

Memorandum 96-60

Best Evidence Rule: Revised Staff Draft Recommendation

At its meeting on July 11, 1996, the Commission directed the staff to revise its draft recommendation on the best evidence rule in certain respects. The Commission also decided to solicit input on the special provision for criminal cases from Professor Uelmen, the California District Attorneys Association (CDAA), and the Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office.

Attached is a revised staff draft recommendation, which incorporates the following substantive changes from the version attached to Memorandum 96-53:

(1) In the revised draft, separate statutes govern proof of the content of a writing by an original (Section 1520) and proof of the content of a writing by secondary evidence (Section 1521). The latter statute is denominated the “Secondary Evidence Rule.”

(2) In the revised draft, the special provision for criminal cases (Section 1521(b)) expressly states that its grounds for exclusion are in addition to the grounds for exclusion enumerated in Section 1521(a). In other respects, the special provision for criminal cases is comparable to the first of the two alternatives (Section 1520(c)) suggested in Memorandum 96-53.

(3) The revised draft makes clear that the term “unfair,” which appears in Section 1521(a), has previously been interpreted in the context of Section 1511 (to be repealed) and Federal Rule of Evidence 1003.

(4) Memorandum 96-53 discusses three alternative versions of the statute on oral testimony of the content of a writing: long, short, and intermediate. The revised draft incorporates the intermediate version.

We are awaiting comments from Professor Uelmen, CDAA, and the Los Angeles County District Attorneys Office on Section 1521(b), the special

provision for criminal cases. The staff will supplement this memorandum with any input it receives.

Respectfully submitted,

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#K-501

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

CALIFORNIA LAW REVISION COMMISSION

Revised Staff Draft

RECOMMENDATION

Best Evidence Rule

August 1996

California Law Revision Commission
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Revised Staff Draft

LETTER OF TRANSMITTAL

The best evidence rule (Evidence Code Section 1500) requires use of the original of a writing to prove the content of the writing. This recommendation calls for repeal of the best evidence rule and its exceptions, and adoption of a new rule known as the “Secondary Evidence Rule.” The new rule would make secondary evidence (other than oral testimony) generally admissible to prove the content of a writing, but require courts to exclude such evidence if (1) a genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and justice requires the exclusion, or (2) admission of the secondary evidence would be unfair.

The best evidence rule is unnecessary in a system with broad pretrial discovery. Its intended functions are to guard against fraud and prevent misinterpretation of writings. In civil cases, those functions are satisfactorily served by existing pretrial opportunities to inspect original documents, coupled with the proposed Secondary Evidence Rule and the normal motivation of the parties to present convincing evidence. In criminal cases, discovery is narrower, so the Secondary Evidence Rule would incorporate a limited exception to address that difference.

Because the best evidence rule already has many exceptions, adoption of the Secondary Evidence Rule would not dramatically change existing practice. The reform would, however, simplify the law, avoid difficulties in interpretation, and reduce injustice and waste of resources, including scarce judicial resources.

This recommendation was prepared pursuant to Resolution Chapter 130 of the Statutes of 1965, continued in Resolution Chapter 87 of the Statutes of 1995.

BEST EVIDENCE RULE

INTRODUCTION

The best evidence rule requires use of the original of a writing to prove the content of the writing. The rule developed in the eighteenth century, when pretrial discovery was practically nonexistent and manual copying was the only means of reproducing documents.¹ Commentators questioned the rule and its many exceptions in the 1960s when the California Law Revision Commission developed the Evidence Code, but there were still persuasive justifications for the rule and it was codified in California as Evidence Code Section 1500 and in the Federal Rules of Evidence as Rule 1002.

Since then, broad pretrial discovery has become routine, particularly in civil cases. Technological developments such as the dramatic rise in use of facsimile transmission and electronic communications pose new complications in applying the best evidence rule and its exceptions. The rationale for the rule no longer withstands scrutiny. A simpler doctrine, making secondary evidence other than oral testimony generally admissible to prove the content of a writing, provides sufficient protection in civil cases and, with slight modification, in criminal cases. Because the best evidence rule already has broad exceptions, adoption of the new doctrine would not make a dramatic change in existing practice, but would instead make the law more straightforward, efficient, just, and workable.

THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE AND ITS EXCEPTIONS

As codified in Evidence Code Section 1500, the best evidence rule provides:

1500. Except as otherwise provided by statute, no evidence other than the original of a writing is admissible to prove the content of a writing. This section shall be known and may be cited as the best evidence rule.

The rule pertains only to proof of the content of a “writing,” which is defined broadly to include “handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, and every other means of recording upon any tangible thing any form of communication or representation, including letters, words, pictures, sounds, or symbols, or combinations thereof.”²

1. Note, *The Best Evidence Rule: A Critical Appraisal of the Law in California*, 9 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 257, 258 (1976); see also Cleary & Strong, *The Best Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context*, 51 Iowa L. Rev. 825 (1966). Evidence Code Section 1500 and its predecessors (former Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1855, 1937, 1938) codified a long-standing common law doctrine.

2. Evid. Code § 250. With respect to other types of proof, there is no “best evidence” requirement. “To subject all evidence to the scrutiny of the judge for determination of whether it is the best evidence would unnecessarily disrupt court proceedings and would unduly encumber the party having the burden of proof.” Note, *supra* note 1, at 260; see also McCormick, Evidence 409, 411-12 (1954).

1 There are many statutory exceptions to the rule's requirement that the proponent
2 introduce the original of the writing.³ In particular, duplicates are admissible to the
3 same extent as the original unless "(a) a genuine question is raised as to the
4 authenticity of the original or (b) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit
5 the duplicate in lieu of the original."⁴ Additionally, the best evidence rule does not
6 exclude the following types of evidence:

- 7 • Printed representations of computer information and computer
8 programs.⁵
- 9 • Secondary evidence of writings that have been lost or destroyed without
10 fraudulent intent of the proponent of the evidence.⁶
- 11 • Secondary evidence of unavailable writings.⁷
- 12 • Secondary evidence of writings an opponent has but fails to produce as
13 requested.⁸
- 14 • Secondary evidence of collateral writings that would be inexpedient to
15 produce.⁹
- 16 • Secondary evidence of writings in the custody of a public entity.¹⁰
- 17 • Secondary evidence of writings recorded in public records, if the record
18 or an attested or certified copy is made evidence of the writing by
19 statute.¹¹
- 20 • Secondary evidence of voluminous writings.¹²
- 21 • Copies of writings that were produced at the hearing and made available
22 to the other side.¹³
- 23 • Certain official records and certified copies of writings in official
24 custody.¹⁴
- 25 • Photographic copies made as business records.¹⁵

