act of Legislature required for conveyance of property used for park purposes by regional park district).

Subdivision (b). The requirements of subdivision (a) apply only to open space property acquired after the time cities and counties have been granted the power of eminent domain to acquire open space. Nonetheless, the requirements apply not only to open space acquired by eminent domain but also to such property acquired by any other method.

Subdivision (c). The requirements of subdivision (a) do not affect the right of cities and counties to convey or lease open space property, or a right or interest therein, under such covenants or other contractual arrangements as will limit its future use in accordance with the provisions of this chapter. See Section 6953. Subdivision (c) permits improvements in the open space area that do not significantly adversely affect its usefulness as open space. If, however, the improvement significantly adversely affects the usefulness of the open space area as open space, subdivision (a) is applicable.

ACQUISITION PRICE PUBLIC INFORMATION

Government Code § 7275 (added)

SEC. . Section 7275 is added to the Government Code, to read:

7275. Whenever any public entity acquires real property by eminent domain, purchase, or exchange, the purchase price and other consideration paid by such entity is public information and shall be made available upon request from the entity concerned.

Comment. Section 7275 continues the substance of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1265.

RESTORATION OF DESTROYED STATE RECORDS

Government Code § 14770 (added)

SEC. . . Article 7 (commencing with Section 14770) is added to Chapter 5 of Part 5.5 of Division 3 of Title 2 of the Government Code, to read:

Article 7. Restoration of Records Destroyed by Public Calamity

14770. (a) As used in this section:

(1) "Acquire" includes acquisition by gift, purchase, lease, eminent domain, or otherwise.

(2) "Public record plant" means the plant, or any part thereof, or any record therein, of any person engaged in the business of searching or publishing public records or insuring or guaranteeing titles to real property, including copies of public records and abstracts or memoranda taken from public records, which is owned by or in the possession of such person or which is used by him in his business.

(b) If public records of any state agency have been lost or destroyed by conflagration or other public calamity, the director may acquire the right to reproduce such portion of a public record plant as is necessary for the purpose of restoring or replacing the records or their substance.

Comment. Section 14770 is new but reflects the same policy as subdivision 15 of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 which applied only to certain local public entities.

The broad authority to acquire the "right to reproduce" lost or destroyed records permits the reproduction of records by such means as making copies, obtaining a computer printout or other visual representation of records preserved in data processing equipment, or duplicating magnetic tapes or other means for preserving such records in data processing equipment.

For comparable authority for local public entities, see GOVT. CODE § 53040.

CONDEMNATION DEPOSITS FUND

Government Code §§ 16429.1–16429.3 (added)

SEC. . Article 10 (commencing with Section 16429.1) is added to Chapter 2 of Part 2 of Division 4 of Title 2 of the Government Code, to read:

Article 10. Condemnation Deposits Fund

Government Code § 16429.1 (added)

16429.1. The Condemnation Deposits Fund in the State Treasury is continued in existence. The fund consists of all money deposited in the State Treasury under Section 1255.070 or 1268.150 of the Code of Civil Procedure and all interest earned or other increment derived from its investment. The State Treasurer shall receive all such moneys, duly receipt for, and safely keep the same in the fund, and for such duty he is liable upon his official bond.

Comment. Sections 16429.1–16429.3 continue the substance of a portion of subdivision (h) and all of subdivisions (i) and (j) of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1254.

Government Code § 16429.2 (added)

16429.2. (a) Money in the Condemnation Deposits Fund may be invested and reinvested in any securities described in Section 16430 or deposited in banks as provided in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 16500).

(b) The Pooled Money Investment Board shall designate at least once a month the amount of money available in the fund for investment in securities or deposit in bank accounts and the type of investment or deposit and shall so arrange the investment or deposit program that funds will be available for the immediate payment of any court order or decree. Immediately after such designation, the State Treasurer shall invest or make deposits in bank accounts in accordance with the designations. For the purposes of this subdivision, a written determination signed by a majority of the members of the Pooled Money Investment Board shall be deemed to be the determination of the board. Members

may authorize deputies to act for them for the purpose of making determinations under this section.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 16429.1.

Government Code § 16429.3 (added)

16429.3. Interest earned and other increment derived from investments or deposits made pursuant to this article, after deposit of money in the State Treasury, shall be deposited in the Condemnation Deposits Fund. After first deducting therefrom expenses incurred by the State Treasurer in taking and making delivery of bonds or other securities under this article, the State Controller shall apportion as of June 30th and December 31st of each year the remainder of such interest earned or increment derived and deposited in the fund during the six calendar months ending with such dates. There shall be apportioned and paid to each plaintiff having a deposit in the fund during the six-month period for which an apportionment is made an amount directly proportionate to the total deposits in the fund and the length of time such deposits remained therein. The State Treasurer shall pay out the money deposited by a plaintiff in such manner and at such times as the court or a judge thereof may, by order or decree, direct.

Comment. See Comment to Section 16429.1.

COUNTIES

Government Code § 25350.5 (added)

SEC. . Section 25350.5 is added to the Government Code, to read:

25350.5. The board of supervisors of any county may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of the powers or functions of the county.

Comment. Section 25350.5 supersedes the grant of condemnation authority formerly contained in various subdivisions of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure and supplements the specific grants of such authority contained in this and other codes. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE § 26020 (airports); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 943 (highways). Its purpose is to give a county adequate authority to carry out its functions.

Specific limitations may be imposed on the exercise of the power of eminent domain. See PENAL CODE § 4106 (no industrial farm may be established on land outside county without consent of the affected county). On the other hand, where a statute authorizes the acquisition of property by means not specifically including eminent domain, such authorization does not preclude the use of eminent domain under this section. See, e.g., PUB. RES. CODE § 5157 (county may acquire land for public park).

MOBILIZATION, TRAINING, AND SUPPLY STATIONS

Government Code § 25431 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 25431 of the Government Code is amended to read:

25431. ~~The acquisition of land for the establishment of a permanent mobilization, training, and supply station for any military purposes authorized by any law of the United States is a public use, and the right of eminent domain is granted and extended to every county availing itself of the provisions of this article for every purpose of condemnation, appropriation, or disposition intended by this article and any Any county may condemn and appropriate all lands and rights whatsoever exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any property necessary or convenient for carrying out the provisions of this article. The right of eminent domain may be exercised on behalf of such public use in accordance with the provisions of Title 7, Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.~~

Comment. The provisions deleted from Section 25431 are unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1230.020 (law governing exercise of eminent domain power), 1240.010 (declaration of public use unnecessary), 1240.110 (right to acquire any right or interest in any type of property).

CITIES

Government Code § 37350.5 (added)

SEC. . Section 37350.5 is added to the Government Code, to read:

37350.5. A city may acquire by eminent domain any property necessary to carry out any of its powers or functions.

Comment. Section 37350.5 supersedes the grant of condemnation authority formerly contained in various subdivisions of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure and supplements the specific grants of such authority contained in this and other codes. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE § 37501 (public assembly or convention halls); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 4090 (streets, walks, parking places). Its purpose is to give a city adequate authority to carry out its municipal functions.

Specific limitations may, of course, be imposed on the exercise of the power of eminent domain under some circumstances. See GOVT. CODE § 37353(c) (no existing golf course may be acquired by eminent domain for golf course purposes). On the other hand, where a statute authorizes the acquisition of property by means not specifically including eminent domain, such authorization does not preclude the use of eminent domain under this section. See Comment to Section 25350.5 (authority of county to condemn for county functions).

CITY REVOLVING FUND

Government Code § 43424 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 43424 of the Government Code is amended to read:

43424. It may advance money from the revolving fund and as a deposit ~~it in court as security upon commencing pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 of, or Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110) of Chapter 11 of, Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure in any eminent domain proceeding to acquire lands, rights of way, or other any property necessary in establishing, laying out, opening, widening, extending, or straightening any street or other public way.~~

Comment. Section 43424 is amended to conform to the numbering of the Eminent Domain Law. The reference to "lands, rights of way, or other property" is deleted as unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.070 ("property" defined) and 1240.110 (right to acquire any necessary right or interest in any type of property).

PROPERTY TO BE USED FOR FEDERAL PURPOSES

Government Code § 50366 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 50366 of the Government Code is amended to read:

~~50366. The acquisition of land for use by the United States pursuant to this article is a public use, and the right of eminent domain is granted to a local agency availing itself of this article to condemn and appropriate lands and rights may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any property necessary or convenient to carry out this article.~~

Comment. The provision deleted from Section 50366 is unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.010 (declaration of public use unnecessary).

AIRPORT HAZARDS

Government Code § 50485.2 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 50485.2 of the Government Code is amended to read:

~~50485.2. It is hereby found that an airport hazard endangers the lives and property of users of the airport and of occupants of land in its vicinity and also, if of the obstruction type, in effect reduces the size of the area available for the landing, taking off and maneuvering of the aircraft, thus tending to destroy or impair the utility of the airport and the public investment therein. Accordingly, it is hereby declared: (a) that the creation or establishment of an airport hazard is a public nuisance and an injury to the community served by the airport in question; and (b) that it is therefore necessary in the interest of the public health, public safety, and general welfare that the creation or establishment of airport~~

hazards be prevented; and ~~(e)~~ that this should be accomplished, to the extent legally possible, by exercise of the police power by appropriate exercise of the police power or the authority conferred by Article 2.6 (commencing with Section 21652) of Part 1 of Division 9 of the Public Utilities Code. It is further declared that both the prevention of the creation or establishment of airport hazards and the elimination, removal, alteration, mitigation, or marking and lighting of existing airport hazards are public purposes for which a city or county may raise and expend public funds and acquire land or property interests therein.

Comment. Section 50485.2 is amended to preserve the broad discretion of local governments in selecting the means employed in acquiring airport approach protection. See former Section 50485.13 and Public Utilities Code Sections 21652 and 21653 (acquisitions for airport approach protection).

Government Code § 50485.13 (repealed)

SEC. . Section 50485.13 of the Government Code is repealed.

~~50485.13.~~ In any case in which: ~~(a)~~ it is desired to remove, lower, or otherwise terminate a nonconforming structure or use; or ~~(b)~~ the approach protection necessary cannot, because of constitutional limitations, be provided by airport zoning regulations under this article; or ~~(c)~~ it appears advisable that the necessary approach protection be provided by acquisition of property rights rather than by airport zoning regulations, the city or county within which the property or nonconforming use is located or the city or county owning the airport or served by it may acquire, by purchase, grant, or condemnation in the manner provided by the law under which a city or county is authorized to acquire real property for public purposes, such air right, air navigation easement, or other estate or interest in the property or nonconforming structure or use in question as may be necessary to effectuate the purposes of this article. In the case of the purchase or grant of any property or any easement or estate or interest therein or the acquisition of the same by the power of eminent domain by a city or county making such purchase or

~~exercising such power, there shall be included in the damages for the taking, injury or destruction of property the cost of the removal and relocation of any structure or public utility which is required to be moved to a new location.~~

Comment. Section 50485.13, granting cities and counties the power of eminent domain to eliminate airport hazards, is superseded by other sections.

The power to condemn for the elimination of airport hazards is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 21652. To the extent that entities were limited in their exercise of eminent domain under Section 50485.13 to situations in which zoning would have been inadvisable or unconstitutional, the limitation is not continued. Any entity authorized to condemn for airports may condemn to eliminate airport hazards without limitation under Public Utilities Code Section 21652. It should be noted that cities and counties may achieve this end by appropriate use of its police or eminent domain power. GOVT. CODE § 50485.2.

The requirement that cities and counties pay the cost of relocation of structures when acquiring property to eliminate airport hazards is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 21653.

The authority of cities and counties to condemn property outside their boundaries for airport purposes is retained in Government Code Section 50470.

AGRICULTURAL PRESERVES

Government Code § 51291 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 51291 of the Government Code is amended to read:

51291. (a) As used in this section, Section 51292, and Section 51295 "public agency" means the state, or any department or agency thereof, and any county, city, school district, or other local public district, agency, or entity; and "person" means any person authorized by ~~Section 1001 of the Civil Code~~ to acquire property by eminent domain.

(b) Whenever it appears that land within an agricultural preserve may be required by a public agency or person for a public use, the public agency or person shall advise the Director of Agriculture and the local governing body responsible for the administration of the preserve of

the intention to consider the location of a public improvement within the preserve.

Within 30 days thereafter the Director of Agriculture and the local governing body shall forward to the public agency or person concerned their comments with respect to the effect of the location of the public improvement on the land within the agricultural preserve and such comments shall be considered by the public agency or person. Failure of any public agency or person to comply with the requirements of this section shall not invalidate any action by such agency or person to locate a public improvement within an agricultural preserve. However, such failure by any person or any public agency other than a state agency shall be admissible in evidence in any litigation for the acquisition of such land or involving the allocation of funds or the construction of the public improvement.

Comment. Section 51291 is amended to delete the reference to former Civil Code Section 1001 (repealed). See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.020 (statutory delegation of condemnation authority required).

RESTORATION OF DESTROYED LOCAL PUBLIC RECORDS

Government Code § 53040 (added)

SEC. . Article 2.6 (commencing with Section 53040) is added to Chapter 1 of Part 1 of Division 2 of Title 5 of the Government Code, to read:

Article 2.6. Restoration of Records Destroyed by Public Calamity

53040. (a) As used in this section:

(1) "Acquire" includes acquisition by gift, purchase, lease, eminent domain, or otherwise.

(2) "Local public entity" means any public entity other than the state.

(3) "Public record plant" means the plant, or any part thereof, or any record therein, of any person engaged in the business of searching or publishing public records or insuring or guaranteeing titles to real property, including

copies of public records and abstracts or memoranda taken from public records, which is owned by or in the possession of such person or which is used by him in his business.

(b) If public records of a local public entity have been lost or destroyed by conflagration or other public calamity, the local public entity may acquire the right to reproduce such portion of a public record plant as is necessary for the purpose of restoring or replacing the records or their substance.

Comment. Section 53040 is derived from and reflects the same policy as subdivision 15 of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238. However, the provision is broadened to cover all local public entities and is limited to acquiring the "right to reproduce" such records and does not permit permanent acquisition of the public records plant itself.

The broad authority to acquire the "right to reproduce" lost or destroyed records permits the reproduction of records by such means as making copies, obtaining a computer printout or other visual representation of records preserved in data processing equipment, or duplicating magnetic tapes or other means for preserving such records in data processing equipment.

For comparable authority for state agencies, see GOVT. CODE § 14770.

INTEREST ON DEPOSITS

Government Code § 53844 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 53844 of the Government Code is amended to read:

53844. In any county which qualifies as set forth in Section 53840 to use the foregoing procedure for short-term financing, all interest payments on the loans may, in the discretion of the board of supervisors, be charged to the general fund of any district or fund for which loans have been made. All interest earned on funds in the county treasury shall be credited to said general fund of the county, excepting therefrom the interest on deposits of school districts which shall accrue to the general funds of the respective school districts, the interest earned on specific investments of a local agency as authorized by Section 53601 of this code or by Section 5007

of the Education Code, and moneys on deposit in court in eminent domain actions pursuant to ~~order of court to secure immediate possession Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 of, or Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110) of Chapter 11 of, Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.~~

Comment. Section 53844 is amended to conform to the provisions of the Eminent Domain Law.

JOINT SANITATION PROJECTS

Government Code § 55003 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 55003 of the Government Code is amended to read:

55003. When it is necessary to ~~take or damage private acquire~~ property in the construction of any outfall sewer or conduit pursuant to this chapter, the property may be ~~taken acquired by eminent domain pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure.~~

Comment. Section 55003 is amended to conform to the terminology of the Eminent Domain Law.

WHARVES, CHUTES, AND PIERS

Harbors & Navigation Code § 4009 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 4009 of the Harbors and Navigation Code is amended to read:

4009. After authority to construct a wharf or chute has been granted, *until the grantee may procure has procured from the owner the right of way and other necessary incidental uses of any of his lands necessary for the wharf or chute, by condemnation proceedings had under Part III of Title VII, of the Code of Civil Procedure. Until the use of the lands held adversely is obtained by agreement, or by the proceedings herein mentioned,* there is no authority to construct a wharf or chute or to take tolls thereon.

Comment. Section 4009 is amended to delete the grant of the right to exercise the power of eminent domain. The right of a wharfinger to condemn property is continued by Public Utilities Code Section 619 to the extent that the wharfinger is a public utility. Insofar as Section 4009 might have been

construed to authorize private persons to exercise the power of eminent domain, such authority is not continued.

NONPROFIT HOSPITALS

Health & Safety Code § 438.4 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 438.4 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

438.4. The voluntary area health planning agency, acting upon an application originally or reviewing a recommendation of a voluntary local health planning agency or the consumer members of a voluntary area health planning agency acting as an appeals body, and the Advisory Health Council shall make one of the following decisions:

- (a) Approve the application in its entirety;
- (b) Deny the application in its entirety;
- (c) Approve the application subject to modification by the applicant, as recommended by the body involved.

A decision shall become final when all rights to appeal have been exhausted. Approval shall terminate 12 months after the date of such approval unless the applicant has commenced construction, or conversion to a different license category, *or an action to condemn property pursuant to Section 1427*, and is diligently pursuing the same to completion as determined by the voluntary area health planning agency; or unless the approval is extended by the voluntary area health planning agency for an additional period of up to 12 months upon the showing of good cause for the extension. If the Advisory Health Council finds that the voluntary area health planning agency has dissolved, it may grant such extension upon a showing by the applicant of good cause for the extension.

Comment. Section 1427 requires that health planning agency approval be secured before a nonprofit hospital may condemn property for hospital facilities. The amendment to Section 438.4 recognizes that condemnation may require more than a year and provides that approval automatically is extended at the end of 12 months if condemnation has been commenced and is diligently pursued.

Health & Safety Code § 1427 (added)

SEC. . . Section 1427 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

1427. (a) As used in this section, "nonprofit hospital" means any institution, place, building, or agency currently licensed under this chapter to provide 24-hour inpatient services for the diagnosis, care, and treatment of various physical or mental illnesses or ailments of humans, in multiple departments having an organized medical or medical-dental staff, and which is owned and operated by a fund, foundation, or corporation, no part of the net earnings of which inures, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual. "Nonprofit hospital" does not include institutions the primary purpose of which is to provide convalescent, rehabilitative, nursing, or resident care.

(b) Any nonprofit hospital may exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the establishment, operation, or expansion of the hospital if both the following requirements are met:

(1) A final and favorable decision concerning the project for which the property is sought to be condemned has been made pursuant to Part 1.5 (commencing with Section 437) of Division 1 of the Health and Safety Code by such agencies and with such procedures as are required for the certification of health facilities pursuant to the provisions of the Health and Safety Code.

(2) The Director of Health has certified that (i) the acquisition of the property sought to be condemned is necessary for the establishment, operation, or expansion of the hospital, (ii) the public interest and necessity require the proposed project, and (iii) the proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

(c) The certificate of the Director of Health pursuant to subdivision (b) establishes a presumption that the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure are true. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.

Comment. Section 1427 supersedes former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238.3.

Subdivision (a). The term "nonprofit" has the same meaning under subdivision (a) as under former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238.3. However, the definition of "hospital" in subdivision (a) has been narrowed to include only those institutions that are licensed to provide diversified, professional, short-term services and to exclude institutions that provide only long-term or specialized services. The definition is in keeping with the Administrative Code definitions of "hospital" and "general hospital." See 9 CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 515; 17 CAL. ADMIN. CODE, Ch. 1, § 230.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) grants broader authority to condemn than was provided by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238.3, for it permits acquisition of property to establish a newly-organized and licensed hospital, dispenses with the requirement that the property be "immediately adjacent" to existing holdings, and no longer requires that the hospital condemnor be engaged in "scientific research or an educational activity." The limitation to property immediately adjacent unduly restricted the ability of existing hospitals to acquire one parcel in a large tract needed for expansion. The limitation to hospitals engaged in scientific research or education was both narrow and ineffective and no longer serves a limiting function since nearly all medical institutions conduct some research or education. Also, the limitation to expansion of existing hospitals was undesirable in view of the equal or greater need of new hospitals for the right of eminent domain. The new scheme is intended to aid expansion to meet public needs as determined by authorized agencies.

In place of the restrictions contained in former Section 1238.3, paragraph (1) of subdivision (b) requires that a project be approved by the appropriate agencies before condemnation will be permitted. Paragraph (2) continues the requirement of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238.3 that the Director of Health certify that the acquisition is necessary. In addition, paragraph (2) requires the certificate to indicate the public interest and necessity for the acquisition. Cf. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.030.

Subdivision (c). Subdivision (c) establishes and classifies the presumption of necessity afforded the certificate of the Director of Health for the purposes of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.030.

SEWER CONSTRUCTION

Health & Safety Code § 4967 (added)

SEC. . . Section 4967 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

4967. The owner of property that may be benefited by the acquisition, construction, extension, or operation of the works referred to in this chapter may file with the district a request that a particular work be undertaken. The request may, but need not, include the descriptions and estimates referred to in Section 4966 and shall not be denied without a public hearing.

Comment. Section 4967 is added to the Health and Safety Code to expressly authorize initiation of sewerage construction and extension proposals by individual property owners. The request may be made of any city, county, city and county, or any municipal or public corporation or district which is authorized to acquire, construct, own, or operate a sewer system. See Section 4951. In reviewing a property owner's request, the district should consider both the necessity for the requested action and its relative hardship on any party whose land is sought to be used compared with the benefit to the requester.

Under prior law, private individuals under certain circumstances were authorized to condemn property for a sewer easement. *Linggi v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955). Private individuals no longer have a right to condemn property for this purpose. See the Comment to subdivision 8 of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238. Instead, Section 4967 provides a procedure whereby the property owner can initiate proceedings to have the public entity acquire a sewer easement or any other necessary property. The public entity is authorized to acquire the necessary property by gift, purchase, condemnation, or otherwise. See Sections 5000, 5001.

COMMUNITY REDEVELOPMENT LAW

Health & Safety Code § 33398 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 33398 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

33398. Section ~~1243.1~~ *1245.260* of the Code of Civil Procedure shall not apply to any resolution or ordinance adopting, approving, amending, or approving the amendment of a redevelopment project or plan. Section

~~1243.1~~ **1245.260** of the Code of Civil Procedure shall apply to a resolution adopted by a redevelopment agency declaring the public necessity for and authorizing the condemnation of, and expressly authorizing the filing of a condemnation action as to a particular parcel or parcels of real property.

Comment. Section 33398 is amended to conform to the numbering of the Eminent Domain Law.

RENEWAL AREA AGENCY

Health & Safety Code § 33720 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 33720 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

33720. The power of eminent domain shall not be exercised by the renewal area agency ~~without the specific authority of unless the legislative body , by a majority vote of its members, has adopted a resolution of necessity .~~

Comment. Sections 33720, 33721, and 33723 are amended to conform to the Eminent Domain Law. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.040 and 1245.210 *et seq.*

Health & Safety Code § 33721 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 33721 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

33721. The ~~authorization shall be contained in a certificate of the legislative body specifying that resolution of necessity may be adopted only after a public hearing ; it has determined that the acquisition of the property by eminent domain and the construction of the housing on the property is in the public interest and necessary for the public use. by the legislative body and shall contain all of the following:~~

(a) *A general description of the proposed project with a reference to the specific statute or statutes authorizing the renewal area agency to acquire property for such project.*

(b) *A description of the property to be acquired for the proposed project and its use in the proposed project.*

(c) *A declaration that the legislative body has found and determined each of the following:*

(1) *The public interest and necessity require the proposed project.*

(2) *The proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.*

(3) *The property described in the resolution is necessary for the proposed project.*

Comment. See the Comment to Section 33720.

Health & Safety Code § 33723 (amended)

SEC. . Section 33723 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

33723. ~~A duly certified copy of the certificate of the legislative body~~ *The resolution of necessity* is conclusive evidence of the matters ~~certified in it referred to in~~ *in* ~~Section 1240.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure~~ in any proceeding in eminent domain to acquire property or any part of it set forth in the ~~certificate~~ *resolution*.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 33720.

HOUSING AUTHORITY

Health & Safety Code § 34325 (amended)

SEC. . Section 34325 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

34325. ~~Pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure an~~ *An authority may acquire by eminent domain any real property which it deems necessary for its purposes under this chapter after the adoption by it of a resolution declaring that the acquisition of the real property described in it is necessary for such purposes. Property already devoted to a public use may be acquired by eminent domain, but real *Real* property belonging to the city, the county, the State, or any of its political subdivisions shall not be acquired without its consent.*

Comment. The provisions deleted from Section 34325 are unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1230.020 (law governing exercise of eminent domain power), 1245.210 *et seq.* (resolution of necessity), 1240.510 (compatible use), 1240.610 (more necessary public use).

LIMITED DIVIDEND HOUSING CORPORATIONS**Health & Safety Code § 34875 (amended)**

SEC. . Section 34875 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

34875. The power of eminent domain shall not be exercised by a corporation ~~except with the specific authorization of~~ unless the commission, *by a majority vote of its members, has adopted a resolution of necessity.*

Comment. Sections 34875, 34876, and 34878 are amended to conform to the Eminent Domain Law. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.040 and 1245.210 *et seq.*

Health & Safety Code § 34876 (amended)

SEC. . Section 34876 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

34876. The ~~authorization shall be contained in a certificate of the commission specifying that resolution of necessity may be adopted only after a public hearing by the commission has determined that the acquisition of the property by eminent domain and the construction of the housing on the property is in the public interest and necessary for the public use and shall contain all of the following:~~

(a) *A general description of the proposed project with a reference to the specific statute or statutes authorizing the corporation to acquire property for such project.*

(b) *A description of the property to be acquired for the proposed project and its use in the proposed project.*

(c) *A declaration that the commission has found and determined each of the following:*

(1) *The public interest and necessity require the proposed project.*

(2) *The proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.*

(3) *The property described in the resolution is necessary for the proposed project.*

Comment. See the Comment to Section 34875.

Health & Safety Code § 34878 (amended)

SEC. . Section 34878 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

34878. A duly certified copy of the certificate of the commission *The resolution of necessity* is conclusive evidence of the matters certified in it referred to in Section 1240.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure in any proceeding in eminent domain to acquire property or any part of it set forth in the certificate resolution.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 34875.

LAND CHEST CORPORATIONS**Health & Safety Code § 35167 (added)**

SEC. . Section 35167 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

35167. When the commissioner has approved a housing project, the corporation may acquire the property necessary for the project by gift, bequest, purchase, or eminent domain.

Comment. Sections 35167–35171 retain the substance of subdivision 21 of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 insofar as that subdivision may have applied to land chest corporations (nonprofit corporations formed for the purpose of providing “housing in rural and suburban areas for families of low income”). Sections 35167–35171 use language that is comparable to that used in Sections 34874–34878 relating to limited dividend housing corporations (corporations formed for the purpose of providing housing for families of low income or reconstructing slum areas).

Health & Safety Code § 35168 (added)

SEC. . Section 35168 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

35168. The power of eminent domain shall not be exercised by a corporation unless the commissioner has made a certificate of necessity.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 35167.

Health & Safety Code § 35169 (added)

SEC. . Section 35169 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

35169. The certificate of necessity may be made only after a public hearing by the commissioner and shall contain all of the following:

(a) A general description of the proposed project with a reference to the specific statute or statutes authorizing the corporation to acquire property for such project.

(b) A description of the property to be acquired for the proposed project and its use in the proposed project.

(c) A declaration that the commissioner has found and determined each of the following:

(1) The public interest and necessity require the proposed project.

(2) The proposed project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

(3) The property described in the certificate is necessary for the proposed project.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 35167.

Health & Safety Code § 35170 (added)

SEC. . Section 35170 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

35170. The hearing shall be held at a time and place designated by the commissioner. At least 10 days prior to the hearing, the corporation shall give notice of the hearing by publication in a newspaper designated by the commissioner and published or circulated in the city or county where the property is located.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 35167.

Health & Safety Code § 35171 (added)

SEC. . Section 35171 is added to the Health and Safety Code, to read:

35171. The certificate of necessity is conclusive evidence of the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure in any proceeding in eminent

domain to acquire the property or any part of it set forth in the certificate.

Comment. See the Comment to Section 35167.

HOUSING AUTHORITY

Health & Safety Code § 36059 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 36059 of the Health and Safety Code is amended to read:

36059. Within its area of operation, and with reference to farm labor centers, a housing authority may:

- (a) Own, hold, and improve real or personal property.
- (b) Purchase, lease, obtain options upon, acquire by gift, bequest, devise, or otherwise, any real or personal property or any interest therein.
- (c) Accept grants from any person or agency, public or private.
- (d) Borrow money and pledge any property, real or personal, as security.
- (e) Contract with any person or agency, public or private, with regard to operation of the farm labor centers.
- (f) Sell, lease, exchange, transfer, assign, purchase, or dispose of any real or personal property or interest therein.
- (g) Insure or provide for the insurance of any real or personal property or operations of any farm labor centers against any risks or hazards.
- (h) Employ such officers and employees, permanent and temporary, as may be required, determine their qualifications, duties and compensation, and delegate to one or more of them such powers or duties as may be necessary for the acquisition of any farm labor center.
- (i) Acquire any real property by eminent domain ~~after adopting a resolution declaring that the acquisition of the real property is necessary for the purposes of the housing authority.~~
- (j) Lease or rent any dwellings, accommodations, lands, buildings, structures, or facilities embraced in any farm labor center, and, subject to the requirements for occupancy contained in this part, establish the rents and charges therefor.

Comment. The provision deleted from Section 36059 is continued in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.040.

PREVENTION OF SUBSIDENCE IN OIL OR GAS PRODUCTION AREA

Public Resources Code § 3320.1 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 3320.1 of the Public Resources Code is amended to read:

3320.1. (a) An agreement for the management, development and operation of two or more tracts in a pool or pools, or portions thereof, in a field as a unit without regard to separate ownerships for the production of oil and gas, including repressuring operations therein, and for the allocation of benefits and costs on a basis set forth in such agreement, shall be valid and binding upon those who consent thereto and may be filed with the supervisor for approval.

Any agreement for the co-operative management, development and operation of two or more tracts in a pool or pools, or portions thereof, in a field for the production of oil or gas, including repressuring operations therein, shall be valid and binding upon those who consent thereto and may be filed with the supervisor for approval.

If in the judgment of the supervisor a unit agreement or co-operative agreement filed for approval is not detrimental to the intent and purposes of this article to arrest or ameliorate subsidence, or otherwise unlawful, the supervisor may approve the same. No such agreement approved by the supervisor hereunder or heretofore approved pursuant to applicable law prior to the enactment of this article shall be held to violate any of the statutes of this State prohibiting monopolies or acts, arrangements, agreements, contracts, combinations or conspiracies in restraint of trade or commerce.

(b) In the event that at the time of the approval by the supervisor of a unit or co-operative agreement under subdivision (a) of this section, the supervisor makes written findings that:

1. A primary purpose of the unit or co-operative agreement is the initiation and conduct of repressuring

operations in the area covered thereby for the purpose of arresting or ameliorating subsidence; and

2. The initiation and conduct of repressuring operations in the area covered by the unit or co-operative agreement are feasible and compatible with the purposes of this article; and

3. The persons who are entitled to 75 percent of the proceeds of production of oil and gas within the area covered by the unit or co-operative agreement (measured by the production of oil and gas therein in the last calendar year preceding the date of such approval) have become parties to such agreement by signing or ratifying it; and

4. It is necessary, in order to initiate and conduct such repressuring operations, that the properties of nonconsenting persons who own working interests or royalty interests in lands within the area covered by the unit or co-operative agreement become subject to such agreement; and

5. The agreement is fair and reasonable, and contains appropriate provisions to protect and safeguard the rights of all persons having an interest in oil and gas production in the area covered thereby; then the supervisor shall make and enter an order which shall provide that unless such nonconsenting persons shall, within 30 days after service upon such persons of the order in the manner specified by the supervisor, become parties to the agreement by signing or ratifying the same, the right of eminent domain may be exercised as ~~hereinafter~~ provided in subdivision (c) ~~hereof~~ for the purpose of acquiring the properties of such nonconsenting persons which are found by the supervisor to be necessary for the initiation and conduct of such repressuring operations.

In the event the supervisor shall make findings in accordance with the foregoing, such findings shall be prima facie evidence (1) of the public necessity of the development and operation of the said properties in accordance with the unit or co-operative agreement and of the repressuring operations to be initiated and conducted pursuant to such agreement; and (2) that the acquisition of the properties of the nonconsenting persons which are designated by the supervisor is necessary

therefor; and (3) that the repressuring and other operations to be initiated and conducted pursuant to such agreement, and the improvements to be made in connection therewith are planned or located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

The acquisition and use of land, including oil and gas rights therein, and personal property used in the production of oil and gas within a subsidence area for the purposes and by the persons mentioned in this section under the circumstances herein specified, are public uses on behalf of which the right of eminent domain may be exercised.

(c) Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b) ~~hereof~~, the right of eminent domain for the purposes therein mentioned may be exercised by any city, county, or city and county, which has agreed to commit the properties to be acquired to such unit or co-operative agreement, or which has agreed to convey all or a portion of said properties upon acquisition, for a price not less than the cost of acquiring the same, to working interest owners who are parties to such unit or co-operative agreement and who have agreed to commit such properties to said agreement.

Except as otherwise provided in subdivisions (b) and (c) ~~hereof~~, any condemnation action brought hereunder shall be governed by the provisions of Title 7 (commencing at Section ~~1237~~ 1230.010) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

If a condemnation action or actions to acquire the properties of the nonconsenting persons are promptly commenced and diligently prosecuted to final judgment by which such properties are acquired, no compulsory unit order affecting the area covered by such agreement shall be made by the supervisor under Section 3321 of this article with respect to such area.

Comment. Section 3320.1 is amended to conform to the numbering of the Eminent Domain Law.

Public Resources Code § 3341 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 3341 of the Public Resources Code is amended to read:

3341. At the termination of oil and gas production from a unit area established or approved pursuant to this article and the abandonment of attempts to obtain production therefrom, any interested municipal corporation or other public agency may acquire by eminent domain, in the manner provided by law for the condemnation of property for public use by the State, municipal corporation or other public agency, such oil production properties or facilities within the unit area as such municipal corporation or other public agency may deem necessary or essential to the maintenance of such pressures as will continue to arrest or ameliorate subsidence. ~~Such municipal corporation or other public agency shall proceed in its name, under the provisions of Title 7 (commencing at Section 1237) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provisions are hereby made applicable for that purpose, and the use of the property which may be condemned, taken or appropriated under the provisions of this section is a public use.~~

Comment. The last sentence of Section 3341 is deleted as unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1230.020 (law governing exercise of eminent domain power), 1240.010 (declaration of public use unnecessary).

RECREATIONAL TRAILS**Public Resources Code § 5077.1 (repealed)**

SEC. . . Section 5077.1 of the Public Resources Code is repealed.

~~5077.1. Notwithstanding the prohibition contained in Section 5077 against acquiring by eminent domain property or interests in property for trails established pursuant to this article, the Department of Public Works shall, pursuant to Section 104.2 of the Streets and Highways Code, replace, through the exercise of eminent domain, the riding and hiking trail in the vicinity of Alhambra Avenue in Martinez acquired by the~~

~~department for highway purposes through the use of eminent domain.~~

Comment. Section 5077.1 was enacted in 1969 to authorize a particular taking and is special legislation that should not be retained.

PARKS AND BOULEVARDS

Public Resources Code § 5301 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . . Section 5301 of the Public Resources Code is amended to read:

5301. Any city or city and county may acquire and hold land for public parks, or public boulevards, or both, by purchase, or by condemnation ; ~~under the provisions of title seven of part three of the Code of Civil Procedure~~.

Comment. The provision deleted from Section 5301 is unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.020 (law governing exercise of eminent domain power).

LANDS EXEMPT FROM CONDEMNATION

Public Resources Code § 8030 (added)

SEC. . . . Article 11 (commencing with Section 8030) is added to Chapter 4 of Part 3 of Division 6 of the Public Resources Code, to read:

Article 11. Exemption From Condemnation

8030. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, all 16th and 36th sections, both surveyed and unsurveyed, owned by the state or the United States, which are now or may hereafter be included within the exterior boundaries of a national reservation, a reserve, or lands withdrawn from public entry, are exempt from taking by eminent domain.

Comment. Section 8030 continues without substantive change the limitation upon condemnation of the lands described in subdivision 2 of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.

NATIONAL PARKS

Public Resources Code § 8402 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 8402 of the Public Resources Code is amended to read:

8402. ~~The use of land for National park purposes by the United States is a public use, and the right of eminent domain is granted and extended to every county availing itself of the provisions of this chapter for every purpose of condemnation, appropriation or disposition intended by this chapter.~~ Any such county may condemn and appropriate all lands and rights whatsoever exercise the right of eminent domain to acquire any property necessary or convenient for carrying out the provisions of this chapter. ~~Such right of eminent domain may be exercised in accordance with the provisions of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.~~

Comment. The provisions deleted from Section 8402 are unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.010 (declaration of public use unnecessary), 1240.110 (right to acquire any necessary right or interest in any type of property), 1230.020 (law governing exercise of eminent domain power).

PRIVATELY OWNED PUBLIC UTILITIES

Public Utilities Code §§ 610–624 (added)

SEC. . . Article 7 (commencing with Section 610) is added to Chapter 3 of Part 1 of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code, to read:

Article 7. Eminent Domain

Public Utilities Code § 610 (added)

610. This article applies only to a corporation or person that is a public utility.

Comment. Section 610 is included to make clear that this article extends the right of eminent domain only to “public utilities” as defined in Section 216 (“service is performed for or the commodity delivered to the public or any portion thereof”) and not to persons or corporations that are not subject to regulation and rate control. It has been held that the exercise of the right of eminent domain conclusively evidences an

intention to devote the property so acquired to a public use, thereby rendering the condemnor a public utility. *Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n*, 176 Cal. 499, 505, 169 P. 59, 61 (1917). Compare *McCullagh v. Railroad Comm'n*, 190 Cal. 13, 210 P. 264 (1922). This section is consistent with the holding in the *Producers Transp. Co.* case.

