

1/8/62

Memorandum No. 1(1962)

Subject: 1962 Annual Report; Report on Status of 1961-63 Program

1962 ANNUAL REPORT

The Commission must approve its 1962 Annual Report at the January meeting. We plan to have page proofs of the report in your hands prior to the meeting. If the State Printer finds that he will be unable to deliver the page proofs in time for the meeting we will mimeograph the report for distribution to you prior to the meeting.

We hope that it will not be necessary to take any meeting time at the January meeting to consider the form and content of the 1962 Annual Report. The format and content are substantially the same as for previous reports.

In connection with the 1962 Annual Report, your attention is directed to the following matters:

(1) Report on Statutes Repealed by Implication or Held Unconstitutional. It is sometimes difficult from the opinion of the court to determine whether a statute is held unconstitutional, merely unconstitutional in part or merely unconstitutional in its application in a specific case. The case of American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education, 55 Cal.2d 167, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 45(1961) requires careful reading to determine the extent to which Sections 16564 and 16565 of the Education Code are unconstitutional. Exhibit IV, attached, sets out an extract from the 1962 Annual Report containing

the staff's analysis of the case. You may want to read the case and refer to the pertinent statutes prior to the meeting so that we will not have to take meeting time to discuss this case unless a member of the Commission does not agree with our analysis of the case.

(2) Legislative History. The portion of the report relating to the 1961 Legislative Program of the Commission is taken from our Third Bound Volume.

(3) Changes in Format of Report. Please note that the address of the Commission has been inserted on the cover of the report. A Special Committee of the National Legislative Conference made a study of the form of reports and suggested that certain information be included on the cover of reports published by governmental agencies. With the addition of the address on the cover, our report conforms to the suggestions of this committee. As a practical matter, it is desirable to include the address on the report. When our publications are listed in national checklists, our address is indicated as Sacramento and requests for copies of our reports are sent there and must be forwarded to our office at Stanford. The address is also included on the title page and the letter of transmittal.

The form of the bold face and italic headings in the report conforms generally to the uniform form we have adopted for use in our printed reports. This, for example, facilitated our use in the Annual Report of the same type used to print the Legislative History in the Third Bound Volume.

(4) List of Topics for Study. The staff does not believe that any useful purpose would be served by considering whether additional

topics should be added to the list of topics we are authorized to study or whether topics should be deleted from the list. Nevertheless, in Exhibits II and III, attached, we include information relating to assigned topics in case you wish information concerning them. The portion of the report requesting authority to expand the study on personal injury damages as separate property is in the form approved at the December meeting.

STATUS OF COMMISSION'S 1961-63 PROGRAM

Exhibit I, attached, sets out the status of our 1961-63 Program. Note that four items on the program are now in the hands of the State Bar and we are awaiting their comments. These are:

- (1) The tentative recommendation on pretrial conferences and discovery in eminent domain proceedings.
- (2) The tentative recommendation on hearsay evidence.
- (3) The revised recommendation on moving expenses.
- (4) The revised recommendation on evidence in eminent domain proceedings.

You are aware of our progress on the sovereign immunity study.

We are making satisfactory progress on other items on the 1961-63 Program (arson and personal injury damages as separate property). It is unlikely that we will make recommendations on other items listed in Exhibit I to the 1963 Legislature.

You may find information of interest in Exhibit I and we suggest you examine it.

Respectfully submitted,

John H. DeMouilly  
Executive Secretary

EXHIBIT I

STATUS OF COMMISSION'S 1961-63 PROGRAM

Study No.	Subject	Commission Progress	State Bar Committee Progress
34(L) -	Uniform Rules of Evidence		
	Hearsay Article	<u>Waiting for action by State Bar Committee</u>	
		Tentative Recommendation approved at September 1961 meeting--you have galley proofs of the tentative recommendation and research study	State Bar Committee is now reviewing tentative recommendation. The Chairman states: "Conceivably after a study of these changes a joint meeting with the Commission would not be necessary. In my view most of the proposed changes are not too far reaching in character."
	Privilege Article	The Commission has considered this article on a number of occasions but has not approved a final draft of any portion  Research study needs considerable work to put it in shape to send to the printer.	The State Bar Committee is making good progress on this article. The State Bar Committee will probably complete its work on the article before the Commission returns to consideration of it.
	Authentication Article	Never considered by Commission. Closely related to Hearsay Article.	Not yet considered by State Bar Committee