3. See Evid. Code §§ 1500.5-1566. All further statutory references are to the Evidence Code, unless otherwise indicated.

4. Section 1511. For the definition of "duplicate," see Section 260. For the definition of "original," see Section 255.

5. Section 1500.5.

6. Sections 1501, 1505.

7. Sections 1502, 1505.

8. Sections 1503, 1505.

9. Sections 1504, 1505.

10. Sections 1506, 1508.

11. Sections 1507, 1508.

12. Section 1509.

13. Section 1510.

14. Sections 1530-1532.

15. Section 1550.

- Photographic copies of documents lost or destroyed, if properly certified.¹⁶
- Copies of business records produced in compliance with Sections 1560-1561.¹⁷

The number of these exceptions prompted one commentator to state that “the Best Evidence Rule has been treated by the judiciary and the legislature as an unpleasant fact which must be avoided through constantly increasing and broadening the number of ‘loopholes.’”¹⁸

The Evidence Code has another complexity: In some situations it recognizes degrees of secondary evidence, favoring copies over other types of secondary evidence. Thus, for example, copies of collateral writings are admissible, but oral testimony as to the contents of collateral writings is only admissible if the proponent does not have a copy of the collateral writing.¹⁹ With respect to voluminous writings, however, all types of secondary evidence are treated equally.²⁰

AN ALTERNATIVE: THE SECONDARY EVIDENCE RULE

The best evidence rule, with its many exceptions and emphasis on identifying the original, is not the only possible approach to admissibility of secondary evidence in proving the content of a writing. Commentators have suggested a number of other approaches, including a comparatively simple rule on secondary evidence.²¹ Instead of making secondary evidence presumptively inadmissible to prove the content of a writing, this rule (hereinafter the “Secondary Evidence Rule”) would make such evidence generally admissible. The court would,

16. Section 1551.

17. Sections 1562, 1564, 1566.

18. Taylor, *The Case for Secondary Evidence*, 81 Case & Comment 46, 48 (1976). Many of the exceptions also appear in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 1001-1008.

19. See Sections 1504-1505. For other examples of preference for copies over other types of secondary evidence, see Sections 1505-1508. In contrast, there is essentially no hierarchy of secondary evidence in the Federal Rules of Evidence. See Fed. R. Evid. 1001-1008.

20. Section 1509.

21. The rule discussed in the text is suggested in Note, *supra* note 1, at 282-83. Other proposed approaches include:

(1) Professor Broun’s proposal, which would allow the court “to require the party seeking to offer secondary evidence of the contents of a writing to produce the original writing for inspection, if it is under his control, or to state his reasons for not producing it.” Broun, *Authentication and Contents of Writings*, 1969 Law & Soc. Ord. 611, 617.

(2) Dean Wigmore’s approach, under which “[p]roduction of the original may be dispensed with, in the trial court’s discretion, whenever in the case in hand the opponent does not bona fide dispute the contents of the document and no other useful purpose will be served by requiring production.” 4 J. Wigmore, *Evidence in Trials at Common Law* 434 (J. Chadbourn ed. 1972).

(3) Making secondary evidence of the content of a writing equally admissible to an original of the writing. See Taylor, *supra* note 18, at 48-49.

1 however, be required to exclude secondary evidence if it finds that either (1) a
2 genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and justice requires
3 the exclusion, or (2) admission of the secondary evidence would be unfair.

4 A variant on the Secondary Evidence Rule would make the rule inapplicable to
5 oral testimony of the content of a writing. Because such testimony is subject to the
6 vagaries of perception and memory, it would remain generally inadmissible to
7 prove the content of a writing.

8 In light of the broad exceptions to the best evidence rule, this variant of the
9 Secondary Evidence Rule would not amount to a major change in existing
10 practice. In fact, the approach essentially already applies to duplicates.²² It would,
11 however, be a simpler and more straightforward doctrine than the complex best
12 evidence rule. Meaningfully comparing this approach with the best evidence rule
13 requires examination of the rationale for the best evidence rule.

14 RATIONALE FOR THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE

15 Section 1500 and most of its current exceptions were enacted in 1965 as part of
16 the Evidence Code drafted by the Law Revision Commission.²³ Since then, there
17 has been rapid technological change, including a sharp rise in use of photocopies
18 and electronic communications. There have also been expansions in the breadth
19 and the use of pretrial discovery. These developments prompted the Commission
20 to review the continued utility of the best evidence rule.

21 There are two prevalent arguments for the rule: preventing fraud and guarding
22 against misinterpretation of writings.

23 **Fraud Deterrence**

24 Some courts and commentators maintain that the best evidence rule guards
25 against incomplete or fraudulent proof.²⁴ The underlying assumption is that an
26 original writing is less susceptible to fraudulent alteration than a copy of the

22. See Section 1511. See also Rule 1003 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Cases interpreting those statutes would be a source of guidance in applying the Secondary Evidence Rule. *See, e.g.*, *United States v. Sinclair*, 74 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 1996) (admitting copies of expense account reports was not unfair); *Ruberto v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 774 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1985) (tax court did not err in excluding photocopies of canceled checks, “since problems in matching the copies of the backs of the checks with copies of the fronts made them somewhat suspect”); *Amoco Production Co. v. United States*, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir. 1980) (approving trial court’s determination that “admission of the file copy would be unfair because the most critical part of the original conformed copy ... is not completely reproduced in the ‘duplicate’”); *People v. Garcia*, 201 Cal. App. 3d 324, 330, 247 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1988) (claim of unfairness “must be based on substance, not mere speculation that the original might contain some relevant difference”).

23. 1965 Cal. Stat. ch. 299, § 2. For the Commission’s recommendation proposing the Evidence Code, see *Recommendation Proposing an Evidence Code*, 7 Cal. L. Revision Comm’n Reports 1 (1965).

24. *See, e.g.*, 5 J. Weinstein, M. Berger & J. McLaughlin, Weinstein’s Evidence 1002-6 (hereinafter Weinstein’s Evidence); *see also* Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 826-28.

1 writing or oral testimony about the writing. By excluding secondary evidence and
2 admitting only originals, the best evidence rule is said to reduce fraud.