Public Utilities Code § 611 (added)

611. A railroad corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its railroad.

Comment. Section 611 grants a "railroad corporation" (defined in Section 230) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its railroad. "Railroad" is defined in Section 229 to mean in substance all railroad property devoted to public use in the transportation of persons or property. Thus, Section 611 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the railroad. It retains in substance the authority formerly found in subdivision (g) of Section 7526 of the Public Utilities Code and in Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See, e.g., *Southern Pac. Co. v. Los Angeles Mill Co.*, 177 Cal. 395, 170 P. 829 (1918) (spur tracks); *Vallejo & N. R.R. v. Reed Orchard Co.*, 169 Cal. 545, 147 P. 238 (1915) (land for wharves for transfer of freight between railroad cars and boats where reasonably necessary for railroad corporation's future business); *Central Pacific Ry. v. Feldman*, 152 Cal. 303, 92 P. 849 (1907) (land adjacent to station grounds required for a freight house); *Southern Pac. R.R. v. Raymond*, 53 Cal. 223 (1878) (workshop); *Madera Ry. v. Raymond Granite Co.*, 3 Cal. App. 668, 87 P. 27 (1906) (spur tracks). Cf. *City of Los Angeles v. Los Angeles Pac. Co.*, 31 Cal. App. 100, 159 P. 992 (1916) (land for pole line for transmission of power to public railway). Section 611 would not, however, permit condemnation by a railroad corporation of land to be used, for example, as an industrial park.

Section 611 supersedes provisions formerly contained in the Public Utilities Code and Code of Civil Procedure insofar as those provisions related to privately owned public utilities. See subdivision (g) of Section 7526 of the Public Utilities Code (right to condemn lands "to be used in the construction and maintenance of its roads, and all necessary appendages and adjuncts"); Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238, subdivision 4 ("steam, electric and horse railroads"), subdivision 11 (railroads

“for quarrying, logging or lumbering purposes”). See also Section 1238, subdivision 9 (“roads for transportation by traction engines or road locomotives”).

Section 611 has no effect on various specific grants of the power to railroads to condemn private property. See PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 7533 (additional tracks), 7535 (railroad intersections), 7536 (railroad crossings). See also PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7508 (right of eminent domain in transferee of railroad corporation).

Public Utilities Code § 612 (added)

612. An electrical corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its electric plant.

Comment. Section 612 grants an “electrical corporation” (defined in Section 218) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its electric plant. “Electric plant” is defined in Section 217 to mean in substance all property devoted to public use in the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of electricity for light, heat, or power. Thus, Section 612 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the electrical corporation. It retains and possibly broadens the authority formerly found in subdivisions 12 and 13 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure and supersedes those subdivisions insofar as they applied to privately owned public utilities. See also the Comment to Section 613. Insofar as subdivision 13 permitted acquisition of property for future use, this authority is continued in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.220.

Public Utilities Code § 613 (added)

613. A gas corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its gas plant.

Comment. Section 613 grants a “gas corporation” (defined in Section 222) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its gas plant. “Gas plant” is defined in Section 221 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of gas, natural or manufactured, for light, heat, or power. Thus, Section 613 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the gas corporation.

Sections 612, 613, and 614 largely supersede subdivision 17 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Insofar as subdivision 17 permitted acquisition of property for future use, this authority is continued in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.220.

Public Utilities Code § 614 (added)

614. A heat corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its heating plant.

Comment. Section 614 grants a “heat corporation” (defined in Section 224) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its heating plant. “Heating plant” is defined in Section 223 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate the production, generation, transmission, delivery, or furnishing of heat for domestic, business, industrial, or public use. Thus, Section 614 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the heat corporations. See the Comment to Section 613.

Public Utilities Code § 615 (added)

615. A pipeline corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its pipeline.

Comment. Section 615 grants a “pipeline corporation” (defined in Section 228) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its pipeline. “Pipeline” is defined in Section 227 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate the transmission, storage, distribution, or delivery of crude oil or other fluid substances except water through pipelines. Thus, Section 615 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the pipeline corporation.

Section 615 supersedes subdivision 10 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure (authorizing condemnation for “oil pipelines”) insofar as that subdivision related to privately owned public utilities.

Public Utilities Code § 616 (added)

616. A telephone corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its telephone line.

Comment. Section 616 grants a “telephone corporation” (defined in Section 234) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its telephone line. “Telephone line” is defined in Section 233 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate communication by telephone, whether such communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires. Thus, Section 616 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the telephone corporation.

Section 616 supersedes a portion of subdivision 7 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure (authorizing condemnation for “telephone . . . lines, systems and plants”) insofar as that subdivision related to privately owned public utilities.

Public Utilities Code § 617 (added)

617. A telegraph corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its telegraph line.

Comment. Section 617 grants a “telegraph corporation” (defined in Section 236) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its telegraph line. “Telegraph line” is defined in Section 235 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate communication by telegraph, whether such communication is had with or without the use of transmission wires. Thus, Section 617 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the telegraph corporation.

Section 617 supersedes a portion of subdivision 7 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure (authorizing condemnation for “telegraph . . . lines, systems and plants”) insofar as that subdivision related to privately owned public utilities.

Public Utilities Code § 618 (added)

618. A water corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its water system.

Comment. Section 618 grants a "water corporation" (as defined in Section 241) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its water system. "Water system" is defined in Section 240 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate the diversion, development, storage, supply, distribution, sale, furnishing, carriage, apportionment, or measurement of water for power, irrigation, reclamation, or manufacturing, or for municipal, domestic, or other beneficial use. Thus, Section 618 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of the water corporation.

Section 618 supersedes portions of subdivisions 3 and 4 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as those portions related to condemnation by privately owned public utilities.

Public Utilities Code § 619 (added)

619. A wharfinger may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of facilities for the receipt or discharge of freight or passengers.

Comment. Section 619 grants a "wharfinger" the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for facilities for the receipt or discharge of freight or passengers. "Wharfinger" is defined in Section 242 to include "every corporation or person owning, controlling, operating, or managing any dock, wharf, or structure used by vessels in connection with or to facilitate the receipt or discharge of freight, other than bulk liquid commodities, or passengers for compensation within this State."

Section 619 supersedes portions of subdivisions 3 ("public mooring places for watercraft") and 4 ("wharves, docks, piers, . . . chutes, booms") of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as those portions related to privately owned public utilities.

Public Utilities Code § 620 (added)

620. A common carrier, as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 211, may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of facilities for its transportation of persons or property.

Comment. Section 620 grants the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for ferry facilities. The reference to subdivision (b) of Section 211 incorporates a definition of those public utilities that transport persons or property for compensation by vessel upon inland waters or upon the high seas between points within this state. Section 620 supersedes the grant of condemnation for "ferries" in subdivision 4 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as that subdivision related to privately owned public utilities. See STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 30802, 30866 (regulation of amount of ferry tolls).

Public Utilities Code § 621 (added)

621. A street railroad corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its street railroad.

Comment. Section 621 grants a "street railroad corporation" (defined in Section 232) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its "street railroad" (defined in Section 231). It replaces in substance the authority formerly found in subdivision (g) of Section 7526 (railroad corporation) (incorporated by reference for street railroad corporations by Section 7801) and in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238. See the Comment to Section 611.

Public Utilities Code § 622 (added)

622. (a) As used in this section, "motor carrier" means:

(1) A highway common carrier as defined in Section 213.

(2) A passenger stage corporation as defined in Section 226.

(b) As used in this section, "water carrier" means a common carrier operating upon any waterway in this state between fixed termini or over a regular route.

(c) A motor carrier or water carrier may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of terminal facilities for the receipt, transfer, or delivery of the passengers or property it carries.

Comment. Section 622 grants certain motor carriers and water carriers the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for terminal facilities. Sections 621 and 622 supersede subdivision 22 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure

which granted condemnation authority for "terminal facilities, lands or structures for the receipt, transfer or delivery of passengers or property by any common carrier operating upon any public highway or waterway in this state between fixed termini or over a regular route, or for other terminal facilities of any such carrier."

Pubic Utilities Code § 623 (added)

623. A warehouseman may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its facilities for storing property.

Comment. Section 623 grants a "warehouseman" (defined in Section 239) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for storing property. Section 623 supersedes a portion of subdivision 4 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure (granting authority to condemn for "warehouses") insofar as that portion related to privately owned public utilities.

Public Utilities Code § 624 (added)

624. A sewer system corporation may condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its sewer system.

Comment. Section 624 grants a "sewer system corporation" (defined in Section 230.6) the right of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its sewer system. "Sewer system" is defined in Section 230.5 to include all property used in connection with or to facilitate sewage collection, treatment, or disposition for sanitary or drainage purposes. Thus, Section 624 authorizes condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the regulated activities of sewer system corporations. Section 624 does not, however, authorize condemnation for a sewer system which merely collects sewage on the property of a single owner (Section 230.5); nor does it authorize condemnation by anyone other than a public utility subject to the jurisdiction, control, and regulation of the Public Utilities Commission.

Section 624 supersedes portions of subdivisions 3, 4, and 8 of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure insofar as those portions related to condemnation by privately owned public utilities.

CONTROVERSIES CONCERNING RELOCATION OF UTILITY IMPROVEMENTS

Public Utilities Code § 861 (added)

SEC. . Article 7 (commencing with Section 861) is added to Chapter 4 of Part 1 of Division 1 of the Public Utilities Code, to read:

Article 7. Controversies Concerning Relocation of Utility Improvements

861. (a) As used in this section, "special law water district" means the Santa Clara Valley Water District and the Yuba-Bear River Basin Authority and, if created by an uncodified special law, any of the following: a county flood control district, a county flood control and water district, a county flood control and water conservation district, a county water conservation and flood control district, or a county water agency.

(b) Whenever by court order or judgment in an eminent domain proceeding or by agreement a special law water district is required to relocate any improvements of a public utility, if the special law water district and the public utility fail to agree as to the character or location of the new improvements to be relocated by the special law water district, the character and location of such new improvements and any other controversy relating thereto shall be submitted to and determined by the Public Utilities Commission in the manner prescribed in Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 1201).

Comment. Section 861 is derived from and supersedes numerous provisions formerly found in the uncodified statutes relating to special water districts. See, e.g., Alameda County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 28 (Cal. Stats. 1949, Ch. 1275); Alpine County Water Agency Act, § 19 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1896); Amador County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2137); Contra Costa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1617); El Dorado County Water Agency Act, § 20 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2139); Kern County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1003); Lake County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1544), § 33 (added Cal. Stats. 1954, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 62, § 48); Marin

County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 28 (Cal. Stats. 1953, Ch. 666); Mariposa County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2036); Monterey County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1947, Ch. 699); Napa County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1449); Nevada County Water Agency Act, § 19 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2122); Placer County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1957, Ch. 1234); San Benito County Water Conservation and Flood Control District Act, § 33 (Cal. Stats. 1953, Ch. 1598); San Diego Flood Control District Act, § 39 (Cal. Stats. 1966, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 55); San Joaquin County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 33 (Cal. Stats. 1956, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 46); San Luis Obispo County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1945, Ch. 1294); Santa Barbara County Flood Control and Water Conservation District Act, § 30 (Cal. Stats. 1955, Ch. 1057); Santa Clara Valley Water District Act, § 29 (Cal. Stats. 1951, Ch. 1405); Sutter County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2088); Tulare County Flood Control District Act, § 32 (Cal. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1149); Tuolumne County Water Agency Act, § 20 (Cal. Stats. 1969, Ch. 1236); Yuba-Bear River Basin Authority Act, § 19 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 2131); Yuba County Water Agency Act, § 4.9 (Cal. Stats. 1959, Ch. 788). The substance of these superseded provisions is continued in Section 861 and is extended to all special law water districts of the same type.

EXTENSION OF SERVICE INTO AREA SERVED BY PRIVATE UTILITY

Public Utilities Code § 1503 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . Section 1503 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

1503. The Legislature finds and declares that whenever a political subdivision constructs facilities to provide or extend water service, or provides or extends such service, to any service area of a private utility with the same type of service, such an act constitutes a taking of the property of the private utility for a public purpose to the extent that the private utility is injured by reason of any of its property employed in providing the water service being made inoperative, reduced in value or rendered useless to the private utility for the purpose of

providing water service to the service area; ~~and such taking shall be compensable under Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of California.~~

Comment. The provision deleted from Section 1503 is unnecessary. See the last sentence of Section 1504.

MUTUAL WATER COMPANIES

Public Utilities Code § 2729 (added)

SEC. . Section 2729 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:

2729. A mutual water company may exercise the power of eminent domain for water, water rights, canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for irrigation of lands furnished with water by such company.

Comment. Section 2729 specifies the condemnation authority of a mutual water company (defined in Section 2725). The section continues without substantive change the authority to condemn formerly conferred by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238(4) (condemnation authorized for "water, water rights, canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for irrigation of lands furnished with water by corporations supplying water to the lands of the stockholders thereof only").

Mutual water companies are not generally subject to the jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2705. However, it is possible that exercise of the power of eminent domain by a mutual water company may demonstrate an intention to devote the property so acquired to public use and thereby render the company subject to regulation as a public utility. See *Corona City Water Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n*, 54 Cal.2d 834, 357 P.2d 301, 9 Cal. Rptr. 245 (1960); *Lamb v. California Water & Tel. Co.*, 21 Cal.2d 33, 129 P.2d 371 (1942). Nevertheless, the authority granted by this section is not dependent upon whether a company is or is not held to be a public utility by exercising such authority.

RAILROADS

Public Utilities Code § 7526 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 7526 of the Public Utilities Code is amended to read:

7526. Every railroad corporation has all of the following powers:

(a) To make such examination and surveys as are necessary to the selection of the most advantageous route for the railroad. The officers, agents, and employees of the corporation may enter upon the lands or waters of any person, for this purpose, subject to liability for all damages which they do thereto.

(b) To receive, hold, take, and convey, by deed or otherwise, as a natural person, such voluntary grants and donations of real estate and other property as are made to it to aid and encourage the construction, maintenance, and accommodation of the railroad.

(c) To purchase, or by voluntary grants or donations to receive, enter, take possession of, hold, and use all such real estate and other property as is necessary for the construction and maintenance of such railroad, and for all stations, depots, and other purposes necessary to successfully work and conduct the business of the road.

(d) To lay out its road, not exceeding 10 rods wide, and to construct and maintain it, with one or more tracks, and with such appendages and adjuncts as are necessary for the convenient use of the road.

(e) To construct its roads across, along, or upon any stream of water, watercourse, roadstead, bay, navigable stream, street, avenue, or highway, or across any railway, canal, ditch, or flume which the route of its road intersects, crosses, or runs along, in such manner as to afford security for life and property. The corporation shall restore the stream or watercourse, road, street, avenue, highway, railroad, canal, ditch, or flume thus intersected to its former state of usefulness as near as may be, or so that the railroad does not unnecessarily impair its usefulness or injure its franchise.

(f) To cross, intersect, join, or unite its railroad with any other railroad, either before or after construction, at any point upon its route, and upon the grounds of the other railroad corporation, with the necessary turnouts, sidings, and switches, and other conveniences in furtherance of the objects of its connections. Every corporation whose railroad is intersected by any new railroad shall unite with the owners of the new railroad in forming the intersections and connections, and grant facilities therefor. If the two corporations cannot agree upon the amount of compensation to be made therefor, or the points or the manner of the crossings, intersections, and connections, such matters shall be ascertained and determined as is provided in **Title 7, Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure** *Part 1 (commencing with Section 201)* of Division 1.

(g) To ~~purchase~~ acquire lands, timber, stone, gravel, or other materials to be used in the construction and maintenance of its road, and all necessary appendages and adjuncts; ~~or acquire them in the manner provided in Title 7, Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, for the condemnation of lands.~~

(h) To change the line of its road, in whole or in part, whenever a majority of the directors so determine, as provided in Section 7531, but the change shall not vary the general route of the road, as contemplated in its articles of incorporation.

Comment. Subdivision (f) of Section 7526 is amended to substitute a reference to provisions of the Public Utilities Code for the former reference to the eminent domain title of the Code of Civil Procedure. The determination and regulation of the place and manner of railroad connections and crossings is in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Public Utilities Commission. See the Public Utilities Act (Part 1 of Division 1), particularly Sections 764 and 765 (connections), 1201 and 1202 (crossings). Cf. former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1247(1) and Comment thereto. The Public Utilities Act also provides for determination and allocation of compensation in such cases. See PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 764, 765, 1201–1205; See also PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1206–1218 (commission determination of just compensation in connection with grade separations; commission jurisdiction here is not exclusive, see Section 1217).

The authority to condemn for lands, timber, stone, gravel, or other materials used in the construction or maintenance of a railroad is deleted from subdivision (g) of Section 7526 because it duplicates and is more restrictive than the general power of railroad corporations to condemn any property necessary for the construction and maintenance of its railroad provided by Section 611.

Public Utilities Code § 7557 (added)

SEC. . . Section 7557 is added to the Public Utilities Code, to read:

7557. Where any railroad or street railroad tracks are located on property that a public entity is authorized to acquire by eminent domain for road, highway, boulevard, street, or alley purposes or on property that a city, county, or municipal water district is authorized to acquire by eminent domain for the right of way of a public utility that it will construct, complete, and maintain, the plaintiff may require the relocation or removal of such tracks by exercise of the power of eminent domain. In such case, the complaint shall contain a description and map of the location and proposed location of such tracks.

Comment. Section 7557 is an exception to the general rule that, in eminent domain proceedings, the plaintiff must acquire all structures and improvements upon the property it is taking. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1263.210. It continues the substance of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1248a. Section 7557 does not affect any jurisdiction that the Public Utilities Commission may have over the relocation or removal of tracks in an eminent domain proceeding. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.060 and Comment thereto (Public Utilities Commission jurisdiction preserved).

AIRPORT HAZARDS

Public Utilities Code § 21634 (repealed)

SEC. . . Section 21634 of the Public Utilities Code is repealed.

~~21634. The department may contract or otherwise provide, by condemnation if necessary, for the removal or relocation of any airport hazard or the removal or the relocation of all private structures, railways, highways,~~

mains, pipes, conduits, wires, cables, poles, and all other facilities and equipment which may interfere with the location, expansion, development, or improvement of the airports and other air navigation facilities or with the safe approach thereto or takeoff therefrom by aircraft, and may pay the cost of the removal or relocation. When exercising its power of removal or relocation, the department shall pay the cost of removal and relocation of any private structures, railways, mains, pipes, conduits, wires, cables, poles, or any other structure or equipment required to be moved to a new location.

Comment. The substance of Section 21634 is continued in Section 21653.

AIRCRAFT HAZARD OR DISTURBANCE ELIMINATION

Public Utilities Code §§ 21652-21653 (added)

SEC. . Article 2.6 (commencing with Section 21652) is added to Chapter 4 of Part 1 of Division 9 of the Public Utilities Code, to read:

Article 2.6. Hazard Elimination; Flight Disturbance

Public Utilities Code § 21652 (added)

21652. (a) Any person authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain for airport purposes may acquire by purchase, gift, devise, lease, condemnation, or otherwise:

(1) Any property necessary to permit the safe and efficient operation of the airport, or to permit the removal, elimination, obstruction-marking, or obstruction-lighting of airport hazards, or to prevent the establishment of airport hazards.

(2) Airspace or an easement in such airspace above the surface of property where necessary to permit imposition upon such property of excessive noise, vibration, discomfort, inconvenience, interference with use and enjoyment, and any consequent reduction in market value, due to the operation of aircraft to and from the airport.

(3) Remainder property underlying property taken pursuant to paragraph (2), where permitted by Section 1240.410 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(b) As used in this section, "property" includes real and personal property and any right or interest therein, whether within, beyond, adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, the boundaries of an airport or airport site, and, by way of illustration and not by way of limitation, includes air rights, airspace, air easements, and easements in airport hazards.

Comment. Section 21652 continues the authority of the state (formerly found in Section 21633) of cities, counties, and airport districts (formerly found in CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1239.2 and 1239.4 and GOVT. CODE § 50485.13) to condemn or otherwise acquire property for the elimination and prevention of airport hazards. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21017 ("airport hazard" defined). In addition, it extends this authority to entities previously not covered by a specific grant, *e.g.*, San Diego Unified Port District. See Cal. Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 67, §§ 4, 5, 27. For statutes granting local public entities the power of eminent domain for airport purposes, see GOVT. CODE §§ 26020 (counties), 50470 (cities, counties); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 22553 (port districts); Cal. Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 67, §§ 4, 5, 27 (San Diego Unified Port District). For statutes granting the state the power of eminent domain for airport purposes, see GOVT. CODE §§ 15853 and 15854; PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21633.

Section 21652 also continues and expands the authority (formerly found in CODE CIV. PROC. § 1239.3) of cities, counties, airport districts, and the San Diego Unified Port District to condemn to provide areas where flight disturbance will result in damage that might otherwise be the subject of actions for property damage. *Cf.* PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21688. Section 21652 extends this authority to the state and to any other airport condemnors previously not covered by specific grant.

Subdivision (a). Paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) is based on language formerly found in Public Utilities Code Section 21633 (authority of Department of Aeronautics). As a specific authorization of condemnation for airport protective purposes, it duplicates the more general authority found in Section 1240.120 of the Code of Civil Procedure, but this duplication has been retained because it provides useful detail.

Paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) retains the substance of former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1239.3 that airspace or

airspace rights may be taken in any area to which flight disturbance will penetrate.

Paragraph (3) of subdivision (a) permits airport condemnors to take—in addition to airspace interests—land and other property for the purpose of providing areas of flight disturbance where a taking pursuant to paragraph (2) would leave a physical or financial remnant. The procedures and standards applicable to such takings are those set forth in Section 1240.410 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The right to take pursuant to Section 1240.410 entails the right to dispose of property thus acquired pursuant to Section 1240.430 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) makes clear that property of any character or degree may be condemned for airport protective or flight disturbance purposes. As such, it supersedes the restrictive language of former Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1239.2 and 1239.3, and it is consistent with the more general definition of property found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1235.170.

The provision formerly found in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1239.4, authorizing acquisition of land, reserving an “irrevocable free license” in the former owner to use and occupy such land has not been continued since subdivision (b) defines “property” so broadly that a condemnor may take land subject to such an interest where necessary.

Public Utilities Code § 21653 (added)

21653. Any person authorized to exercise the power of eminent domain for airport purposes may provide, by purchase, gift, devise, lease, condemnation, or otherwise, for the removal or relocation of any airport hazard or the removal or relocation of all facilities, structures, and equipment that may interfere with the location, expansion, development, or improvement of the airport and other air navigation facilities or with the safe approach thereto and takeoff therefrom by aircraft. Any person acting under authority of this section shall pay the cost of such removal or relocation.

Comment. Section 21653 continues the authority of the state (formerly found in PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21634) and of cities and of counties (formerly found in GOVT. CODE § 50485.13) to require the removal or relocation of airport hazards. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21017 (“airport hazard” defined). In addition, it

extends this authority to entities previously not covered by a specific grant, *e.g.*, airport districts. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 22553.

Section 21653 also continues the authority of the state to require the removal and relocation of structures, facilities, and equipment that might interfere with the location, expansion, development, or improvement of the airport and its facilities and extends this authority to other public entities. In addition, it requires payment for relocation or removal of airport hazards generally.

While Section 21653 is phrased as a separate grant of authority to require removal or relocation, such authority can be exercised in connection with an eminent domain proceeding brought under Section 21652.

It should be noted that the removal or relocation of property held for or devoted to a public use may be required only after the court in which proceedings are pending finds that the relocation for airport purposes is of greater public necessity than the public use for which the property was previously held or used. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.610 *et seq.*; see Comment to former PUB. UTIL. CODE § 21635.

COUNTY—ACQUISITIONS FOR STATE HIGHWAY PURPOSES

Streets & Highways Code § 760 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 760 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

760. Whenever it is determined by a four-fifths vote of the membership of the board of supervisors of any county that such acquisition or contribution, or both, will promote the interests of the county and such acquisition or contribution, or both, is recommended in writing by the department, the board thereafter may, by resolution passed by a four-fifths vote of its members, determine:

(a) To acquire any real property or interest therein needed for State highway purposes and described in such recommendation. The board shall proceed, if necessary, to condemn any such real property or interest therein. The title to such property or interest may be taken in the name of the State or the county. The resolution of the board is the only preliminary procedure required prior to the acquisition of such property or interest, or to the

commencement of such condemnation ~~action proceeding~~; but if the acquisition is by eminent domain, the resolution shall be one that satisfies the requirements of Section 1245.230 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

(b) To contribute bridges, fencing, money, labor, materials, and appurtenances toward the construction of State highways within the limits of the county.

Such acquisitions or contributions, or both, shall be for the use of the State as provided in section 762.

Comment. Section 760 is amended to make clear that the last sentence of subdivision (a) is not intended to excuse compliance with Code of Civil Procedure Section 1245.230 (contents of resolution of necessity).

CHANGE OF GRADE

Streets & Highways Code § 858 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 858 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

858. The department shall not make any change in the physical grade of said highway affecting any property as to which an objection has been filed until it has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the objection filed is without merit or until *the probable compensation shall have first been made to, or paid into court has been deposited for*; each person filing an objection, as required by section 14 of Article 1 of the Constitution of California provided in Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 of, or the amount of the award has been deposited as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110) of Chapter 11 of, Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Comment. Section 858 is amended to refer to the statutory provisions relating to deposits in eminent domain proceedings.

BOUNDARIES OF HIGHWAYS

Streets & Highways Code § 869 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 869 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

869. If an objection is filed the department shall not perform any work on the property claimed by the objector until it has been finally determined by a court of competent jurisdiction that the objection filed is without merit or until *the probable compensation shall have first been made to, or paid into court has been deposited for*; the person filing the objection ; as required by section 14 of Article I of the Constitution of California provided in Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) of Chapter 6 of, or the amount of the award has been deposited as provided in Article 2 (commencing with Section 1268.110) of Chapter 11 of, Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This section shall not apply in so far as any objector may make claim to a part of the established traveled way.

Comment. Section 869 is amended to refer to the statutory provisions relating to deposits in eminent domain proceedings.

COUNTY ROADS AND HIGHWAYS

Streets & Highways Code § 943 (amended)

SEC. . Section 943 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

943. Such board may:

(a) Acquire any ~~real~~ property ~~or interest therein~~ necessary for the uses and purposes of county highways ; ~~including real property adjacent to property being condemned for the purpose of exchanging the same for other real property to be used for widening county highways.~~ When eminent domain proceedings are necessary, the board shall require the district attorney to institute such proceedings. The expense of and award in such proceedings may be paid from the road fund or the general fund of the county, or the road fund of any district benefited.

(b) Lay out, construct, improve, and maintain county highways.

(c) Incur a bonded indebtedness for any of such purposes, subject to the provisions of Section 944.

(d) Construct and maintain stock trails approximately paralleling any county highway, retain and maintain for stock trails the right-of-way of any county highway which is superseded by relocation. Such stock trail shall not be included in the term "maintained mileage of county roads" as that term is used in Chapter 3 (*commencing with Section 2100*) of Division 3 of this code.

Comment. The provisions deleted from Section 943 are superseded by provisions of the Eminent Domain Law. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.110 (right to acquire any necessary right or interest in any type of property), 1240.120 (right to acquire property to make effective the principal use), 1240.310 *et seq.* (condemnation of property to be used for exchange purposes). See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.130 (acquisition by gift, purchase, lease, or other means).

Streets & Highways Code § 943.1 (repealed)

SEC. . Section 943.1 of the Streets and Highways Code is repealed.

943.1. Whenever a part of a parcel of land is to be taken for county highway purposes and the remainder of such parcel is to be left in such shape or condition as to be of little value to its owner, or to give rise to claims or litigation concerning severance or other damages, the county may acquire the whole parcel and may sell the remainder or may exchange the same for other property needed for county highway purposes.

Comment. Section 943.1 is superseded by Section 1240.410 *et seq.* of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Streets & Highways Code § 943.2 (repealed)

SEC. . Section 943.2 of the Streets and Highways Code is repealed.

943.2. Whenever property which is devoted to or held for some other public use for which the power of eminent domain might be exercised is to be taken for county highway purposes, the county may, with the consent of the

person or agency in charge of such other public use, condemn, in the name of the people of the county, real property to be exchanged with such person or agency for the real property so to be taken for county highway purposes. This section does not limit the authorization to the county to acquire, other than by condemnation, property for such purposes.

Comment. Section 943.2 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.310 *et seq.* See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.030 (exercise of eminent domain power discretionary).

Streets & Highways Code § 943.4 (repealed)

SEC. . Section 943.4 of the Streets and Highways Code is repealed.

~~943.4. Whenever real property is sought to be taken for the purpose of county highway widening which is devoted to or held for some other public use by a person or public agency that has the power of eminent domain, the county may, with the consent of the person or public agency, condemn in the name of the county the real property to be exchanged with such person or public agency for the real property so to be taken for county highway purposes. This section does not limit the authorization of the county to acquire, other than by condemnation, property for such purposes.~~

Comment. Section 943.4 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.320. See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.030 (exercise of eminent domain power discretionary).

WORK TO REDUCE COMPENSATION

Streets & Highways Code § 970 (repealed)

SEC. . Section 970 of the Streets and Highways Code is repealed.

~~970. In connection with the acquisition of land for the opening or widening of a county highway the county may agree with the owner of the property to construct, reconstruct or install immediately adjacent to the right-of-way, fences, driveways, sidewalks, retaining walls, and drainage or utility connections, if the performance of such work will reduce the amount of damages which~~

would otherwise be payable to the property owner as compensation for the diminution in value of that portion of said owner's property not being acquired for the opening or widening of the county highway.

The cost of the work so performed shall not exceed the estimated amount of the damages otherwise payable to the property owner and shall be deemed work incident to the improvement of the county highway and a proper charge against the funds of the county.

Comment. Section 970 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1263.610 (performance of work to reduce compensation).

PRIVATE BYROADS

Streets & Highways Code §§ 1050-1054 (repealed)

SEC. . Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 1050) of Division 2 of the Streets and Highways Code is repealed.

Comment. Chapter 3.5 (commencing with Section 1050), relating to private byroads, is repealed because it is special legislation that should not be preserved in the codes.

IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1911

Streets & Highways Code § 5100 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 5100 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

5100. All streets, places, public ways, or property, or rights-of-way, or tidelands, or submerged lands owned by any city, open or dedicated to public use, and any property for the immediate possession and use of which, as rights-of-way required for public use, an order for possession prior to judgment has been obtained in compliance with the provisions of Section 14 of Article I of the State Constitution, and all tidelands or submerged lands to which all the right, title and interest of the state have been granted to any city, and all tidelands or submerged lands which have been leased by the state to any city for the construction of improvements authorized by subdivision (g) of Section 5101, are open public streets, places, public ways, or property or rights-of-way owned by

the city, for the purposes of this division, and the legislative body of the city may establish and change the grades of the respective ways, properties, and rights-of-way hereinbefore enumerated and fix the width thereof and is hereby invested with jurisdiction to order to be done therein, over or thereon, either singly or in any combination thereof, any of the work mentioned in this division under the proceedings described in this part.

Comment. Section 5100 is amended to conform to the terminology of the Eminent Domain Law. See Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Streets & Highways Code § 5101 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 5101 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

5101. Whenever in the opinion of the legislative body the public interest or convenience may require, it may order the whole or any portion, either in length or in width, of any one or more of the streets, places, public ways, or property, easements, or rights-of-way, or tidelands, or submerged lands owned by any city, or tidelands or submerged lands leased by the state to any city for the construction of improvements authorized by subdivision (g), open or dedicated to public use, and any property for the immediate possession and use of which as rights-of-way required for public use, *which* an order for possession prior to judgment has been obtained in compliance with the provisions of Section 14 of Article I of the State Constitution, to be improved by or have constructed therein, over or thereon, either singly or in any combination thereof, any of the following:

(a) The grading or regrading, the paving or repaving, the planking or replanking, the macadamizing or remacadamizing, the graveling or regraveling, the oiling or reoiling thereof.

(b) The construction or reconstruction of sidewalks, crosswalks, steps, safety zones, platforms, seats, statuary, fountains, parks and parkways, recreation areas, including all structures, buildings, and other facilities necessary to make parks and parkways and recreation areas useful for

the purposes for which intended, culverts, bridges, curbs, gutters, tunnels, subways or viaducts.

(c) Sanitary sewers or instrumentalities of sanitation, together with the necessary outlets, cesspools, manholes, catch basins, flush tanks, septic tanks, disposal plants, connecting sewers, ditches, drains, conduits, tunnels, channels or other appurtenances.

(d) Drains, tunnels, sewers, conduits, culverts and channels for drainage purposes; with necessary outlets, cesspools, manholes, catch basins, flush tanks, septic tanks, disposal plants, connecting sewers, ditches, drains, conduits, channels and appurtenances.

(e) Poles, posts, wires, pipes, conduits, tunnels, lamps and other suitable or necessary appliances for the purpose of lighting said streets, places or public ways of any such city or property or rights-of-way owned by any such city, or for the purpose of furnishing electricity and electric service or telephone service to property within a city.

(f) Pipes, hydrants and appliances for fire protection.

(g) Breakwaters, levees, bulkheads, groins, and walls of rock or other material to protect the streets, places, public ways and other property in any such city, from overflow by water, or to prevent beach erosion or to promote accretion to beaches.

(h) Wells, pumps, dams, reservoirs, storage tanks, channels, tunnels, conduits, pipes, hydrants, meters or other appurtenances for supplying or distributing a domestic water supply.

(i) Mains, services, pipes, fittings, valves, regulators, governors, meters, drips, drains, tanks, ditches, tunnels, conduits, channels, or other appurtenances for supplying or distributing a domestic or industrial gas supply.

(j) The construction or maintenance of bomb shelters or fallout shelters which are primarily designed to protect and shelter the population from conventional or nuclear bomb or missile warhead explosions, shellfire, radiation, and fallout in the event of an enemy attack.

(k) Retaining walls, embankments, buildings and any other structures or facilities necessary or suitable in connection with any of the work mentioned in this section.

(l) The planting of trees, shrubs or other ornamental vegetation.

(m) The construction, repairing, or improving of public mooring places for watercraft, the building, repairing and improving of wharves, piers, docks, slips, quays, moles, or other utilities, structures, and appliances necessary or convenient for the promotion or accommodation of commerce, navigation and the protection of lands within said city, and for aiding and securing access to the waters of said lands to the people of the State of California, in the exercise of their rights to fish, or for the extension of public streets or places.

(n) Compaction of land, change of grade or contours, construction of caissons, retaining walls, drains and other structures suitable for the purpose of stabilizing land.

(o) All other work which may be deemed necessary to improve the whole or any portion of such streets, places, public ways, property, easements or rights-of-way owned by such city.

(p) All other work auxiliary to any of the above, which may be required to carry out the same.

Comment. Section 5101 is amended to conform to the terminology of the Eminent Domain Law. See Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (possession prior to judgment).

Streets & Highways Code § 5104 (technical amendment)

SEC. . . . Section 5104 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

5104. If the written consent of the owner of the property is first obtained, work may be done on private property to eliminate any disparity in level or size between the improvement and private property, provided that the legislative body determines in the resolution of intention to order the improvement that it is in the public interest and more economical to do such work on private property than to adjust the work on public property to eliminate such disparity. The actual cost of such work may be added to the assessment of the lot on which the work is done. *Nothing in this section limits or*

restricts the authority of the legislative body to make agreements authorized by Section 1263.610 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Comment. The last sentence has been added to Section 5104 to make clear that the authority granted by that section does not limit or restrict the authority granted by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1263.610 (performance of work to reduce compensation).

Streets & Highways Code § 5661 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 5661 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

5661. No proceedings taken or had under this division shall ever be held to be invalid on the ground that the street, right of way, public property or any portion thereof, upon which the work or any part thereof is or was done has not been lawfully dedicated or acquired; provided, the same is lawfully dedicated or acquired, or an order of immediate for possession prior to judgment and use thereof has been obtained; at any time before judgment is entered in the action involving such proceeding.

Comment. Section 5661 is amended to conform to the terminology of the Eminent Domain Law. See Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure (possession prior to judgment).

MUNICIPAL IMPROVEMENT ACT OF 1913

Streets & Highways Code § 10100.1 (technical amendment)

SEC. . Section 10100.1 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

10100.1. If the written consent of the owner of the property is first obtained, work may be done on private property to eliminate any disparity in level or size between the improvement and private property, provided that the legislative body determines in the resolution of intention to order the improvement that it is in the public interest and more economical to do such work on private property than to adjust the work on public

property to eliminate such disparity. The actual cost of such work may be added to the assessment of the lot on which the work is done. *Nothing in this section limits or restricts the authority of the legislative body to make agreements authorized by Section 1263.610 of the Code of Civil Procedure.*

Comment. The last sentence has been added to Section 10100.1 to make clear that the authority granted by that section does not limit or restrict the authority granted by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1263.610 (performance of work to reduce compensation).

PEDESTRIAN MALL LAW OF 1960

Streets & Highways Code § 11400 (amended)

SEC. . . Section 11400 of the Streets and Highways Code is amended to read:

11400. If following the hearing the legislative body shall determine that the pedestrian mall shall be established, and if at that time there remain any written claims for damages which have not been allowed pursuant to Section 11310 or which have not been withdrawn, the legislative body shall direct that an action or actions be brought in the superior court in the name of the city by the county counsel, district attorney, or city attorney, as the case may be, or other attorney designated by the legislative body for a determination of the damages, if any, to which the claimant may legally be entitled because of the establishment of the pedestrian mall. Such action shall be in the nature of a proceeding in eminent domain for the condemnation of the right or rights in real property, the taking of which by the establishment of the pedestrian mall results in the damages claimed. Except as may otherwise be provided in this part, such action and proceeding shall be governed so far as the same may be made applicable by ~~those the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to actions and proceedings in eminent domain ; provided, however, that the time within which the proceedings may be abandoned pursuant to Section 1255a of said code and the time within which the sum of money assessed must be paid under Section 1251 of~~

said code are hereby extended to one year from the date of the final judgment. In any such action the resolution of intention adopted pursuant to this part and the resolution adopted under Section 11311 shall be conclusive evidence of the public necessity of the proposed pedestrian mall; that the property or rights in property to be taken are necessary therefor, and that the pedestrian mall is planned and located in the manner which will be compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury conclusively establish the matters referred to in Section 1240.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Comment. Section 11400 is amended to delete the special exception to the general eminent domain provisions and to conform to Code of Civil Procedure Section 1245.250 (effect of resolution of necessity).