Study No.	Subject	Commission Progress	State Bar Committee Progress
36(L)	<p>Condemnation Law and Procedure</p>	<p><u>Waiting for action by State Bar Committee</u></p>	<p>The two sections of the State Bar Committee on Condemnation Law and Procedure have studied this matter. We have not yet been advised as to the final decision of the committee. As soon as we are advised, the Commission can take final action on this and we will then be ready to present our recommendation to the Interim Committee.</p>
	Moving Expenses	<p>Commission has carefully reviewed recommendation to 1961 Legislature. Has recommended some changes. This matter is being studied by the Senate Fact Finding Committee on Judiciary. The 1961 bill was referred to that committee for study.</p> <p>Any supplemental recommendation we wish to make on this topic can be covered in our 1963 Annual Report.</p>	
	Evidence	<p><u>Waiting for action by State Bar Committee</u></p>	<p>The State Bar Committee on Condemnation Law and Procedure is undertaking a careful study of this matter. We anticipate that there will be an area of disagreement between the State Bar Committee and the Commission. We will not be able to take action on this until the State Bar Committee advises us as to the results of its study of the matter.</p>
		<p>The Commission has reviewed its 1961 recommendation and made some changes in it.</p> <p>We will probably cover any supplemental recommendation we wish to make on this subject in our 1963 Annual Report.</p>	

Study No.	Subject	Commission Progress	State Bar Committee Progress
36(L) (Continued)	Pretrial Conferences and Discovery	<u>Waiting for action by three State Bar Committees</u>	
		Tentative Recommendation distributed to a distribution list of approximately 230 persons.	State Bar Committee on Condemnation Law and Procedure is deferring action on this recommendation until it
		We have revised the original research study and you have or will receive a copy of the revised study for your files.	completes its study of Evidence. The Board of Governors has determined that this recommendation should be reviewed by two
		We have the research study set in type.	additional State Bar Committees: the Committee on Rules of Court Procedure and the Committee on Administration of Justice.

Study No.	Subject	Commission Progress	State Bar Committee Progress
46	Arson	Now under consideration by Commission.	Not referred to a State Bar Committee.
52(L)	Sovereign Immunity	Now under consideration by Commission.	No State Bar Committee appointed as yet.
53	Personal Injury Damages	Now under consideration by Commission. 1962 Annual Report requests that authority in connection with this study be expanded.	
57(L)	Bail	This is deferred. We will not be able to make a recommendation on this topic to the 1963 Legislature.	
12	Taking Instructions to Jury Room	This is deferred. We will not be able to make a recommendation on this topic to the 1963 Legislature.	

EXHIBIT II

The following is an explanation of the scope of each topic now on the current agenda of the Commission. Topics that were disposed of by a recommendation to the 1961 legislative session are not included. If the topic is one assigned to the Commission upon request of the Commission, the explanation is taken (with a few exceptions) from the annual report of the Commission where the particular topic was described.

Study No. 12: A study to determine whether the jury should be authorized to take a written copy of the court's instructions into the jury room in civil as well as criminal cases.

Penal Code Section 1137 authorizes a written copy of the court's instructions to be taken into the jury room in criminal cases. It has been held, however, that Sections 612 and 614 of the Code of Civil Procedure preclude permitting a jury in a civil case to take a written copy of the instructions into the jury room. There seems to be no reason why the rule on this matter should not be the same in both civil and criminal cases.

The Commission made a recommendation on this topic to the 1957 Legislature. However, following circulation by the Commission to interested persons throughout the State of its printed pamphlet containing the recommendation and study on this matter, a number of questions were raised by members of the bench and bar relating to practical problems involved in making a copy of the court's instructions available to the jury in the jury room. Since there would not have been an adequate opportunity to study these problems and amend the bill during the 1957 Session, the Commission determined not to seek enactment of the bill but to hold the matter for further study.