3 If the purpose of the best evidence rule is to prevent fraud, however, it is poorly
4 tailored. There are situations in which the rule is inapplicable yet ought to apply if
5 it is intended to deter fraud. For example, the rule only applies to proof of the
6 content of writings, but the fraud rationale extends to proof of other matters as
7 well. Likewise, there are situations in which the rule applies yet ought not to apply
8 if the goal is fraud deterrence, such as where the honesty of the proponent is not in
9 question.²⁵

10 The fraud rationale is also undercut by the reality that even where the best
11 evidence rule applies it may often be ineffective to prevent fraud. Litigants
12 determined to introduce fabricated secondary evidence are unlikely to have qualms
13 about manufacturing an excuse satisfying one of the rule's exceptions.²⁶

14 For these reasons, fraud prevention is not the leading modern rationale for the
15 best evidence rule. The Official Comment to Section 1500 does not even mention
16 the fraud rationale.²⁷

17 Still, no means of fraud control is perfect. Although the best evidence rule may
18 be poorly tailored and often ineffective as a fraud deterrent, it may help prevent
19 fraud to some extent.

20 That degree of protection would justify the rule, but not if there is another means
21 of achieving a similar effect. The mandatory exceptions to the Secondary Evidence
22 Rule are directed to that end.

23 **Minimizing Misinterpretation of Writings**

24 The rationale given in the Official Comment to Evidence Code Section 1500 is
25 that the best evidence rule is “designed to minimize the possibilities of
26 misinterpretation of writings by requiring the production of the original writings
27 themselves, if available.” Underlying this rationale are several concepts:

25. See Wigmore, *supra* note 21, at 417-19; see also Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 826-27.

26. Professors Cleary and Strong explain that where “fraud is actually contemplated through the use of fabricated or distorted secondary evidence,” it is unlikely

that any litigant not in control of the original of a document would put himself in the position of introducing false or inaccurate testimony as to the terms of a document, or a false or inaccurate copy, only to be confounded by the adversary's production of the original. A litigant in possession of an original and totally bent on fraud might of course avert the above risk by failing to disclose the original on discovery and proceeding to introduce false or distorted secondary evidence with relative impunity. It may be noted, however, that the best evidence rule itself provides no absolute protection against this species of attempted fraud. The litigant determined to introduce fabricated secondary evidence can hardly be expected to stick at manufacturing an excuse sufficient to procure its admission under one of the numerous currently recognized exceptions to the best evidence rule.

Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 847; see also Note, *supra* note 1, at 259.

27. See also *Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.*, 808 F.2d 1316, 1319 (9th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 484 U.S. 826 (1987).

- 1 • In litigation, the exact words of a writing are often especially important,
2 particularly with regard to contracts, wills, and other such instruments.
3 The exact words of a document may be easier to discern from an original
4 than from secondary evidence.
- 5 • An original document may provide clues to interpretation not present on
6 copies or other secondary evidence, such as the presence of staple holes
7 or the color of ink.
- 8 • Secondary evidence of the contents of a document, such as copies and
9 oral testimony, may not faithfully reflect the original. Memories are
10 fallible and copying techniques are imperfect.²⁸

11 Preventing misinterpretation of writings is an important goal. Yet modern
12 expansion of the breadth of discovery undermines it as a rationale for the best
13 evidence rule. When litigants are able to examine original documents in discovery,
14 they can discern inaccuracies and fraudulent tampering before trial, rather than
15 unearthing such problems through the best evidence rule in the midst of trial.²⁹

16 Professors Cleary and Strong, leading proponents of the best evidence rule,
17 acknowledged in 1966 that increases in the breadth of discovery diminished the
18 rule's significance.³⁰ Nonetheless, they maintained that the rule continued to
19 operate usefully in certain areas.³¹ In particular, they and others focused on the
20 following contexts:

21 *Unanticipated documents and unanticipated use of known documents.* Exhaustive
22 discovery is not always reasonable discovery, and reasonable discovery may fail to
23 disclose all relevant documents or focus attention on all possible uses of those
24 documents. Thus, even with broad pretrial discovery, a litigant may on occasion
25 confront an opponent with an unanticipated document at trial, or an unexpected
26 emphasis on a known document. In such circumstances, the best evidence rule
27 may force production of an original that might otherwise be withheld in favor of
28 secondary evidence.³²

29 Still, today there is relatively little likelihood that a diligent civil litigant will be
30 confronted with a significant unanticipated document at trial. Although broad
31 pretrial discovery was a relatively new phenomenon when Professors Cleary and
32 Strong championed the best evidence rule, it is now so routine that litigants are
33 almost always quite familiar with the critical documents by the time of trial.

34 If a key document does surface for the first time at trial, it may be admissible
35 under an exception to the best evidence rule. Even if the best evidence rule
36 requires use of the original, in many such instances no benefit will flow from use

28. See Weinstein's Evidence, *supra* note 24, at 1002-6; Note, *supra* note 1, at 258-59.

29. Note, *supra* note 1, at 258, 279; see also Broun, *supra* note 21, at 617-18.

30. Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 837.

31. *Id.* at 847.

32. *Id.* at 839-40; see also 5 D. Louisell & C. Mueller, Federal Evidence 394 (1981).

1 of the original as opposed to secondary evidence. Only in a tiny subset of cases
2 involving unanticipated documents, or unanticipated use of known documents,
3 will the best evidence rule be of any use.³³

4 Those situations could also be addressed through application of the Secondary
5 Evidence Rule. For instance, attempted use of a writing in a manner that could not
6 reasonably have been anticipated would be a factor for the court to consider in
7 applying the rule's mandatory exceptions.

8 *Documents outside the jurisdiction.* Some authorities claim that the best evidence
9 rule is useful with regard to documents beyond the court's jurisdiction.³⁴
10 Professors Cleary and Strong observed, however, that the rule is largely ineffective
11 to obtain production of original writings in the control of persons beyond the
12 court's jurisdiction.³⁵ Instead, courts commonly find that such evidence falls
13 within one or more of the rule's exceptions.³⁶ For example, Section 1502
14 specifically directs that a copy "is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule
15 if the writing was not reasonably procurable by the proponent by use of the court's
16 process or by other available means." In light of this exception, there may not be
17 any cases, much less a significant number of such cases, in which the rule excludes
18 secondary evidence of the contents of documents outside the jurisdiction.³⁷ Any
19 such instances could also be addressed by the unfairness exception to the
20 Secondary Evidence Rule.