PRIVATE WAYS FOR CANALS

Water Code §§ 7020-7026 (repealed)

SEC. . . Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7020) of Division 4 of the Water Code is repealed.

Comment. Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 7020), relating to private ways for canals, is repealed because it is obsolete; its functions are presently being served by special districts and other local agencies.

CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS

California Constitution, Art. I, § 14 (amended)

SEC. 14. Private property shall not be taken or damaged for public use without just compensation having first been made to, or paid into court for, the owner. *Subject to the provisions of Section 23a of Article XII, just compensation shall be assessed in a court of record as in other civil cases and, unless a jury is waived, shall be determined by a jury. The Legislature may provide for the taking of possession of property and the devoting of such property to public use following commencement of an eminent domain proceeding and may prescribe the persons who may take such possession, the public uses for which such possession may be taken, and the manner in and the time at which such possession may be taken. Legislation authorizing possession to be taken shall require that (1) before possession is taken, the probable amount of compensation to be made for the taking of the property be paid into court for the owner, (2) the amount to be paid into court be subject to determination by the court on motion of any interested party, and (3) the total amount paid into court be available immediately to the persons that the court determines to be entitled thereto and be withdrawable by such persons in accordance with such procedure as the legislation may provide.*; and no right of way or lands to be used for reservoir purposes shall be appropriated to the use of any corporation, except a municipal corporation or a county or the State or metropolitan water district, municipal utility district, municipal water district, drainage, irrigation, levee, reclamation or water conservation district, or similar public corporation until full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner, irrespective of any benefits from any improvement proposed by such corporation, which compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law; provided, that in any proceeding in eminent domain brought by the State, or a county, or a municipal corporation, or metropolitan water district, municipal

utility district, municipal water district, drainage, irrigation, levee, reclamation or water conservation district, or similar public corporation; the aforesaid State or municipality or county or public corporation or district aforesaid may take immediate possession and use of any right of way or lands to be used for reservoir purposes, required for a public use whether the fee thereof or an easement therefor be sought upon first commencing eminent domain proceedings according to law in a court of competent jurisdiction and thereupon giving such security in the way of money deposited as the court in which such proceedings are pending may direct, and in such amounts as the court may determine to be reasonably adequate to secure to the owner of the property sought to be taken immediate payment of just compensation for such taking and any damage incident thereto, including damages sustained by reason of an adjudication that there is no necessity for taking the property, as soon as the same can be ascertained according to law. The court may, upon motion of any party to said eminent domain proceedings, after such notice to the other parties as the court may prescribe, alter the amount of such security so required in such proceedings. The taking of private property for a railroad run by steam or electric power for logging or lumbering purposes shall be deemed a taking for a public use, and any person, firm, company or corporation taking private property under the law of eminent domain for such purposes shall thereupon and thereby become a common carrier.

Comment. The effect of this revision of Section 14 is as follows:

First sentence. No change is made in existing constitutional law respecting "public use," "just compensation," "inverse condemnation," or the general requirement that property not be taken or damaged until compensation is made to or paid into court for the owner. See, e.g., *People v. Chevalier*, 52 Cal.2d 299, 340 P.2d 598 (1959), and *City & County of San Francisco v. Ross*, 44 Cal.2d 52, 279 P.2d 529 (1955) (public use); *Metropolitan Water Dist. v. Adams*, 16 Cal.2d 676, 107 P.2d 618 (1940), and *Sacramento So. R.R. v. Heilbron*, 156 Cal. 408, 104 P. 979 (1909) (just compensation); *Bauer v. County of Ventura*, 45 Cal.2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955), and *Rose v. State*, 19 Cal.2d 713, 123 P.2d 505

(1942) (inverse condemnation proceedings); *Heilbron v. Superior Court*, 151 Cal. 271, 90 P. 706 (1907), and *McCauley v. Weller*, 12 Cal. 500 (1859) (prepayment or payment into court).

Second sentence. This sentence states the established judicial construction of deleted language that required that "compensation shall be ascertained by a jury, unless a jury be waived, as in other civil cases in a court of record, as shall be prescribed by law." See *City of Los Angeles v. Zeller*, 176 Cal. 194, 167 P. 849 (1917). With respect to the requirement that the power of eminent domain be exercised through judicial proceedings, see *Wilcox v. Engebretsen*, 160 Cal. 288, 116 P. 750 (1911); and *Weber v. Board of Supervisors*, 59 Cal. 265 (1881). Regarding the assurance of trial by jury in condemnation and inverse condemnation proceedings, see *Vallejo & No. R.R. v. Reed Orchard Co.*, 169 Cal. 545, 147 P. 238 (1915), and *Highland Realty Co. v. City of San Rafael*, 46 Cal.2d 669, 298 P.2d 15 (1956). The words "Subject to the provisions of Section 23a of Article XII" are included to prevent any implication that Section 23a is superseded by the readoption of this section. Section 23a empowers the Legislature to authorize the Public Utilities Commission to determine the compensation to be made in takings of public utility property. Section 23a is limited in application to property that is already devoted to a public use. See *S. H. Chase Lumber Co. v. Railroad Comm'n*, 212 Cal. 691, 300 P. 12 (1931). The procedure for determining just compensation adopted pursuant to Section 23a (see Public Utilities Code Sections 1401–1421) is not exclusive and is an alternative to proceedings under Title 7 (commencing with Section 1230.010) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Further, in cases in which compensation is determined by the Public Utilities Commission, the procedures of the Code of Civil Procedure other than those for assessing compensation are available to the parties. See *Citizens Util. Co. v. Superior Court*, 59 Cal.2d 805, 382 P.2d 356, 31 Cal. Rptr. 316 (1963). No change is made in these rules.

Third sentence. This sentence replaces the former authorization for the taking of "immediate possession" by certain entities in right of way and reservoir cases, and removes any doubt whether the Legislature may, by statute, provide for possession prior to judgment. See *Steinhart v. Superior Court*, 137 Cal. 575, 70 P. 629 (1902). Compare *Spring Valley Water Works v. Drinkhouse*, 95 Cal. 220, 30 P. 218 (1892); *Heilbron v. Superior Court*, 151 Cal. 271, 90 P. 706 (1907). See also Taylor, *Possession Prior to Final Judgment in California Condemnation Procedure*, 7 SANTA CLARA LAWYER 37, 56–74 (1966). The

sentence also permits the Legislature to classify condemnors and public purposes in this connection. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255.010 *et seq.*

Fourth sentence. This sentence clarifies the application of the first sentence of this section to the taking of possession in eminent domain proceedings. It requires that, before possession of the property is taken, the probable amount of compensation that eventually will be awarded in the proceeding be paid into court for the owner. It also adds a requirement, not heretofore imposed by this section, that the funds paid into court be available to the property owner prior to termination of the proceeding. This sentence thus accords with decisions of the California Supreme Court holding that, before property is taken, compensation must be paid into court *for the owner*. See *Steinhart v. Superior Court*, 137 Cal. 575, 70 P. 629 (1902). The sentence will permit the Legislature to specify whether the amount paid into court is determined initially by the plaintiff, by the court, or in some other manner, but requires that such amount be subject to determination by the court on motion of an interested party. The sentence will also permit the Legislature to specify the circumstances under which the property owner must give security to protect the plaintiff in cases where the amount withdrawn may be in excess of the compensation eventually awarded in the proceeding. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1255.010 *et seq.*

Language deleted. In deleting the second portion of the first sentence of this section, this revision eliminates language that prohibited "appropriation" of property in certain cases, "until full compensation therefor be first made in money or ascertained and paid into court for the owner." This language was held to add nothing to the meaning of the first portion of the sentence. See *Steinhart v. Superior Court*, 137 Cal. 575, 70 P. 629 (1902). A more explicit requirement is imposed by the fourth sentence of the section as revised.

The revision also deletes language which required that, in certain cases, compensation be made "irrespective of any benefits from any improvement proposed." This limitation as to the offsetting of benefits applied only to private corporations taking rights of way or lands for reservoir purposes and probably was inoperative under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. See *Beveridge v. Lewis*, 137 Cal. 619, 70 P. 1083 (1902). In deleting the language, this revision clarifies and unfetters the power of the Legislature to deal with the offsetting of benefits

in eminent domain proceedings. The subject is governed by Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1263.410–1263.450.

The proviso to the first sentence of this section, and the next following sentence, which dealt with “immediate possession” in right of way and reservoir cases are superseded by the third and fourth sentences of the revised section.

This revision deletes the last sentence of the section which declared that the taking of property for a railroad “run by steam or electric power” for logging or lumbering purposes should be deemed a taking for a “public use.” The provision was added by amendment in 1911 and was never construed or applied by the appellate courts. Its apparent purpose was to preclude a holding that takings for such purposes may not be authorized because they do not effectuate a “public use.” (For a collection and discussion of the judicial decisions on this general question, see Annot., 86 A.L.R. 552 (1933).) Takings for such purposes by publicly and privately owned public utilities are authorized by existing legislation, and there is no need to state in the Constitution that such a taking is a taking for a public use. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.010. Moreover, in applying the “public use” limitation, the California courts have consistently refused to be bound by a general declaration and have held that the question must be resolved by reference to the facts of the particular case. For a thorough analysis of the California decisions on a closely analogous problem, see Comment, *Eminent Domain Powers Exercisable Over California Property by Oil and Gas Corporations*, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 327 (1960). In addition, the provision is obsolete since the use of “steam” or “electric power” locomotives for logging purposes has largely been abandoned in favor of diesel powered locomotives and trucks.

The last sentence of the section also declared that any person taking property for such purposes “shall thereupon and thereby become a common carrier.” This declaration duplicates the result reached independently of any constitutional basis in *Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n*, 176 Cal. 499, 169 P. 59 (1917). That decision held that the exercise by a carrier of the statutory power of eminent domain was conclusive evidence of a dedication of its condemned right of way to public use. (See also CAL. CONST., Art. XII, §§ 17, 23; CIVIL CODE § 2168; PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 211, 216, 230. The judicial decisions on this problem are collected and analyzed in Annot., 67 A.L.R. 588 (1930).)

Deletion of the last sentence, therefore, makes no significant change in existing law respecting either the doctrine of public use or the status and obligations of common carriers.

California Constitution, Art. I, § 14½ (repealed)

SEC. 14½. The State, or any of its cities or counties, may acquire by gift, purchase or condemnation, lands for establishing, laying out, widening, enlarging, extending, and maintaining memorial grounds, streets, squares, parkways and reservations in and about and along and leading to any or all of the same, providing land so acquired shall be limited to parcels lying wholly or in part within a distance not to exceed one hundred fifty feet from the closest boundary of such public works or improvements; provided, that when parcels which lie only partially within said limit of one hundred fifty feet only such portions may be acquired which do not exceed two hundred feet from said closest boundary, and after the establishment, laying out, and completion of such improvements, may convey any such real estate thus acquired and not necessary for such improvements, with reservations concerning the future use and occupation of such real estate so as to protect such public works and improvements and their environs and to preserve the view, appearance, light, air and usefulness of such public works.

The Legislature may, by statute, prescribe procedure.

Comment. Section 14½ provides for “excess condemnation” in specified cases. This phrase refers to a taking of more property than is actually physically necessary for the construction of a public work. At the time it was enacted, courts were very restrictive in the amount of land that could be taken for a public use through eminent domain. Since adoption of this section, courts have adopted an interpretation of the concept of “public use” which permits additional lands to be taken to provide median and surrounding areas. Moreover, the California Supreme Court has refused to construe Section 14½ as a limitation on the power of the Legislature to provide for excess condemnation free from constitutional restraints. The case of *People v. Superior Court*, 68 Cal.2d 206, 436 P.2d 342, 65 Cal. Rptr. 342 (1968), so held and effectively emasculated the apparent limitations of Section 14½. The section no longer

serves a discernable purpose. For further discussion, see Capron, *Excess Condemnation in California—A Further Expansion of the Right to Take*, 20 HASTINGS L. J. 571, 588–591 (1969). See also CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION REVISION COMMISSION, PROPOSED REVISION OF THE CALIFORNIA CONSTITUTION, Part 5 at 31 (1971).

APPENDIX

DISPOSITION OF EXISTING GENERAL CONDEMNATION STATUTE

Title 7 (commencing with Section 1237) of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure is the existing general condemnation statute. This entire title, being superseded by the Eminent Domain Law, will be repealed when the Eminent Domain Law takes effect.

The text of each section of Title 7 is set out below. The disposition of the provisions of these sections is indicated in the Comments that follow the text of the sections.

TITLE 7. OF EMINENT DOMAIN

Chapter 1. Eminent Domain Generally

§ 1237 (repealed). Eminent domain defined

1237. Eminent domain is the right of the people or Government to take private property for public use. This right may be exercised in the manner provided in this Title.

Comment. The first sentence of Section 1237 is superseded by Section 1240.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The second sentence is superseded by Section 1230.020 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1238 (repealed). Exercise of right; uses

1238. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

1. Fortifications, magazines, arsenals, Navy yards, Navy and Army stations, lighthouses, range and beacon lights, coast surveys, and all other public uses authorized by the government of the United States.

2. Public buildings and grounds for use of a state, or any state institution, or any institution within the State of California which is exempt from taxation under the provisions of Section 1a, of Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of California, and all other public uses authorized by the Legislature of the State of California.

3. Any public utility, and public buildings and grounds, for the use of any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village, town, school district, or irrigation district, ponds, lakes, canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, tunnels, flumes, ditches, or pipes, lands, water system plants, buildings, rights of any nature in water, and any other character of property necessary for conducting or storing or distributing water for the use of any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village or town or municipal water district, or the inhabitants thereof, or any state institution, or necessary for the proper development and control of such use of said water, either at the time of the taking of said property, or for the future proper development and control thereof, or for draining any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village or town; raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and widening and deepening or straightening their channels; roads, highways, boulevards, streets and alleys; public mooring places for watercraft; public parks, including parks and other places covered by water, and all other public uses for the benefit of any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village or town, or the inhabitants thereof, which may be authorized by the Legislature; but the mode of apportioning and collecting the costs of such improvements shall be such as may be provided in the statutes by which the same may be authorized.

4. Wharves, docks, piers, warehouses, chutes, booms, ferries, bridges, toll roads, byroads, plank and turnpike roads; paths and roads either on the surface, elevated, or depressed, for the use of bicycles, tricycles, motorcycles and other horseless vehicles, steam, electric, and horse railroads, canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for irrigation, public transportation, supplying mines and farming neighborhoods with water, and draining and reclaiming lands, and for floating logs and lumber on streams not navigable, and water, water rights, canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts and pipes for irrigation of lands furnished with water by corporations supplying water to the lands of the stockholders thereof only, and lands with all wells and water therein adjacent to the lands of any municipality or

of any corporation, or person supplying water to the public or to any neighborhood or community for domestic use or irrigation.

5. Roads, tunnels, ditches, flumes, pipes, aerial and surface tramways and dumping places for working mines; also outlets, natural or otherwise, for the flow, deposit or conduct of tailings or refuse matter from mines; also an occupancy in common by the owners or possessors of different mines of any place for the flow, deposit, or conduct of tailings or refuse matter from their several mines.

6. Byroads leading from highways to residences, farms, mines, mills, factories and buildings for operating machinery, or necessary to reach any property used for public purposes.

7. Telegraph, telephone, radio and wireless lines, systems and plants.

8. Sewerage of any incorporated city, city and county, or of any village or town, whether incorporated or unincorporated, or of any settlement consisting of not less than 10 families, or of any buildings belonging to the state, or to any college or university, also the connection of private residences and other buildings, through other property, with the mains of an established sewer system in any such city, city and county, town or village.

9. Roads for transportation by traction engines or road locomotives.

10. Oil pipelines.

11. Railroads, roads and flumes for quarrying, logging or lumbering purposes.

12. Canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes and outlets natural or otherwise for supplying, storing, and discharging water for the operation of machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for the supply of mines, quarries, railroads, tramways, mills, and factories with electric power; and also for the applying of electricity to light or heat mines, quarries, mills, factories, incorporated cities and counties, villages, towns, or irrigation districts; and also for furnishing electricity for lighting, heating or power purposes to individuals or corporations; together with

lands, buildings and all other improvements in or upon which to erect, install, place, use or operate machinery for the purpose of generating and transmitting electricity for any of the purposes or uses above set forth.

13. Electric power lines, electric heat lines, electric light lines, electric light, heat and power lines, and works or plants, lands, buildings or rights of any character in water, or any other character of property necessary for generation, transmission or distribution of electricity for the purpose of furnishing or supplying electric light, heat or power to any county, city and county or incorporated city or town, or irrigation district, or the inhabitants thereof, or necessary for the proper development and control of such use of such electricity, either at the time of the taking of said property, or for the future proper development and control thereof.

14. Cemeteries for the burial of the dead, and enlarging and adding to the same and the grounds thereof.

15. The plants, or any part thereof, or any record therein of all persons, firms or corporations heretofore, now or hereafter engaged in the business of searching public records, or publishing public records, or insuring or guaranteeing titles to real property, including all copies of, and all abstracts or memoranda taken from, public records, which are owned by, or in the possession of, such persons, firms or corporations or which are used by them in their respective businesses; provided, however, that the right of eminent domain in behalf of the public uses mentioned in this subdivision may be exercised only for the purposes of restoring or replacing, in whole or in part, public records, or the substance of public records, of any city, city and county, county or other municipality, which records have been, or may hereafter be, lost or destroyed by conflagration or other public calamity; and provided further, that such right shall be exercised only by the city, city and county, county or municipality whose records, or part of whose records, have been, or may be, so lost or destroyed.

16. Expositions or fairs in aid of which the granting of public moneys or other things of value has been authorized by the Constitution.

17. Works or plants for supplying gas, heat, refrigeration or power to any county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or irrigation district, or the inhabitants thereof, together with lands, buildings, and all other improvements in or upon which to erect, install, place, maintain, use or operate machinery, appliances, works and plants for the purpose of generating, transmitting and distributing the same and rights of any nature in water, or property of any character necessary for the purpose of generating, transmitting and distributing the same, or necessary for the proper development and control of such use of such gas, heat, refrigeration, or power, either at the time of the taking of said property, or for the future proper development and control thereof.

18. Standing trees and ground necessary for the support and maintenance thereof, along the course of any highway, within a maximum distance of 300 feet on each side of the center thereof; and ground for the culture and growth of trees along the course of any highway, within the maximum distance of 300 feet on each side of the center thereof.

19. Propagation, rearing, planting, distribution, protection or conservation of fish.

20. Airports for the landing and taking off of aircraft, and for the construction and maintenance of hangars, mooring masts, flying fields, signal lights and radio equipment.

21. Any work or undertaking of a city, county, or city and county, housing authority or commission, or other political subdivision or public body of the state: (a) to demolish, clear or remove buildings from any area which is detrimental to the safety, health and morals of the people by reason of the dilapidation, overcrowding, faulty arrangement or design, lack of ventilation or sanitary facilities of the dwellings predominating in such areas; or (b) to provide dwellings, apartments or other living accommodations for persons or families who lack the amount of income which is necessary (as determined by the body engaging in said work or undertaking) to enable them to live in decent, safe and sanitary dwellings without overcrowding.

22. Terminal facilities, lands, or structures for the receipt, transfer or delivery of passengers or property by any common carrier operating upon any public highway or waterway in this state between fixed termini or over a regular route, or for other terminal facilities of any such carrier.

Comment. Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which listed public uses in behalf of which the right of eminent domain might be exercised, is not continued in the new Eminent Domain Law. This legislative listing of public uses was intended to satisfy the constitutional requirement that property be taken by eminent domain only for a public use. See CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 14. It attempted to do so by providing a definitive schedule of such uses. However, many recognized public uses were not included in the schedule, and the inclusion of a use in the schedule was no guarantee that the use was in fact a public use under the Constitution. See Comment to CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.010. Moreover, to a considerable extent, the listing of uses in Section 1238 was surplusage since specific authorizations to condemn for particular uses were provided in other codes.

The scheme of the Eminent Domain Law renders a listing of public uses in the general condemnation statute unnecessary. The power of eminent domain may be exercised to acquire property only by a person expressly authorized by statute to exercise the power for a particular use. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.020. However, a statutory authorization to condemn property for a particular use is a legislative declaration that that use is a public use. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.010. Accordingly, there is no need to maintain a separate listing of public uses.

Under the scheme of the Eminent Domain Law, every public entity that would be authorized to condemn for a use listed in Section 1238 may still condemn for that use. The state (GOVT. CODE § 15853), cities (GOVT. CODE § 37350.5), counties (GOVT. CODE § 25350.5), and school districts (EDUC. CODE § 1047) may exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property necessary for any of their powers or functions. These general authorizations to condemn for proper state, city, county, and school district functions often overlap more specific authorizations to condemn or simply to acquire property for particular public uses. On occasion, a statute authorizes a public entity to undertake a public use but specifically denies the right of eminent domain for that use. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE § 37353(c) (existing golf course may not be acquired by city by

eminent domain). In such a case, the specific provision controls over the general authorization. Special districts may condemn only for those specific public uses for which they have expressly been granted the power of eminent domain. The great majority of special districts have, by virtue of their enabling statutes, general authority to condemn all property necessary to carry out any powers of the district. A few districts, such as soil conservation districts (PUB. RES. CODE §§ 9074–9953) and the City of Marysville Levee District (Cal. Stats. 1875–76, Ch. 134), have limited condemnation authority or none at all.

The repeal of Section 1238, together with the repeal of Civil Code Section 1001, deprives private persons of condemnation rights previously recognized by the courts. See *Lingga v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955). Separately enacted provisions in other codes, however, continue the right of some types of private persons to condemn for certain public uses. Privately owned public utilities may condemn for utility purposes. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 610–624. Mutual water companies may condemn to irrigate lands that they service. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2729. Land chest corporations (HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 35167) and limited dividend housing corporations (HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 34874) may condemn property for their projects. Nonprofit hospitals may condemn property for their purposes. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 1427. Nonprofit educational institutions of collegiate grade may condemn to carry out their functions. EDUC. CODE § 30051. Although private persons may no longer condemn for sewers, they may request the appropriate public authority to undertake such condemnation on their behalf. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 4967.

The particular private persons authorized to condemn are quasi-public, and the purposes for which they are authorized to condemn are public in nature. Whether it would be constitutional to authorize a private person to condemn for what appear to be predominately private purposes is doubtful. Cf. *Lorenz v. Jacob*, 63 Cal. 73 (1883) (supplying mines with water); *Lindsay Irr. Co. v. Mehrtens*, 97 Cal. 676, 32 P. 802 (1893) (supplying farming neighborhoods with water); *General Petroleum Corp. v. Hobson*, 23 F.2d 349 (S.D. Cal. 1927) (byroad to prospect for oil).

There follows below an indication where, in other codes, the authorization to condemn for specific public uses formerly listed in Section 1238 can be found. It should be noted that, although Section 1238 purported to list only public uses in behalf of which the right of eminent domain might be exercised, it in fact on occasion also indicated what types of property or

interests may be taken. In general, under the Eminent Domain Law, this type of particularization is not continued. The authority to condemn property for a public use includes the authority to condemn any property right or interest necessary for that use. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170 ("property" defined), 1240.110, and 1240.120 (right to take property or interest necessary for project). Section 1238 also in some instances indicated which persons were authorized to condemn property for specific uses. The persons authorized to condemn for particular uses are indicated in the Comments to particular subdivisions below.

Subdivision 1

Subdivision 1, which was intended to authorize taking for federal purposes, is not continued since it no longer serves any useful purpose. The 1872 Code Commissioners' Note to subdivision 1 cites two California cases expressing doubt that the federal government had an independent right of eminent domain. It is now clear, however, that federal eminent domain power is not dependent on state authority and cannot be limited by the state. *Kohl v. United States*, 91 U.S. 367 (1875); *C. M. Patten & Co. v. United States*, 61 F.2d 970 (9th Cir. 1932).

Subdivision 2

Insofar as subdivision 2 authorized takings for state purposes, it is unnecessary because it has been superseded by the much broader condemnation powers conferred upon the State Public Works Board. See GOVT. CODE §§ 15853–15855. Insofar as the subdivision might have authorized condemnation on behalf of a state other than California, it is not continued. Takings under the eminent domain power of one state for the benefit of another state raise serious problems under the public use doctrine. See 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.112 (3d ed. 1964). If property is to be condemned by or for another state for a particular purpose, the takings should be authorized by a specific statute dealing with the specific situation. *E.g.*, WATER CODE § 5901, Art. VI, § A (Klamath River Basin Compact). The authorization in subdivision 2 for acquisitions for nonprofit colleges and universities ("institution . . . which is exempt from taxation under the provisions of Section 1a, of Article XIII of the Constitution of the State of California") is continued in Section 30051 of the Education Code. The reference in subdivision 2 to "all other public uses authorized by the Legislature of the State of California" was superfluous and had no substantive effect.

Subdivision 3

Any public utility. The authority to condemn "any public utility . . . for the use of any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village, town, school district, or irrigation district" was ambiguous in that it may have authorized condemnation of property owned by a public utility or may have authorized condemnation of property to be used for public utility purposes whether or not already devoted to public utility purposes. Cf. Breeze, *Limitations on the Right of a Municipality in California to Condemn a Public Utility*, 16 CAL. L. REV. 105, 106 (1927). As evidenced by other statutes enacted the same year relating to condemnation of public utility property, the apparent original intent of the provision was to authorize only the taking of property owned by public utilities. Compare Cal. Stats. 1913, Ch. 291, § 1, with Cal. Stats. 1913, Ch. 339, § 1. See also Cal. Stats. 1913, Chs. 158, 159, 160, 200, 292, 293, 298.

To the extent this provision authorized the acquisition of property belonging to a public utility, it was superfluous. A municipal corporation may acquire utility property. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10002; former CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240(3), (4), (5), and 1241(3). See also PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 1401–1421 (just compensation where utility property acquired by a political subdivision) and former CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1264.1–1264.9. Cf. Comment, *Eminent Domain Powers Exercisable Over California Property by Oil and Gas Corporations*, 7 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 327 (1960).

It is not clear whether the provision concerning any public utility "for the use of" the local public entities in subdivision 3 restricted the exercise of condemnation to the named entities or permitted condemnation by private public utilities providing service within the territorial limits of the named entities. Whichever is the proper construction of the provision, it is unnecessary. The authority of private corporations to condemn for particular public utility purposes is continued in Public Utilities Code Sections 611–624; the authority of local entities to condemn for particular public utility purposes is continued in specific grants of authority in other codes. See, e.g., the Comments to other repealed provisions of subdivisions 3, 4, 12, 13, and 17 *infra*.

Public buildings and grounds. The authority granted in subdivision 3 to condemn for "public buildings and grounds, for the use of any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village, town, school district, or irrigation district" is continued in other sections. E.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 25351 (county), 37353

(city); EDUC. CODE § 1047 (school district); WATER CODE § 22425 (irrigation districts). See also GOVT. CODE §§ 50333, 50531 (local agencies may acquire property for public buildings and grounds on public squares or to grant to the state). Villages and towns, as unincorporated territory, may not condemn. In addition to the general authority to condemn for public buildings and grounds, entities also have specific authority to condemn for particular types of buildings and works. For a compilation of statutes authorizing condemnation for certain types of public assembly facilities, see Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.4.

It should be noted that an entity authorized to acquire property for a building may acquire grounds necessary to protect or preserve the attractiveness, safety, or usefulness of the building. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.120. See also *University of So. Cal. v. Robbins*, 1 Cal. App.2d 523, 37 P.2d 163 (1934).

Water supply. The portion of subdivision 3 relating to condemnation of property necessary for conducting, storing, or distributing water is superseded by other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of "property," the authorization subsumes particular types of property, such as those mentioned in subdivision 3: ponds, lakes, canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, tunnels, flumes, ditches, or pipes, lands, water system plants, buildings, rights of any nature in water, and any other "character of property." See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110. The authority to condemn for a particular purpose includes the authority to condemn all property necessary for the proper control and development of that purpose at the time of the taking of the property as well as in the future. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.120, 1240.220. See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.220 for limitations on acquisition for future use.

Insofar as this portion of subdivision 3 may have been intended to grant any county, incorporated city, city and county, municipal water district, or state institution authority to condemn property necessary to conduct, store, or distribute water, such authority is continued in the following sections: STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 5101(h), 5102, 10010, 10100(a), 10101–10102 (cities and counties); GOVT. CODE §§ 54309(a), 54340–54341 ("local agencies," including cities and counties), 38730 (city), 25353, 25662, 25691 (county), 15853 (state institutions); WATER CODE § 71694 (municipal water districts). An unincorporated town or village, not being a public entity, may not condemn;

however, water supplies can be condemned on their behalf. See below.

The authority granted by subdivision 3 to condemn property necessary to conduct, store, or distribute water for the use of any county, incorporated city, city and county, town or village, municipal water district, or state institution, or the inhabitants thereof, is continued in other sections. There are numerous special water districts servicing various areas of the state. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 61600, 61610 (community services districts); WATER CODE §§ 35600 (California water districts), 31040–31042 (county water districts), 55370 (county waterworks districts), 22425 (irrigation districts). Water corporations, which are public utilities, may also condemn for these purposes. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 618. Private corporations may not condemn for other than public utility purposes. See *Burr v. Maclay Rancho Water Co.*, 160 Cal. 268, 280, 116 P. 715, 721 (1911) (a leading case adopting a strict view of public use where it was held that water used to fulfill a contract obligation was a private use because “it is not offered to the public generally, or to all who may want it within a certain territory”); *Thayer v. California Dev. Co.*, 164 Cal. 117, 128 P. 21 (1912). Cf. CIVIL CODE §§ 548–552.

Drainage. The authority provided by subdivision 3 to condemn for draining named local entities is continued in other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of “property” for drainage purposes, the authorization includes property and interests of all types, including the types listed in subdivision 3: ponds, lakes, canals, aqueducts, reservoirs, tunnels, flumes, ditches, pipes, lands, buildings, rights of any nature in water, and any other “character of property.” See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120.

The authority of the state to condemn for drainage is expressed in Government Code Section 15853. See also WATER CODE § 8304. The authority granted to cities and counties to condemn for drainage is continued in the following sections: GOVT. CODE § 40404(b), and STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 5101(d), 5102 (cities only); Storm Drain Maintenance District Act, § 5 (Cal. Stats. 1937, Ch. 265) (counties). See also HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 4602.4, 4627 (community facilities); WATER CODE § 8010(b) (cities). Drainage for villages, towns, and other areas can be provided by some of the numerous special districts authorized to provide drainage. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 61600, 61610 (community service districts); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 16404 (public utilities districts); WATER CODE §§ 22425 (irrigation districts), 31040–31042 (county water districts), 35600

(California water districts), 43500 (California water storage districts).

Although drainage is an established public use (*e.g., Bauer v. County of Ventura*, 45 Cal.2d 276, 289 P.2d 1 (1955)), private persons may not condemn to supply drainage. Sewer system corporations may provide drainage (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 230.5) and may condemn for that purpose (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 624) because they are public utilities (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216). See also former WATER CODE §§ 7020–7026 and Comment thereto (private ways for drainage and seepage canals).

Generally, the authority to provide for drainage overlaps the authority to provide for sewerage, reclamation, and flood control. For a compilation of statutes authorizing condemnation for sewerage, see Comment to subdivision 8 *infra*. For statutes relating to reclamation, see Comment to subdivision 4 *infra*. For flood control, see Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.6. See also stream improvements, immediately below.

Stream improvements. Raising the banks of streams, removing obstructions therefrom, and widening and deepening or straightening their channels is in itself a public use. See, *e.g., Reclamation District No. 551 v. Superior Court*, 151 Cal. 263, 90 P. 545 (1907) (“levee” is a public use although not specifically mentioned). Nonetheless, the authority to condemn for stream improvements is not normally a “use” or end in itself but rather a means to some other end such as flood control, navigation, irrigation, drainage, reclamation, water supply, and the like. These uses may, and often do, involve stream improvements. See Comments to subdivisions 3 (water supply, drainage) and 4 (water supply, water transport, drainage, reclamation, irrigation). See also Comments to former CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1238.5 (irrigation) and 1238.6 (reclamation, flood control). See also WATER CODE §§ 7040–7045 (maintenance of flow in streams for various purposes).

In addition to the general public uses described above under authority of which stream improvements might be undertaken, there is specific authority granted in various codes for entities to engage in stream improvement. Some statutes authorizing public entities to condemn for stream improvements, including raising its bank (levees and dikes) and altering its channel (widening, deepening, straightening), are: GOVT. CODE §§ 39901, 40404(c) (cities may alter channels), 25680–25684 (county control of streams and floodwaters), 54152 (“local agency” action for flood relief); HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 2270(d) (mosquito abatement district may raise banks); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 965 (county stream improvements for

highway protection); WATER CODE §§ 12934(3) (state water development projects), 8110, 8126 (county stream improvements), 8590(a), 8631 (Sacramento-San Joaquin Drainage District), 50930, 50932 (reclamation district).

Roads, highways, boulevards, streets, alleys. The authority to condemn for roads, highways, boulevards, streets, and alleys duplicates authority contained in other sections. *E.g.*, for highways: STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 104 (state for state highway), 941–943 (county for county highway), 25050 (joint highway district), and GOVT. CODE § 38304 (city for extraurban highways); for boulevards: PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5157 (county for boulevards), 5301 (city for boulevards), 5541–5542 (regional park districts for boulevards), and STS. & HWYS. CODE § 26113 (boulevard districts); for streets: STS. & HWYS. CODE § 4090 (city and county for streets), and GOVT. CODE §§ 37353, 39934, 40404(a) (county for streets). For a discussion of the right to condemn for byroads, see Comment to subdivision 6 *infra*.

Public mooring places for watercraft. The authority to condemn for public mooring places for watercraft is continued in other sections. See discussion under subdivision 4 *infra*, relating to the authority to condemn for wharves, docks, and piers. See also, *e.g.*, GOVT. CODE §§ 39961(b) (authority of city to acquire property for public mooring places for watercraft), 26301(b) (authority of county to acquire property for public small boat harbors).

Public parks. The authority to condemn for public parks, including parks and other places covered by water, is continued in other sections. Where other sections authorize the condemnation of land for parks, that authorization includes submerged lands and water rights for parks of all types including aquatic parks. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120. Cf. GOVT. CODE § 61600(e) (“park” includes “aquatic park”).

Cities may condemn for public parks. GOVT. CODE §§ 38002, 38010, 39732, 40401(b). Counties may acquire property interests for public parks. GOVT. CODE § 25353; PUB. RES. CODE § 5157 (this section authorizes only “purchase,” “lease,” and “gift” acquisitions; however, the authority to acquire, combined with the general power of the county to condemn for its proper functions—GOVT. CODE § 25350.5—enables the county to make use of the power of eminent domain for park purposes). In addition, cities and counties may acquire land for state parks (PUB. RES. CODE § 5150), and counties may acquire land for federal parks (PUB. RES. CODE § 8402).

Special districts having the power to condemn for public parks include community services districts (GOVT. CODE §§ 61600(e), 61610), public utilities districts (PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 16404, 16463), recreation and park districts (PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5782.2, 5782.5; *but see* §§ 5790–5791—districts with powers not including eminent domain), and regional park districts (PUB. RES. CODE §§ 5541–5542).

All other public uses. The authority to condemn for all uses authorized by the Legislature is superseded by Section 1240.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that a legislative authorization of condemnation on behalf of a particular purpose constitutes a declaration that that purpose is a public use. This rule is applicable to legislative authorizations to any condemnor—not merely to counties, incorporated cities, cities and counties, villages, towns, and their inhabitants, as previously provided in subdivision 3.

Costs of public improvements. The provision formerly found in subdivision 3 that the mode of apportioning and collecting the costs of public improvements was to be in the manner provided in their authorizing statutes is not continued. With the repeal of Section 1238, the only public use declarations that exist are in particular statutory authorizations which carry with them any applicable financial limitations on the construction of improvements.

Subdivision 4

Wharves, docks, piers, chutes, booms. The authority to condemn for wharves, docks, piers, chutes, and booms is continued in other sections. Cities, counties, and cities and counties may provide harbors and construct any structures necessary or convenient to promote commerce and navigation. GOVT. CODE §§ 39901(a), 39962, 54309(g), 54309.1(e), 54340, 54341; STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 5101(m) and 5102. These entities may also condemn for authorized uses. GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5 and 37350.5. See also GOVT. CODE § 40404(d)–(f). The authority of special districts to condemn for wharves, docks, piers, chutes, and booms is expressed in their enabling legislation. Public utilities may condemn for wharves, docks, piers, chutes, and booms. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 619. Private persons that are not public utilities may not condemn property for these purposes.

Warehouses. The authority to condemn for warehouses is continued in other sections. Cities and counties have general authority to condemn for any proper function. GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5 (county), 37350.5 (city). As to warehouses operated in connection with a harbor, see the sections cited above in

connection with wharves, docks, piers, chutes, and booms. See also *Clark v. City of Los Angeles*, 160 Cal. 317, 323, 116 P. 966, 968 (1911). Since cities and counties have general authority to condemn for proper city or county functions, they may condemn for a warehouse if they have general authority to construct and operate such a warehouse. Contrast *City of Los Angeles v. Koyer*, 48 Cal. App. 720, 192 P. 301 (1920) (city may not condemn for warehouses apart from wharves absent express authority); the rule in this case is not being continued.