Study No. 21: A study relating to partition sales.

This is a study to determine whether the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to partition sales and the provisions of the Probate Code relating to the confirmation of sales of real property of estates of deceased persons should be made uniform and, if not, whether there is need for clarification as to which of them governs the confirmation of private judicial partition sales. (As expanded in 1959 - Res.ch. 218).

Study No. 26: A study to determine whether the law relating to escheat of personal property should be revised.

In the recent case of Estate of Nolan the California District Court of Appeal held that two savings bank accounts in California totaling \$16,000, owned by the estate of a decedent who had died without heirs while domiciled in Montana, escheated to Montana rather than California. The Supreme Court denied the Attorney General's petition for hearing.

There is little case authority as to which state, as between the domicile of the decedent and any other, is entitled to escheat personal property. In some cases involving bank accounts it has been held that they escheat to the domiciliary state; in others, that they escheat to the state in which the bank is located. The Restatement of Conflict of Laws takes the position that personal property should escheat to the state in which the particular property is administered.

In two recent cases California's claim as the domicile of the decedent to escheat personal property has been rejected by sister states where the property was being administered, both states applying rules favorable to themselves. The combination of these decisions with that of the California court in Estate of Nolan suggests that California will lose out all around as the law now stands.

Study No. 27: A study to determine whether the law relating to the rights of a putative spouse should be revised.

The concept of "putative spouse" has been developed by the courts of this State to give certain property rights to a man or a woman who has lived with another as man and wife in the good faith belief that they were married when in fact they were not legally married or their marriage was voidable and has been annulled. The essential requirement of the status of putative spouse is a good faith belief that a valid marriage exists. The typical situation in which putative status is recognized is one where a marriage was properly solemnized but one or both of the parties were not free to marry, as when a prior marriage had not been dissolved or a legal impediment making the marriage void or voidable existed.

The question of the property rights of the parties to an invalid marriage generally arises when one of the parties dies or when the parties separate. It is now well settled that upon death or separation a putative spouse has the same rights as a legal spouse in property which would have been community property had the couple been legally married. This rule has been developed by the courts without the aid of legislation. The underlying reason for the rule apparently is the desire to secure for a person meeting the good faith requirement the benefits which he or she believed would flow from the attempted marriage.

The courts have held that a putative spouse is not entitled to an award of alimony. They have also held, however, that a putative wife

has a quasi-contractual right to recover from the putative husband (or his estate), the value of the services rendered to him during marriage less the value of support received from him. While in all of the cases in which this right has been recognized there was no quasi community property, it is not clear whether the existence of such property would preclude recovery in quasi contract. The earlier cases recognizing the quasi-contractual right all involved situations where one spouse had fraudulently misrepresented to the other that they were free to marry; the theory on which recovery was allowed was that the defendant had been unjustly enriched by services rendered in reliance upon his misrepresentation. But this rationale has apparently been abandoned in two recent cases. In one, the defendant's misrepresentation was innocent but recovery was nonetheless allowed. In the other, there was no misrepresentation but the court permitted recovery on the ground that the defendant had been guilty of misconduct which would have constituted grounds for divorce had the parties been married.

The Commission believes that several questions relating to the position of the putative spouse warrant study:

1. Is the theory of recovery in quasi contract either theoretically proper or practically adequate for the solution of the problem presented? The theory seems to have been abandoned recently by the courts, at least in part. Moreover, it will not justify recovery by one who has not been able, because of illness or other incapacity, to perform services which exceed in value the support received; yet, in most circumstances, such a claimant has the greater practical need for a recovery.

2. Should the existence of conduct which would be grounds for divorce justify recovery without regard to misrepresentations? If so, should it not be recognized that what is really involved is quasi alimony rather than recovery on the ground of unjust enrichment?

3. Should a putative spouse be able to recover both quasi community property and quasi alimony?

4. Where one of the spouses has died should the other spouse be given substantially the same rights which he or she would have had if the parties had been validly married?