21 *Criminal cases.* When the best evidence rule was codified in the 1960s,
22 proponents of the rule maintained that it was important in criminal cases, because
23 opportunities for pretrial discovery in those cases were more limited than in civil
24 cases.³⁸ The scope of pretrial discovery in criminal cases has expanded greatly
25 since that time, although it remains narrower than in civil cases.³⁹

26 Thus, even in the criminal context the continued utility of the best evidence rule
27 is questionable.⁴⁰ With an extra exception to account for the limits on discovery in
28 criminal cases, the Secondary Evidence Rule would provide similar protection
29 against fraud and misinterpretation of writings. Specifically, the mandatory
30 exception for criminal cases would, with limitations, condition use of secondary

33. See Broun, *supra* note 21, at 616, 618-19.

34. See, e.g., Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1001 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

35. Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 844.

36. *Id.*

37. *Cf.* Broun, *supra* note 21, at 618 (documents outside the jurisdiction do not justify federal version of the best evidence rule).

38. See Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 844-45; Advisory Committee Note to Rule 1001 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.

39. See Penal Code §§ 1054.1, 1054.3; *Izazaga v. Superior Court*, 54 Cal. 3d 356, 372, 377, 815 P.2d 304, 285 Cal. Rptr. 231 (1991); *People v. Jackson*, 15 Cal. App. 4th 1197, 1201, 19 Cal. Rptr. 2d 80 (1993).

40. *Cf.* Broun, *supra* note 21, at 619 (arguing that the best evidence rule was unnecessary under the then-existing federal discovery scheme).

evidence on making the original reasonably available if the proponent has it. That would discourage use of any misleading secondary evidence.

OTHER SAFEGUARDS AGAINST FRAUD AND MISINTERPRETATION

The best evidence rule is not the only protection against fraud and misinterpretation of writings, nor even the only incentive for litigants to use original documents. Rather, there is also the normal motivation of the parties to present the most convincing evidence in support of their cases. If a litigant inexplicably proffers secondary evidence instead of an original, the trier of fact is likely to discount the probative value of the evidence, particularly if opposing counsel draws attention to the point in cross-examination or closing argument.⁴¹ Indeed, Section 412 specifically directs: “If weaker and less satisfactory evidence is offered when it was within the power of the party to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust.”

Additionally, Section 352 gives the court discretion to exclude evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the issues, or of misleading the jury.” In some cases, Section 352 may serve as a basis for excluding unreliable secondary evidence.⁴²

COSTS OF THE BEST EVIDENCE RULE

Commentators have pointed out significant costs of the best evidence rule.⁴³ For example, Professor Broun stated in 1969 that the rule

has produced and will continue to produce ... results that not only waste precious judicial time but that are clearly unjust. While the rule ostensibly protects against fraud and inaccuracy, it has been blindly applied as a technical hurdle that must be overcome if documentary evidence is to be admitted, despite the fact that fraud or inaccuracy are but minute possibilities in the particular case. The single valuable function of the rule — that is, to insure that the original of a writing is available for inspection so that its genuineness and the accuracy of secondary evidence with regard to it can be tested under the scrutiny of the adversary system — is often ignored in favor of a rigid application of the exclusionary feature of the rule. Thus, exclusion may be required under the rule even though the party opposing the document has had adequate opportunity to scrutinize the original writing, and even though that party could himself have introduced

41. Note, *supra* note 1, at 282; *see also* Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 846-47.

42. *See* Taylor, *supra* note 18, at 48-49.

43. *See* Broun, *supra* note 21, at 611-24; Note, *supra* note 1, at 258, 279-80, 283; J. Wigmore, *supra* note 21, at 434-35; Taylor, *supra* note 18, at 48-49; Note, *Best Evidence Rule — The Law in Oregon*, 41 Ore. L. Rev. 138, 153 (1962).

1 the original if he had any question as to either its genuineness or the
2 accuracy of the secondary evidence introduced by his opponent.⁴⁴

3 Similarly, Wigmore commented that the best evidence rule

4 sound at core as it is, tends to become encased in a stiff bark of rigidity.
5 Thousands of times it is enforced needlessly. Hundreds of appeals are
6 made upon nice points of its detailed application which bear no relation at
7 all to the truth of the case at bar. For this reason the whole rule is in an
8 unhealthy state. The most repugnant features of technicalism ... are
9 illustrated in this part of the law of evidence.⁴⁵

10 These remarks may overstate the detriments of the best evidence rule, but it is
11 clear that the rule is complicated and presents difficulties in determining points
12 such as: When is an object with words on it a “writing” within the meaning of the
13 rule? When is a litigant seeking to prove the content of a writing? What is the
14 “original” of a writing?⁴⁶ Advances in technology, such as fax machines,
15 electronic mail systems, and computer networks, pose new possibilities for
16 confusion and inconsistencies in application of the best evidence rule.⁴⁷ These
17 complexities may trap inexperienced litigators and, regardless of the experience of
18 counsel, may lead to disputes over application of the best evidence rule.

44. Broun, *supra* note 21, at 611-12. Professor Broun supported his points with case illustrations and identified issues that posed problems in applying the rule. *See id.* at 620-24.

45. J. Wigmore, *supra* note 21, at 435.

46. *See, e.g.,* United States v. Jones, 958 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1992) (IRS transcript of 1982 tax liability was admissible because it was not being offered to prove content of 1982 tax return); Doe v. United States, 805 F. Supp. 1513, 1517 (D. Hawaii 1992) (best evidence rule inapplicable because computer records were offered to prove HIV test results, not content of writing); People v. Bizieff, 226 Cal. App. 3d 1689, 1696-98, 277 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1991) (credit card was the original, credit card receipt was not a duplicate, best evidence rule did not preclude oral testimony of name on credit card); People v. Mastin, 115 Cal. App. 3d 978, 982-86, 171 Cal. Rptr. 780 (1981) (applicability of best evidence rule to inscribed chattels); B. Jefferson, California Evidence Benchbook §§ 31.1-31.7 (2nd ed. 1982 & Supp. June 1990); J. Weinstein, J. Mansfield, N. Abrams & M. Berger, Cases & Materials on Evidence 211-40 (8th ed. 1988).

47. For example, if a document is downloaded from a computer network, is the downloaded information an “original” or an admissible “duplicate?” What about a printout of that information? Is the answer different if the document is converted from one word processing system to another? What if formatting adjustments are made, such as changes in page width, pagination, paragraph spacing, font size, or font? Is the answer different for a pagination change in a document with internal page references than for a pagination change in a document lacking such references? Is the answer different if the change is from Courier font (abcd) to Monaco (abcd), rather than from Courier to Zapf Dingbats (****)?