The authority of special districts to condemn for warehouses is expressed in their enabling legislation. See, e.g., HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 6075, 6076, 6077.3 (harbor districts), 6295, 6296, 6307 (port districts), 6895, 6896 (river port districts), 7147, 7149(b), (c) (small craft harbor districts). Privately operated public warehouses that are public utilities may condemn property. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 623. Private persons that are not public utilities may not condemn property for this purpose.

Ferries. The authority to condemn for ferries is continued in other sections. Cities, counties, and cities and counties are authorized to acquire and maintain public ferries. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 39731, 39963, 54301, 54309(e), 54340, 54341; STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 1750–1757. These entities may condemn to carry out their functions. GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5, 37350.5. A privately owned public ferry system is a common carrier. (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 211(b)) and may not operate unless granted a franchise by the Department of Transportation or by the city within which it provides service. STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 30800–30902. See also CIVIL CODE §§ 528–531. As common carriers, the ferries are also public utilities (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216) and may condemn property. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 620.

Bridges. The authority to condemn for bridges was enacted in 1872, based on Sections 9 and 10 of an act concerning *toll* bridges. Cal. Stats. 1855, Ch. 147, amended Cal. Stats. 1864, Ch. 196. For legislative intent, see 2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 1238, at 102 n.5 (Haymond & Burch 1872). The word “toll” was deleted at the time the authorization for bridges was inserted in subdivision 4. As it relates to bridges generally, this authorization is superfluous, for under Streets and Highways Code Section 23, “highway” includes bridges; hence any authorization to condemn for highways includes authorization to condemn for bridges. See Comment to subdivision 3 *supra*. See also STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 1300–1404 (county bridges).

As it relates to toll bridges, the authority of public entities to condemn is continued in other sections. See STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 30400–30413 (California Toll Bridge Authority), 27165

(county bridge and highway districts), 31000–31010 (Gold Rush Parkway). Private toll bridge corporations (defined in PUB. UTIL. CODE § 237) are public utilities. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216(a). They may not operate without a franchise granted by the Department of Transportation. STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 30800–30873; see also CIVIL CODE §§ 528–531. Their authority to condemn is not continued since it is state policy to acquire and own all toll bridges and, ultimately, to eliminate all toll charges thereon. STS. & HWYS. CODE § 30001. See also Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1264.1–1264.9 (condemnation of toll bridge franchises). If the power to condemn property for a privately owned toll bridge is to be granted, it should be granted by a specific statute.

Toll roads. If the power of public entities to condemn property for toll roads is to be provided, it should be expressly stated by statute.

The authority of private corporations to condemn for toll roads is not continued. A private toll road must be granted a franchise by the Department of Transportation (STS. & HWYS. CODE § 30800) unless the franchise was granted prior to August 14, 1929 (STS. & HWYS. CODE § 30811). Under Streets and Highways Code Section 902, at the expiration of a franchise to run a toll road, the road becomes public with no need for compensation. See *People v. Davidson*, 79 Cal. 166, 21 P. 538 (1889); *People v. O'Keefe*, 79 Cal. 171, 21 P. 539 (1889). No evidence has been found that the Department of Transportation has granted franchises for toll roads; under modern conditions, there is no need to continue the authority of private persons to condemn for such roads. See also Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1264.1–1264.9 (condemnation of toll road franchises).

Byroads. See the Comment to subdivision 6 *infra*.

Plank and turnpike roads. The authority to condemn for plank and turnpike roads is discontinued as obsolete. This provision was enacted in 1872, based on Section 15 of an act authorizing the formation of private corporations for the construction of plank or turnpike roads. See Cal. Stats. 1853, Ch. 121. See also the discussion in 2 CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. ANN. § 1238, at 102 n.5 (Haymond & Burch 1872). This act was repealed years ago. Moreover, any plank or turnpike roads that existed at the time of repeal would have since become free public roads upon the expiration of the private franchise to collect tolls. See *People v. Auburn & Yankee Jim's Turnpike Co.*, 122 Cal. 335, 55 P. 10 (1898).

Paths or roads for bicycles, tricycles, motorcycles, or other horseless vehicles. The authority to condemn for paths or roads either on the surface, elevated, or depressed for the use of bicycles, tricycles, motorcycles, and other horseless vehicles duplicates other provisions and is not continued. This provision was added to Section 1238 in 1897 to provide an express grant of authority to condemn for public ways for driver-propelled and self-propelled vehicles. The apparent reasoning behind this addition was that the authority to condemn for roads contained in subdivision 3, having been enacted in 1872, applied only to horse-drawn vehicles. This reasoning is not sound, however, for the authority to condemn for "roads" includes the authority to condemn for public ways for all types of vehicles and nonvehicles. See *Muscolino v. Superior Court*, 172 Cal. App.2d 525, 341 P.2d 773 (1959) (pedestrian and equestrian trails). Thus, the authority to condemn for paths and roads for bicycles and the like duplicates general authority to condemn for roads found in other sections and is repealed as unnecessary. See Comment to subdivision 3 *supra*.

In addition to the general authority found in other sections to condemn for roads, there is added special authority to condemn for bicycle and other paths separate from automotive thoroughfares. See, e.g., PUB. RES. CODE § 5078.5 (city, county, or local agency may condemn property to establish bicycle paths or routes); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 104(j) (Department of Transportation may condemn property for bicycle lanes and paths), 951 (county may construct "sidepaths" along highways), 5101(b), 5102 (city and county construction of sidewalks and parkways). See also VEH. CODE § 21207 (bicycle regulations not to be construed to deny right to construct bicycle lanes); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 100.12 (incorporation of pedestrian and bicycle facilities in design of freeways), 105.5, and 105.7 (facilities for pedestrian, bicycle, and other nonmotorized traffic).

Steam, electric, and horse railroads. The authority contained in subdivision 4 to condemn for "steam, electric, and horse railroads" is discontinued. (These words are not to be read in series with any other uses or qualifications—e.g., "public transportation"—contained in subdivision 4. *San Francisco & S.J.V. Ry. v. Leviston*, 134 Cal. 412, 66 P. 473 (1901); *Central Pac. Ry. v. Feldman*, 152 Cal. 303, 92 P. 849 (1907).) The grant is obsolete because such railroads have largely been replaced by railroads using diesel-powered locomotives. Further, railroad corporations are given the power of eminent domain by Section 611 of the Public Utilities Code. See also PUB. UTIL. CODE

§§ 7533 (additional tracks), 7535 (railroad intersections), 7536 (railroad crossings). *Cf.* PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7508 (right of eminent domain in transferee of railroad corporation). Cities may condemn for facilities in aid of railroads and other public utilities. GOVT. CODE §§ 39790–39794.

Irrigation. The authority to condemn for irrigation is continued in other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of “property” for irrigation, the authorization subsumes particular types of property, such as those mentioned in subdivision 4: canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes. See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120. See also *Stratford Irr. Dist. v. Empire Water Co.*, 44 Cal. App.2d 61, 111 P. 2d 957 (1941) (property an irrigation district may condemn).

The power of any local agency authorized to supply irrigation to condemn property is continued generally in Government Code Sections 54309(a), 54340–54341 (local agency includes city, county, city and county, municipal or public corporation or district). In addition, numerous special districts are specifically authorized to condemn for irrigation. See, e.g., GOVT. CODE §§ 61600, 61610 (community services districts); WATER CODE §§ 35600 (California water districts), 31040–31042 (county water districts), 55370 (county waterworks districts), 22425 (irrigation districts), and 50910 (reclamation districts).

In addition, a water corporation, as a public utility (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 216; see also CIVIL CODE §§ 548–552), may condemn (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 618) for irrigation purposes (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 240). This is a valid public use. See *Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co.*, 36 Cal. App. 556, 178 P. 150 (1918); compare former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.5 (eminent domain for irrigation). See also former WATER CODE §§ 7020–7026 and Comment thereto (private ways for irrigation canals).

Public transportation by water. The authority granted by subdivision 4 to condemn canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for public transportation is not continued. This grant of authority was enacted in 1872 primarily for the benefit of private canal transport companies and is obsolete.

Condemnation authority for public transportation by water is provided by other statutes. Any water carrier may condemn for terminal facilities. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 622. See also PUB. UTIL. CODE § 620 (certain common carriers by water may condemn property necessary for transportation purposes). See also HARB. & NAV. CODE §§ 4150–4153 (county may acquire towpath

easement along navigable streams); GOVT. CODE § 39901 (city may construct deep water canal, waterway, or water facilities for transportation purposes).

Supplying mines with water. The authority of private persons to condemn for canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying mines with water is of doubtful constitutionality and is not continued. See *Lorenz v. Jacob*, 63 Cal. 73 (1883); see also former subdivision 5 *infra*. Public entities and public utilities have adequate condemnation authority. See discussion of their authority in other portions of the Comment to this section.

Supplying farming neighborhoods with water. The authority granted in subdivision 4 to condemn canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for supplying farming neighborhoods with water is not continued since it is superfluous. This grant of authority has been construed to be a grant of authority for irrigation purposes. See *Lux v. Haggan*, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919, 10 P. 674 (1886). As such, it merely duplicated the authority of those public entities already authorized to supply irrigation (see discussion above).

This grant of authority could also be interpreted as bestowing an added power upon owners of private farms to condemn for their own use. As such, it is probably an unconstitutional private use; in order for a private person to condemn to supply irrigation to farming neighborhoods, he must become in essence a public utility, offering to supply every person in the farming neighborhood he services. *Lindsay Irr. Co. v. Mehrtens*, 97 Cal. 676, 32 P. 802 (1893); *Lux v. Haggan*, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919, 10 P. 674 (1886). Furthermore, water corporations, which are public utilities (see discussion above), have adequate authorization to supply farming neighborhoods with water. In addition, farming neighborhoods may obtain their irrigation through the mechanism of mutual water companies (see discussion below) which have the power of eminent domain. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2729. Also, many special water districts have condemnation authority. Compare former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.5 (eminent domain for irrigation).

Drainage. The authority provided by subdivision 4 to condemn for draining lands is continued in other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of "property" for drainage purposes, the authorization includes property and interests of all types, including the types listed in subdivision 4: canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120. The authority of various entities and utilities to condemn for drainage is set out

in the Comment to subdivision 3 *supra*. Generally, the authority to provide for drainage overlaps the authority to provide for sewerage, reclamation, and flood control. For a compilation of statutes authorizing condemnation for sewerage, see Comment to subdivision 8 *infra*. For statutes relating to reclamation, see Comment immediately below. For flood control, see Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.6. See also stream improvements, subdivision 3 *supra*.

Reclamation. The authority granted by subdivision 4 to condemn for reclaiming lands is continued in other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of "property" for reclamation of land, the authorization extends to all types of and interests in property, including but not limited to the types mentioned in subdivision 4: canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120.

The authority of the state to condemn for reclamation is continued in Government Code Section 15853. See also WATER CODE § 8593 (Reclamation Board). The authority of cities and counties to condemn for reclamation is continued in Government Code Sections 25681.1 (counties) and 38901 (cities). See also *City of Redwood City v. Moore*, 231 Cal. App.2d 563, 42 Cal. Rptr. 72 (1965). The authority of special districts, if any, to condemn for reclamation is contained in their grants of power. See, e.g., WATER CODE §§ 31040–31042 (county water districts), 35600 (California water districts), 43500 (California water storage districts), 50930 (reclamation districts).

Private persons do not have authority to condemn for reclamation. Although reclamation of land is a public use (*cf. Reclamation Dist. No. 511 v. Superior Court*, 151 Cal. 263, 90 P. 545 (1907)), reclamation by private persons of land for their own benefit remains a private use. While a water corporation may condemn for "reclamation," it is clear that reclamation of water only—rather than land reclamation—is authorized. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 240.

Generally, the authority to provide for reclamation of land overlaps the authority to provide for drainage. See discussion of the authority to condemn for drainage immediately above and under subdivision 3 *supra*. See also former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.6 (eminent domain for protection, preservation, reclamation of land, flood control).

Floating logs on nonnavigable streams. The authority to condemn for canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for floating lumber on nonnavigable

streams is of doubtful constitutionality and is not continued. See Annot., 51 A.L.R. 1199 (1927); *cf. People v. Elk River M. & L. Co.*, 107 Cal. 221, 40 P. 531 (1895). See also former subdivision 11 *infra*.

Mutual water company. The authority of a mutual water company to condemn for water, water rights, canals, ditches, dams, poundings, flumes, aqueducts, and pipes for irrigation of lands serviced by the company is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 2729. See the Comment to that section.

Extraterritorial condemnation for domestic and irrigation water. The grant of authority for any municipality, corporation, or person that supplies water to the public or to any neighborhood or community for domestic use or irrigation to condemn land with wells and water adjacent to it is not continued because it is unduly restrictive.

A municipality, or any local public entity, may condemn property beyond its territorial limits—regardless of whether that property is adjacent or whether it consists of lands with wells and water—if the right to condemn is expressly granted by statute or is necessarily implied as an incident to one of its other statutory powers. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.050. Municipalities are expressly granted the right to condemn property beyond their jurisdictional limits in aid of supplying water for domestic use and irrigation. See GOVT. CODE § 54341. In addition, absent such a provision, the power of extraterritorial condemnation would be necessarily implied as an incident of the power to supply water. See *City of North Sacramento v. Citizens Util. Co.*, 192 Cal. App.2d 482, 13 Cal. Rptr. 538 (1961). See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.050.

The limitations on the extraterritorial condemnation rights of special districts, if any, are expressed in their particular authorizing statutes. See, e.g., WATER CODE §§ 35628 (California water districts), 71694 (municipal water districts).

A corporation or person that supplies water to the public for domestic use or irrigation may, of course, no longer condemn at all unless it is a water corporation—a public utility—or a mutual water company. See discussion above. There are no restrictions upon the locations in which a water corporation or any public utility may condemn; the only limitation is that the property condemned must be “necessary” for the water system. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 618.

Subdivision 5

Subdivision 5 is not continued. It is clear from the language of the subdivision itself, and from the statute that it superseded (Cal. Stats. 1869-70, Ch. 404), that the Legislature intended to authorize takings by individual mine owners to facilitate the working of their mines. However, the California courts have refused to give the subdivision its intended application or any effect whatsoever. *County of Sutter v. Nichols*, 152 Cal. 688, 93 P. 872 (1908); *Amador Queen Min. Co. v. Dewitt*, 73 Cal. 482, 15 P. 74 (1887); *Lorenz v. Jacob*, 63 Cal. 73 (1883); *Consolidated Channel Co. v. Central Pac. R.R.*, 51 Cal. 269 (1876). Although the courts have not held the subdivision unconstitutional, they have invoked the constitutional doctrine of public use to prevent any takings under the subdivision. The only possible application of the subdivision might have been under the former Placer Mining District Act (PUB. RES. CODE §§ 2401-2512, repealed Cal. Stats. 1953, Ch. 1365). See *Black Rock Placer Mining Dist. v. Summit Water & Irr. Co.*, 56 Cal. App.2d 513, 133 P.2d 58 (1943). Although the repeal of that act did not affect the existence or powers of any district previously organized pursuant to the repealed act, there are no such districts presently reporting financial transactions to the State Controller. See CAL. STATE CONTROLLER, FINANCIAL TRANSACTIONS CONCERNING SPECIAL DISTRICTS IN CALIFORNIA (1965-66).

Subdivision 6

Subdivision 6 is not continued. The authority of public entities to condemn property for byroads necessary to reach any property for public purposes is embraced in the authority to condemn for roads generally. For a compilation of such authority, see Comment to subdivision 3 *supra* ("roads, highways, boulevards, streets, alleys"). See also CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.350 (substitute condemnation to provide utility service or access to public road).

Private persons have no right to condemn property for byroads. The former law was unclear because there was no case precisely on point. See *General Petroleum Corp. v. Hobson*, 23 F.2d 349 (1927) (prospecting for oil not a use listed in Section 1238); *City of Sierra Madre v. Superior Court*, 191 Cal. App.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1961) (land developer not authorized to bring condemnation action in name of city). Cf. *Lingga v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955) (private individual may condemn sewer easement over property adjoining his). See also *Sherman v. Buick*, 32 Cal. 242 (1867) ("byroad" a public

use for which county could acquire property). Cf. former STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 1050–1054 and Comment thereto (private byroads).

Subdivision 7

The authority granted in subdivision 7 to condemn for telegraph, telephone, radio, and wireless (and by implication other forms of communication) lines, systems, and plants to a considerable extent duplicated other provisions. (“Wireless” duplicated “radio,” the former being the word preferred in British usage. See WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1872, 2624 (1961).)

The state has a teletype system (GOVT. CODE §§ 14710, 14711) and the Department of Justice maintains a statewide telecommunication system for the use of law enforcement agencies (GOVT. CODE § 15152). In addition, the Department of General Services is authorized to acquire, construct, and maintain communications systems and facilities available to all public agencies in the state. GOVT. CODE § 14931. The state may exercise the power of eminent domain on behalf of these uses and any other communication purposes for which appropriations are made. GOVT. CODE § 15853.

Cities, counties, and cities and counties, as municipal corporations, may establish and operate public works to provide their inhabitants with telephone service or other means of communication. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 10001–10004, 10101; GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5, 37350.5, 39732, 39790, 39792; STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 5101(e), 5102. Moreover, municipal utility districts may be formed to provide their members with telephone service or other means of communication. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 12801. These districts are empowered to exercise eminent domain to provide and maintain the facilities necessary to afford their members the requisite means of communication. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12703, 12771.

Private communications companies may continue to condemn only if they are public utilities. Telephone and telegraph companies are public utilities that are strictly regulated by the Public Utilities Commission. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 216, 1001. These companies may exercise the power of eminent domain to take land for almost any purpose that would facilitate communication by telephone and telegraph. See PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 233–236, 616, 617. Such exercise is a public use. *San Diego Gas & Elec. Co. v. Lux Land Co.*, 194 Cal. App.2d 472, 14 Cal. Rptr. 899 (1961). It should be noted that these utilities may use the public highways for the creation and maintenance

of telephone and telegraph lines and the fixtures necessary thereto. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7901. See also *Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City & County of San Francisco*, 51 Cal.2d 766, 336 P.2d 514 (1959) (construction by utilities amounts to state franchise); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 117, 5101(e) (location of structures or fixtures in public rights of way); federal "Post Roads Act" (discussion in 1 P. NICHOLS, EMINENT DOMAIN § 2.15 (1964)).

Subdivision 8

Insofar as subdivision 8 authorized condemnation by public entities, it was unnecessary. Cities have general condemnation authority for connection to sewer systems. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE §§ 37350.5, 38900, 40404. See also GOVT. CODE §§ 54340, 55003; HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 5001, 5008. Counties also have general condemnation authority for connection to sewer systems. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5, 25825. See also HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 4740, 4760 (county sanitation districts). The authority of an incorporated village or town to condemn for sewer purposes is the same as that of a city. See GOVT. CODE § 20 ("city" includes "incorporated town").

Unincorporated towns, villages, and small settlements have no authority to condemn, but there are a number of methods by which sewer service can be provided in these areas. For example, the county may condemn for a sewer system on their behalf. GOVT. CODE § 25825. The county may form a county sanitation district on their behalf. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 4711. A city may form an improvement district on their behalf. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 4614.4. A sewer maintenance district may be formed. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 4870. In addition, 25 persons in any county may form a sanitary district with the power to condemn for sewage. HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 6514. A municipal utility district may be formed. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12703, 12771.

The authority of the state and of any college or university to condemn for sewage from its buildings is continued elsewhere. The state may condemn for any state purpose. GOVT. CODE § 15853. The University of California, the state college system, and nonprofit higher education institutions may condemn property necessary to carry out any of their functions. EDUC. CODE §§ 23151, 30051. See also the Comment to subdivision 2 *supra*.

Under prior law, private persons were authorized to condemn for the connection of buildings with city or county sewer mains. See *Linggi v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955). This authority is not continued. Instead, a private person

may request the public entity that operates the sewer system in his vicinity to make the connection for him and to condemn an easement or other property if needed for that purpose. See HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 4967. A sewer system corporation, as a public utility, is authorized to condemn property. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 624.

Subdivision 9

Subdivision 9, which was enacted in 1891, is obsolete. Traction engines and road locomotives—essentially steam-powered locomotives which ran on wheels rather than tracks—have long been considered collector's items. See F. CLYMER, ALBUM OF HISTORICAL STEAM TRACTION ENGINES (1949); Fisher, *Road Locomotives in TRANSACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF NEW YORK CITY*, 31ST ANNUAL REPORT at 877 (1870–71); F. GILLFORD, THE TRACTION ENGINE 1843–1936 (1952).

Subdivision 10

Subdivision 10 is superseded by Section 615 of the Public Utilities Code which grants the power of eminent domain to pipeline corporations. See the Comment to Section 615.

Subdivision 11

Subdivision 11 is repealed as unnecessary.

The authority of public entities to condemn for quarrying is not affected by the repeal of subdivision 11 and is continued in other provisions. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE § 39793; STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104(c).

The authority of logging railroads to condemn is valid only to the extent that the railroads are common carriers. See *Great Northern Ry. v. Superior Court*, 126 Cal. App. 575, 14 P.2d 899 (1932); *cf.* CAL. CONST., Art. I, § 14 (last sentence). This authority is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 611.

Byroads servicing private lumbering or quarrying property may no longer be condemned by private persons. See former subdivision 6 *supra*.

Insofar as quarrying, logging, and lumbering are businesses carried on by private persons for private profit, the attempt to grant the right to condemn for rights of way servicing those businesses is of doubtful constitutionality and is not continued. See former subdivision 4 *supra* (logging). Cf. former subdivision 5 and Comment thereto *supra* (mining).

Subdivision 12

Subdivision 12 is superseded in whole by other provisions. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of "property," the authorization subsumes particular types of property, such as

those mentioned in subdivision 12: canals, reservoirs, dams, ditches, flumes, aqueducts, pipes, outlets, buildings, and "all other improvements." See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120.

Subdivision 12 authorized condemnation for generating and transmitting electricity to supply power, light, and heat to individuals and corporations, both public and private. This grant of authority duplicated, and was broader than, that found in subdivision 13.

The power of local public entities to condemn for these purposes is continued in other sections. *E.g.*, STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 5101(e), 5102, 10010, 10100(b), 10101–10102 (cities and counties); GOVT. CODE §§ 39732, 39790–39792 (cities); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 10002 (municipal corporation).

The power of special districts to condemn for the purposes listed above also is continued in other sections. *E.g.*, PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 12703, 12801 (municipal utility district), 16404, 16461 (public utility district); WATER CODE §§ 22115, 22456 (irrigation districts). See also PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 8101–8134 (joint operation by irrigation district and public utility); GOVT. CODE §§ 55300–55367 (joint city, county, sanitation district project for electric lines).

The power of private persons generally to condemn is not continued. However, a public utility may condemn to generate and transmit electricity for the purposes listed above. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 612.

In addition, insofar as railroads and "tramways" are common carriers, their authority to condemn in aid of their operations is continued in Public Utilities Code Sections 611 and 621.

Subdivision 13

Subdivision 13 is superseded in whole by provisions of other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of "property," the authorization subsumes particular types of property, such as those mentioned in subdivision 13: electric lines, works or plants, lands, buildings, rights of any character in water, or "any other character of property." See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120.

Insofar as subdivision 13 specifically authorized takings for future use, it is continued in the Eminent Domain Law; the authority to condemn for a particular purpose includes authority to condemn for the proper development and control of that purpose at the time of the taking of the property as well as in the future. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.120, 1240.220. See also

CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.220 for limitations on acquisition for future use.

Subdivision 13 authorized condemnation for generating, transmitting, and distributing electricity to supply power, light, and heat to local public entities or their inhabitants. This grant of authority duplicated, and was narrower than, that found in subdivision 12. For a listing of statutes authorizing condemnation for these purposes, see Comment to subdivision 12 *supra*.

Subdivision 14

Subdivision 14 is unnecessary because all public entities that operate cemeteries have specific authority to condemn for cemetery purposes. The state's authority appears in Government Code Section 15853. The cities' authority appears in Government Code Section 37350.5. See also GOVT. CODE § 37681. The authority of public cemetery districts is in Health and Safety Code Section 8961. Private cemeteries are not authorized to condemn property. See HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 8500. *But see* HEALTH & SAF. CODE § 8715 (taking of roadways, parks, and the like by private cemetery).

Subdivision 15

Subdivision 15 is superseded by Sections 14770 and 53040 of the Government Code.

Subdivision 16

Subdivision 16 is obsolete and merely duplicates other specific grants of condemnation authority.

All public entities that might utilize the power of eminent domain for fair or exposition purposes are specifically granted the power of eminent domain. Specific grants are made to the state (GOVT. CODE § 15853), cities (GOVT. CODE § 37350.5; see also GOVT. CODE § 50331), counties (GOVT. CODE § 25350.5; see also GOVT. CODE §§ 25900–25908), district agricultural associations (GOVT. CODE § 15853; see also FOOD & AGRI. CODE § 4051), and citrus fruit fairs (GOVT. CODE § 15853; see also FOOD & AGRI. CODE § 4701). Private fair corporations (*e.g.*, CIVIL CODE § 620) do not have the power of eminent domain.

With the repeal in 1949 of all special constitutional grants in aid of private expositions, subdivision 16 became obsolete. (The subdivision was enacted in 1911, apparently as a grant of eminent domain power to the Panama-Pacific International Exposition Company. See former CAL. CONST., Art. XI, § 8a.) *But see County of Alameda v. Meadowlark Dairy Corp.*, 227 Cal. App.2d 80, 38 Cal. Rptr. 474 (1964) (subdivision 16 relied upon

to authorize condemnation by a county for fair purposes on the theory that the Constitution grants to counties a tax-exempt status which is a "thing of value . . . authorized by the Constitution" within the meaning of subdivision 16). However, subdivision 16 is no longer necessary because counties now have a specific grant of condemnation authority. GOVT. CODE § 25350.5. See also GOVT. CODE §§ 25900-25908.

Subdivision 17

Subdivision 17 is in part discontinued and in part superseded by provisions of other sections. Where other sections authorize the acquisition of "property," the authorization subsumes particular types of property, such as those mentioned in subdivision 17: works or plants, lands, buildings, and all other improvements, rights of any nature in water, or property "of any character necessary for the purpose." See CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120. The authority to condemn for a particular purpose includes the authority to condemn all property necessary for the proper development and control of that purpose at the time of the taking of the property, as well as in the future. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.120, 1240.220.

The authority granted by subdivision 17 to condemn property necessary for generating, transmitting, distributing, and supplying refrigeration to any county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or irrigation district, or the inhabitants thereof is not continued. The provision has no apparent present application. There is no statute regulating the incorporation or operation of "refrigeration" companies. Hence, there is no need to continue a general condemnation authority for refrigeration. Insofar as a railroad company, for example, supplies "refrigeration" in connection with the transportation of property (see PUB. UTIL. CODE § 209), it can condemn necessary property under Public Utilities Code Section 611.

The authority granted by subdivision 17 to public entities to condemn property necessary for generating, transmitting, distributing, and supplying gas, heat, and power is continued in other sections. *E.g.*, STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 5101(i), 5102 (Improvement Act of 1911—gas), 10010, 10100(c), 10101-10102 (Municipal Improvement Act of 1913—gas, heat, power); GOVT. CODE § 39732 (cities—gas, heat, power); PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 10002 (municipal corporation—heat, power), 12703, 12801 (municipal utility districts), 16404, 16461 (public utility districts). See also Comments to subdivisions 12 and 13 *supra*, relating to electrical power. For the authority of irrigation

districts to condemn for electrical power, see Comments to subdivisions 12 and 13 *supra*.

The authority granted by subdivision 17 to private persons to condemn property necessary for generating, transmitting, distributing, and supplying gas, heat, and power is continued to the extent the private person is a public utility. See Comments to subdivisions 12 and 13 *supra* for power of electrical corporations to supply electrical power. A gas corporation (see PUB. UTIL. CODE § 222) may condemn property (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 613) for its gas plant (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 221). See also 15 U.S.C. § 717(f)-(h) (1964) (Natural Gas Act—condemnation by public utility in interstate commerce). A heat corporation (see PUB. UTIL. CODE § 224) may condemn property (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 614) for its heating plant (PUB. UTIL. CODE § 223).

Subdivision 18

Subdivision 18 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.120, providing general authority to condemn property necessary for protective purposes. This general authority permits condemnation to provide for the culture and growth of trees along highways without the 300-foot limitation formerly found in subdivision 18. Under Code of Civil Procedure Section 1240.120, a condemner may take any property “necessary” for protective purposes. See also STS. & HWYS. CODE § 104(f) (authorizing the taking of property by the Department of Transportation).

Subdivision 19

Subdivision 19 duplicated authority found elsewhere in the codes to condemn for fish conservation purposes. The power of state agencies to condemn is found in the general authorization of Government Code Section 15853 and the more specific grants to specific agencies. *E.g.*, WATER CODE §§ 253, 11900; FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1120, 1301, 1345, 1348. See *State v. Natomas Co.*, 239 Cal. App. 2d 547, 49 Cal. Rptr. 64 (1966). The authority of counties to condemn is found in Government Code Section 25350.5. See also FISH & GAME CODE §§ 1150 and 13100. The authority of special districts, if any, is to be found in their particular authorizing grants. See, *e.g.*, *Monterey County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Hughes*, 201 Cal. App.2d 197, 20 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1962), in which the district’s power to condemn for recreational purposes was upheld based upon a general condemnation power in its authorizing statute plus policy statements in the Water Code that fish and wildlife values, both economic and recreational, were to be given

consideration in any flood control or water conservation program. Private persons do not have the right to condemn for fish conservation purposes.

Subdivision 20

Subdivision 20 is superseded by provisions conferring adequate condemnation authority on all public entities authorized to operate airports. See GOVT. CODE §§ 26020 (counties), 50470 (cities, counties, cities and counties); PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21633 (state), 22553 (airport districts); HARB. & NAV. CODE APP. 1, §§ 4, 5, 27 (West Supp. 1967) (San Diego Unified Port District). Insofar as subdivision 20 may have authorized condemnation for airport purposes by private persons (see 9 OPS. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 187 (1947)), it is not continued.

Subdivision 21

Subdivision 21 was unnecessary because it merely duplicated express grants of the power of eminent domain given the agencies engaged in slum clearance and low-rent housing by other statutes. Thus, housing authorities, which may be activated within any city or county, may condemn property for slum clearance, construction of low-cost housing, or construction of farm labor camps. HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 34240, 34325, 36059(i). See also HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 34874, 34875, 34879 (limited dividend housing corporations). The addition of Sections 35167–35171 to the Health and Safety Code to grant condemnation authority to community land chest corporations (nonprofit corporations formed under Health and Safety Code Sections 35100–35237 to provide “housing in rural and suburban areas for families of low income”) provides all of the agencies covered by subdivision 21 with adequate condemnation authority.

Subdivision 22

Subdivision 22 is superseded by Section 622 of the Public Utilities Code.

§ 1238.1 (repealed). Offstreet parking

1238.1. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

1. Off-street parking. Off-street motor vehicle parking places, including property necessary or convenient for

ingress thereto or egress therefrom, established by any city or city and county for public use.

Comment. Section 1238.1, which applied only to cities and to the City and County of San Francisco, has been repealed as unnecessary. Cities are authorized to acquire property for parking facilities by numerous other statutes. Some of these authorizations contain express powers of condemnation. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE §§ 54031, 54341 (offstreet revenue-producing parking); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 4090(a), (b) (offstreet parking authorizations), 31506 (offstreet vehicle parking districts), 35108(j) (offstreet parking districts), 32802(b) (offstreet parking authorities). Other statutes merely provide for acquisition of the necessary property. *E.g.*, GOVT. CODE §§ 37353(a) (offstreet parking), 54061 (offstreet stadium-coliseum parking); STS. & HWYS. CODE § 36000(a) (offstreet business area parking facilities). However, these latter statutes are both augmented and supplemented by Government Code Section 37350.5 (general grant of condemnation authority). Cf. City of Anaheim v. Michel, 259 Cal. App.2d 835, 66 Cal. Rptr. 543 (1968). Thus, retention of Section 1238.1 would add nothing to the condemnation authority given cities by other statutes.

§ 1238.2 (repealed). Farmers' free market

1238.2. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

1. Farmers' Free Market. Contiguous property at one site necessary for the establishment of a farmers' free market solely for the vending of fresh fruits and vegetables, including property necessary or convenient for ingress thereto or egress therefrom may be acquired under this title for a public use by a county or city and county whose average population per square mile is more than ten thousand persons.

Comment. Section 1238.2, which applied only to the City and County of San Francisco, has been repealed as unnecessary. The section obviously was intended to facilitate a particular acquisition. See GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5, 37350.5 (general grant of condemnation authority).

§ 1238.3 (repealed). Nonprofit hospitals

1238.3. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

1. Property immediately adjacent to and necessary for the operation or expansion of a nonprofit hospital then in existence and engaged in scientific research or an educational activity and the acquisition of which has been certified as necessary by the Director of the State Department of Public Health, except that property devoted to use for the relief, care, or treatment of the spiritual, mental, or physical illness or ailment of humans shall not be taken under this section.

2. As used in this section, "nonprofit hospital" means any health center or general, tuberculosis, mental, chronic disease, or other type of hospital holding a license in good standing issued under the provisions of Chapter 2 of Division 2 of the Health and Safety Code and owned and operated by a fund, foundation or corporation, no part of the net earnings of which inures, or may lawfully inure, to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual.

Comment. Section 1238.3 is superseded by Section 1427 of the Health and Safety Code.

§ 1238.4 (repealed). Public assembly facilities

1238.4. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

Public Assembly Facilities. Public buildings and grounds for convention and exhibition halls, trade and industrial centers, auditoriums, opera houses, music halls and centers, and related facilities for public assembly including off-street motor vehicle parking places and property necessary or convenient for ingress thereto or egress therefrom.

Comment. Section 1238.4 was added to the Code of Civil Procedure in 1955, apparently to authorize counties to condemn for the purposes listed. Compare Government Code Section 25351.3(a), enacted simultaneously with Section 1238.4, granting counties the authority to construct and acquire land for such public assembly facilities. For this purpose, Section

1238.4 is repealed as no longer necessary, for a county may condemn for any proper county function. GOVT. CODE § 25350.5.

To the extent that Section 1238.4 may incidentally have authorized other entities to condemn for the purposes listed, it is superseded by other sections. Generally, the state may condemn for public buildings and grounds for any of its activities. See Comment to subdivision 2 of former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238. It should be noted, however, that the power of eminent domain may not be exercised on behalf of California World Trade Centers. GOVT. CODE § 8324.

Cities may condemn land for public assembly and convention halls as well as for public buildings and grounds generally. GOVT. CODE § 37501. See Comment to subdivision 3 of former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238. In addition, cities (and counties) may construct exhibition halls, historical museums, and art galleries. GOVT. CODE § 50331. The power of eminent domain is available for these purposes. GOVT. CODE § 37350.5.

District agricultural associations and citrus fruit fairs (and counties) may construct recreational and cultural facilities of general public interest. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 19630.5. For a compilation of statutes authorizing the power of eminent domain for fair and exposition purposes, see Comment to subdivision 16 of former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.

Although public assembly facilities are a public use (see, e.g., *County of Los Angeles v. Anthony*, 224 Cal. App.2d 103, 36 Cal. Rptr. 308, cert. denied, 376 U.S. 963 (1964)), private persons may not condemn for that use. See former CIVIL CODE § 1001 and Comment thereto.

The authority contained in former Section 1238.4 to condemn for offstreet parking that services public assembly facilities is repealed because it duplicates broader and more general authority to condemn for offstreet parking. See Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.1.

The authority contained in former Section 1238.4 to condemn for access to public assembly facilities is repealed as unnecessary. The right to condemn for public assembly facilities has inherent in it the right to provide for ingress to and egress from the facilities. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.120.

§ 1238.5 (repealed). Irrigation

1238.5. Irrigation is a public use in behalf of which the right of eminent domain may be exercised pursuant to this title.

Comment. Section 1238.5, declaring irrigation to be a public use, is repealed as unnecessary. All public entities authorized to supply irrigation to the public have adequate independent authority to condemn for that purpose. See Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238, subdivision 4 (irrigation generally, and for various specific purposes, declared to be a public use). Irrigation is a public use only so long as it is offered to the public. See *Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co.*, 36 Cal. App. 556, 178 P. 150 (1918). Private persons may not condemn for this purpose. See former CIVIL CODE § 1001 and Comment to that section. However, a mutual water company does have the power of eminent domain for irrigation purposes. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2729 and the Comment to that section.

§ 1238.6 (repealed). Protection, preservation or reclamation of land against overflow or incursion of water

1238.6. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

1. Protection, preservation, or reclamation of land, whether covered or uncovered by water, against the overflow or incursion of water or the threat thereof, or against the effects of subsidence of the surface of said land, as by constructing levees or by filling, diking, draining or other appropriate remedial method.

Comment. Former Section 1238.6 was enacted in 1957 to declare as a public use the protection, preservation, and reclamation of lands subject to flooding or subsidence. This declaration is no longer necessary because the scheme of the Eminent Domain Law is to eliminate a listing of general public uses and to rely instead on specific legislative authorizations to condemn. See the introductory portion of the Comment to former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238. Generally speaking, the state (GOVT. CODE § 15853), cities (GOVT. CODE § 37350.5), and counties (GOVT. CODE § 25350.5) may condemn for any of their functions. Special districts may condemn if expressly authorized to do so. Private persons may not condemn for this purpose.