Similarly, suppose a document is prepared on a computer and faxed directly from the computer without making a printout. What is the “original” of the document? Is the answer the same as for a document that is printed from a computer and then faxed? What if a document is printed from a computer, signed manually, and then faxed? Does the best evidence rule apply differently if a digital, rather than manual, signature is attached and the same document is faxed directly from the computer without ever being printed out?

For additional discussion along these lines, see Letter from Gerald H. Genard to California Law Revision Commission (May, 4, 1994) (attached to Memorandum 95-34, on file with California Law Revision Commission) (expressing uncertainty regarding application of the best evidence doctrine to faxes and digital signatures). See also AB 2897, as amended July 3, 1996, which would create a best evidence rule exception for images stored on video or digital media.

1 In some cases, the result may be exclusion of reliable evidence, injustice, and
2 reversal on appeal followed by a costly retrial.⁴⁸ More often, the trial court may
3 resolve the dispute correctly, but only after it and the parties devote scarce
4 resources to determining fine points of the best evidence rule, which may have to
5 be relitigated on appeal at further expense.⁴⁹ Waste may also occur in a third way:
6 To preclude a best evidence objection, a litigant may expend effort tracking down
7 the original of a writing, even though secondary evidence of the writing may be
8 easier to obtain and equally valuable in the pursuit of justice.

9 The Secondary Evidence Rule would not differ dramatically in content, but
10 would help alleviate these problems. It is a simpler, more straightforward doctrine
11 than the best evidence rule, so it should be easier for courts and litigants to apply.
12 The doctrine also de-emphasizes the form of the writing (whether it is an original
13 or secondary evidence) and properly focuses on the genuineness of secondary
14 evidence and fairness of using it. By directing attention to substance rather than
15 technicalities, the rule would help eliminate unnecessary disputes and occasional
16 injustice.

17 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION

18 The best evidence rule is an anachronism. In yesterday's world of manual
19 copying and limited pretrial discovery, it served as a safeguard against misleading
20 use of secondary evidence. Under contemporary circumstances, in which high
21 quality photocopies are standard and litigants have broad opportunities for pretrial
22 inspection of original documents, the best evidence rule is no longer necessary to
23 protect against unreliable secondary evidence. Because the rule's costs now
24 outweigh its benefits, the Law Revision Commission recommends that it be
25 repealed.

26 In general, normal motivations to present convincing evidence deter use of
27 unreliable secondary evidence. To further protect against misinterpretation of
28 writings, the best evidence rule and its numerous exceptions should be replaced
29 with the comparatively simple Secondary Evidence Rule.⁵⁰ Rather than making
30 secondary evidence presumptively inadmissible to prove the content of a writing,

48. For examples of cases reversed on best evidence grounds, see *Moretti v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 77 F.3d 637, 645 (2d Cir. 1996) (exclusion of xerox copies without affording opportunity to establish best evidence exception was erroneous); *Amoco Production Co. v. United States*, 619 F.2d 1383, 1389-91 (10th Cir. 1980) (trial court erred in ruling that "the availability of a properly recorded version of the 1942 deed precluded admission of any other evidence of the contents of the deed"); *Brown for Brown v. Bowen*, 668 F. Supp. 146 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) ("The ALJ incorrectly applied a rigid evidentiary rule of exclusion by requiring that the 'best evidence' of the acknowledgment, the original document, be produced").

49. See, e.g., *People v. Atkins*, 210 Cal. App. 3d 47, 53-55, 258 Cal. Rptr. 113 (1989) (upholding trial court ruling that photostatic copies of certain documents were admissible); *People v. Garcia*, 201 Cal. App. 3d 324, 27-330, 247 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1988) (upholding trial court ruling that photo of sketch of suspect was admissible).

50. Note, *supra* note 1, at 282-83.

1 the new rule makes such evidence admissible, but requires the court to exclude
2 secondary evidence if it finds that either (1) a genuine dispute exists concerning
3 material terms of the writing and justice requires the exclusion, or (2) admission of
4 the secondary evidence would be unfair.

5 The Secondary Evidence Rule would not apply to oral testimony of the content
6 of a writing. Such evidence is less reliable than other types of secondary
7 evidence.⁵¹ To safeguard the truth-seeking process, the proposed legislation would
8 preserve existing law making oral testimony generally inadmissible to prove the
9 contents of a writing.

10 The proposed legislation also incorporates an exception to the Secondary
11 Evidence Rule to account for limitations on discovery in criminal cases.
12 Specifically, if the proponent of secondary evidence in a criminal case has
13 possession of the original, secondary evidence would generally be admissible only
14 if the proponent made the original reasonably available for inspection.

51. See, e.g., Note, *supra* note 1, at 258-59; Cleary & Strong, *supra* note 1, at 828-29.

PROPOSED LEGISLATION

Evid. Code §§ 1500-1511 (repealed). Best Evidence Rule

SECTION 1. Article 1 (commencing with Section 1500) of Chapter 2 of Division 11 of the Evidence Code is repealed.

Note. The text of Sections 1500-1511 is set out *infra*. See material under “Comments to Repealed Sections.”

Evid. Code §§ 1520-1523 (added). Proof of the Content of a Writing

SEC. 2. Article 1 (commencing with Section 1520) is added to Chapter 2 of Division 11 of the Evidence Code, to read:

Article 1. Proof of the Content of a Writing

§ 1520. Proof of the content of a writing by an original

1520. The content of a writing may be proved by an original of the writing that is otherwise admissible.

Comment. Section 1520 continues former Section 1500 insofar as it permitted proof of the content of a writing by an original of the writing. See also Sections 1521 (Secondary Evidence Rule), 1522 (oral testimony of the content of a writing).

§ 1521. Proof of the content of a writing by secondary evidence (Secondary Evidence Rule)

1521. (a) The content of a writing may be proved by secondary evidence of the writing that is otherwise admissible. The court shall exclude secondary evidence of the content of a writing if the court finds either of the following:

(1) A genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and justice requires the exclusion.

(2) Admission of the secondary evidence would be unfair.

(b) In addition to the grounds for exclusion authorized by subdivision (a), in a criminal action the court shall exclude secondary evidence of the content of a writing, other than a duplicate as defined in Section 260, if it is closely related to the controlling issues and the court finds both of the following:

(1) The original is in the proponent’s possession, custody, or control.