Specific authority for the above-named entities to preserve, protect, and reclaim lands subject to flooding or subsidence can be found in numerous sections. See, e.g., WATER CODE §§ 12579, 12861 (flood control policy declaration), 8300–8304 (flood control by Department of Water Resources), 8590–8596, 8619

(flood control by Reclamation Board), 8000–8061 (flood control by cities), 8100 (flood control by counties), 8110 (flood control by county-formed districts), 50930 (flood control by reclamation districts), 70150 (flood control by protection districts). See also HEALTH & SAF. CODE §§ 4602.4(e), 4627 (flood control by municipal utilities); GOVT. CODE §§ 25680–25684 (flood control by counties); PUB. RES. CODE §§ 3315–3347 (land subsidence in oil and gas pool areas), 6303 (flood control policy declaration).

The authority granted in former Section 1238.6 overlaps the authority of governmental entities to condemn for drainage, land reclamation, stream improvements, and sewerage. For compilations of these statutes, see Comments to subdivisions 3, 4, and 8 of former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1238.

§ 1238.7 (repealed). Earth fill source

1238.7. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

1. Property as a source of earth fill material for use in the development of a school site by a school district which is situated wholly or partly within a city or city and county having in excess of 750,000 population and an average population per square mile of more than 4,500 persons.

Comment. Section 1238.7 is repealed as unnecessary since Section 1047, which is added to the Education Code, permits condemnation of any property necessary to carry out the functions of the district and, therefore, would permit condemnation of an earth fill source. See also CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1235.170, 1240.110, 1240.120.

§ 1239 (repealed). Classification of estates and rights subject to be taken

1239. The following is a classification of the estates and rights in lands subject to be taken for public use:

1. A fee simple, when taken for public buildings or grounds, or for permanent buildings, for reservoirs and dams, and permanent flooding occasioned thereby, or for an outlet for a flow, or a place for the deposit of debris or tailings of a mine, or for the protection of water bearing lands from drought therefrom of any character whatsoever from any adjacent lands.

2. Except as provided in subsections 3 and 4, or specifically in any other statute, an easement, when taken for any other use; provided, however, that when the taking is by a municipal corporation, and is for the purpose of constructing, equipping, using, maintaining or operating any works, road, railroad, tramway, power plant, telephone line, or other necessary works or structures, for the preparation, manufacture, handling or transporting of any material or supplies required in the construction or completion by such municipal corporation of any public work, improvement, or utility, a fee simple may be taken if the legislative body of such municipal corporation shall, by resolution, determine the taking thereof to be necessary; and provided, further, that, when any land is taken for the use of a by-pass, or drainage way, or overflow channel, or a levee, or an embankment, or a cut required by the plans of the California Debris Commission referred to in that certain act of the Legislature, entitled "An act approving the report of the California Debris Commission transmitted to the Speaker of the House of Representatives by the Secretary of War on June 27, 1911, directing the approval of plans of reclamation along the Sacramento River or its tributaries or upon the swamp lands adjacent to said river, directing the State Engineer to procure data and make surveys and examinations for the purpose of perfecting the plans contained in said report of the California Debris Commission, and to make reports thereof, making an appropriation to pay the expenses of such examinations and surveys, and creating a Reclamation Board and defining its power," approved December 24, 1911, or any modifications or amendments that may be adopted to the same, either a fee simple or easement may be taken as a reclamation board shall by resolution determine may be necessary. Such resolution shall be conclusive evidence that a taking of the fee simple or easement, as the case may be, is necessary.

3. The right of entry upon and occupation of lands, and the right to take therefrom such earth, gravel, stones, trees, and timber as may be necessary for some public use.

4. When the property is taken by any mutual water system, county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or a municipal water district, or other political subdivision, regardless of the use, a fee simple may be taken if the legislative or other governing body of such mutual water system, county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or municipal water district, or other political subdivision, shall, by resolution, determine the taking thereof in fee to be necessary. Such resolution shall be conclusive evidence of the necessity for the taking of the fee simple. Where the fee is taken, the decree of condemnation shall specifically provide for the taking of a fee simple estate.

The provisions of this subsection shall not be applicable where the property is taken under the authority conferred by subsection 1 hereof.

Comment. Section 1239 is superseded by Section 1240.110 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See also CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.040, 1245.210 *et seq.* (resolution of necessity). A background study, prepared for the Law Revision Commission, on Section 1239 is published as Taylor, *The Right to Take—The Right to Take the Fee or Any Lesser Interest*, 1 PAC. L.J. 555 (1970).

§ 1239.2 (repealed). Airspace or air easement

1239.2. Airspace above the surface of property or an air easement in such airspace may be acquired under this title by a county, city or airport district if such taking is necessary to protect the approaches of any airport from the encroachment of structures or vegetable life of such height or character as to interfere with or be hazardous to the use of such airport.

Comment. The substance of Section 1239.2 is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 21652.

§ 1239.3 (repealed). Airspace or air easement; taking near airport to provide interference-free area

1239.3. Airspace above the surface of property or an air easement in such airspace may be acquired under this title by a county, city, port district, or airport district if such

taking is necessary to provide an area in which excessive noise, vibration, discomfort, inconvenience or interference with the use and enjoyment of real property located adjacent to or in the vicinity of an airport and any reduction in the market value of real property by reason thereof will occur through the operation of aircraft to and from the airport.

Comment. The substance of Section 1239.3 is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 21652.

§ 1239.4 (repealed). Airspace or air easement; uses reserved to property owner; acquisition in fee

1239.4. Where necessary to protect the approaches of any airport from the encroachment of structures or vegetable life of such a height or character as to interfere with or be hazardous to the use of such airport, land adjacent to, or in the vicinity of, such airport may be acquired under this title by a county, city or airport district reserving to the former owner thereof an irrevocable free license to use and occupy such land for all purposes except the erection or maintenance of structures or the growth or maintenance of vegetable life above a certain prescribed height or may be acquired by a county, city or airport district in fee.

Comment. The substance of Section 1239.4 is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 21652. The right under former Section 1239.4 to take a fee interest or a fee with an "irrevocable free license" reserved to the original owner is continued under Section 21652 of the Public Utilities Code which permits the taking of a fee or any lesser interest. See also CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.110, 1240.120.

§ 1240 (repealed). Property subject to be taken

1240. The private property which may be taken under this title includes:

1. All real property belonging to any person;
2. Lands belonging to this state, including tide and submerged lands, not within the corporate limits of any city, or city and county, or to any county, incorporated city, or city and county, village or town, not appropriated

to some public use; provided, that all 16th and 36th sections, both surveyed and unsurveyed, owned by the state or the United States, which may now or may hereafter be included within the exterior boundaries of a national reservation, or of a reserve, or within the exterior boundaries of lands withdrawn from public entry, shall be and hereby are withheld from the operation of this title and shall not be condemned as against the state or the United States;

3. Property appropriated to public use; but such property shall not be taken unless for a more necessary public use than that to which it has already been appropriated; provided, that where any such property has been so appropriated by any individual, firm or private corporation, the use thereof for a state highway or a public street or highway of the state, or a county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, joint highway district, or the use thereof by the state or a county, city and county, incorporated city or town, joint highway district, or irrigation or municipal water district, for the same public purpose to which it has been so appropriated, or for any other public purpose shall be deemed more necessary uses than the public use to which such property has already been appropriated; and provided further, that where property already appropriated to a public use or purpose, by any person, firm or private corporation, is sought to be taken by the state, a county, city and county, incorporated city or town, joint highway district, irrigation or municipal water district, for another public use or purpose, which is consistent with the continuance of the use of such property or some portion thereof for such existing purpose, to the same extent as such property is then used, or to a less or modified extent, then the right to use such property for such proposed public purpose, in common with such other use or purpose, either as then existing, or to a less or modified extent, may be taken by the state, such county, city and county, incorporated city or town, joint highway district, or irrigation or municipal water district, and the court may fix the terms and conditions upon which such property may be so taken, and the manner and extent of the use thereof for each of such public purposes, and

may order the removal or relocation of any structures, or improvements therein or thereon, so far as may be required by such common use. But property appropriated to the use of any county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or municipal water district, may not be taken by any other county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or municipal water district, while such property is so appropriated and used for the public purposes for which it has been so appropriated.

4. Property appropriated to any public use by any irrigation district, may be taken by another irrigation district for another public use and purpose, which is consistent with the use of such property for such existing purposes to the same extent as such property is then used; provided, that the right to such limited use in common shall include the right to enlarge, change or improve the property so taken; provided further, that such enlargement, change or improvement shall not interfere with the original use or any necessary extension or enlargement of such use.

5. Franchises for any public utility, and all kinds of property of any nature whatsoever used, either during the existence of or at the termination of said franchise, to supply and furnish the service of such public utility, but such franchise or property shall not be taken except for a more necessary public use.

6. All rights-of-way for any and all the purposes mentioned in Section 1238, and any and all structures and improvements on, over, across or along such rights-of-way, and the lands held or used in connection therewith shall be subject to be connected with, crossed, or intersected by or embraced within any other right-of-way or improvements, or structures thereon. They shall also be subject to a limited use, in common with the owner thereof, when necessary; but such uses, crossings, intersections, and connections shall be made in manner most compatible with the greatest public benefit and least private injury.

7. All classes of private property not enumerated may be taken for public use, when such taking is authorized by law.

8. Proceedings to condemn lands belonging to this state are hereby authorized, and must be maintained and conducted in the same manner as are other condemnation proceedings provided for in this title; except, that in such proceedings the summons and a copy of the complaint must be served on the Governor, Attorney General, and the State Lands Commission of this state.

Comment. Section 1240 is superseded by the provisions listed below. Unless otherwise indicated, the references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.

<i>Section 1240</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision 1	See §§ 1235.170, 1240.110
Subdivision 2	See PUB. RES. CODE § 8030
Subdivision 3	See §§ 1240.510 <i>et seq.</i> , 1240.610 <i>et seq.</i> ; see also § 1235.180
Subdivision 4	See § 1240.510 <i>et seq.</i> ; see also § 1235.180
Subdivision 5	See § 1240.610 <i>et seq.</i> ; see also §§ 1235.170, 1240.110
Subdivision 6	See § 1240.510 <i>et seq.</i> ; see also §§ 1235.170, 1240.030, 1240.110
Subdivision 7	See §§ 1235.170, 1240.110
Subdivision 8	See §§ 1230.020, 1235.170, 1240.110, 1250.140. <i>But</i> <i>see §§ 1235.180, 1240.640.</i>

§ 1241 (repealed). Prerequisites

1241. Before property can be taken, it must appear:
1. That the use to which it is to be applied is a use authorized by law;

2. That the taking is necessary to such use; provided, when the board of a sanitary district or the board of directors of an irrigation district, of a transit district, of a rapid transit district, of a public utility district, of a county sanitation district, of a community service district, or of a water district or the legislative body of a county, city and county, or an incorporated city or town, or the governing board of a school district, shall, by resolution or ordinance, adopted by vote of two-thirds of all its members, have

found and determined that the public interest and necessity require the acquisition, construction or completion, by such county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or school district, or sanitary, irrigation, transit, rapid transit, public utility, county sanitation, community services or water district, of any proposed public utility, or any public improvement, and that the property described in such resolution or ordinance is necessary therefor, such resolution or ordinance shall be conclusive evidence; (a) of the public necessity of such proposed public utility or public improvement; (b) that such property is necessary therefor, and (c) that such proposed public utility or public improvement is planned or located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good, and the least private injury; provided, that said resolution or ordinance shall not be such conclusive evidence in the case of the taking by any county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or school district, or sanitary, irrigation, transit, rapid transit, public utility, county sanitation, community services or water district, of property located outside of the territorial limits thereof.

3. If already appropriated to some public use, that the public use of which it is to be applied is a more necessary public use; provided, that where such property has been so appropriated by any individual, firm or private corporation the use thereof for a public street or highway of the state, a county, city and county, or any incorporated city or town, or joint highway district, or the use thereof by the state, a county, city and county, or any incorporated city or town, or joint highway district, or a municipal water district or an irrigation district, a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, a community service district, or a water district for the same purposes to which it has been appropriated or for any public purpose, shall be deemed a more necessary use than the public use to which such property has been already appropriated; and provided, further, that property of any character, whether already appropriated to public use or not, including all rights of any nature in water, owned by any person, firm or private corporation may be taken by

a county, city and county, or any incorporated city or town or by a municipal water district, or an irrigation district, a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, a community service district, or a water district, for the purpose of supplying water, or electricity for power, lighting or heating purposes to such county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or municipal water district, or an irrigation district, a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, a community service district, or a water district, or the inhabitants thereof, or for the purpose of supplying any other public utility, or for any other public use. And such taking may be made, either to furnish a separate and distinct supply of such water, and such electricity for power, lighting or heating purposes, or to provide for any such separate and distinct other public utility or other public use; to furnish such a supply or provide for any such other public utility or other public use in conjunction with any other supply or with any other public utility or other public use that may have been theretofore provided for or that may thereafter be provided for in so supplying or providing for such county, city and county, or incorporated city or town, or municipal water district or an irrigation district, a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, a community service district, or a water district, or the inhabitants thereof; or in conjunction with any other supply or with any other public utility or other public use that may have been theretofore determined upon or that may thereafter be determined upon in accordance with law by the people of any such county, city and county, incorporated city or town or municipal water district or an irrigation district, a transit district, a rapid transit district, a public utility district, a community service district, or a water district. Nothing herein contained shall be construed as in any way limiting such rights as may be given by any other law of this state to counties, cities and counties, incorporated cities or towns or municipal water districts or irrigation districts, transit districts, rapid transit districts, public utility districts, a community service district, or water districts.

But private property appropriated to the use of any

county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or municipal water district, or irrigation district, or transit district, or rapid transit district, or public utility district, or community services district, or water district, may not be taken by any other county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or municipal district, or irrigation district, or transit district, or rapid transit district, or public utility district, a community services district, or water district, while such property is so appropriated and used for the public purposes for which it has been so appropriated.

Comment. Section 1241 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1241</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision 1	§§ 1240.010, 1240.020
Subdivision 2	§§ 1240.030, 1240.040, 1245.210 <i>et seq.</i>
Subdivision 3	§ 1240.610 <i>et seq.</i> ; see also § 1235.180

§ 1241.7 (repealed). Park property; presumption as to best public use; declaratory relief against highway use

1241.7. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the fact that property is appropriated for public use as a state, regional, county, or city park or recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl management area as presently established by the Department of Fish and Game pursuant to Section 1525 of the Fish and Game Code, or historic site included in the National Register of Historic Places or state-registered landmarks, or as an ecological reserve as provided for in Article 4 (commencing with Section 1580) of Chapter 5 of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code, establishes a rebuttable presumption of its having been appropriated for the best and most necessary public use. The presumption established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.

(b) When property appropriated for a public use as a state, regional, county, or city park or recreation area, or wildlife or waterfowl management area as presently

established by the Department of Fish and Game pursuant to Section 1525 of the Fish and Game Code, or historic site included in the National Register of Historic Places or state-registered landmarks, or as an ecological reserve as provided for in Article 4 (commencing with Section 1580) of Chapter 5 of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code, is sought to be acquired for state highway purposes, or for public utility route or structure purposes, and such park or recreational area, or wildlife or waterfowl management area, or historic site, or ecological reserve was dedicated to or established for park or recreational purposes, or as a wildlife or waterfowl management area, or as an historic site included in the National Register of Historic Places or state-registered landmarks, or as an ecological reserve as provided for in Article 4 (commencing with Section 1580) of Chapter 5 of Division 2 of the Fish and Game Code, prior to the initiation of highway route location studies, or public utility route or structure location studies, an action for declaratory relief may be brought only by the public agency owning such park or recreational area, or wildlife or waterfowl management area, or historic site, or ecological reserve in the superior court to determine the question of which public use is the best and most necessary public use for such property. Such action for declaratory relief shall be filed and served within 120 days after publication by the California Highway Commission or the public utility in a newspaper of general circulation pursuant to Section 6061 of the Government Code, and delivery of a written notice to the public agency owning such park or recreational area, or wildlife or waterfowl management area, or historic site, or ecological reserve by the California Highway Commission or public utility that a proposed route or site or an adopted route or site includes park land or recreational area, or a wildlife or waterfowl management area, or an historic site, or an ecological reserve owned by that agency. In such declaratory relief action, the resolution of the California Highway Commission shall not be conclusive evidence of the matters set forth in Section 103 of the Streets and Highways Code. Such action for declaratory relief shall have preference over all other civil actions in the matter

of setting the same for hearing or trial to the end that any such action shall be quickly heard and determined. If an action for declaratory relief is not filed and served within such 120-day period, the right to bring such action is waived and the provisions of subdivision (a) shall not apply. When a declaratory relief action, with respect to such property being sought for highway purposes, or for public utility route or structure purposes, may not be brought pursuant to this subdivision, the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section shall not apply.

Comment. Section 1241.7 is superseded by Sections 1240.680 and 1240.690 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision for public utility lines and structures is not continued since property appropriated to a public use by a public entity is for a more necessary public use than any use by any person that is not a public entity. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.650.

§ 1241.9. (repealed). Preservation of certain property in its natural condition; presumption as to best public use; declaratory relief against highway use

1241.9. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the fact that property is owned by a nonprofit organization contributions to which are deductible for state and federal income tax purposes under the law of this state and of the United States and having the primary purpose of preserving areas in their natural condition, and that such property is open to the public subject to reasonable restrictions and is appropriate, and used exclusively, for the preservation of native plants, or native animals, including, but not limited to, mammals, birds, and marine life, or biotic communities, or geological or geographical formations of scientific or educational interest; and further that such property is irrevocably dedicated to such uses so that upon liquidation, dissolution, or abandonment of or by the owner, such property will be distributed only to a fund, foundation, or corporation whose property is likewise irrevocably dedicated to such uses, or to a governmental agency holding land for such uses; establishes a rebuttable presumption of its having

been appropriated for the best and most necessary public use. The presumption established by this section is a presumption affecting the burden of proof.

(b) When property described in subdivision (a) is sought to be acquired for state highway purposes, and such property was exclusively devoted to a use or uses described in subdivision (a) prior to the initiation of highway route location studies, an action for declaratory relief may be brought only by such nonprofit organization owning such property in the superior court to determine the question of which public use is the best and most necessary public use for such property. Such action for declaratory relief shall be filed and served within 120 days after written notice to the nonprofit organization owning such property by the California Highway Commission that a proposed route or an adopted route includes such property owned by that organization; provided that such written notice need only be given to nonprofit organizations that are on file with the Registrar of Charitable Trusts of this state. In such declaratory relief action, the resolution of the commission shall not be conclusive evidence of the matters set forth in Section 103 of the Streets and Highways Code. Such action for declaratory relief shall have preference over all other civil actions in the matter of setting the action for hearing or trial to the end that any such action shall be quickly heard and determined. If an action for declaratory relief is not filed and served within such 120-day period, the right to bring such action is waived and the provisions of subdivision (a) shall not apply. When a declaratory relief action, with respect to such property being sought for highway purposes, may not be brought pursuant to this subdivision, the provisions of subdivision (a) of this section shall not apply.

Comment. Section 1241.9 is superseded by Sections 1240.670 and 1240.690 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1242 (repealed). Location; examinations; surveys; maps; entry upon land

1242. (a) In all cases where land is required for public use, such use must be located in the manner which will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury.

(b) Subject to Section 1242.5, a person having the power of eminent domain may enter upon property to make studies, surveys, examinations, tests, soundings, or appraisals or to engage in similar activities reasonably related to the purpose for which the power may be exercised.

(c) The liability, if any, of a public entity for damages to property that arise from the entry and activities mentioned in subdivision (b) is determined by Section 816 of the Government Code.

(d) Any person that has the power of eminent domain, other than a public entity, is liable for damages to property that arise from the entry and activities mentioned in subdivision (b) to the same extent that a public entity is liable for such damages under Section 816 of the Government Code.

(e) As used in this section, "public entity" means a public entity as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code.

Comment. Section 1242 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1242</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision (a)	§ 1240.030(b)
Subdivision (b)	§ 1245.010
Subdivisions (c), (d)	§ 1245.020
Subdivision (e)	unnecessary, see § 1235.190

§ 1242.5 (repealed). Survey and exploration of land for reservoir purposes

1242.5. (a) In any case in which the entry and activities mentioned in subdivision (b) of Section 1242 will subject the person having the power of eminent domain to liability under Section 816 of the Government Code,

before making such entry and undertaking such activities, the person shall secure:

(1) The written consent of the owner to enter upon his property and to undertake such activities; or

(2) An order for entry from the superior court in accordance with subdivision (b).

(b) The person seeking to enter upon the property shall petition the court for an order permitting the entry and shall give such prior notice to the owner of the property as the court determines is appropriate under the circumstances of the particular case. Upon such petition and after such notice has been given, the court shall determine the purpose for the entry, the nature and scope of the activities reasonably necessary to accomplish such purpose, and the probable amount of compensation to be paid to the owner of the property for the actual damage to the property and interference with its possession and use. After such determination, the court may issue its order permitting the entry. The order shall prescribe the purpose for the entry and the nature and scope of the activities to be undertaken and shall require the person seeking to enter to deposit the probable amount of compensation in the manner provided in Section 1243.6.

(c) At any time after an order has been made pursuant to subdivision (b), either party may, upon noticed motion, request the court to determine whether the nature and scope of the activities reasonably necessary to accomplish the purpose of the entry should be modified or whether the amount deposited is the probable amount of compensation that will be awarded. If the court determines that the nature and scope of the activities to be undertaken or the amount of the deposit should be modified, the court shall make its order prescribing the necessary changes.

(d) The court shall retain the amount deposited under this section for a period of six months following the termination of the entry. Such amount shall be held, invested, deposited, and disbursed in accordance with Section 1254.

(e) The owner is entitled to recover from the person who entered his property the amount necessary to compensate the owner for any damage which arises out of the entry and for his court costs, and reasonable attorney fees to be fixed by the court, in the proceeding under this section. Where a deposit has been made pursuant to this section, the owner may, upon noticed motion made within six months following the termination of the entry, request the court to determine the amount he is entitled to recover under this subdivision. Thereupon, the court shall determine such amount and award it to the owner and the money on deposit shall be available for the payment of such amount. Nothing in this subdivision affects the availability of any other remedy the owner may have for the damaging of his property.

Comment. Section 1242.5 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1242.5</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision (a)	§ 1245.030
Subdivision (b)	§ 1245.040
Subdivision (c)	§ 1245.050
Subdivision (d)	§ 1245.060
Subdivision (e)	§ 1245.070

§ 1243 (repealed). Jurisdiction; venue; method of commencing proceedings; change of venue; lis pendens

1243. All proceedings under this title must be commenced in the superior court of the county in which the property sought to be taken is situated; provided, that where, of any one piece or article of property, or of any one interest in or to property, sought to be taken, a portion thereof is situated in one county and another portion thereof is situated in another county, the plaintiff may commence such proceedings in any of the counties where any portion of such piece or article of property, or interest in or to property, is situated, and the county so selected is the proper county for the trial of such proceedings; and provided, further, that when the plaintiff is a county, city and county, incorporated city or town, or a municipal water district, and the property sought to be taken is

situated in more than one county, then the proceeding may be brought, at the option of the plaintiff, in any county wherein is situated any of the property sought to be taken, and said proceeding may be tried in said county, with reference to any property situated in the state; provided, however, that the right in this section granted to any plaintiff to commence and try an action in any county other than the county in which may be located any property in said action sought to be taken, shall be limited to property which is owned by the defendant, or by the defendant in common with the other defendants, or some of them. All such proceedings must be commenced by filing a complaint and issuing a summons. The provisions of this code for the change of place of trial of actions shall apply to proceedings under this title except as in this section otherwise provided. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to repeal any law of this state giving jurisdiction to the Public Utilities Commission to ascertain the just compensation which must be paid in eminent domain proceedings. A lis pendens shall be recorded in the office of the county recorder at the time of the commencement of the action in every county in which any of the property to be affected shall be located.

Comment. Section 1243 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1243</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Sentence 1	§§ 1250.010–1250.030
Sentence 2	§ 1250.110
Sentence 3	§ 1250.040
Sentence 4	§ 1230.060
Sentence 5	§ 1250.150. See also § 1250.130.

§ 1243.1 (repealed). Inverse condemnation proceeding against public entity; grounds; effect on powers of public entity

1243.1. In any case in which a public entity, as defined in Section 811.2 of the Government Code, which possesses the power of eminent domain establishes by resolution or ordinance the necessity to acquire a particular parcel or parcels of real property by eminent domain, and such

public entity does not thereafter initiate, within six months, an action in eminent domain to take such parcel, the owner of the parcel may bring an action in inverse condemnation requiring the taking of such parcel and a determination of the fair market value payable as just compensation for such taking. In such inverse condemnation action, the court may, in addition, or in the alternative, if it finds that the rights of the owner have been interfered with, award damages for any such interference by the public entity. This section shall not affect a public entity's authority to do any of the following:

- (1) Institute a condemnation action.
- (2) Take immediate possession of the particular parcel of property sought to be condemned.
- (3) Rescind a resolution or ordinance which established the necessity to acquire a particular parcel of real property and abandon the condemnation action.

Comment. Section 1243.1 is superseded by Section 1245.260 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1243.4 (repealed). Immediate possession and use of right of way or lands for reservoir purposes

1243.4. In any proceeding in eminent domain brought by the State, or a county, or a municipal corporation, or metropolitan water district, municipal utility district, municipal water district, drainage, irrigation, levee, reclamation or water conservation district, or similar public corporation, the plaintiff may take immediate possession and use of any right-of-way, or lands to be used for reservoir purposes, required for a public use whether the fee thereof or an easement therefor be sought, in the manner and subject to the conditions prescribed by law.

Comment. Section 1243.4 is superseded by Section 1255.410 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1243.5 (repealed). Immediate possession and use of property; security

1243.5. (a) In any proceeding in eminent domain, if the plaintiff is authorized by law to take immediate possession of the property sought to be condemned, the plaintiff may, at any time after the issuance of summons and prior to the entry of judgment, apply ex parte to the court for an order determining the amount to be deposited as security for the payment of the just compensation which will be made for the taking of the property and any damage incident thereto. Such security shall be in the amount the court determines to be the probable just compensation which will be made for the taking of the property and any damage incident thereto. After depositing the security, the plaintiff may, at any time prior to the entry of judgment, apply ex parte to the court for an order authorizing it to take immediate possession of and to use the property sought to be condemned.

(b) If the court determines that the plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain and to take immediate possession thereof, and if the court determines that the plaintiff has deposited the security, the court shall by order authorize the plaintiff to take immediate possession of and to use the property sought to be condemned. The order authorizing immediate possession shall:

(1) Describe the property and the estate or interest therein sought to be condemned, which description may be made by reference to the complaint.

(2) State the purposes of the condemnation.

(3) State the amount of the deposit.

(4) State the date after which the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property which date, unless the plaintiff requests a later date, shall be the earliest date on which the plaintiff would be entitled to take possession of the property if service were made under subdivision (c) of this section on the day the order is made.

(c) At least 20 days prior to the time possession is taken, the plaintiff shall serve a copy of the order on the record owner or owners of the property and on the occupants, if any. Service of the order shall be made by personal service

unless the person on whom service is to be made has previously appeared in the proceeding or has previously been served with a copy of the summons and complaint in the manner prescribed by law, in which case service of the order may be made by mail upon such person and his attorney of record, if any. If a person upon whom a copy of the order authorizing immediate possession is required to be personally served under this section resides out of the State, or has departed from the State or cannot after due diligence be found within the State, the plaintiff may in lieu of such personal service send a copy of the order by registered or certified mail addressed to such person at his last known address. If a copy of the order is sent by registered or certified mail in lieu of personal service, the plaintiff shall file an affidavit in the proceeding setting forth the facts showing the reason personal service could not have been made. The court may, for good cause shown by affidavit, authorize the plaintiff to take possession of the property without serving a copy of the order of immediate possession upon a record owner not occupying the property. A single service upon or mailing to those at the same address shall be sufficient. The court may, for good cause shown by affidavit, shorten the time specified in this subdivision to a period of not less than three days.

As used in this subdivision, "record owner or owners of the property" means both the person or persons in whose name the legal title to the fee appears by deeds or other instruments duly recorded in the recorder's office of the county in which the property is located and the person or persons, if any, in possession of the property under a written and duly recorded lease or agreement of purchase.

(d) At any time after the court has made an order authorizing immediate possession, the court may, upon motion of any party to the eminent domain proceeding, order an increase or a decrease in the security that the plaintiff is required to deposit pursuant to this section if the court determines that the security which should be deposited for the taking of the property and any damage incident thereto is different from the amount of the security theretofore deposited. Prior to judgment, such

security may not be reduced to an amount less than that already withdrawn pursuant to Section 1243.7.

(e) The amount required to be deposited by the plaintiff and the amount of such deposit withdrawn by the defendant may not be given in evidence or referred to in the trial of the issue of compensation.

(f) The plaintiff shall not be held to have abandoned or waived the right to appeal from the judgment by taking possession of the property pursuant to this section.

Comment. Section 1243.5 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1243.5</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision (a)	§§ 1255.010, 1255.410
Subdivision (b)	§ 1255.410
Subdivision (c)	§ 1255.450
Subdivision (d)	§ 1255.030
Subdivision (e)	§§ 1255.060, 1255.270
Subdivision (f)	§ 1255.470. See also § 1255.080.

§ 1243.6 (repealed). Deposit of security in state treasury; investment; disbursement of interest

1243.6. When money is required to be deposited as provided by Section 1243.5, the court shall order the money to be deposited in the State Treasury, unless the plaintiff requests the court to order deposit in the county treasury, in which case the court shall order deposit in the county treasury. If money is deposited in the State Treasury pursuant to this section it shall be held, invested, deposited, and disbursed in the manner specified in Section 1254, and interest earned or other increment derived from its investment shall be apportioned and disbursed in the manner specified in that section.

Comment. Section 1243.6 is superseded by Section 1255.070 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1243.7 (repealed). Withdrawal of deposit

1243.7. (a) At any time after money has been deposited as provided in Section 1243.5, the party whose property or interest in property is being taken may apply to the court, in the manner hereinafter provided, for the withdrawal of all or any portion of the amount deposited for his property or property interest. Upon such application, the court shall order that portion of the amount applied for, which the applicant is entitled to withdraw under the provisions of this section, to be paid to such applicant from the money deposited in connection with such property or property interest.

(b) If the total amount sought to be withdrawn prior to judgment exceeds the amount of the original deposit, each applicant, before any of such excess is withdrawn, shall file an undertaking executed by two or more sufficient sureties approved by the court to the effect that they are bound to the plaintiff in double the amount of such excess for the return of any amount withdrawn by the applicant that exceeds the amount to which the applicant is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding, together with legal interest from the date of its withdrawal.

If there is more than one applicant and the total amount sought to be withdrawn exceeds the amount of the original deposit, the applicants, in lieu of filing separate undertakings, may jointly file an undertaking executed by two or more sufficient sureties approved by the court to the effect that they are bound to the plaintiff in double the amount of such excess for the return of any amount withdrawn by the applicants that exceeds the amount to which the applicants are entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding together with legal interest from the date of its withdrawal.

If the undertaking required by this subdivision is executed by an admitted surety insurer, the undertaking is sufficient in amount if the surety is bound only to the extent that the amount sought to be withdrawn exceeds the amount originally deposited.

The plaintiff may consent to an undertaking that is less than the amount required under this subdivision.

If the undertaking is executed by an admitted surety insurer, the applicant filing the undertaking is entitled to recover the premium paid for the undertaking, but not to exceed 2 percent of the face value of the undertaking, as a part of the recoverable costs in the eminent domain proceeding.

(c) The application shall be made by affidavit wherein the applicant shall set forth his interest in the property and request withdrawal of a stated amount. The applicant shall serve a copy of the application on the plaintiff and no withdrawal shall be made until at least 20 days after such service of the application, or until the time for all objections has expired, whichever is later.

(d) Within the 20-day period, the plaintiff may object to such withdrawal by filing an objection thereto in court on the ground that an undertaking should be filed or that the amount of, or the sureties upon, such an undertaking are insufficient.

(e) Within the 20-day period, the plaintiff may object to such withdrawal by filing an objection thereto in court on the grounds that other persons are known or believed to have interests in the property. In this event the plaintiff shall attempt to personally serve on such other persons a notice to such persons that they may appear within 10 days after such service and object to such withdrawal, and that failure to appear will result in the waiver of any right to such amount withdrawn or further rights against the plaintiff to the extent of the sum withdrawn. The plaintiff shall state in such objection the names and last known addresses of other persons known or believed to have an interest in the property, whether or not it has been able to serve them with such notice and the date of such service. If the plaintiff in its objection reports to the court that it is unable to personally serve persons known or believed to have interests in the property within the 20-day period, said money shall not be withdrawn until the applicant causes such personal service to be made.

(f) If the persons so served appear and object to the withdrawal, or if the plaintiff so requests, the court shall thereupon hold a hearing after notice thereof to all parties and shall determine the amounts to be withdrawn, if any,

and by whom. If the court determines that a party is entitled to withdraw any portion of a deposit which another person claims, the court may require such party, before withdrawing such portion, to file an undertaking executed by two or more sufficient sureties approved by the court to the effect that they are bound to the adverse claimant in such amount as is fixed by the court, but not to exceed double the portion claimed by the adverse claimant, for the payment to the person entitled thereto of any amount withdrawn that exceeds the amount to which such party is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding, together with legal interest from the date of its withdrawal. No persons so served shall have any claim against the plaintiff for compensation for the value of the property taken or severance damages thereto, or otherwise, to the extent of the amount withdrawn by all parties; provided, the plaintiff shall remain liable for said compensation to persons having an interest of record who are not so served.

(g) If withdrawn, the receipt of any such money shall constitute a waiver by operation of law of all defenses in favor of the person receiving such payment except his claim for greater compensation. Any amount so paid to any party shall be credited upon the judgment in the eminent domain proceeding.

(h) Any amount withdrawn by any party in excess of the amount to which he is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding shall be paid to the party entitled thereto together with legal interest thereon from the date of its withdrawal, and the court in which the eminent domain proceeding is pending shall enter judgment therefor against the defendant. If the defendant does not pay the judgment within 30 days after the judgment is entered, the court may, on motion, enter judgment against the sureties for such amount together with the interest that may be due thereon.

Comment. Section 1243.7 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1243.7</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision (a)	§§ 1255.210, 1255.220
Subdivision (b)	§ 1255.250
Subdivision (c)	§§ 1255.210, 1255.230
Subdivision (d)	§ 1255.230
Subdivision (e)	§ 1255.230
Subdivision (f)	§§ 1255.230, 1255.240
Subdivision (g)	§§ 1255.260, 1268.010
Subdivision (h)	§ 1255.280

§ 1244 (repealed). Complaint; parties; statement of right; map; description; parcels in same or separate proceedings; board of supervisors as plaintiff

1244. The complaint must contain:

1. The name of the corporation, association, commission, or person in charge of the public use for which the property is sought, who must be styled the plaintiff;
2. The names of all owners and claimants, of the property, if known, or a statement that they are unknown, who must be styled defendants;
3. A statement of the right of the plaintiff;
4. If a right of way be sought, the complaint must be accompanied by a map showing the location, general route, and termini of said right of way, so far as the same is involved in the action or proceeding;
5. A description of each piece of land, or other property or interest in or to property, sought to be taken, and whether the same includes the whole or only a part of an entire parcel or tract or piece of property, or interest in or to property, but the nature or extent of the interests of the defendants in such land need not be set forth. All parcels of land, or other property or interest in or to property, lying in the county, and required for the same public use, may be included in the same or separate proceedings, at the option of the plaintiff, but the court may consolidate or separate them to suit the convenience of the parties. When application for the condemnation of a right of way

for the purpose of sewerage is made on behalf of a settlement, or of an incorporated village or town, the board of supervisors of the county may be named as plaintiff.

Comment. Section 1244 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1244</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision 1	§§ 1250.210, 1250.310
Subdivision 2	§§ 1250.210, 1250.220, 1250.310
Subdivision 3	§ 1250.310
Subdivision 4	§ 1250.310
Subdivision 5	§§ 1250.240, 1250.310. See also § 1048 and GOVT. CODE §§ 25350.5 and 25825.

§ 1245 (repealed). Summons; issuance; contents; form; service

1245. The clerk must issue a summons, which must contain the names of the parties, a general description of the whole property, or specific descriptions of the parcels to be taken, a statement of the public use for which it is sought, and, where a general description is used, a reference to the complaint for descriptions of the respective parcels, and a notice to the defendants to appear and show cause why the property described should not be condemned as prayed for in the complaint. Except as otherwise specified in this title, it must be in the form of a summons in civil actions, and must be served in like manner.

Comment. Section 1245 is superseded as to the form and contents of the summons by Section 1250.120 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See also Section 1250.130 (additional requirements in eminent domain proceedings where service is by publication). As to the service of summons, Section 1230.040 (rules of practice in eminent domain proceedings) incorporates the general rules provided by Sections 415.10-415.50.

§ 1245.2 (repealed). Alias summons; issuance and contents; conclusiveness of judgment by default

1245.2. A summons may be issued which contains only the names of the defendants to be served therewith and a description or descriptions of only the property sought to be condemned against the defendants. Judgment based on failure to appear and answer after service of such summons shall be conclusive against such defendants in respect only to the property described in such summons.

Comment. Section 1245.2 is not continued. Ordinarily, the summons is not now required to contain a description of the property. See Section 1250.120.

§ 1245.3 (repealed). Unknown persons as defendants; heirs and devisees of deceased claimants; publication and posting of summons; protection of interest of claimant believed dead; conclusiveness and effect of judgment

1245.3. In any action brought under this title the plaintiff may name as defendants, in addition to those persons who appear of record or are known to plaintiff to have or claim an interest in the property, "all persons unknown claiming any title or interest in or to the property," naming them in that manner, and if any person who appears of record to have or claim an interest or who is known to plaintiff to have or claim an interest in the property is dead or is believed by plaintiff to be dead, and if no executor or administrator of the estate of said person has been appointed by the superior court of the county in which the property is located who is then duly qualified, and if no certified copy of an order of the superior court of any other county appointing an executor or administrator of the estate of said person who is then duly qualified and acting has been recorded in the county in which the property is located, and if plaintiff knows of no other duly qualified and acting executor or administrator of the estate of said person and said facts are averred in the

complaint or in an affidavit by the plaintiff or its attorney filed with the complaint, plaintiff may also name as defendants, "the heirs and devisees of _____ (naming such deceased claimant), deceased and all persons claiming by, through, or under said decedent," naming them in that manner, and if it is alleged that any such person is believed by plaintiff to be dead, such person may also be named as a defendant. If it appears to the satisfaction of the court by affidavit that after due diligence the plaintiff is unable to ascertain the identity and whereabouts of any person or persons sued as the heirs and devisees of a deceased claimant or one believed to be dead or the identity and whereabouts of any person or persons sued as persons claiming by, through or under said deceased claimant or one believed to be dead or the identity and whereabouts of any person or persons sued as persons unknown claiming any title or interest in the property, the court shall make its order directing that process be served upon such persons by posting a copy of the summons on the property within 10 days after the making of the order and by publication of the same in some newspaper of general circulation published in the county in which the property is located and designated by the court as most likely to give notice to such persons once a week for four successive weeks.

Upon the trial the court shall determine the extent of and the value of the interest or damages thereto of any person whom it is alleged is dead or believed by plaintiff to be dead whose interest or claim appears of record or is known to plaintiff and unless such person or a duly qualified and acting executor or administrator of the estate of said person appears in the action, shall order the amount thereof paid to the county clerk to be held by him for the account of the persons entitled thereto and shall determine the extent of and the value of the interest or damages thereto, if any, of all persons sued as persons unknown, whether or not they are in being, and shall order the amount thereof paid to the county clerk to be held by him for the account of the persons entitled thereto. Any person claiming any title or interest of any

character in or to said property, whether legal or equitable, may appear in said action.

Any judgment rendered in such a proceeding shall be binding and conclusive not only upon the persons named as defendants and served with process but upon the heirs and devisees of, and all persons claiming by, through, or under, any decedent sued and served as herein provided and upon all persons unknown claiming any right, title, estate or interest in the property described in the complaint and shall have the force and effect of a judgment in rem.

Comment. Section 1245.3 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1245.3</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Sentence 1	§ 1250.220
Sentence 2	§§ 1230.040, 1250.130
Sentence 3	§ 1260.240; cf. § 1268.110
Sentence 4	§ 1250.230
Sentence 5	§ 1250.220

§ 1245.4 (repealed). Land shown upon map as a square or other open space; parties; authority to sue state; conclusiveness of judgment

1245.4. Whenever in any proceeding brought under this title in which any municipal corporation is the plaintiff it is sought to condemn to public use any land or any remainder, reversion, easement or other estate therein, which land is shown upon any filed or recorded map as a "square" or other open space without any further words specifying the intentions of the owners thereof filing such map with respect thereto or the uses or purposes for which the same may have been abandoned or dedicated, and no deed, offer of dedication or other instrument appears of record in the office of the county recorder showing or indicating the uses or purposes for which the same may have been abandoned or dedicated and such map has been on file or on record for more than 50 years, the plaintiff may in said proceeding seek a judgment against the county in which the land is located and the inhabitants thereof and against the State of California and the people

thereof, determining its title thereto, the uses or trusts, if any, under which it holds the same, and the purposes to which it may put the same. Authority is hereby granted in any such proceeding to sue the State of California and in any such proceeding service of process shall be made upon the Attorney General and the Director of General Services. In any such action the Attorney General shall represent the State of California in its sovereign and in its proprietary capacity and also the people of the State of California as the beneficiaries of any trust under which said land is, or is alleged to be, held. Any judgment rendered in such proceeding shall be conclusive upon the State of California and the people thereof and upon the county in which said land is located and the inhabitants thereof, if said county is made a party to said proceedings.

Comment. Section 1245.4 was evidently intended as narrowly drawn special legislation designed to aid the City of Marysville in condemning property known as Cortez Square and conveying it to the County of Yuba for the purpose of erecting a county courthouse. *Cf. Govt. Code §§ 50530 and 50533, and City of Marysville v. Boyd*, 181 Cal. App.2d 755, 5 Cal. Rptr. 598 (1960). As such, it has outlasted any usefulness it may have had. See *City of Marysville v. Boyd, supra*. *Cf. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.070* (effect of enactment of Eminent Domain Law).

The right of a person authorized to condemn property for a public use to name as defendants all persons public and private, known or unknown, is continued in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1250.220. See also Section 1250.140 (service on Attorney General where state is a defendant).

§ 1246 (repealed). Answer of named defendants; persons who may defend

1246. Each defendant must, by answer, set forth his estate or interest in each parcel of property described in the complaint and the amount, if any, which he claims for each of the several items of damage specified in section 1248.

All persons in occupation of, or having or claiming an interest in any of the property described in the complaint, or in the damages for the taking thereof, though not named, may appear, plead, and defend, each in respect to

his own property or interest, or that claimed by him, in like manner as if named in the complaint.

Comment. The first paragraph of Section 1246 is superseded by Section 1250.320. It should be noted, however, that Section 1250.320 no longer requires that the defendant specify the compensation he claims for the taking. The second paragraph of Section 1246 is superseded by Section 1250.230.

§ 1246.1 (repealed). Determination of amount of award; apportionment of award; costs

1246.1. Where there are two or more estates or divided interests in property sought to be condemned, the plaintiff is entitled to have the amount of the award for said property first determined as between plaintiff and all defendants claiming any interest therein; thereafter in the same proceeding the respective rights of such defendants in and to the award shall be determined by the court, jury, or referee and the award apportioned accordingly. The costs of determining the apportionment of the award shall be allowed to the defendants and taxed against the plaintiff except that the costs of determining any issue as to title between two or more defendants shall be borne by the defendants in such proportion as the court may direct.

Comment. The first sentence of Section 1246.1 is superseded by Section 1260.220 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The second sentence of Section 1246.1 is superseded by Section 1268.710.

§ 1246.2 (repealed). Award not to include penalty for prepayment of mortgage or deed of trust

1246.2. Where the property acquired for a public use is encumbered by a mortgage or deed of trust, the amount payable to the mortgagee or beneficiary under the deed of trust shall not include any penalty for prepayment.

Comment. Section 1246.2 is superseded by Section 1265.240 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1246.3 (repealed). Inverse condemnation; judgment for plaintiff; costs, disbursements, and expenses

1246.3. In any inverse condemnation proceeding brought for the taking of any interest in real property, the court rendering judgment for the plaintiff by awarding compensation for such taking, or the attorney representing the public entity who effects a settlement of such proceeding, shall determine and award or allow to such plaintiff, as a part of such judgment or settlement, such sum as will, in the opinion of the court or such attorney, reimburse such plaintiff for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.

Comment. Section 1246.3 is continued without change in Section 1036 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1246.4 (repealed). Condemnation; judgment against public entity; costs, disbursements, and expenses of owner

1246.4. In any condemnation proceeding in which the final judgment is that the public entity cannot acquire the real property, the owner shall be awarded such an amount, as determined by the court, which will reimburse him for his reasonable costs, disbursements, and expenses, including reasonable attorney, appraisal, and engineering fees, actually incurred because of such proceeding.

Comment. Section 1246.4 is superseded by Section 1268.610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See also Section 1268.620 (recovery after dismissal of damages caused by possession).

§ 1247 (repealed). Powers of court

1247. The court shall have power:

1. To regulate and determine the place and manner of making connections and crossings, or of enjoying the common use mentioned in subdivision 6 of Section 1240;
2. To hear and determine all adverse or conflicting claims to the property sought to be condemned, and to the damages therefor;

3. To determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condemnation of the same property.

Comment. Section 1247 is repealed. The disposition of its provisions is indicated below.

Subdivision 1. The broad jurisdictional grant to the court to regulate and determine the place and manner of making all connections and crossings of rights of way is not continued. The Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction to determine and regulate connections and crossings of rights of way of certain public utilities. *E.g.*, CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.060 (jurisdiction of Public Utilities Commission preserved); PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 764 and 765 (railroad connections), 766 (connection of telephone and telegraph lines of different companies), 767 (order by Public Utilities Commission for joint use of utility facilities), 1201 and 1202 (railroad crossings). See *Breider v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 272 Cal. App.2d 398, 77 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1969). See also *City of Union City v. Southern Pac. Co.*, 261 Cal. App.2d 777, 67 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1968). Moreover, the manner and place of street and highway connections and crossings are normally within the exclusive control of the entities concerned. Cf. STS. & HWYS. CODE § 100.2; CODE CIV. PROC. § 1245.250 (conclusive effect of resolution of necessity); *City of Los Angeles v. Central Trust Co.*, 173 Cal. 323, 159 P. 1169 (1969); *People v. Reed*, 139 Cal. App. 258, 33 P.2d 879 (1934). Hence, the power of the court is limited to its general authorization to determine whether the project is planned or located in the manner that will be most compatible with the greatest public good and the least private injury. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240.030. However, the power of the court to regulate and determine the place and manner of enjoying common use of rights of way is continued in Article 6 (commencing with Section 1240.510) of Chapter 4 of Title 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. This jurisdiction extends to crossings and intersections of rights of way since crossings and intersections of rights of way are familiar examples of common uses. *San Bernardino County Flood etc. Dist. v. Superior Court*, 269 Cal. App.2d 515, 75 Cal. Rptr. 24 (1969).

Subdivision 2. Subdivision 2 is not continued except insofar as the general rules of practice grant the court the power to hear and determine issues. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1230.040; see also CODE CIV. PROC. § 428.10 and Comment thereto (cross-complaints).

Subdivision 3. The power of the court to determine the respective rights of different parties seeking condemnation of

the same property is continued in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1260.020.

§ 1247a (repealed). Powers of court; regulation of removal or relocation of structures

1247a. The court shall also have power to regulate and determine the place and manner of removing or relocating structures or improvements, or of enjoying the common use mentioned in subdivision 3 of Section 1240.

Comment. Section 1247a is repealed, and the power granted the court by this section to regulate and determine the place and manner of enjoying common use of property already appropriated to public use (see former CODE CIV. PROC. § 1240(3)) and of removing or relocating structures or improvements in connection with such enjoyment is continued in Section 1240.630 and in Article 6 (commencing with Section 1240.510) of Chapter 4 of Title 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See the Comment to former Section 1247 (discussion of subdivision 1). *Cf. San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. v. Superior Court*, 269 Cal. App.2d 514, 521-522, 75 Cal. Rptr. 24, 30 (1969). To the extent the Public Utilities Commission has jurisdiction over the manner of relocation and removal of structures and improvements of a public utility, such jurisdiction is continued. See Section 1230.060 and Comment thereto.

§ 1247b (repealed). Portion of parcel sought to be taken; preparation of map on request of defendant

1247b. Whenever in a condemnation proceeding only a portion of a parcel of property is sought to be taken and upon a request of a defendant to the plaintiff made at least 30 days prior to the time of trial, the plaintiff shall prepare a map showing the boundaries of the entire parcel, indicating thereon the part to be taken, the part remaining, and shall serve an exact copy of such map on the defendant or his attorney at least fifteen (15) days prior to the time of trial.

Comment. Section 1247b is not continued in the Eminent Domain Law. Unlike former Section 1244, Section 1250.310 of the Code of Civil Procedure does not require that the complaint indicate whether the property taken is a part of a larger parcel,

and the framing and resolution of this issue is done under general discovery and pretrial procedures. *Cf.* Section 1250.310(d) (map indicating property described in the complaint).

§ 1248 (repealed). Hearing; items to be ascertained and assessed

1248. The court, jury, or referee must hear such legal testimony as may be offered by any of the parties to the proceeding, and thereupon must ascertain and assess:

1. The value of the property sought to be condemned, and all improvements thereon pertaining to the realty, and of each and every separate estate or interest therein; if it consists of different parcels, the value of each parcel and each estate or interest therein shall be separately assessed;

2. If the property sought to be condemned constitutes only a part of a larger parcel, the damages which will accrue to the portion not sought to be condemned, by reason of its severance from the portion sought to be condemned, and the construction of the improvement in the manner proposed by the plaintiff;

3. Separately, how much the portion not sought to be condemned, and each estate or interest therein, will be benefited, if at all, by the construction of the improvement proposed by the plaintiffs. If the benefit shall be equal to the damages assessed under subdivision 2, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken. If the benefit shall be less than the damages so assessed, the former shall be deducted from the latter, and the remainder shall be the only damages allowed in addition to the value. If the benefit shall be greater than the damages so assessed, the owner of the parcel shall be allowed no compensation except the value of the portion taken, but the benefit shall in no event be deducted from the value of the portion taken;

4. If the property sought to be condemned be water or the use of water, belonging to riparian owners, or appurtenant to any lands, how much the lands of the riparian owner, or the lands to which the property sought to be condemned is appurtenant, will be benefited, if at all,

by a diversion of water from its natural course, by the construction and maintenance, by the person or corporation in whose favor the right of eminent domain is exercised, of works for the distribution and convenient delivery of water upon said lands; and such benefit, if any, shall be deducted from any damages awarded the owner of such property;

5. If the property sought to be condemned be for a railroad, the cost of good and sufficient fences, along the line of such railroad, and the cost of cattle guards, where fences may cross the line of such railroad; and such court, jury or referee shall also determine the necessity for and designate the number, place and manner of making such farm or private crossings as are reasonably necessary or proper to connect the parcels of land severed by the easement condemned, or for ingress to or egress from the lands remaining after the taking of the part thereof sought to be condemned, and shall ascertain and assess the cost of the construction and maintenance of such crossings;

6. If the removal, alteration or relocation of structures or improvements is sought, the cost of such removal, alteration or relocation and the damages, if any, which will accrue by reason thereof;

7. As far as practicable, compensation must be assessed for each source of damages separately.

8. When the property sought to be taken is encumbered by a mortgage or other lien, and the indebtedness secured thereby is not due at the time of the entry of the judgment, the amount of such indebtedness may be, at the option of the plaintiff, deducted from the judgment, and the lien of the mortgage or other lien shall be continued until such indebtedness is paid; except that the amount for which, as between the plaintiff and the defendant, the plaintiff is liable under Section 1252.1 may not be deducted from the judgment.

9. Where property is encumbered by a mortgage or other lien and only a portion of the encumbered property is sought to be taken, and where the property being taken, or some portion of it, is also encumbered by a mortgage or other lien which is junior to the first-mentioned lien and such junior mortgage or other lien is against only a portion

of the property encumbered by the senior mortgage or other lien, it shall be determined whether the award is sufficient in amount so that the amounts owing to the holders of such senior and junior liens may be paid in full from the award.

If it is determined that the award is not sufficient in amount to pay in full such senior and junior liens, the amount of indebtedness which is secured respectively by the senior and junior liens on the property taken, and which will be paid from the award or deducted from the judgment pursuant to subdivision 8, shall be determined as follows:

(a) The total amount of the award which will be available for payment to the senior and junior lienholders shall be determined. Such amount shall tentatively be allocated first to the senior lien up to the full amount of the indebtedness secured by the senior lien, and the remainder, if any, shall tentatively be allocated to the junior lien.

(b) It shall then be determined whether the payment to the junior lienholder of the amount tentatively allocated to the junior lien together with elimination of the junior lien on the property taken, would cause the junior lienholder's security remaining after the taking, if any, to be of less value in proportion to the indebtedness owing after the taking than was the value of his security prior to the taking in proportion to the indebtedness to him prior to the taking.

(c) If it is determined that the proportionate security of the junior lienholder would be reduced by the taking if only the tentative amount allocated to the junior lien were paid to the junior lienholder, the tentative allocations to the senior and the junior liens shall be adjusted. To make such adjustment there shall be deducted from the amount tentatively allocated to the senior lien, and there shall be added to the amount tentatively allocated to the junior lien, an amount sufficient, considering the junior lienholder's remaining lien on property not taken, to preserve the security of the holder of the junior lien for amounts which will remain owing to him after payment to him from the award. Deduction shall not be made from

the amount tentatively allocated to the senior lien to the extent that the remaining amount allocated to the senior lien, if paid to the senior lienholder, would cause the security of the senior lienholder remaining after the taking to be of less value in proportion to the amount remaining owing to him after such payment, than the value of his security prior to the taking, in proportion to the amount secured by his lien before such payment.

(d) No adjustment of the tentative allocations shall be made if it is determined that the security of the junior lienholder which will remain after the taking appears to be sufficient in value to satisfy the indebtedness which will remain owing to the junior lienholder after the taking.

The amounts tentatively allocated to such senior and junior liens, adjusted by such deduction and addition, if any, are the amounts of indebtedness owing to such senior and junior lienholders which are secured by their respective liens on the property taken, and any other indebtedness owing to the senior or junior lienholders shall not be considered as secured by the property to be taken. If the amount of such indebtedness payable to either the senior or to the junior lienholder is not due at the time of entry of the judgment, and the plaintiff makes the election provided in subdivision 8, the indebtedness which shall be deducted from the judgment is the indebtedness in the amount so determined, and the lien shall continue until that amount of indebtedness is paid.

Comment. Section 1248 is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1248</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Introductory clause	§ 1260.220
Subdivision 1	§§ 1260.220, 1260.230, 1263.210, 1263.310. See also § 1048.
Subdivision 2	§§ 1260.230, 1263.410, 1263.420
Subdivision 3	§§ 1260.230, 1263.410, 1263.430
Subdivision 4	§§ 1263.410, 1263.430; cf. § 1235.170.

Subdivision 5	See discussion below.
Subdivision 6	§ 1240.530. See also §§ 1263.210, 1263.610, and GOVT. CODE § 7262.
Subdivision 7	§ 1260.230
Subdivision 8	§ 1265.220
Subdivision 9	§ 1265.230

Subdivision 5. Subdivision 5, specifying that, in case of condemnation for a railroad, the cost of providing fences and crossings must be ascertained and assessed, is omitted as unnecessary.

The duty of a railroad corporation to construct and maintain good and sufficient fences on both sides of its track and property is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 7626 *et seq.* Where any project, whether or not a railroad, would require the owner of the remainder to construct and maintain fencing to service the highest and best use of the remainder, the cost of such construction and maintenance is part of the damage caused by the project and is assessed accordingly. See, e.g., *Butte County v. Boydston*, 64 Cal. 110, 29 P. 511 (1883); *California So. R.R. v. Southern Pac. R.R.*, 67 Cal. 59, 7 P. 153 (1885). See also CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 1263.450 (compensation to reflect project as proposed), 1263.610 (performance of work to reduce compensation).

The duty of a railroad corporation to construct and maintain private or farm crossings over its tracks is continued in Public Utilities Code Section 7537, subject to the control of the Public Utilities Commission. Where any project, whether or not a railroad, would limit the access of the owner of the remainder so as to impair the service of the remainder for its highest and best use, the loss of access is part of the damage caused by the project and is assessed accordingly. See, e.g., *People v. Ricciardi*, 23 Cal.2d 390, 144 P.2d 799 (1943).

§ 1248a (repealed). Municipal public utilities; removal or relocation of railroad, streetcar, or interurban tracks; complaint; compensation

1248a. In any proceeding taken under the provisions of this title, where any railroad, street or interurban railway tracks are situated on, upon, along or across any lands or rights of way sought to be taken therein, for road, highway, boulevard, street or alley purposes, or for the purposes of

a right of way for any public utility to be constructed, completed and maintained by a county, city and county, or any incorporated city or town, or by a municipal water district, the plaintiff shall, if the complaint contains a prayer therefor, and shows the matter hereinafter provided, obtained a final judgment of condemnation ordering, in addition to the condemnation of such lands or right of way for the purposes set forth in the complaint, the relocation or removal of any railroad, street or interurban railway tracks thereon. Where the removal or relocation of such tracks is sought in any such proceedings, the complaint must contain a description of the location and proposed location of such tracks, and must be accompanied by a map showing such location and the proposed location of such tracks. The compensation to be paid for such relocation or removal of tracks shall be ascertained and assessed in the action, as in other cases, and separately from other sources of damage.

Comment. Section 1248a is repealed. The substance of the portion of the section authorizing the plaintiff to seek relocation or removal of railway tracks in certain cases is continued in Section 7557 of the Public Utilities Code. See also CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1240.310–1240.330 (substitute condemnation), 1240.610 (condemnation for more necessary public use). As to right of the defendant to compensation for the taking, see CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1263.210, 1263.610.

§ 1248b (repealed). Manufacturing or industrial equipment installed for use in fixed location as realty

1248b. Equipment designed for manufacturing or industrial purposes and installed for use in a fixed location shall be deemed a part of the realty for the purposes of condemnation, regardless of the method of installation.

Comment. Section 1248b is superseded by Section 1263.220 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1249 (repealed). Compensation and damages; accrual of right; improvements after service of summons

1249. For the purpose of assessing compensation and damages the right thereto shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the issuance of summons and its actual value at that date shall be the measure of compensation for all property to be actually taken, and the basis of damages to property not actually taken but injuriously affected, in all cases where such damages are allowed as provided in Section 1248; provided, that in any case in which the issue is not tried within one year after the date of the commencement of the action, unless the delay is caused by the defendant, the compensation and damages shall be deemed to have accrued at the date of the trial. No improvements put upon the property subsequent to the date of the service of summons shall be included in the assessment of compensation or damages.

Comment. Section 1249, insofar as it specified the date of valuation in an eminent domain proceeding, is superseded by Article 2 (commencing with Section 1263.110) of Chapter 9 of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision relating to the accrual of the right to compensation is continued in Section 1263.020. The last sentence of Section 1249 is superseded by Section 1263.240. As to the measure of compensation, see generally Article 4 (commencing with Section 1263.310) of Chapter 9.

§ 1249.1 (repealed). Compensation and damages; improvements at time of service of summons

1249.1. All improvements pertaining to the realty that are on the property at the time of the service of summons and which affect its value shall be considered in the assessment of compensation, damages and special benefits unless they are removed or destroyed before the earliest of the following times:

(a) The time the title to the property is taken by the plaintiff.

(b) The time the possession of the property is taken by the plaintiff.

(c) The time the defendant moves from the property in compliance with an order of possession.

Comment. Section 1249.1 is superseded by Sections 1263.210 and 1263.230 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1249.2 (repealed). Harvesting and marketing of crops

1249.2. The condemning agency may permit the owner of the property sought to be taken to harvest and retain the financial benefit for crops planted before or after the service of summons in any eminent domain proceeding if the owner in writing agrees to assume the responsibility for the completion of the growing process and the harvesting and marketing of the crops.

If the condemning agency takes possession of the property sought to be condemned at a time when such action prevents the property owner from harvesting and marketing crops planted before or after the service of summons in an eminent domain proceeding, then the value of such crops shall be included in the compensation awarded for the property taken.

Comment. Section 1249.2 is superseded by Section 1263.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1250 (repealed). Defective title; new proceedings

1250. If the title attempted to be acquired is found to be defective from any cause, the plaintiff may again institute proceedings to acquire the same, as in this Title prescribed.

Comment. Section 1250 is not continued. The section is unnecessary because nothing in the Eminent Domain Law precludes institution of new proceedings where necessary to acquire additional interests not previously acquired.

§ 1251 (repealed). Time for paying assessments; bond to build railroad crossings, fences and cattle guards; deposit to build highway fences

1251. The plaintiff must, within thirty days after final judgment, pay the sum of money assessed. In case the plaintiff is the State of California, or is a public corporation,

and it appears by affidavit that bonds of said State or of any agency thereof, or of said public corporation must be issued and sold in order to provide the money necessary to pay the sum assessed, then such sum may be paid at any time within one year from the date of such judgment; provided further, that if the sale of any such bonds can not be had by reason of litigation affecting the validity thereof, then the time during which such litigation is pending shall not be considered a part of the one year's time in which such payment must be made.

In case the use is for railroad purposes, the plaintiff may, at the time of or before payment, elect to build the farm or private crossings, fences and cattle guards; and if he so elect, shall execute to the defendant a bond, with sureties to be approved by the court in double the assessed cost of the same, to build such farm or private crossings, fences and cattle guards within eighteen months from the time the railroad is built on the land taken, and if such bond be given, need not pay the cost of such farm or private crossings, fences and cattle guards. In an action on such bond, the plaintiff may recover reasonable attorney's fees.

In case of property being taken by the State or any county, or city and county, for highway purposes, the State or such county, or city and county, may elect to build the fences for which damages may have been assessed and in such case the amount assessed shall be deposited with the clerk of the court having jurisdiction of the action, and if such fences are not constructed within one year from the date of judgment the said money shall be paid to the defendant or defendants entitled thereto, or to his or their order, who shall immediately build said fences. In case the State, or county, or city and county, builds said fences the moneys deposited shall be returned to said State or county, or city and county, and in case the said moneys are paid to the owner or owners of the lands condemned and are not used for said purposes, within one year from the date of judgment, the same may be recovered by said State or county, or city and county.

Comment. The first sentence of Section 1251 is continued by Section 1268.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The provision of Section 1251 that extended the 30-day time for payment of the judgment by one year where necessary to permit bonds to be issued and sold is not continued.

The second and third paragraphs of Section 1251 relating to the performance of work by the plaintiff is superseded generally by Sections 1263.450 and 1263.610 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, the cost of fences, cattle guards, and crossings is no longer assessed in an eminent domain proceeding as a separate item of damages. A railroad corporation has an affirmative duty to fence its tracks and to provide crossings as determined by the Public Utilities Commission. See PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 7626 and 7537. The railroad is partially absolved from liability for a failure to fence if damages for the lack of a fence were awarded to the owner of adjoining property as part of compensation in an eminent domain proceeding. See PUB. UTIL. CODE § 7627.

§ 1252 (repealed). Compensation and damages; payment or deposit; execution; vacation of proceedings and restoration of possession for nonpayment

1252. Payment may be made to the defendants entitled thereto, or the money may be deposited in Court for the defendants, and be distributed to those entitled thereto. If the money be not so paid or deposited, the defendants may have execution as in civil cases; and if the money cannot be made on execution, the Court, upon a showing to that effect, must set aside and annul the entire proceedings, and restore possession of the property to the defendant, if possession has been taken by the plaintiff.

Comment. Section 1252 is superseded by Sections 1268.010, 1268.020, and 1268.620 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1252.1 (repealed). Liability of plaintiff for ad valorem taxes, penalties and costs; payments to defendant

1252.1. As between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff is liable for any ad valorem taxes, penalties and costs upon the property sought to be taken by eminent

domain that would be subject to cancellation under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 4986) of Part 9 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code if the plaintiff were a public agency covered by Section 4986 of the Revenue and Taxation Code and if such taxes, penalties and costs had not been paid, whether or not the plaintiff is such a public agency.

If the defendant has paid any amount for which, as between the plaintiff and defendant, the plaintiff is liable under this section, the plaintiff shall pay to the defendant a sum equal to such amount.

If the plaintiff takes possession of the property prior to judgment, the amount the defendant is entitled to be paid under this section shall be claimed at the time and in the manner provided for claiming costs. If the plaintiff does not take possession of the property prior to judgment, the amount the defendant is entitled to be paid under this section shall be claimed not later than 30 days after the title vests in the plaintiff and shall be claimed in the manner provided for claiming costs.

Comment. The first paragraph of Section 1252.1 is superseded by Section 1268.410 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The final two paragraphs are superseded by Section 1268.430.

§ 1252.2 (repealed). Separate valuation on assessment roll; application

1252.2. When the property sought to be taken by eminent domain does not have a separate valuation on the assessment roll, any party to the eminent domain proceeding may, at any time after the taxes on such property are subject to cancellation pursuant to Section 4986 of the Revenue and Taxation Code, apply to the tax collector for a separate valuation of such property in accordance with Article 3 (commencing with Section 2821) of Chapter 3 of Part 5 of Division 1 of the Revenue and Taxation Code notwithstanding any provision in such article to the contrary.

Comment. Section 1252.2 is superseded by Section 1268.420 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1253 (repealed). Final order; contents; recordation; vesting of title

1253. When payments have been made and the bond given, if the plaintiff elects to give one, as required by Sections 1251 and 1252, the court shall make a final order of condemnation, which shall describe the property condemned, the estate or interest acquired therein, the purposes of such condemnation, and if possession is taken pursuant to Section 1243.5 or 1254 prior to the making and entry of the final order of condemnation, the date of such possession. For the purposes of this section, the date of possession shall be the date upon or after which the plaintiff is authorized by order of the court to take possession of the property. A certified copy of the order shall thereupon be recorded in the office of the recorder of the county in which the property is located. The title to the property described in the final order of condemnation vests in the plaintiff for the purposes described therein upon the date that a certified copy of the final order of condemnation is recorded in the office of the recorder of the county.

Comment. Section 1253 is superseded by Section 1268.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1254 (repealed). Possession and use of property by plaintiff pending conclusion of litigation

1254. (a) In any case in which the plaintiff is not in possession of the property sought to be condemned, the plaintiff may, at any time after trial and judgment entered or pending an appeal from the judgment and after payment into court for the defendant of the full amount of the judgment and such further sum as may be required by the court as a fund to pay any further damages and costs that may be recovered in the proceeding, apply ex parte for an order authorizing it to take possession of and to use the property sought to be condemned.

(b) If in the judgment the court determined that the plaintiff is entitled to acquire the property by eminent domain and if the court determines that the plaintiff has

made the required payment into court, the court shall by order authorize the plaintiff to take possession of and use the property during the pendency of and until the final conclusion of the litigation, and shall, if necessary, stay all actions and proceedings against the plaintiff on account thereof. The order shall state the date after which the plaintiff is authorized to take possession of the property which date, unless the plaintiff requests a later date, shall be 10 days after the date of the order.

(c) At least 10 days prior to the time possession is taken, the plaintiff shall serve upon the defendants and their attorneys, either personally or by mail, a copy of the order of the court authorizing it to take possession of the property. A single service upon or mailing to those at the same address is sufficient.

(d) At any time after the court has made an order authorizing the plaintiff to take possession pursuant to this section, the court may, upon motion of any party to the eminent domain proceeding, order an increase or a decrease in the amount that the plaintiff is required to pay into court as a further sum pursuant to this section.

(e) The plaintiff shall not be held to have abandoned or waived the right to appeal from the judgment by paying into court the amount of the judgment and such further sum as may be required by the court and taking possession of the property pursuant to this section.

(f) The defendant, who is entitled to the money paid into court for him upon any judgment, shall be entitled to demand and receive the full amount of the judgment at any time thereafter upon obtaining an order therefor from the court. The court, or a judge thereof, upon application by such defendant, shall order and direct that the money so paid into court for him be delivered to him upon his filing a satisfaction of the judgment, or upon his filing a receipt therefor, and an abandonment of all defenses to the action or proceeding, except as to the amount of damages that he may be entitled to in the event that a new trial is granted. A payment to a defendant, as aforesaid, shall be held to be an abandonment by such defendant of all defenses interposed by him, excepting his claim for greater compensation.

(g) Any amount withdrawn by any party in excess of the amount to which he is entitled as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding shall be paid without interest to the party entitled thereto, and the court in which the eminent domain proceeding is pending shall enter judgment therefor against such party.

(h) The payment of the money into court, as hereinbefore provided for, shall not discharge the plaintiff from liability to keep the said fund full and without diminution; but such money shall be and remain, as to all accidents, defalcations, or other contingencies (as between the parties to the proceeding), at the risk of the plaintiff, and shall so remain until the amount of the compensation or damages is finally settled by judicial determination, and until the court awards the money, or such part thereof as shall be determined upon, to the defendant, and until he is authorized or required by rule of court to take it. If, for any reason, the money shall at any time be lost, or otherwise abstracted or withdrawn, through no fault of the defendant, the court shall require the plaintiff to make and keep the sum good at all times until the litigation is finally brought to an end, and until paid over or made payable to the defendant by order of court, as above provided. The court shall order the money to be deposited in the State Treasury, unless the plaintiff requests the court to order deposit in the county treasury, in which case the court shall order deposit in the county treasury. If the court orders deposit in the State Treasury, it shall be the duty of the State Treasurer to receive all such moneys, duly receipt for, and to safely keep the same in the Condemnation Deposits Fund, which fund is hereby created in the State Treasury and for such duty, he shall be liable to the plaintiff upon his official bond. Money in the Condemnation Deposits Fund may be invested and reinvested in any securities described in Section 16430, Government Code, or deposited in banks as provided in Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 16500) of Part 2 of Division 4 of Title 2, Government Code. The Pooled Money Investment Board shall designate at least once a month the amount of money available in the fund for investment in securities or deposit in bank accounts, and

the type of investment or deposit and shall so arrange the investment or deposit program that funds will be available for the immediate payment of any court order or decree. Immediately after such designation the Treasurer shall invest or make deposits in bank accounts in accordance with the designations.

(i) For the purposes of this section, a written determination signed by a majority of the members of the Pooled Money Investment Board shall be deemed to be the determination of the board. Members may authorize deputies to act for them for them for the purpose of making determinations under this section.

(j) Interest earned and other increment derived from investments or deposits made pursuant to this section, after deposit of money in the State Treasury, shall be deposited in the Condemnation Deposits Fund. After first deducting therefrom expenses incurred by the Treasurer in taking and making delivery of bonds or other securities under this section, the State Controller shall apportion as of June 30th and December 31st of each year the remainder of such interest earned or increment derived and deposited in the fund during the six calendar months ending with such dates. There shall be apportioned and paid to each plaintiff having a deposit in the fund during the six-month period for which an apportionment is made, an amount directly proportionate to the total deposits in the fund and the length of time such deposits remained therein. The State Treasurer shall pay out the money deposited by a plaintiff in such manner and at such times as the court or a judge thereof may, by order or decree, direct.

(k) In all cases where a new trial has been granted upon the application of the defendant, and he has failed upon such trial to obtain greater compensation than was allowed him upon the first trial, the costs of such new trial shall be taxed against him.

Comment. The disposition of the provisions of Section 1254 is indicated below; unless otherwise indicated, the new sections are in the Code of Civil Procedure.

<i>Section 1254</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>	
Subdivision (a)	§§ 1268.110, 1268.210	1268.130,
Subdivision (b)	§§ 1268.210, 1268.220	
Subdivision (c)	§ 1268.220	
Subdivision (d)	§ 1268.130	
Subdivision (e)	§§ 1268.170, 1268.230	
Subdivision (f)	§ 1268.140	
Subdivision (g)	§ 1268.160	
Subdivision (h)	§ 1268.150; GOVT. CODE §§ 16429.1-16429.3	
Subdivisions (i), (j)	GOVT. CODE §§ 16429.1-16429.3	
Subdivision (k)	Not continued. See Comment to § 1268.710.	

§ 1255 (repealed). Costs; discretion

1255. Costs may be allowed or not, and if allowed, may be apportioned between the parties on the same or adverse sides, in the discretion of the Court.

Comment. Section 1255 is superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1268.710 (costs in trial court) and 1268.720 (costs on appeal). See also Section 1268.610 (litigation expenses upon dismissal or defeat of right to take).

§ 1255a (repealed). Abandonment

1255a. (a) The plaintiff may abandon the proceeding at any time after the filing of the complaint and before the expiration of 30 days after final judgment, by serving on defendants and filing in court a written notice of such abandonment. Failure to comply with Section 1251 of this code shall constitute an implied abandonment of the proceeding.

(b) The court may, upon motion made within 30 days after such abandonment, set aside the abandonment if it determines that the position of the moving party has been substantially changed to his detriment in justifiable reliance upon the proceeding and such party cannot be

restored to substantially the same position as if the proceeding had not been commenced.

(c) Upon the denial of a motion to set aside such abandonment or, if no such motion is filed, upon the expiration of the time for filing such a motion, on motion of any party, a judgment shall be entered dismissing the proceeding and awarding the defendants their recoverable costs and disbursements. Recoverable costs and disbursements include (1) all expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred in preparing for the condemnation trial, during the trial, and in any subsequent judicial proceedings in the condemnation action and (2) reasonable attorney fees, appraisal fees, and fees for the services of other experts where such fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred to protect the defendant's interests in preparing for the condemnation trial, during the trial, and in any subsequent judicial proceedings in the condemnation action, whether such fees were incurred for services rendered before or after the filing of the complaint. In case of a partial abandonment, recoverable costs and disbursements shall include only those recoverable costs and disbursements, or portions thereof, which would not have been incurred had the property or property interest sought to be taken after the partial abandonment been the property or property interest originally sought to be taken. Recoverable costs and disbursements, including expenses and fees, may be claimed in and by a cost bill, to be prepared, served, filed, and taxed as in civil actions. Upon judgment of dismissal on motion of the plaintiff, the cost bill shall be filed within 30 days after notice of entry of such judgment.

(d) If, after the plaintiff takes possession of or the defendant moves from the property sought to be condemned in compliance with an order of possession, the plaintiff abandons the proceeding as to such property or a portion thereof or it is determined that the plaintiff does not have authority to take such property or a portion thereof by eminent domain, the court shall order the plaintiff to deliver possession of such property or such portion thereof to the parties entitled to the possession thereof and shall make such provision as shall be just for

the payment of damages arising out of the plaintiff's taking and use of the property and damages for any loss or impairment of value suffered by the land and improvements after the time the plaintiff took possession of or the defendant moved from the property sought to be condemned in compliance with an order of possession, whichever is the earlier.

Comment. Section 1255a is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1255a</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision (a)	§§ 1268.020, 1268.510(a)
Subdivision (b)	§ 1268.510(b)
Subdivision (c)	§§ 1268.510(c), 1268.610
Subdivision (d)	§ 1268.620

§ 1255b (repealed). Compensation and damages; interest

1255b. (a) The compensation and damages awarded in an eminent domain proceeding shall draw legal interest from the earliest of the following dates:

- (1) The date of the entry of judgment.
 - (2) The date that the possession of the property sought to be condemned is taken or the damage thereto occurs.
 - (3) The date after which the plaintiff may take possession of the property as stated in an order authorizing the plaintiff to take possession.
- (b) If after the date that interest begins to accrue the defendant continues in actual possession of or receives rents, issues and profits from the property, the value of such possession and of such rents, issues and profits shall be offset against the interest that accrues during the period the defendant continues in actual possession or receives such rents, issues or profits.