(2) The proponent has not made the original reasonably available for inspection at or before trial.

(c) Nothing in this section makes admissible oral testimony to prove the content of a writing if the testimony is inadmissible under Section 1522.

(d) Nothing in this section excuses compliance with Section 1401 (authentication).

(e) This section shall be known as the “Secondary Evidence Rule.”

Comment. Sections 1520 (proof of the content of a writing by an original), 1521 (Secondary Evidence Rule), and Section 1522 (oral testimony of the content of a writing) replace the best evidence rule and its exceptions. For background, see *Best Evidence Rule*, ___ Cal. L. Revision

Comm'n Reports __ (199__). Because of the breadth of the exceptions to the best evidence rule, this reform is not a major departure from former law but primarily a matter of clarification and simplification. Discovery principles remain unchanged.

Subdivision (a) makes secondary evidence generally admissible to prove the content of a writing. The nature of the evidence offered affects its weight, not its admissibility. The normal motivation of parties to support their cases with convincing evidence is a deterrent to introduction of unreliable secondary evidence. See also Section 412 (if a party offers weaker and less satisfactory evidence despite ability to produce stronger and more satisfactory evidence, the evidence offered should be viewed with distrust).

The mandatory exceptions set forth in subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2) provide further protection against unreliable secondary evidence. Those exceptions are modeled on the exceptions to former Section 1511 and to Rule 1003 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Cases interpreting those statutes provide guidance in applying subdivisions (a)(1) and (a)(2). *See, e.g.,* United States v. Sinclair, 74 F.3d 753, 760 (7th Cir. 1996) (admitting copies of expense account reports was not unfair); *Ruberto v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue*, 774 F.2d 61, 64 (2d Cir. 1985) (tax court did not err in excluding photocopies of canceled checks, "since problems in matching the copies of the backs of the checks with copies of the fronts made them somewhat suspect"); *Amoco Production Co. v. United States*, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir. 1980) (upholding trial court's determination that "admission of the file copy would be unfair because the most critical part of the original conformed copy ... is not completely reproduced in the 'duplicate'"); *People v. Garcia*, 201 Cal. App. 3d 324, 330, 247 Cal. Rptr. 94 (1988) (claim of unfairness "must be based on substance, not mere speculation that the original might contain some relevant difference"). Courts may consider a broad range of factors, for example: (1) whether the proponent attempts to use the writing in a manner that could not reasonably have been anticipated, (2) whether the original was suppressed in discovery, (3) whether discovery conducted in a reasonably diligent (as opposed to exhaustive) manner failed to result in production of the original, (4) whether there are dramatic differences between the original and the secondary evidence (e.g., the original but not the secondary evidence is in color and the colors provide significant clues to interpretation), (5) whether the original is unavailable and, if so, why, and (6) whether the writing is central to the case or collateral.

Subdivision (b) sets forth a mandatory exception applicable only in criminal cases, which are governed by narrower discovery rules than civil cases. See Section 130 ("criminal action" includes criminal proceedings). See also Penal Code §§ 1054-1054.7 (discovery in criminal cases). Subdivision (b) does not expand discovery obligations, it simply conditions use of secondary evidence on making the original reasonably available for inspection if the proponent has it. The requirement does not apply to collateral secondary evidence or duplicates (see Section 260). These limitations are drawn from former Sections 1504 and 1511, respectively.

In determining whether the proponent of secondary evidence made the original "reasonably available," the court should examine specific circumstances, such as the time, place, and manner of allowing inspection. The concept is fluid, not rigid. For example, making the original available moments before using secondary evidence may in general suffice if a defendant is rebutting a surprise contention, but not if the prosecution is presenting its case in chief. Similarly, what constitutes reasonable access to computer evidence may vary from system to system.

Subdivision (d) makes clear that like other evidence, secondary evidence is admissible only if it is properly authenticated. Under Section 1401, the proponent must not only authenticate the original writing, but must also establish that the proffered evidence is secondary evidence of the original. *See* B. Jefferson, *Jefferson's Synopsis of California Evidence Law*, § 30.1, at 470-71 (1985).

§ 1522. Oral testimony of the content of a writing

1522. (a) Except as otherwise provided by statute, oral testimony is not admissible to prove the content of a writing.

(b) Oral testimony of the content of a writing is not made inadmissible by subdivision (a) if the proponent does not have possession or control of a copy of the writing and the original is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the proponent of the evidence.

(c) Oral testimony of the content of a writing is not made inadmissible by subdivision (a) if the proponent does not have possession or control of the original or a copy of the writing and any of the following conditions is satisfied:

(1) Neither the writing nor a copy of the writing was reasonably procurable by the proponent by use of the court's process or by other available means.

(2) The writing is not closely related to the controlling issues and it would be inexpedient to require its production.

(d) Oral testimony of the content of a writing is not made inadmissible by subdivision (a) if the writing consists of numerous accounts or other writings that cannot be examined in court without great loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of the whole.

Comment. Section 1522 preserves former law regarding the admissibility of oral testimony to prove the content of a writing. See former Sections 1500, 1501-1509.

Subdivision (a) is based on an assumption that oral testimony as to the content of a writing is typically less reliable than other proof of the content of a writing. For background, see *Best Evidence Rule*, __ Cal. L. Revision Comm'n Reports __ (199_).

Subdivision (b) continues former Sections 1501 and 1505 without substantive change as to oral testimony of the content of a writing that is lost or has been destroyed.

Subdivision (c)(1) continues former Sections 1502 and 1505 without substantive change as to oral testimony of the content of a writing that was not reasonably procurable. In effect, subdivision (c)(1) also continues former Sections 1503 and 1505 without substantive change as to oral testimony of the content of a writing that the opponent has but fails to produce at the hearing despite being expressly or impliedly notified that it would be needed. Under such circumstances, the writing was not reasonably procurable. Finally, subdivision (c)(1) continues former Sections 1506-1508 without substantive change as to oral testimony of the content of a writing where: (1) the writing is in the custody of a public entity and the proponent could not have obtained it or a copy of it in the exercise of reasonable diligence, or (2) the writing has been recorded in the public records, the record or a certified copy of the writing is made evidence of the writing by statute, and the proponent could not have obtained it or a copy of it in the exercise of reasonable diligence. Subdivision (c)(2) continues former Sections 1504 and 1505 as to oral testimony of the content of a collateral writing.

Subdivision (d) continues former Section 1509 without substantive change as to oral testimony.

§ 1523. Requests for exclusion of secondary evidence in criminal actions

1523. In a criminal action, a request to exclude secondary evidence of the content of a writing shall not be made in the presence of the jury.

Comment. Section 1523 continues the requirement of the second sentence of former Section 1503(a), but applies it to all requests for exclusion of secondary evidence in criminal trials. See Section 130 ("criminal action" includes criminal proceedings).

Heading of Article 3 (commencing with Section 1550) (amended)

SEC. 3. The heading of Article 3 (commencing with Section 1550) of Chapter 2 of Division 11 of the Evidence Code is amended, to read:

Article 3. Photographic Copies and Printed Representations of Writings

Comment. The article heading is amended to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule and the addition of Section 1552 to this article. See Comments to Section 1521 and former Section 1500.5.

Evid. Code § 1552 (added). Computer printouts

SEC. 4. Section 1552 is added to the Evidence Code, to read:

1552. A printed representation of computer information or a computer program is presumed to be an accurate representation of the computer information or computer program that it purports to represent. This presumption is a presumption affecting the burden of producing evidence. If a party to an action introduces evidence that a printed representation of computer information or computer program is inaccurate or unreliable, the party introducing the printed representation into evidence has the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the printed representation is an accurate representation of the existence and content of the computer information or computer program that it purports to represent.

Comment. Section 1552 continues without substantive change the second, third, and fourth sentences of the second paragraph of former Section 1500.5, except that the reference to “best available evidence” is changed to “an accurate representation,” due to the replacement of the best evidence rule with the Secondary Evidence Rule. See Section 1521 Comment. See also Section 255 (accurate printout of computer data is an “original”).

Pen. Code § 872.5 (repealed). Best evidence rule in preliminary examinations

SEC. 5. Section 872.5 of the Penal Code is repealed.

~~872.5. The best evidence rule shall not apply to preliminary examinations.~~

Comment. Former Section 872.5 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule and adoption of the Secondary Evidence Rule. See Evid. Code §§ 1520-1523 & Comments. See also new Section 872.5.

Pen. Code § 872.5 (added). Secondary evidence in preliminary examinations

SEC. 6. Section 872.5 is added to the Penal Code, to read:

872.5. Notwithstanding Article 1 (commencing with Section 1520) of Chapter 2 of Division 11 of the Evidence Code, in a preliminary examination the content of a writing may be proved by an original of the writing that is otherwise admissible or by secondary evidence of the writing that is otherwise admissible.

Comment. Section 872.5 is added to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule and adoption of the Secondary Evidence Rule. See Evid. Code §§ 1520-1523 & Comments. See also former section 872.5.

Pen. Code § 1417.7 (amended). Photographic records of exhibits

SEC. 7. Section 1417.7 of the Penal Code is amended, to read:

1417.7. Not less than 15 days before any proposed disposition of an exhibit pursuant to Section 1417.3, 1417.5, or 1417.6, the court shall notify the district

attorney (or other prosecuting attorney), the attorney of record for each party, and each party who is not represented by counsel of the proposed disposition. Before the disposition, any party, at his or her own expense, may cause to be prepared a photographic record of all or part of the exhibit by a person who is not a party or attorney of a party. The clerk of the court shall observe the taking of the photographic record and, upon receipt of a declaration of the person making the photographic record that the copy and negative of the photograph delivered to the clerk is a true, unaltered, and unretouched print of the photographic record taken in the presence of the clerk and, the clerk shall certify the photographic record as such without charge and retain it unaltered for a period of 60 days following the final determination of the criminal action or proceeding. A certified photographic record of exhibits ~~shall be deemed a certified copy of a writing in official custody pursuant to Section 1507~~ shall not be deemed inadmissible pursuant to Section 1521 of the Evidence Code.

Comment. Section 1417.7 is amended to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule and the adoption of the Secondary Evidence Rule. See Evid. Code §§ 1520-1523 & Comments. Section 1417.7 is also amended to make technical changes.

Uncodified (added). Operative date

SEC. 8. (a) This act is operative on January 1, 1998.

(b) This act applies in an action or proceeding commenced before, on, or after January 1, 1998.

(c) Nothing in this act invalidates an evidentiary determination made before January 1, 1998, excluding evidence pursuant to Sections 1500-1511 of the Evidence Code. However, if an action or proceeding is pending on January 1, 1998, the proponent of evidence excluded pursuant to Sections 1500-1511 may, on or after January 1, 1998, and before entry of judgment in the action or proceeding, make a new request for admission of the evidence on the basis of this act.

COMMENTS TO REPEALED SECTIONS

Evid. Code §§ 1500-1511 (repealed). Best evidence rule

Note. Sections 1500-1511 are set out below for reference purposes, with proposed Comments.

Article 1. Best Evidence Rule

Comment. The best evidence rule is repealed and replaced with the Secondary Evidence Rule, under which secondary evidence other than oral testimony is generally admissible to prove the content of a writing, but the court must exclude secondary evidence if it finds that (1) a genuine dispute exists concerning material terms of the writing and justice requires the exclusion, or (2) admission of the secondary evidence would be unfair. See new Article 1 (commencing with Section 1520).

1 **§ 1500 (repealed). Best evidence rule**

2 1500. Except as otherwise provided by statute, no evidence other than the
3 original of a writing is admissible to prove the content of a writing. This section
4 shall be known and may be cited as the best evidence rule.

5 **Comment.** Former Section 1500 is superseded by Sections 1520 (proof of the content of a
6 writing by an original), 1521 (Secondary Evidence Rule), and 1522 (oral testimony of the content
7 of a writing).

8 **§ 1500.5 (repealed). Computer recorded information and computer programs**

9 1500.5. Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 1500, a printed representation
10 of computer information or a computer program which is being used by or stored
11 on a computer or computer readable storage media shall be admissible to prove the
12 existence and content of the computer information or computer program.

13 Computer recorded information or computer programs, or copies of computer
14 recorded information or computer programs, shall not be rendered inadmissible by
15 the best evidence rule. Printed representations of computer information and
16 computer programs will be presumed to be accurate representations of the
17 computer information or computer programs that they purport to represent. This
18 presumption, however, will be a presumption affecting the burden of producing
19 evidence only. If any party to a judicial proceeding introduces evidence that such a
20 printed representation is inaccurate or unreliable, the party introducing it into
21 evidence will have the burden of proving, by a preponderance of evidence, that the
22 printed representation is the best available evidence of the existence and content of
23 the computer information or computer programs that it purports to represent.