(c) The compensation and damages awarded in an eminent domain proceeding shall cease to draw interest on the earliest of the following dates:

- (1) As to any amount deposited pursuant to Section 1243.5, the date that such amount is withdrawn by the person entitled thereto.
- (2) As to any amount paid into court pursuant to Section 1254, the date of such payment.

(3) As to any amount paid to the person entitled thereto, the date of such payment.

(4) If the full amount the defendant is then entitled to receive as finally determined in the eminent domain proceeding together with the full amount of the interest then due thereon is paid into court for the defendant after entry of judgment, the date of such payment.

Comment. Section 1255b is superseded by the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure indicated below.

<i>Section 1255b</i>	<i>New Provisions</i>
Subdivision (a)	§ 1268.310
Subdivision (b)	§ 1268.330
Subdivision (c)	§ 1268.320

§ 1256 (repealed). Applicable rules of practice

1256. Except as otherwise provided in this Title, the provisions of Part II of this Code are applicable to and constitute the rules of practice in the proceedings mentioned in this Title.

Comment. Section 1256 is superseded by Section 1230.040 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1256.1 (repealed). Argument; defendant's right to open and close

1256.1. Notwithstanding the provisions of Part 2 of this code, in any action brought under the provisions of this title, the defendant shall commence and conclude the argument.

Comment. Section 1256.1 is superseded by a portion of subdivision (a) of Section 1260.210 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1257 (repealed). New trials and appeals; applicable provisions; improvements pending new trial or appeal; application of money deposited

1257. The provisions of part II of this code, relative to new trials and appeals, except in so far as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this title, apply to the proceedings mentioned in this title; *provided*, that upon

the payment of the sum of money assessed, and upon the execution of the bond to build the fences and cattle-guards, as provided in section twelve hundred and fifty-one, the plaintiff shall be entitled to enter into, improve, and hold possession of the property sought to be condemned (if not already in possession) as provided in section twelve hundred and fifty-four, and devote the same to the public use in question; and no motion for new trial or appeal shall, after such payment and filing of such bond as aforesaid, in any manner retard the contemplated improvement. Any money which shall have been deposited, as provided in section twelve hundred and fifty-four, may be applied to the payment of the money assessed, and the remainder, if any there be, shall be returned to the plaintiff.

Comment. Section 1257, insofar as it provided general rules relating to new trials and appeals in an eminent domain proceeding, is superseded by Section 1230.040 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Insofar as Section 1257 related to possession after judgment, it is superseded by Section 1268.210. It might be noted that, where the judgment is reversed, vacated, or set aside, the plaintiff may obtain possession only pursuant to Article 3 (commencing with Section 1255.410) of Chapter 6 of the Eminent Domain Law. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1268.210(c). Regarding the repayment of an excess withdrawal, see CODE CIV. PROC. § 1268.160.

§ 1258 (repealed). Effective date; construction

1258. With relation to the Acts passed at the present session of the Legislature, this Title must be construed in the same manner as if this Code had been passed on the last day of this session, and from and after the time this Code takes effect, all laws of this State in relation to the taking of private property for public uses are abolished, and all proceedings had in the exercise of the powers of eminent domain must conform to the provisions of this Title.

Comment. Section 1258, insofar as it required the exercise of the power of eminent domain to conform to the provisions of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is superseded by Section 1230.020.

§ 1259 (repealed). Effective date

1259. Title VII of Part III of THE CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE of the State of California (this Title) shall be in force and effect from and after the fourth day of April, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-two.

Comment. Section 1259 is obsolete.

§ 1260 (repealed). Construction

1260. From and after the time this Title takes effect, it must be construed in the same manner as it would be were Sections 4 and 17 of this Code in force and effect.

Comment. Section 1260 is superseded generally by Article 1 (commencing with Section 1235.010) of Chapter 2 of the Eminent Domain Law. See Comment to Section 1235.010.

§ 1261 (repealed). Pending proceedings; effect upon

1261. No proceeding to enforce the right of eminent domain commenced before this Title takes effect, is affected by the provisions of this Title.

Comment. Section 1261 is superseded by Section 1230.070 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1262 (repealed). Rules of practice

1262. Until the first day of January, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-three, at twelve o'clock noon, the provisions of Sections 1256 and 1257 of this Title are suspended, and until then, except as otherwise provided in this Title, the rules of pleading and practice in civil actions now in force in this State are applicable to the proceedings mentioned in this Title, and constitute the rules of pleading and practice therein.

Comment. Section 1262 is superseded by Section 1230.070 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1263 (repealed). Construction; statutes providing for taking for street purposes

1263. Nothing in this Code must be construed to abrogate or repeal any statute providing for the taking of property in any city or town for street purposes.

Comment. Section 1263 is superseded generally by Section 1230.020 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides that the power of eminent domain shall be exercised as provided by the Eminent Domain Law except where otherwise specifically provided by statute.

§ 1264 (repealed). Preference; setting for trial and hearing

1264. In all actions brought under the provisions of this title, to enforce the right of eminent domain, all courts wherein such actions are or may hereafter be pending, shall give such actions preference over all other civil actions therein, in the matter of setting the same for hearing or trial, and in hearing the same, to the end that all such actions shall be quickly heard and determined.

Comment. Section 1264 is superseded by Section 1260.010 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1264.1 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls

1264.1. Where the property sought to be condemned is a franchise of limited duration to collect tolls on any bridge or highway, the plaintiff may condemn the right to take such franchise as of a future date, which date shall be specified in the complaint and in the judgment of condemnation.

Comment. Section 1264.1 and its implementing sections (Sections 1264.2–1264.6 and 1264.8), relating to condemnation of toll franchises of limited duration as of a future date, are not continued. These sections were of extremely limited application and are presently of little or no significance, for there appear to be no existing toll bridge or toll road franchises. In addition, these sections largely restated the rules of eminent domain that would be applicable in their absence. See Comment, *Work of the 1937 California Legislature*, 11 So. CAL. L. REV. 1, 33–39 (1937).

For related provisions, see CODE CIV. PROC. § 1235.170 (“property” defined); STS. & HWYS. CODE §§ 30800 and 30810 (granting franchises); PUB. UTIL. CODE § 1403 (condemnation of utilities); CAL. CONST., Art. XII, § 8 (right of Legislature). See also former CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1238(4) and 1240(5) and Comments thereto (condemnation of toll bridges and roads, and of franchises).

§ 1264.2 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; measure of damages

1264.2. The measure of damages in the case of a proceeding coming under section 1264.1 shall, except as provided in section 1264.3, be the value of the rights granted under said franchise for the period between said date and the expiration of said franchise, due consideration being had to the burdens as well as the benefits conferred by such franchise.

Comment. See Comment to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1264.1.

§ 1264.3 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; provision in franchise for acquisition of road or bridge; amount of compensation

1264.3. If provision was made in the franchise sought to be condemned or in the applicable statutes under which the franchise was granted for the acquisition of said toll bridge or toll road or said franchise by the county granting the franchise or by the counties, jointly acting, in which the toll bridge or toll road is situate, on the payment of the fair cash value of said toll bridge or toll road, without consideration of the value of the franchise, then and in that event, in any proceeding brought for the taking of such franchise, the compensation awarded shall not exceed the fair cash value of such toll bridge or toll road, exclusive of the value of the franchise.

Comment. See Comment to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1264.1.

§ 1264.4 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; amendment of complaint on new trial

1264.4. If a new trial is granted or the judgment is reversed and remanded for a new trial, the plaintiff shall have the right as a matter of course, in cases coming under section 1264.1 to amend the complaint to specify a different date as of which said franchise shall be taken.

Comment. See Comment to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1264.1.

§ 1264.5 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; affirmance on appeal; deduction of net receipts if plaintiff offered to pay judgment; net receipts defined; exception

1264.5. If the defendant appeals from the judgment and the judgment is affirmed in a case coming under Section 1264.1, the plaintiff shall be entitled to have deducted from the principal of the judgment to be paid the net receipts of tolls collected or collectible from the date for the taking as specified in the judgment to the date on which the judgment of the reviewing court becomes final, on showing that prior to the date specified for said taking the plaintiff was able to pay the said judgment and offered to pay the same to the defendant, or into court for his benefit, in return for a waiver of the appeal. The term "net receipts" means the sum obtained by subtracting from the total amount of tolls collected or collectible the amounts actually and necessarily expended or incurred for operation and maintenance of said toll road or toll bridge during said period.

This section does not apply in those cases in which the plaintiff takes possession pending appeal pursuant to the provisions of Section 1254 or takes possession under the provisions of Section 14 of Article I of the Constitution.

Comment. See Comment to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1264.1.

§ 1264.6 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; determination of deduction of net receipts; motion; jury trial

1264.6. To secure the deduction specified in Section 1264.5 the plaintiff must within 10 days after the remittitur is received from the reviewing court serve on the defendant and file in the superior court his motion to set for hearing the question of the deduction to be made. If, on the hearing of said motion, proof is made to the satisfaction of the court of plaintiff's ability to pay, and offer to pay, the judgment, as specified in Section 1264.5, the court shall grant the motion and shall fix a time for the

determination of the amount to be deducted, which amount shall be determined by the court sitting without a jury unless plaintiff or defendant on or before the date of the hearing of said motion to set files with the court a demand in writing for a jury, in which case the said amount shall be determined by a jury.

Comment. See Comment to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1264.1.

§ 1264.7 (repealed). Judgment and final judgment defined

1264.7. The term "judgment" as used in this title means the judgment determining the right to condemn and fixing the amount of compensation to be paid by the plaintiff. The term "final judgment" as used in this title means such judgment when all possibility of direct attack thereon by way of appeal, motion for a new trial, or motion to vacate the judgment has been exhausted.

Comment. The first sentence of Section 1264.7 is superseded by Section 1235.130 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The second sentence of Section 1264.7 is superseded by Section 1235.120.

§ 1264.8 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; time for payment of judgment; extension; abandonment

1264.8. In any case brought under Section 1264.1, the plaintiff shall have the full period specified in Section 1251 in which to pay the judgment, but in case the period specified in that section expires prior to the date specified in the judgment for the taking of said franchise, the period shall be extended to and including the day preceding said specified date.

No abandonment shall be implied under section 1255a unless the judgment is not paid within the time herein specified.

Comment. See Comment to former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1264.1.

§ 1264.9 (repealed). Franchise to collect tolls; toll road or bridge; award to county, city, or public mandatory for taxes, etc.

1264.9. In any action for the acquisition hereunder of a toll road or toll bridge or the franchise for the collection of tolls thereon, the court in which such action is pending shall have jurisdiction to determine the liability of the condemning party to any county, city or other public mandatory for taxes, license fees or franchise payments and to determine the reversionary rights of any such county, city or other public mandatory in or to the franchise or property so sought to be acquired, and if, and in the event, any such liability be so determined against said condemning party, then and in that event an award shall be made to such county, city or other public mandatory, pursuant to the provisions of the law.

Comment. Section 1264.9—relating to the jurisdiction of the court to determine the liability of a condemnor for taxes, license fees, and franchise payments on, as well as reversionary interests of a city, county, or other public mandatory in, a toll bridge or toll road or franchise thereon—is not continued. The section was of little or no current significance, for there appear to be few existing private toll roads or bridges and no existing franchises for their operation. Moreover, the court has general jurisdiction to determine matters incident to the condemnation of property (*cf.* former CODE Civ. PROC. § 1247(2) and Comment thereto) as well as specific jurisdiction to determine liability for taxes (see REV. & TAX. CODE § 4986; see also CODE Civ. PROC. §§ 1268.410–1268.430).

§ 1265 (repealed). Acquisition of realty by public agency; purchase price as public information

1265. Whenever any public agency acquires real property by eminent domain, purchase, or exchange, the purchase price or other consideration paid by such agency shall be public information made available upon request from the agency concerned.

Comment. Section 1265 is superseded by Section 7275 of the Government Code.

§ 1266 (repealed). Taking whole parcel where award for part would equal value of whole

1266. Whenever land is to be condemned by a county or city for the establishment of any street or highway, including express highways and freeways, and the taking of a part of a parcel of land by such condemning authority would leave the remainder thereof in such size or shape or condition as to require such condemnor to pay in compensation for the taking of such part an amount equal to the fair and reasonable value of the whole parcel, the resolution of the governing body of the city or county may provide for the taking of the whole of such parcel and upon the adoption of any such resolution it shall be deemed necessary for the public use, benefit, safety, economy, and general welfare that such condemning authority acquire the whole of such parcel.

Comment. Section 1266 is superseded by Section 1240.410 *et seq.* of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1266.1 (repealed). Acquisition by gift or purchase; purposes

1266.1. A county or a city may acquire land by gift or purchase from the owner thereof for any of the purposes enumerated in Section 1266 of this code.

Comment. Section 1266.1 is superseded by Sections 1240.130 and 1240.150 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1266.2 (repealed). Compensation or fee for appraisers, referees, commissioners, etc.

1266.2. In any action or proceeding for the purpose of condemning property where the court may appoint appraisers, referees, commissioners, or other persons for the purpose of determining the value of such property and fixing the compensation thereof, and may fix their fees or compensation, the court may set such fees or compensation in an amount as determined by the court to be reasonable, but such fees shall not exceed similar fees for similar services in the community where such services are rendered.

Comment. Section 1266.2 is superseded by Section 1260.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1267 (repealed). Expert witnesses; limitations

1267. (a) Notwithstanding any other provision of law, only two experts shall be permitted to testify for any party as to each parcel in an eminent domain proceeding; but, for good cause shown, the court may permit one or more additional experts to testify for any party. If one or more experts are regularly employed and paid as such by the plaintiff, at least one of the experts who is called as a witness by the plaintiff may be such an employee.

(b) Nothing in this section shall be construed as limiting the number of witnesses, other than experts, which a party may call in such proceeding, including a person who is qualified to testify pursuant to paragraph (2) of subdivision (a) of Section 813 of the Evidence Code.

(c) As used in this section, "expert" means a person who is qualified to testify pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (a) of Section 813 of the Evidence Code.

Comment. Section 1267 is not continued. The repeal of this section does not, however, affect the general authorization to control the number of expert witnesses provided by Section 723 of the Evidence Code.

**Chapter 2. Exchange of Information in
Eminent Domain Proceedings**

**§ 1272.01 (repealed). Exchange of lists of expert
witnesses and statements of
valuation data**

1272.01. (a) Not later than 50 days prior to the day set for the trial, any party to an eminent domain proceeding may serve upon any adverse party and file a demand to exchange lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data.

(b) A party on whom a demand is served may, not later than 40 days prior to the day set for the trial, serve upon any adverse party and file a cross-demand to exchange lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data

relating to the parcel of property described in the demand.

(c) The demand or cross-demand shall:

(1) Describe the parcel of property to which the demand or cross-demand relates, which description may be made by reference to the complaint.

(2) Include a statement in substantially the following form: "You are required to serve and deposit with the clerk of court a list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data in compliance with Chapter 2 (commencing with Section 1272.01) of Title 7 of Part 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure not later than 20 days prior to the day set for trial. Except as otherwise provided in that chapter, your failure to do so will constitute a waiver of your right to call unlisted expert witnesses during your case in chief and of your right to introduce on direct examination during your case in chief any matter that is required to be, but is not, set forth in your statements of valuation data."

(d) Not later than 20 days prior to the day set for trial, each party who served a demand or cross-demand and each party upon whom a demand or cross-demand was served shall serve and deposit with the clerk of the court a list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data. A party who served a demand or cross-demand shall serve his list and statements upon each party on whom he served his demand or cross-demand. Each party on whom a demand or cross-demand was served shall serve his list and statements upon the party who served the demand or cross-demand.

(e) The clerk of the court shall make an entry in the register of actions for each list of expert witnesses and statement of valuation data deposited with him pursuant to this chapter. The lists and statements shall not be filed in the proceeding, but the clerk shall make them available to the court at the commencement of the trial for the limited purpose of enabling the court to apply the provisions of this chapter. Unless the court otherwise orders, the clerk shall, at the conclusion of the trial, return all lists and statements to the attorneys for the parties who deposited them. Lists or statements ordered by the court

to be retained may thereafter be destroyed or otherwise disposed of in accordance with the provisions of law governing the destruction or disposition of exhibits introduced in the trial.

Comment. Subdivisions (a) through (c) of Section 1272.01 are superseded by Section 1258.210 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivisions (d) and (e) are superseded by Sections 1258.220 and 1258.230.

§ 1272.02 (repealed). Statement of valuation data; persons from whom exchanged; contents

1272.02. (a) A statement of valuation data shall be exchanged for each person intended to be called as a witness by the party to testify to his opinion as to any of the following matters:

(1) The value of the property or property interest being valued.

(2) The amount of the damage, if any, to the remainder of the larger parcel from which such property is taken.

(3) The amount of the special benefit, if any, to the remainder of the larger parcel from which such property is taken.

(b) The statement of valuation data shall give the name and business or residence address of the witness and shall include a statement whether the witness will testify to an opinion as to any of the matters listed in subdivision (a) and, as to each such matter upon which he will give an opinion, what that opinion is and the following items to the extent that the opinion on such matter is based thereon:

(1) The estate or interest being valued.

(2) The date of valuation used by the witness.

(3) The highest and best use of the property.

(4) The applicable zoning and the opinion of the witness as to the probability of any change in such zoning.

(5) The sales, contracts to sell and purchase, and leases supporting the opinion.

(6) The cost of reproduction or replacement of the existing improvements on the property, the depreciation or obsolescence the improvements have suffered, and the method of calculation used to determine depreciation.

(7) The gross income from the property, the deductions from gross income, and the resulting net income; the reasonable net rental value attributable to the land and existing improvements thereon, and the estimated gross rental income and deductions therefrom upon which such reasonable net rental value is computed; the rate of capitalization used; and the value indicated by such capitalization.

(8) If the property is a portion of a larger parcel, a description of the larger parcel and its value.

(c) With respect to each sale, contract, or lease listed under paragraph (5) of subdivision (b):

(1) The names and business or residence addresses, if known, of the parties to the transaction.

(2) The location of the property subject to the transaction.

(3) The date of the transaction.

(4) If recorded, the date of recording and the volume and page or other identification of the record of the transaction.

(5) The price and other terms and circumstances of the transaction. In lieu of stating the terms contained in any contract, lease, or other document, the statement may, if the document is available for inspection by the adverse party, state the place where and the times when it is available for inspection.

(d) If any opinion referred to in subdivision (a) is based in whole or in substantial part upon the opinion of another person, the statement of valuation data shall include the name and business or residence address of such other person, his business, occupation, or profession, and a statement as to the subject matter to which his opinion relates.

(e) Except when an appraisal report is used as a statement of valuation data as permitted by subdivision (f), the statement of valuation data shall include a statement, signed by the witness, that the witness has read the statement of valuation data and that it fairly and correctly states his opinions and knowledge as to the matters therein stated.

(f) An appraisal report that has been prepared by the witness which includes the information required to be included in a statement of valuation data may be used as a statement of valuation data under this chapter.

Comment. Subdivision (a) of Section 1272.02 is superseded by Section 1258.250 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Subdivisions (b) through (f) are superseded by Section 1258.260.

§ 1272.03 (repealed). List of expert witnesses; contents

1272.03. The list of expert witnesses shall include the name, business or residence address, and business, occupation, or profession of each person intended to be called as an expert witness by the party and a statement as to the subject matter to which his testimony relates.

Comment. Section 1272.03 is superseded by Section 1258.240 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1272.04 (repealed). Notice to persons upon whom list and statements served of additional witnesses or data; form

1272.04. (a) A party who is required to exchange lists of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data shall diligently give notice to the parties upon whom his list and statements were served if, after service of his list and statements, he:

(1) Determines to call an expert witness not included in his list of expert witnesses to testify on direct examination during his case in chief;

(2) Determines to have a witness called by him testify on direct examination during his case in chief to any opinion or data required to be listed in the statement of valuation data for that witness but which was not so listed; or

(3) Discovers any data required to be listed in a statement of valuation data but which was not so listed.

(b) The notice required by subdivision (a) shall include the information specified in Sections 1272.02 and 1272.03 and shall be in writing; but such notice is not required to be in writing if it is given after the commencement of the trial.

Comment. Section 1272.04 is superseded by Section 1258.270 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1272.05 (repealed). Limitations upon calling witnesses and testimony by witnesses

1272.05. Except as provided in Section 1272.06, upon objection of any party who has served his list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data in compliance with Section 1272.01:

(a) No party required to serve a list of expert witnesses may call an expert witness to testify on direct examination during the case in chief of the party calling him unless the information required by Section 1272.03 for such witness is included in the list served by the party who calls the witness.

(b) No party required to serve statements of valuation data may call a witness to testify on direct examination during the case in chief of the party calling him to his opinion of the value of the property described in the demand or cross-demand or the amount of the damage or benefit, if any, to the remainder of the larger parcel from which such property is taken unless a statement of valuation data for the witness was served by the party who calls the witness.

(c) No witness called by any party required to serve statements of valuation data may testify on direct examination during the case in chief of the party who called him to any opinion or data required to be listed in the statement of valuation data for such witness unless such opinion or data is listed in the statement served, except that testimony that is merely an explanation or elaboration of data so listed is not inadmissible under this section.

Comment. Section 1272.05 is superseded by Section 1258.280 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1272.06 (repealed). Grounds for court authority to call witness or permit testimony by witness

1272.06. (a) The court may, upon such terms as may be just, permit a party to call a witness, or permit a witness called by a party to testify to an opinion or data on direct examination, during the party's case in chief where such witness, opinion, or data is required to be, but is not, included in such party's list of expert witnesses or statements of valuation data if the court finds that such party has made a good faith effort to comply with Sections 1272.01 to 1272.03, inclusive, that he has complied with Section 1272.04, and that, by the date of the service of his list and statements, he:

(1) Would not in the exercise of reasonable diligence have determined to call such witness or discovered or listed such opinion or data; or

(2) Failed to determine to call such witness or to discover or list such opinion or data through mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.

(b) In making a determination under this section, the court shall take into account the extent to which the opposing party has relied upon the list of expert witnesses and statements of valuation data and will be prejudiced if the witness is called or the testimony concerning such opinion or data is given.

Comment. Section 1272.06 is superseded by Section 1258.290 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1272.07 (repealed). Applicability of chapter

1272.07. This chapter does not apply in any eminent domain proceeding in any county having a population in excess of 4,000,000 in which a pretrial conference is held.

Comment. Section 1272.07 is superseded by Section 1258.300 of the Code of Civil Procedure. However, Section 1258.300 is not limited solely to Los Angeles County but authorizes any county with the approval of the Judicial Council to provide exchange procedures in lieu of those provided by statute.

§ 1272.08 (repealed). Use of discovery procedures

1272.08. The procedure provided in this chapter does not prevent the use of discovery procedures or limit the matters that are discoverable in eminent domain proceedings. Neither the existence of the procedure provided by this chapter, nor the fact that it has or has not been invoked by a party to the proceeding, affects the time for completion of discovery in the proceeding.

Comment. Section 1272.08 is superseded by Sections 1258.010 and 1258.020 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

§ 1272.09 (repealed). Admissibility of evidence

1272.09. Nothing in this chapter makes admissible any evidence that is not otherwise admissible or permits a witness to base an opinion on any matter that is not a proper basis for such an opinion.

Comment. Section 1272.09 is superseded by Section 1258.030 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Chapter 3. Arbitration of Compensation in Acquisitions of Property for Public Use**§ 1273.01 (repealed). Public entity defined**

1273.01. As used in this chapter, "public entity" includes the state, the Regents of the University of California, a county, city, district, public authority, public agency, and any other political subdivision or public corporation in the state.

Comment. Section 1273.01 is not continued because it is unnecessary. See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1235.190.

§ 1273.02 (repealed). Person authorized to enter arbitration agreement; "person" defined

1273.02. (a) Any person authorized to acquire property for public use may enter into an agreement to arbitrate any controversy as to the compensation to be made in connection with the acquisition of the property.

(b) Where property is already appropriated to a public use, the person authorized to compromise or settle the claim arising from a taking or damaging of such property for another public use may enter into an agreement to arbitrate any controversy as to the compensation to be made in connection with such taking or damaging.

(c) For the purposes of this section, in the case of a public entity, "person" refers to the particular department, officer, commission, board, or governing body authorized to acquire property on behalf of the public entity or to compromise or settle a claim arising from the taking or damaging of the entity's property.

Comment. Section 1273.02 is continued without substantive change in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1273.010.

§ 1273.03 (repealed). Expenses and fees payable by party acquiring property; fees of any other party payable by agreement; source of funds

1273.03. (a) Notwithstanding Sections 1283.2 and 1284.2, the party acquiring the property shall pay all of the expenses and fees of the neutral arbitrator and the statutory fees and mileage of all witnesses subpoenaed in the arbitration; together with other expenses of the arbitration incurred or approved by the neutral arbitrator, not including attorney's fees or expert witness fees or other expenses incurred by other parties for their own benefit.

(b) An agreement authorized by this chapter may require that the party acquiring the property pay reasonable attorney's fees, or expert witness fees, or both, to any other party to the arbitration. If the agreement requires the payment of such fees, the amount of the fees is a matter to be determined in the arbitration proceeding unless the agreement prescribes otherwise.

(c) The party acquiring the property may pay the expenses and fees referred to in subdivisions (a) and (b) from funds available for the acquisition of the property or other funds available for the purpose.

Comment. Section 1273.03 is continued without substantive change in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1273.020.

§ 1273.04 (repealed). Applicability of Title 9; exceptions

1273.04. (a) Except as specifically provided in this chapter, agreements authorized by this chapter are subject to Title 9 (commencing with Section 1280) of this part.

(b) An agreement authorized by this chapter may be made whether or not an eminent domain proceeding has been commenced to acquire the property. If an eminent domain proceeding has been commenced or is commenced, any petition or response relating to the arbitration shall be filed and determined in the eminent domain proceeding.

(c) Notwithstanding Section 1281.4, an agreement authorized by this chapter does not waive or restrict the power of any person to commence and prosecute an eminent domain proceeding, including the taking of possession prior to judgment, except that, upon motion of a party to the eminent domain proceeding, the court shall stay the determination of compensation until any petition for an order to arbitrate is determined and, if arbitration is ordered, until arbitration is had in accordance with the order.

(d) The effect and enforceability of an agreement authorized by this chapter is not defeated or impaired by contention or proof by any party to the agreement that the party acquiring the property pursuant to the agreement lacks the power or capacity to take the property by eminent domain proceedings.

(e) Notwithstanding the rules as to venue provided by Sections 1292 and 1292.2, any petition relating to arbitration authorized by this chapter shall be filed in the superior court in the county in which the property, or any portion of the property, is located.

Comment. Section 1273.04 is continued without substantive change in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1273.030.

§ 1273.05 (repealed). Abandonment of proceedings; time

1273.05. (a) Except as provided in subdivision (b), an agreement authorized by this chapter may specify the terms and conditions under which the party acquiring the property may abandon the acquisition, the arbitration proceeding, and any eminent domain proceeding that may have been, or may be, filed. Unless the agreement provides that the acquisition may not be abandoned, the party acquiring the property may abandon the acquisition, the arbitration proceeding, and any eminent domain proceeding at any time not later than the time for filing and serving a petition or response to vacate an arbitration award under Sections 1288 and 1288.2.

(b) If the proceeding to acquire the property is abandoned after the arbitration agreement is executed, the party from whom the property was to be acquired is entitled to recover (1) all expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred (i) in preparing for the arbitration proceeding and for any judicial proceedings in connection with the acquisition of the property, (ii) during the arbitration proceeding and during any judicial proceedings in connection with the acquisition, and (iii) in any subsequent judicial proceedings in connection with the acquisition and (2) reasonable attorney's fees, appraisal fees, and fees for the services of other experts where such fees were reasonably and necessarily incurred to protect his interests in connection with the acquisition of the property. Unless the agreement otherwise provides, the amount of such expenses and fees shall be determined by arbitration in accordance with the agreement.

Comment. Section 1273.05 is continued without substantive change in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1273.040.

§ 1273.06 (repealed). Agreements acknowledged, recorded, and re-recorded; notice; memorandum

1273.06. (a) An agreement authorized by this chapter may be acknowledged and recorded, and rerecorded, in the same manner and with the same effect as a

conveyance of real property except that two years after the date the agreement is recorded, or rerecorded, the record ceases to be notice to any person for any purpose.

(b) In lieu of recording the agreement, there may be recorded a memorandum thereof, executed by the parties to the agreement, containing at least the following information: the names of the parties to the agreement, a description of the property, and a statement that an arbitration agreement affecting such property has been entered into pursuant to this chapter. Such memorandum when acknowledged and recorded, or rerecorded, in the same manner as a conveyance of real property has the same effect as if the agreement itself were recorded or rerecorded.

Comment. Section 1273.06 is continued without substantive change in Code of Civil Procedure Section 1273.050.

TABLE OF SECTIONS AFFECTED

This is a table of sections of the Constitution, codes, and uncodified statutes affected (added, amended, or repealed) by the proposed legislation contained in the following January 1974 Commission publications:

- Tentative Recommendations Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure:*
The Eminent Domain Law (herein referred to as "EDL")
Condemnation Authority of State Agencies (herein referred to as "StC")
Conforming Changes in Special District Statutes (herein referred to as "SD")
Recommendation Relating to Condemnation Law and Procedure: Conforming Changes in Improvement Acts (herein referred to as "IA")

The tentative recommendation relating to conforming changes in special district statutes includes eight bills, which are numbered in that tentative recommendation as "Bill No. 1" through "Bill No. 8." This table indicates the number of the particular bill which contains the section affected. For example, "Bill No. 3" is referred to as "SD #3."

One of the following abbreviations is used after each section listed in the table to indicate how the section is affected:

- "(new)"—a new section to be added to the code
"(A)"—a section of existing law that is amended
"(R)"—a section of existing law that is repealed

CIVIL CODE		1235.110 (new)	EDL
1001 (R)	EDL	1235.120 (new)	EDL
		1235.130 (new)	EDL
		1235.140 (new)	EDL
		1235.150 (new)	EDL
CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE		1235.160 (new)	EDL
170 (A)	EDL	1235.170 (new)	EDL
426.70 (new)	EDL	1235.180 (new)	EDL
428.10 (A)	EDL	1235.190 (new)	EDL
534 (A)	EDL	1235.200 (new)	EDL
640 (A)	EDL	1235.210 (new)	EDL
710 (A)	EDL	1237 (R)	EDL
1036 (new)	EDL	1238 (R)	EDL
1230.010 (new)	EDL	1238.1 (R)	EDL
1230.020 (new)	EDL	1238.2 (R)	EDL
1230.030 (new)	EDL	1238.3 (R)	EDL
1230.040 (new)	EDL	1238.4 (R)	EDL
1230.050 (new)	EDL	1238.5 (R)	EDL
1230.060 (new)	EDL	1238.6 (R)	EDL
1230.070 (new)	EDL	1238.7 (R)	EDL
1235.010 (new)	EDL	1239 (R)	EDL
1235.020 (new)	EDL	1239.2 (R)	EDL
1235.030 (new)	EDL	1239.3 (R)	EDL
1235.040 (new)	EDL	1239.4 (R)	EDL
1235.050 (new)	EDL	1240 (R)	EDL
1235.060 (new)	EDL	1240.010 (new)	EDL
1235.070 (new)	EDL		

1240.020 (new)	EDL	1245.230 (new)	EDL
1240.030 (new)	EDL	1245.240 (new)	EDL
1240.040 (new)	EDL	1245.250 (new)	EDL
1240.050 (new)	EDL	1245.260 (new)	EDL
1240.110 (new)	EDL	1246 (R)	EDL
1240.120 (new)	EDL	1246.1 (R)	EDL
1240.130 (new)	EDL	1246.2 (R)	EDL
1240.140 (new)	EDL	1246.3 (R)	EDL
1240.150 (new)	EDL	1246.4 (R)	EDL
1240.160 (new)	EDL	1247 (R)	EDL
1240.210 (new)	EDL	1247a (R)	EDL
1240.220 (new)	EDL	1247b (R)	EDL
1240.230 (new)	EDL	1248 (R)	EDL
1240.310 (new)	EDL	1248a (R)	EDL
1240.320 (new)	EDL	1248b (R)	EDL
1240.330 (new)	EDL	1249 (R)	EDL
1240.340 (new)	EDL	1249.1 (R)	EDL
1240.350 (new)	EDL	1249.2 (R)	EDL
1240.360 (new)	EDL	1250 (R)	EDL
1240.410 (new)	EDL	1250.010 (new)	EDL
1240.420 (new)	EDL	1250.020 (new)	EDL
1240.430 (new)	EDL	1250.030 (new)	EDL
1240.510 (new)	EDL	1250.040 (new)	EDL
1240.520 (new)	EDL	1250.110 (new)	EDL
1240.530 (new)	EDL	1250.120 (new)	EDL
1240.610 (new)	EDL	1250.130 (new)	EDL
1240.620 (new)	EDL	1250.140 (new)	EDL
1240.630 (new)	EDL	1250.150 (new)	EDL
1240.640 (new)	EDL	1250.210 (new)	EDL
1240.650 (new)	EDL	1250.220 (new)	EDL
1240.660 (new)	EDL	1250.230 (new)	EDL
1240.670 (new)	EDL	1250.240 (new)	EDL
1240.680 (new)	EDL	1250.310 (new)	EDL
1240.690 (new)	EDL	1250.320 (new)	EDL
1240.700 (new)	EDL	1250.330 (new)	EDL
1241 (R)	EDL	1250.340 (new)	EDL
1241.7 (R)	EDL	1250.350 (new)	EDL
1241.9 (R)	EDL	1250.360 (new)	EDL
1242 (R)	EDL	1250.370 (new)	EDL
1242.5 (R)	EDL	1251 (R)	EDL
1243 (R)	EDL	1252 (R)	EDL
1243.1 (R)	EDL	1252.1 (R)	EDL
1243.4 (R)	EDL	1252.2 (R)	EDL
1243.5 (R)	EDL	1253 (R)	EDL
1243.6 (R)	EDL	1254 (R)	EDL
1243.7 (R)	EDL	1255 (R)	EDL
1244 (R)	EDL	1255a (R)	EDL
1245 (R)	EDL	1255b (R)	EDL
1245.2 (R)	EDL	1255.010 (new)	EDL
1245.3 (R)	EDL	1255.020 (new)	EDL
1245.4 (R)	EDL	1255.030 (new)	EDL
1245.010 (new)	EDL	1255.040 (new)	EDL
1245.020 (new)	EDL	1255.050 (new)	EDL
1245.030 (new)	EDL	1255.060 (new)	EDL
1245.040 (new)	EDL	1255.070 (new)	EDL
1245.050 (new)	EDL	1255.080 (new)	EDL
1245.060 (new)	EDL	1255.210 (new)	EDL
1245.070 (new)	EDL	1255.220 (new)	EDL
1245.210 (new)	EDL	1255.230 (new)	EDL
1245.220 (new)	EDL	1255.240 (new)	EDL

1255.250 (new)	EDL	1263.330 (new)	EDL
1255.260 (new)	EDL	1263.410 (new)	EDL
1255.270 (new)	EDL	1263.420 (new)	EDL
1255.280 (new)	EDL	1263.430 (new)	EDL
1255.410 (new)	EDL	1263.440 (new)	EDL
1255.420 (new)	EDL	1263.450 (new)	EDL
1255.430 (new)	EDL	1263.510 (new)	EDL
1255.440 (new)	EDL	1263.610 (new)	EDL
1255.450 (new)	EDL	1263.620 (new)	EDL
1255.460 (new)	EDL	1264 (R)	EDL
1255.470 (new)	EDL	1264.1 (R)	EDL
1255.480 (new)	EDL	1264.2 (R)	EDL
1256 (R)	EDL	1264.3 (R)	EDL
1256.1 (R)	EDL	1264.4 (R)	EDL
1257 (R)	EDL	1264.5 (R)	EDL
1258 (R)	EDL	1264.6 (R)	EDL
1258.010 (new)	EDL	1264.7 (R)	EDL
1258.020 (new)	EDL	1264.8 (R)	EDL
1258.030 (new)	EDL	1264.9 (R)	EDL
1258.210 (new)	EDL	1265 (R)	EDL
1258.220 (new)	EDL	1265.010 (new)	EDL
1258.230 (new)	EDL	1265.110 (new)	EDL
1258.240 (new)	EDL	1265.120 (new)	EDL
1258.250 (new)	EDL	1265.130 (new)	EDL
1258.260 (new)	EDL	1265.140 (new)	EDL
1258.270 (new)	EDL	1265.150 (new)	EDL
1258.280 (new)	EDL	1265.160 (new)	EDL
1258.290 (new)	EDL	1265.210 (new)	EDL
1258.300 (new)	EDL	1265.220 (new)	EDL
1259 (R)	EDL	1265.230 (new)	EDL
1260 (R)	EDL	1265.240 (new)	EDL
1260.010 (new)	EDL	1265.310 (new)	EDL
1260.020 (new)	EDL	1265.410 (new)	EDL
1260.110 (new)	EDL	1265.420 (new)	EDL
1260.120 (new)	EDL	1266 (R)	EDL
1260.210 (new)	EDL	1266.1 (R)	EDL
1260.220 (new)	EDL	1266.2 (R)	EDL
1260.230 (new)	EDL	1267 (R)	EDL
1260.240 (new)	EDL	1268.010 (new)	EDL
1260.250 (new)	EDL	1268.020 (new)	EDL
1261 (R)	EDL	1268.030 (new)	EDL
1262 (R)	EDL	1268.110 (new)	EDL
1263 (R)	EDL	1268.120 (new)	EDL
1263.010 (new)	EDL	1268.130 (new)	EDL
1263.020 (new)	EDL	1268.140 (new)	EDL
1263.110 (new)	EDL	1268.150 (new)	EDL
1263.120 (new)	EDL	1268.160 (new)	EDL
1263.130 (new)	EDL	1268.170 (new)	EDL
1263.140 (new)	EDL	1268.210 (new)	EDL
1263.150 (new)	EDL	1268.220 (new)	EDL
1263.210 (new)	EDL	1268.230 (new)	EDL
1263.220 (new)	EDL	1268.240 (new)	EDL
1263.230 (new)	EDL	1268.310 (new)	EDL
1263.240 (new)	EDL	1268.320 (new)	EDL
1263.250 (new)	EDL	1268.330 (new)	EDL
1263.260 (new)	EDL	1268.340 (new)	EDL
1263.270 (new)	EDL	1268.410 (new)	EDL
1263.280 (new)	EDL	1268.420 (new)	EDL
1263.310 (new)	EDL	1268.430 (new)	EDL
1263.320 (new)	EDL	1268.510 (new)	EDL