24 **Comment.** Section 1500.5 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See
25 Section 1521 Comment. The last three sentences of the second paragraph of Section 1500.5 are
26 continued in Section 1552 without substantive change, except that the reference to “best available
27 evidence” is changed to “an accurate representation,” due to the replacement of the best evidence
28 rule with the Secondary Evidence Rule.

29 **§ 1501 (repealed). Copy of lost or destroyed writing**

30 1501. A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if
31 the writing is lost or has been destroyed without fraudulent intent on the part of the
32 proponent of the evidence.

33 **Comment.** Section 1501 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
34 1521 Comment. As to oral testimony of the content of a writing that is lost or has been destroyed,
35 the combined effect of former Sections 1501 and 1505 is continued in Section 1522 without
36 substantive change.

37 **§ 1502 (repealed). Copy of unavailable writing**

38 1502. A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if
39 the writing was not reasonably procurable by the proponent by use of the court’s
40 process or by other available means.

41 **Comment.** Section 1502 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
42 1521 Comment. As to oral testimony of the content of a writing that was not reasonably

1 procurable, the combined effect of Sections 1502 and 1505 is continued without substantive
2 change in Section 1522.

3 **§ 1503 (repealed). Copy of writing under control of opponent**

4 1503. (a) A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule
5 if, at a time when the writing was under the control of the opponent, the opponent
6 was expressly or impliedly notified, by the pleadings or otherwise, that the writing
7 would be needed at the hearing, and on request at the hearing the opponent has
8 failed to produce the writing. In a criminal action, the request at the hearing to
9 produce the writing may not be made in the presence of the jury.

10 (b) Though a writing requested by one party is produced by another, and is
11 thereupon inspected by the party calling for it, the party calling for the writing is
12 not obliged to introduce it as evidence in the action.

13 **Comment.** Section 1503 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
14 1521 Comment. As to oral testimony of the content of a writing, the combined effect of former
15 Section 1505 and the first sentence of subdivision (a) is continued without substantive change in
16 Section 1522.

17 The requirement of the second sentence of subdivision (a) remains significant in the context of
18 the Secondary Evidence Rule (Section 1521), which replaces the best evidence rule. Section 1523
19 applies that requirement to all requests for exclusion of secondary evidence in criminal actions.

20 Subdivision (b) is not continued, because it is subsumed in the general principle that parties are
21 under no obligation to introduce evidence they subpoena. That principle remains unchanged even
22 though the specific language of subdivision (b) is not continued.

23 **§ 1504 (repealed). Copy of collateral writing**

24 1504. A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if
25 the writing is not closely related to the controlling issues and it would be
26 inexpedient to require its production.

27 **Comment.** Section 1504 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
28 1521 Comment. As to oral testimony of the content of a collateral writing the combined effect of
29 former Sections 1504 and 1505 is continued without substantive change in Section 1522.

30 **§ 1505 (repealed). Other secondary evidence of writings described in Sections 1501-1504**

31 1505. If the proponent does not have in his possession or under his control a
32 copy of a writing described in Section 1501, 1502, 1503, or 1504, other secondary
33 evidence of the content of the writing is not made inadmissible by the best
34 evidence rule. This section does not apply to a writing that is also described in
35 Section 1506 or 1507.

36 **Comment.** Section 1505 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
37 1521 Comment. Insofar as Section 1505 pertains to oral testimony of the content of a writing, it is
38 continued without substantive change in Section 1522. See Comments to former Sections 1501-
39 1504.

40 **§ 1506 (repealed). Copy of public writing**

41 1506. A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if
42 the writing is a record or other writing that is in the custody of a public entity.

1 **Comment.** Section 1506 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
2 1521 Comment. As to oral testimony of the content of a writing in the custody of a public entity,
3 the combined effect of former Sections 1506 and 1508 is continued without substantive change in
4 Section 1522.

5 **§ 1507 (repealed). Copy of recorded writing**

6 1507. A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if
7 the writing has been recorded in the public records and the record or an attested or
8 a certified copy thereof is made evidence of the writing by statute.

9 **Comment.** Section 1507 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
10 1521 Comment. As to oral testimony of the content of a writing that has been recorded in the
11 public records, the combined effect of former Sections 1507 and 1508 is continued without
12 substantive change in Section 1522.

13 **§ 1508 (repealed). Other secondary evidence of writings described in Sections 1506 and 1507**

14 1508. If the proponent does not have in his possession a copy of a writing
15 described in Section 1506 or 1507 and could not in the exercise of reasonable
16 diligence have obtained a copy, other secondary evidence of the content of the
17 writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule.

18 **Comment.** Section 1508 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
19 1521 Comment. Insofar as Section 1508 pertains to oral testimony of the content of a writing, it is
20 continued without substantive change in Section 1522. See Comments to former Sections 1506,
21 1507.

22 **§ 1509 (repealed). Voluminous writings**

23 1509. Secondary evidence, whether written or oral, of the content of a writing is
24 not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if the writing consists of
25 numerous accounts or other writings that cannot be examined in court without
26 great loss of time, and the evidence sought from them is only the general result of
27 the whole; but the court in its discretion may require that such accounts or other
28 writings be produced for inspection by the adverse party.

29 **Comment.** Section 1509 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
30 1521 Comment. To the extent that Section 1509 provided a means of obtaining production of
31 accounts or other writings for inspection, continuation of that aspect is unnecessary because other
32 statutes afford sufficient opportunities for such inspection. *See, e.g.,* Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1985.3,
33 1987, 2020, 2031; Penal Code §§ 1054.1, 1054.3. Insofar as Section 1509 pertains to oral
34 testimony of the content of voluminous writings, it is continued without substantive change in
35 Section 1522.

36 **§ 1510 (repealed). Copy of writing produced at the hearing**

37 1510. A copy of a writing is not made inadmissible by the best evidence rule if
38 the writing has been produced at the hearing and made available for inspection by
39 the adverse party.

40 **Comment.** Section 1510 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
41 1521 Comment.

1 **§ 1511 (repealed). Duplicate of writing**

2 1511. A duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an original unless (a) a
3 genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (b) in the
4 circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.

5 **Comment.** Section 1511 is repealed to reflect the repeal of the best evidence rule. See Section
6 1521 Comment. Exceptions to the Secondary Evidence Rule are modeled on the exceptions in
7 former Section 1511. See Section 1521(a).