1268.610 (new)	EDL	192 (R)	EDL
1268.620 (new)	EDL	193 (R)	EDL
1268.710 (new)	EDL	194 (R)	EDL
1268.720 (new)	EDL	195 (R)	EDL
1272.01 (R)	EDL	196 (R)	EDL
1272.02 (R)	EDL	816 (A)	EDL
1272.03 (R)	EDL	Ch. 12, Div. 7, Tit.	
1272.04 (R)	EDL	1 heading (A)	EDL
1272.05 (R)	EDL	6950 (A)	EDL
1272.06 (R)	EDL	6952 (A)	EDL
1272.07 (R)	EDL	6953 (A)	EDL
1272.08 (R)	EDL	6955 (new)	EDL
1272.09 (R)	EDL	6956 (new)	EDL
1273.01 (R)	EDL	7275 (new)	EDL
1273.02 (R)	EDL	8324 (A)	StC
1273.03 (R)	EDL	14661 (R)	StC
1273.04 (R)	EDL	14662 (A)	StC
1273.05 (R)	EDL	14715 (A)	StC
1273.06 (R)	EDL	14770 (new)	EDL
1273.010 (new)	EDL	15853 (A)	StC
1273.020 (new)	EDL	15854 (A)	StC
1273.030 (new)	EDL	15854.1 (R)	StC
1273.040 (new)	EDL	15855 (R)	StC
1273.050 (new)	EDL	15855 (new)	StC
15856 (R)		15856 (R)	StC
15858 (R)		15858 (R)	StC
15859 (R)		15859 (R)	StC
16429.1 (new)		16429.1 (new)	EDL
16429.2 (new)		16429.2 (new)	EDL
16429.3 (new)		16429.3 (new)	EDL
25350.5 (new)		25350.5 (new)	EDL
25431 (A)		25431 (A)	EDL
37350.5 (new)		37350.5 (new)	EDL
38000 (R)		38000 (R)	IA
38000 (new)		38000 (new)	IA
38001 (R)		38001 (R)	IA
38001 (new)		38001 (new)	IA
38002 (R)		38002 (R)	IA
38002 (new)		38002 (new)	IA
38003 (R)		38003 (R)	IA
38004 (R)		38004 (R)	IA
38005 (R)		38005 (R)	IA
38006 (R)		38006 (R)	IA
38007 (R)		38007 (R)	IA
38008 (R)		38008 (R)	IA
38009 (R)		38009 (R)	IA
38010 (R)		38010 (R)	IA
38010 (new)		38010 (new)	IA
38011 (R)		38011 (R)	IA
38011 (new)		38011 (new)	IA
38012 (R)		38012 (R)	IA
38020 (R)		38020 (R)	IA
38021 (R)		38021 (R)	IA
38022 (R)		38022 (R)	IA
38023 (R)		38023 (R)	IA
38024 (R)		38024 (R)	IA
38025 (R)		38025 (R)	IA
38026 (R)		38026 (R)	IA
38027 (R)		38027 (R)	IA
38028 (R)		38028 (R)	IA

38029 (R)	IA	38124 (R)	IA
38030 (R)	IA	38125 (R)	IA
38031 (R)	IA	38126 (R)	IA
38032 (R)	IA	38127 (R)	IA
38033 (R)	IA	38128 (R)	IA
38034 (R)	IA	38140 (R)	IA
38035 (R)	IA	38141 (R)	IA
38036 (R)	IA	38142 (R)	IA
38037 (R)	IA	38143 (R)	IA
38050 (R)	IA	38144 (R)	IA
38051 (R)	IA	38145 (R)	IA
38052 (R)	IA	38146 (R)	IA
38053 (R)	IA	38147 (R)	IA
38054 (R)	IA	38148 (R)	IA
38055 (R)	IA	38149 (R)	IA
38056 (R)	IA	38150 (R)	IA
38057 (R)	IA	38151 (R)	IA
38058 (R)	IA	38152 (R)	IA
38059 (R)	IA	38153 (R)	IA
38070 (R)	IA	38154 (R)	IA
38071 (R)	IA	38155 (R)	IA
38072 (R)	IA	38156 (R)	IA
38073 (R)	IA	38170 (R)	IA
38080 (R)	IA	38171 (R)	IA
38081 (R)	IA	38172 (R)	IA
38082 (R)	IA	38173 (R)	IA
38083 (R)	IA	38174 (R)	IA
38084 (R)	IA	38175 (R)	IA
38085 (R)	IA	38176 (R)	IA
38086 (R)	IA	38190 (R)	IA
38087 (R)	IA	38191 (R)	IA
38088 (R)	IA	38192 (R)	IA
38089 (R)	IA	38193 (R)	IA
38090 (R)	IA	38194 (R)	IA
38091 (R)	IA	38195 (R)	IA
38092 (R)	IA	38196 (R)	IA
38093 (R)	IA	38210 (R)	IA
38094 (R)	IA	38211 (R)	IA
38095 (R)	IA	38212 (R)	IA
38096 (R)	IA	38213 (R)	IA
38097 (R)	IA	39000 (R)	IA
38098 (R)	IA	39001 (R)	IA
38099 (R)	IA	39002 (R)	IA
38100 (R)	IA	39003 (R)	IA
38101 (R)	IA	39004 (R)	IA
38102 (R)	IA	39005 (R)	IA
38110 (R)	IA	39006 (R)	IA
38111 (R)	IA	39007 (R)	IA
38112 (R)	IA	39008 (R)	IA
38113 (R)	IA	39009 (R)	IA
38114 (R)	IA	39010 (R)	IA
38115 (R)	IA	39011 (R)	IA
38116 (R)	IA	39012 (R)	IA
38117 (R)	IA	39013 (R)	IA
38118 (R)	IA	39014 (R)	IA
38119 (R)	IA	39015 (R)	IA
38120 (R)	IA	39016 (R)	IA
38121 (R)	IA	39040 (R)	IA
38122 (R)	IA	39041 (R)	IA
38123 (R)	IA	39042 (R)	IA

39043 (R)	IA	39251 (R)	IA
39044 (R)	IA	39252 (R)	IA
39045 (R)	IA	39280 (R)	IA
39046 (R)	IA	39281 (R)	IA
39070 (R)	IA	39282 (R)	IA
39071 (R)	IA	39283 (R)	IA
39072 (R)	IA	39284 (R)	IA
39073 (R)	IA	39285 (R)	IA
39074 (R)	IA	39286 (R)	IA
39075 (R)	IA	39287 (R)	IA
39076 (R)	IA	39288 (R)	IA
39077 (R)	IA	39289 (R)	IA
39078 (R)	IA	39290 (R)	IA
39079 (R)	IA	39291 (R)	IA
39100 (R)	IA	39292 (R)	IA
39101 (R)	IA	39293 (R)	IA
39102 (R)	IA	39294 (R)	IA
39103 (R)	IA	39295 (R)	IA
39104 (R)	IA	39296 (R)	IA
39105 (R)	IA	39297 (R)	IA
39106 (R)	IA	39298 (R)	IA
39107 (R)	IA	39299 (R)	IA
39108 (R)	IA	39300 (R)	IA
39109 (R)	IA	39301 (R)	IA
39110 (R)	IA	39302 (R)	IA
39111 (R)	IA	39330 (R)	IA
39112 (R)	IA	39331 (R)	IA
39140 (R)	IA	39332 (R)	IA
39141 (R)	IA	39333 (R)	IA
39142 (R)	IA	39334 (R)	IA
39143 (R)	IA	39335 (R)	IA
39170 (R)	IA	39336 (R)	IA
39171 (R)	IA	39337 (R)	IA
39172 (R)	IA	39338 (R)	IA
39173 (R)	IA	39339 (R)	IA
39174 (R)	IA	39340 (R)	IA
39175 (R)	IA	39341 (R)	IA
39176 (R)	IA	39370 (R)	IA
39177 (R)	IA	39371 (R)	IA
39178 (R)	IA	39372 (R)	IA
39179 (R)	IA	39373 (R)	IA
39180 (R)	IA	39374 (R)	IA
39181 (R)	IA	43424 (A)	EDL
39182 (R)	IA	50366 (A)	EDL
39210 (R)	IA	50485.2 (A)	EDL
39211 (R)	IA	50485.13 (R)	EDL
39212 (R)	IA	51291 (A)	EDL
39213 (R)	IA	53040 (A)	EDL
39214 (R)	IA	53844 (A)	EDL
39240 (R)	IA	54093 (A)	StC
39241 (R)	IA	55003 (A)	EDL
39242 (R)	IA	61610 (A)	SD #1
39243 (R)	IA	61715 (A)	IA
39244 (R)	IA	66657 (A)	SD #1
39245 (R)	IA	HARBORS & NAVIGATION CODE	
39246 (R)	IA	4009 (A)	EDL
39247 (R)	IA	5900.4 (A)	SD #1
39248 (R)	IA	6076 (A)	SD #1
39249 (R)	IA		
39250 (R)	IA		

6296 (A)	SD#1	623 (new)	EDL	
6896 (A)	SD#1	624 (new)	EDL	
7147 (A)	SD#1	861 (new)	EDL	
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE				
438.4 (A)	EDL	1503 (A)	EDL	
1427 (new)	EDL	2729 (new)	EDL	
4771 (A)	IA	7526 (A)	EDL	
4967 (new)	EDL	7557 (new)	EDL	
6541 (A)	IA	12703 (A)	SD#1	
8961 (A)	SD#1	16404 (A)	SD#1	
33398 (A)	EDL	16405 (R)	SD#1	
33720 (A)	EDL	17010 (A)	IA	
33721 (A)	EDL	21633 (A)	StC	
33723 (A)	EDL	21634 (R)	EDL	
34325 (A)	EDL	21635 (R)	StC	
34875 (A)	EDL	21652 (new)	EDL	
34876 (A)	EDL	21653 (new)	EDL	
34878 (A)	EDL	25703 (A)	SD#2	
35167 (new)	EDL	28953 (A)	SD#2	
35168 (new)	EDL	28954 (R)	SD#2	
35169 (new)	EDL	30503 (A)	SD#2	
35170 (new)	EDL	30504 (R)	SD#2	
35171 (new)	EDL	40162 (A)	SD#2	
36059 (A)	EDL	50162 (A)	SD#2	
MILITARY & VETERANS CODE				
437 (A)	StC	70162 (A)	SD#2	
438 (R)	StC	90402 (A)	SD#2	
PUBLIC RESOURCES CODE				
3320.1 (A)	EDL	96002 (A)	SD#2	
3341 (A)	EDL	98212 (A)	SD#2	
5006 (A)	StC	100130.5 (R)	SD#2	
5006.1 (R)	StC	100131 (A)	SD#2	
5077.1 (R)	EDL	101177 (A)	SD#2	
5301 (A)	EDL	102241 (R)	SD#2	
5542 (A)	SD#1	102242 (A)	SD#2	
5542.5 (R)	SD#1			
5566 (R)	SD#1			
6210.9 (A)	StC			
6808 (A)	StC			
8030 (new)	EDL			
8402 (A)	EDL			
13070.1 (new)	SD#1			
PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE				
610 (new)	EDL			
611 (new)	EDL			
612 (new)	EDL			
613 (new)	EDL			
614 (new)	EDL			
615 (new)	EDL			
616 (new)	EDL			
617 (new)	EDL			
618 (new)	EDL			
619 (new)	EDL			
620 (new)	EDL			
621 (new)	EDL			
622 (new)	EDL	1050 (R)	EDL	
		1051 (R)	EDL	
		1052 (R)	EDL	
		1053 (R)	EDL	
		1054 (R)	EDL	
		4000 (R)	IA	
		4000 (new)	IA	
STREETS & HIGHWAYS CODE				
102 (A)				
103 (R)				
103.5 (A)				
104.1 (R)				
104.2 (R)				
104.3 (R)				
104.7 (R)				
104.15 (A)				
135 (A)				
146.5 (A)				
760 (A)		EDL		
858 (A)		EDL		
869 (A)		EDL		
887.2 (A)		StC		
943 (A)		EDL		
943.1 (R)		EDL		
943.2 (R)		EDL		
943.4 (R)		EDL		
970 (R)		EDL		
1050 (R)		EDL		
1051 (R)		EDL		
1052 (R)		EDL		
1053 (R)		EDL		
1054 (R)		EDL		
4000 (R)		IA		
4000 (new)		IA		

4000.2 (R)	IA	4144 (R)	IA
4000.2 (new)	IA	4145 (R)	IA
4000.5 (R)	IA	4160 (R)	IA
4000.5 (new)	IA	4161 (R)	IA
4000.7 (R)	IA	4162 (R)	IA
4001 (R)	IA	4163 (R)	IA
4001 (new)	IA	4164 (R)	IA
4002 (R)	IA	4165 (R)	IA
4002 (new)	IA	4166 (R)	IA
4003 (R)	IA	4167 (R)	IA
4004 (R)	IA	4168 (R)	IA
4005 (R)	IA	4169 (R)	IA
4006 (R)	IA	4170 (R)	IA
4007 (R)	IA	4185 (R)	IA
4008 (R)	IA	4186 (R)	IA
4008 (new)	IA	4187 (R)	IA
4009 (R)	IA	4188 (R)	IA
4009 (new)	IA	4189 (R)	IA
4010 (R)	IA	4199 (R)	IA
4011 (R)	IA	4200 (R)	IA
4012 (R)	IA	4201 (R)	IA
4013 (R)	IA	4202 (R)	IA
4030 (R)	IA	4203 (R)	IA
4031 (R)	IA	4204 (R)	IA
4032 (R)	IA	4205 (R)	IA
4040 (R)	IA	4206 (R)	IA
4041 (R)	IA	4207 (R)	IA
4042 (R)	IA	4208 (R)	IA
4043 (R)	IA	4209 (R)	IA
4044 (R)	IA	4210 (R)	IA
4050 (R)	IA	4211 (R)	IA
4060 (R)	IA	4211.5 (R)	IA
4061 (R)	IA	4212 (R)	IA
4070 (R)	IA	4213 (R)	IA
4090 (R)	IA	4214 (R)	IA
4090 (new)	IA	4215 (R)	IA
4091 (new)	IA	4216 (R)	IA
4092 (R)	IA	4217 (R)	IA
4093 (R)	IA	4218 (R)	IA
4094 (R)	IA	4219 (R)	IA
4095 (R)	IA	4220 (R)	IA
4096 (R)	IA	4221 (R)	IA
4097 (R)	IA	4222 (R)	IA
4098 (R)	IA	4223 (R)	IA
4099 (R)	IA	4224 (R)	IA
4100 (R)	IA	4230 (R)	IA
4120 (R)	IA	4231 (R)	IA
4121 (R)	IA	4232 (R)	IA
4122 (R)	IA	4233 (R)	IA
4123 (R)	IA	4234 (R)	IA
4124 (R)	IA	4235 (R)	IA
4125 (R)	IA	4236 (R)	IA
4125.5 (R)	IA	4237 (R)	IA
4126 (R)	IA	4238 (R)	IA
4127 (R)	IA	4239 (R)	IA
4128 (R)	IA	4240 (R)	IA
4140 (R)	IA	4241 (R)	IA
4141 (R)	IA	4255 (R)	IA
4142 (R)	IA	4270 (R)	IA
4143 (R)	IA	4271 (R)	IA

4272 (R)	IA	4430 (R)	IA
4273 (R)	IA	4431 (R)	IA
4274 (R)	IA	4432 (R)	IA
4275 (R)	IA	4433 (R)	IA
4276 (R)	IA	4434 (R)	IA
4277 (R)	IA	4435 (R)	IA
4278 (R)	IA	4436 (R)	IA
4279 (R)	IA	4437 (R)	IA
4280 (R)	IA	4438 (R)	IA
4281 (R)	IA	4439 (R)	IA
4282 (R)	IA	4440 (R)	IA
4283 (R)	IA	4441 (R)	IA
4284 (R)	IA	4442 (R)	IA
4284.1 (R)	IA	4443 (R)	IA
4285 (R)	IA	4500 (R)	IA
4286 (R)	IA	4501 (R)	IA
4287 (R)	IA	4502 (R)	IA
4288 (R)	IA	4503 (R)	IA
4289 (R)	IA	4504 (R)	IA
4290 (R)	IA	4505 (R)	IA
4291 (R)	IA	4506 (R)	IA
4292 (R)	IA	4507 (R)	IA
4293 (R)	IA	4508 (R)	IA
4300 (R)	IA	4509 (R)	IA
4301 (R)	IA	4510 (R)	IA
4302 (R)	IA	4511 (R)	IA
4320 (R)	IA	4512 (R)	IA
4321 (R)	IA	4530 (R)	IA
4323 (R)	IA	4531 (R)	IA
4324 (R)	IA	4532 (R)	IA
4325 (R)	IA	4533 (R)	IA
4326 (R)	IA	4534 (R)	IA
4327 (R)	IA	4535 (R)	IA
4340 (R)	IA	4536 (R)	IA
4341 (R)	IA	4550 (R)	IA
4342 (R)	IA	4551 (R)	IA
4343 (R)	IA	4552 (R)	IA
4344 (R)	IA	4553 (R)	IA
4345 (R)	IA	4554 (R)	IA
4346 (R)	IA	4570 (R)	IA
4347 (R)	IA	4571 (R)	IA
4348 (R)	IA	4572 (R)	IA
4349 (R)	IA	4573 (R)	IA
4350 (R)	IA	4574 (R)	IA
4370 (R)	IA	4590 (R)	IA
4371 (R)	IA	4591 (R)	IA
4372 (R)	IA	4592 (R)	IA
4373 (R)	IA	4593 (R)	IA
4390 (R)	IA	4594 (R)	IA
4391 (R)	IA	4610 (R)	IA
4392 (R)	IA	4611 (R)	IA
4393 (R)	IA	4612 (R)	IA
4394 (R)	IA	4613 (R)	IA
4395 (R)	IA	4614 (R)	IA
4396 (R)	IA	4615 (R)	IA
4397 (R)	IA	4616 (R)	IA
4398 (R)	IA	4617 (R)	IA
4399 (R)	IA	4618 (R)	IA
4400 (R)	IA	4630 (R)	IA
4401 (R)	IA	4631 (R)	IA

4632 (R)	IA	6122 (R)	IA
4633 (R)	IA	6123 (R)	IA
4634 (R)	IA	10100.1 (A)	EDL
4635 (R)	IA	10207 (A)	IA
4636 (R)	IA	10600 (A)	IA
4637 (R)	IA	11011 (new)	IA
4650 (R)	IA	11400 (A)	EDL
4651 (R)	IA	25052 (R)	SD#1
4652 (R)	IA	25280 (A)	SD#1
4653 (R)	IA	27166 (A)	SD#1
4654 (R)	IA	30401 (A)	StC
4655 (R)	IA	30402 (A)	StC
4656 (R)	IA	30403 (R)	StC
4657 (R)	IA	30404 (R)	StC
4658 (R)	IA	30405 (R)	StC
4659 (R)	IA	31001 (A)	SD#1
4670 (R)	IA	31002 (R)	SD#1
4671 (R)	IA	31003 (R)	SD#1
4672 (R)	IA	31004 (R)	SD#1
4673 (R)	IA	31201 (A)	SD#1
4674 (R)	IA	31202 (R)	SD#1
4675 (R)	IA	31203 (R)	SD#1
4676 (R)	IA	31204 (R)	SD#1
4677 (R)	IA	31501 (R)	IA
5100 (A)	EDL	31502 (A)	IA
5101 (A)	EDL	31503 (R)	IA
5150.5 (A)	IA	31503 (new)	IA
5661 (A)	EDL	31504 (A)	IA
6000 (R)	IA	31505 (R)	IA
6001 (R)	IA	31505 (new)	IA
6020 (R)	IA	31506 (R)	IA
6021 (R)	IA	31506 (new)	IA
6022 (R)	IA	31507 (R)	IA
6023 (R)	IA	31508 (R)	IA
6040 (R)	IA	31509 (R)	IA
6041 (R)	IA	31510 (R)	IA
6042 (R)	IA	31511 (R)	IA
6043 (R)	IA	31512 (R)	IA
6044 (R)	IA	31513 (R)	IA
6045 (R)	IA	31514 (R)	IA
6046 (R)	IA	31515 (R)	IA
6047 (R)	IA	31517.5 (R)	IA
6048 (R)	IA	31519 (new)	IA
6070 (R)	IA	31530 (R)	IA
6071 (R)	IA	31530.1 (R)	IA
6072 (R)	IA	31531 (R)	IA
6073 (R)	IA	31532 (R)	IA
6074 (R)	IA	31533 (R)	IA
6075 (R)	IA	31534 (R)	IA
6090 (R)	IA	31535 (R)	IA
6091 (R)	IA	31536 (R)	IA
6092 (R)	IA	31537 (R)	IA
6093 (R)	IA	31537.1 (R)	IA
6094 (R)	IA	31537.2 (R)	IA
6095 (R)	IA	31537.3 (R)	IA
6096 (R)	IA	31537.4 (R)	IA
6097 (R)	IA	31538 (R)	IA
6098 (R)	IA	31539 (R)	IA
6120 (R)	IA	31540 (R)	IA
6121 (R)	IA	31541 (R)	IA

31542 (R)	IA	31629 (R)	IA
31543 (R)	IA	31630 (R)	IA
31544 (R)	IA	31631 (R)	IA
31545 (R)	IA	31632 (R)	IA
31546 (R)	IA	31633 (R)	IA
31547 (R)	IA	31634 (R)	IA
31548 (R)	IA	31634.1 (R)	IA
31549 (R)	IA	31635 (R)	IA
31550 (R)	IA	31636 (R)	IA
31551 (R)	IA	31637 (R)	IA
31552(R)	IA	31638 (R)	IA
31553 (R)	IA	31639 (R)	IA
31554 (R)	IA	31640 (R)	IA
31555 (R)	IA	31641 (R)	IA
31556 (R)	IA	31642 (R)	IA
31557 (R)	IA	31670 (R)	IA
31558 (R)	IA	31671 (R)	IA
31559 (R)	IA	31672 (R)	IA
31560 (R)	IA	31673 (R)	IA
31561 (R)	IA	31674 (R)	IA
31562 (R)	IA	31675 (R)	IA
31563 (R)	IA	31676 (R)	IA
31564 (R)	IA	31676.1 (R)	IA
31565 (R)	IA	31677 (R)	IA
31566 (R)	IA	31678 (R)	IA
31567 (R)	IA	31679 (R)	IA
31568 (R)	IA	31680 (R)	IA
31568.1 (R)	IA	31680.1 (R)	IA
31569 (R)	IA	31681 (R)	IA
31569.1 (R)	IA	31682 (R)	IA
31569.2 (R)	IA	31683 (R)	IA
31569.3 (R)	IA	31700 (R)	IA
31569.4 (R)	IA	31701 (R)	IA
31569.5 (R)	IA	31702 (R)	IA
31570 (R)	IA	31703 (R)	IA
31580 (R)	IA	31704 (R)	IA
31580 (new)	IA	31705 (R)	IA
31581 (R)	IA	31706 (R)	IA
31581 (new)	IA	31707 (R)	IA
31582 (R)	IA	31708 (R)	IA
31582 (new)	IA	31709 (R)	IA
31583 (R)	IA	31710 (R)	IA
31584 (R)	IA	31730 (R)	IA
31585 (R)	IA	31731 (R)	IA
31590 (R)	IA	31732 (R)	IA
31591 (R)	IA	31733 (R)	IA
31592 (R)	IA	31734 (R)	IA
31593 (R)	IA	31735 (R)	IA
31593.5 (R)	IA	31736 (R)	IA
31594 (R)	IA	31737 (R)	IA
31595 (R)	IA	31738 (R)	IA
31620 (R)	IA	31739 (R)	IA
31621 (R)	IA	31740 (R)	IA
31622 (R)	IA	31741 (R)	IA
31623 (R)	IA	31742 (R)	IA
31624 (R)	IA	31743 (R)	IA
31625 (R)	IA	31744 (R)	IA
31626 (R)	IA	31745 (R)	IA
31627 (R)	IA	31746 (R)	IA
31628 (R)	IA	31747 (R)	IA

31748 (R)	IA	31044 (R)	SD #1
31749 (R)	IA	31502 (A)	IA
31750 (R)	IA	35625 (R)	SD #1
31781 (A)	IA	35626 (R)	SD #1
31782 (A)	IA	36455.1 (A)	IA
31791 (A)	IA	39061 (R)	SD #1
31792 (A)	IA	43531 (R)	SD #1
31853.5 (R)	IA	43532 (R)	SD #1
31861 (A)	IA	43532.5 (A)	SD #1
31862 (R)	IA	43533 (R)	SD #1
31863 (R)	IA	56100 (A)	IA
31864 (R)	IA	56104 (A)	IA
31867 (R)	IA	60230 (A)	SD #1
31910 (A)	IA	71693 (A)	SD #1
31915 (A)	IA	71694 (A)	SD #1
31932 (R)	IA	74553 (A)	SD #1
35276 (A)	IA	74555 (R)	SD #1
35400 (R)	IA	74900 (A)	IA
35401.5 (R)	IA	7025 (R)	EDL
35402 (A)	IA	7026 (R)	EDL
35402.1 (R)	IA	8304 (A)	StC
35402.3 (A)	IA	8590 (A)	StC
35450 (A)	IA	8590.1 (R)	StC
35469 (A)	IA	8593 (A)	StC
35469.5 (A)	IA	8594 (R)	StC
		8595 (R)	StC
WATER CODE			
250 (A)	StC	11575.1 (R)	StC
251 (R)	StC	11575.2 (R)	StC
251.1 (R)	StC	11580 (A)	StC
252 (A)	StC	11581 (R)	StC
254 (R)	StC	11582 (R)	StC
255 (R)	StC	11583 (R)	StC
256 (R)	StC	11587 (R)	StC
7020 (R)	EDL	22229 (R)	SD #1
7021 (R)	EDL	22425 (A)	SD #1
7022 (R)	EDL	22455 (R)	SD #1
7023 (R)	EDL	22456 (A)	SD #1
7024 (R)	EDL	31040 (A)	SD #1
		31043 (R)	SD #1

STATUTES OTHER THAN CODES

Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1949, Ch. 1275)	
§ 5 (A)	SD #3
§ 28 (R)	SD #5
§ 28.1 (R)	SD #3
Alpine County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1961, Ch. 1896)	
§ 7 (A)	SD #6
§ 19 (R)	SD #5
Amador County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2137)	
§ 3.4 (A)	SD #6
§ 4.9 (R)	SD #5
American River Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1927, Ch. 808)	
§ 2 (A)	SD #4
§ 23 (R)	SD #4
Antelope Valley-East Kern Water Agency Law (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2146)	
§ 61 (A)	SD #7
Bethel Island Municipal Improvement Dist. Act (Stats. 1960, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 22)	
§ 80 (A)	SD #8
Bighorn Mountains Water Agency Law (Stats. 1969, Ch. 1175)	
§ 15 (A)	SD #7
Castaic Lake Water Agency Law (Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 28)	
§ 15 (A)	SD #7
Contra Costa County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1617)	
§ 5 (A)	SD #3
§ 29 (R)	SD #5
Contra Costa County Storm Drainage Dist. Act (Stats. 1953, Ch. 1532)	
§ 5 (A)	SD #8
§ 7 (A)	SD #8
Contra Costa County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1957, Ch. 518)	
§ 10 (A)	SD #6
County Water Authority Act (Stats. 1943, Ch. 545)	
§ 5 (A)	SD #7
Crestline-Lake Arrowhead Water Agency Act (Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 40)	
§ 11 (A)	SD #7
Del Norte County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1955, Ch. 166)	
§ 6 (A)	SD #3
§ 7 (A)	SD #3
§ 30 (R)	SD #5
Desert Water Agency Law (Stats. 1961, Ch. 1069)	
§ 15 (A)	SD #7
Drainage Dist. Act of 1885 (Stats. 1885, Ch. 158)	
§ 19 (R)	SD #8
Drainage Dist. Act of 1903 (Stats. 1903, Ch. 238)	
§ 14 (A)	SD #8
§ 16 (R)	SD #8
Drainage Dist. Act of 1919 (Stats. 1919, Ch. 354)	
§ 22 (A)	SD #8

El Dorado County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2139)	
§ 8 (A)	SD #6
§ 20 (R)	SD #5
Embarcadero Municipal Improvement Dist. Act (Stats. 1960, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 81)	
§ 81 (A)	SD #8
Estero Municipal Improvement Dist. Act (Stats. 1960, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 82)	
§ 81 (A)	SD #8
Fairfield-Suisun Sewer Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 303)	
§ 44 (A)	SD #8
Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1931, Ch. 641)	
§ 7.5 (A)	SD #4
Fresno Metropolitan Flood Control Act (Stats. 1955, Ch. 503)	
§ 8 (A)	SD #3
§ 26 (A)	SD #3
Fresno Metropolitan Transit Dist. Act of 1961 (Stats. 1961, Ch. 1932)	
§ 6.3 (A)	SD #8
Guadalupe Valley Municipal Improvement Dist. Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2037)	
§ 80 (A)	SD #8
Humboldt Bay Harbor, Recreation & Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1970, Ch. 1283)	
§ 30 (A)	SD #8
Humboldt County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1945, Ch. 939)	
§ 6 (A)	SD #3
§ 7 (A)	SD #3
§ 30 (R)	SD #5
Kern County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1961, Ch. 1003)	
§ 3.4 (A)	SD #6
§ 4.9 (R)	SD #5
Kings River Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 931)	
§ 26 (A)	SD #7
Knight's Landing Ridge Drainage Dist. Act (Stats. 1913, Ch. 99)	
§ 5 (A)	SD #8
Lake County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1544)	
§ 5 (A)	SD #3
§ 33 (R)	SD #5
Lake Cuyamaca Recreation & Park Dist. Act (Stats. 1961, Ch. 1654)	
§ 35 (A)	SD #8
Lassen-Modoc County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2127)	
§ 3 (A)	SD #4
Levee dists. (Stats. 1905, Ch. 310)	
§ 15 (A)	SD #8
Los Angeles County Flood Control Act (Stats. 1915, Ch. 755)	
§ 2 (A)	SD #4
§ 16 (A)	SD #4
§ 16-½ (R)	SD #4
§ 16-% (R)	SD #4
§ 16-¾ (R)	SD #4
Madera County Flood Control & Water Conservation Agency Act (Stats. 1969, Ch. 916)	
§ 260 (A)	SD #4
§ 650 (A)	SD #4
§ 651 (R)	SD #5

Marin County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1953, Ch. 666)	
§ 5 (A)	SD#3
§ 28 (R)	SD#5
Mariposa County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2036)	
§ 3.4 (A)	SD#6
§ 4.9 (R)	SD#5
Mendocino County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1949, Ch. 995)	
§ 3 (A)	SD#4
Metropolitan Water Dist. Act (Stats. 1969, Ch. 209)	
§ 141 (A)	SD#8
Mojave Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2146)	
§ 14 (A)	SD#6
Montalvo Municipal Improvement Dist. Act (Stats. 1955, Ch. 549)	
§ 45 (A)	SD#8
Monterey County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1947, Ch. 699)	
§ 5 (A)	SD#3
§ 6 (A)	SD#3
§ 29 (R)	SD#5
Monterey Peninsula Airport Dist. Act (Stats. 1941, Ch. 52)	
§ 3 (A)	SD#8
Mount San Jacinto Winter Park Authority Act (Stats. 1945, Ch. 1040)	
§ 4.8 (A)	SD#8
§ 4.9 (R)	SD#8
Mountain View Shoreline Regional Park Community Act (Stats. 1969, Ch. 1109)	
§ 51 (A)	SD#8
Napa County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1449)	
§ 5 (A)	SD#3
§ 6 (A)	SD#3
§ 29 (R)	SD#5
Nevada County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2122)	
§ 7 (A)	SD#6
§ 19 (R)	SD#5
Orange County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1927, Ch. 723)	
§ 2 (A)	SD#4
§ 16 (A)	SD#4
§ 16.1 (R)	SD#4
Orange County Water Dist. Act (Stats. 1933, Ch. 924)	
§ 2 (A)	SD#7
§ 39 (A)	SD#5
Placer County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1957, Ch. 1234)	
§ 3.4 (A)	SD#6
§ 4.9 (R)	SD#5
Plumas County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2114)	
§ 3 (A)	SD#4
Protection Dist. Act of 1895 (Stats. 1895, Ch. 201)	
§ 6 (A)	SD#8
Protection Dist. Act of 1907 (Stats. 1907, Ch. 25)	
§ 15 (R)	SD#8

Riverside County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1945, Ch. 1122)		
§ 9 (A)	SD #4	
§ 9.2 (R)	SD #4	
§ 35 (R)	SD #5	
Sacramento County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1952, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 10)		
§ 3.4 (A)	SD #6	
§ 4.9 (R)	SD #5	
Sacramento River West Side Levee Dist. Act (Stats. 1915, Ch. 361)		
§ 5 (A)	SD #8	
San Benito County Water Conservation & Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1953, Ch. 1598)		
§ 6 (A)	SD #3	
§ 8 (A)	SD #3	
§ 33 (R)	SD #5	
San Bernardino County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1939, Ch. 73)		
§ 2 (A)	SD #4	
§ 25 (A)	SD #5	
San Diego County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1966, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 55)		
§ 6 (A)	SD #3	
§ 39 (R)	SD #5	
San Diego Unified Port Dist. Act (Stats. 1962, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 67)		
§ 27 (A)	SD #8	
San Gorgonio Pass Water Agency Law (Stats. 1961, Ch. 1435)		
§ 15 (A)	SD #7	
San Joaquin County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1956, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 46)		
§ 5 (A)	SD #3	
§ 33 (R)	SD #5	
San Luis Obispo County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1945, Ch. 1294)		
§ 5 (A)	SD #3	
§ 6 (A)	SD #3	
§ 6.1 (A)	SD #3	
§ 29 (R)	SD #5	
San Mateo County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2108)		
§ 3 (A)	SD #3	
§ 31 (R)	SD #5	
Santa Barbara County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1955, Ch. 1057)		
§ 5 (A)	SD #3	
§ 30 (R)	SD #5	
Santa Barbara County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1945, Ch. 1501)		
§ 3.4 (A)	SD #6	
§ 4.9 (R)	SD #5	
Santa Clara Valley Water Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1405)		
§ 5 (A)	SD #3	
§ 6 (A)	SD #3	
§ 6.1 (R)	SD #3	
§ 29 (R)	SD #5	

Santa Cruz County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1955, Ch. 1489)		
§ 23 (A)	SD #4	
§ 24 (R)	SD #4	
§ 41 (A)	SD #4	
Shasta County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1957, Ch. 1512)		
§ 58 (R)	SD #5	
§ 65 (A)	SD #6	
§ 66 (A)	SD #6	
§ 67 (R)	SD #6	
Sierra County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2123)		
§ 3 (A)	SD #4	
Siskiyou County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2121)		
§ 3 (A)	SD #4	
Solano County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1656)		
§ 3.4 (A)	SD #4	
§ 4.8 (R)	SD #5	
Solvang Municipal Improvement Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1635)		
§ 45 (A)	SD #8	
Sonoma County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1949, Ch. 994)		
§ 3 (A)	SD #4	
Sutter County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2088)		
§ 3.4 (A)	SD #6	
§ 4.9 (R)	SD #5	
Tahoe-Truckee Sanitation Agency Act (Stats. 1971, Ch. 1560)		
§ 141 (A)	SD #8	
Tehama County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1957, Ch. 1280)		
§ 3 (A)	SD #4	
Tulare County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1969, Ch. 1149)		
§ 5 (A)	SD #3	
§ 32 (R)	SD #5	
Tuolumne County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1969, Ch. 1236)		
§ 8 (A)	SD #6	
§ 20 (R)	SD #5	
Vallejo Sanitation & Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1952, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 17)		
§ 2 (A)	SD #8	
§ 23 (R)	SD #8	
Ventura County Flood Control Dist. Act (Stats. 1944, 4th Ex. Sess., Ch. 44)		
§ 7 (A)	SD #4	
§ 29 (A)	SD #5	
Water Conservation Act of 1927 (Stats. 1927, Ch. 91)		
§ 2 (A)	SD #7	
§ 26 (R)	SD #7	
West Bay Rapid Transit Authority Act (Stats. 1964, 1st Ex. Sess., Ch. 104)		
§ 6.6 (A)	SD #8	
Yolo County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. Act (Stats. 1951, Ch. 1657)		
§ 3 (A)	SD #4	
Yuba-Bear River Basin Authority Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 2131)		
§ 8 (A)	SD #6	
§ 19 (R)	SD #5	

Yuba County Water Agency Act (Stats. 1959, Ch. 788)

§ 3.4 (A)	SD #6
§ 4.9 (R)	SD #5

(497-500 blank)

Photoelectronic composition by
CALIFORNIA OFFICE OF STATE PRINTING

vc86042-604 3-74 2M