Study No. 29: A study to determine whether the law respecting post-conviction sanity hearings should be revised.

Section 1367 of the Penal Code provides that a person cannot be punished for a public offense while he is insane. The Penal Code contains two sets of provisions apparently designed to implement this general rule. One set pertains to persons sentenced to death and the other set to persons sentenced to imprisonment.

Persons Sentenced to Death. Sections 3700 to 3704 of the Penal Code provide for a hearing to determine whether a person sentenced to death is insane and thus immune from execution. The hearing procedure is initiated by the warden's certification that there is good reason to believe that the prisoner has become insane. The

question of the prisoner's sanity is then tried to a jury. If he is found to be insane he must be taken to a state hospital until his reason is restored. If the superintendent of the hospital later certifies that the prisoner has recovered his sanity, this question is determined by a judge sitting without a jury. If the prisoner is found to be sane he is returned to the prison and may subsequently be executed.

The Commission believes that a number of important questions exist concerning the procedure provided for in Penal Code Sections 3700 to 3704. For example, why should the issue of the prisoner's sanity be determined by a jury in the initial hearing but not in a later hearing to determine whether his reason has been restored? Why should the statute explicitly state that the prisoner is entitled to counsel on a hearing to determine whether he has been restored to sanity and make no provision on this matter in the case of the initial hearing? Does this mean that the prisoner is not entitled to counsel at the initial hearing under the rule expressio unius est exclusio alterius? If so, is this desirable? Who has the burden of proof as to the issue of the prisoner's sanity and does this differ as between the initial and later hearings? What standard of sanity is to be applied? Shall the court call expert witnesses? May the parties do so? Does the prisoner have the right to introduce evidence and cross-examine witnesses? In People v. Riley, the court held that (1) a prisoner found to be insane has no right of appeal and (2) a unanimous verdict is not necessary because the hearing is not a criminal proceeding. Are these rules desirable?

Persons Sentenced to Imprisonment. Penal Code Section 2684 provides that any person confined to a state prison who is mentally ill, mentally deficient, or insane may be transferred to a state hospital upon the certification of the Director of Corrections that in his opinion the rehabilitation of the prisoner would be expedited by treatment in the hospital and upon the authorization of the Director of Mental Hygiene. The code contains no provision for a hearing of any kind and the decision of the Director of Corrections and the Director of Mental Hygiene is final. If the superintendent of the state hospital later notifies the Director of Corrections that the prisoner "will not benefit by further care and treatment in the state hospital," the Director of Corrections must send for the prisoner and return him to the state prison. The prisoner has no right to a hearing before he is returned to prison. Section 2685 of the Penal Code provides that the time spent at the state hospital shall count as time served under the prisoner's sentence.

Sections 2684 and 2685 appear to present a number of important questions. Does the standard provided for removal of a prisoner to the state hospital or for returning him to the state prison--whether his rehabilitation would be expedited by treatment at the hospital and whether he would not benefit by further treatment there--conflict with the general mandate of Section 1367 that a person may not be punished while he is insane? If so, should a

different standard and a different procedure be established to avoid the punishment of insane prisoners? Should the time spent in the state hospital by a prisoner adjudged insane for purposes of punishment be counted as part of time served under his sentence?

Study No. 30: A study to determine whether the law respecting jurisdiction of courts in proceedings affecting the custody of children should be revised.

There are in this State various kinds of statutory proceedings relating to the custody of children. Civil Code Section 138 provides that in actions for divorce or separate maintenance the court may make an order for the custody of minor children during the proceeding or at any time thereafter and may at any time modify or vacate the order. Civil Code Section 199 provides that, without application for divorce, a husband or wife may bring an action for the exclusive control of the children; and Civil Code Section 214 provides that when a husband and wife live in a state of separation, without being divorced, either of them may apply to any court of competent jurisdiction for custody of the children. Furthermore, anyone may bring an action under Probate Code Section 1440 to be appointed guardian of a child.

These various provisions relating to the custody of children present a number of problems relating to the jurisdiction of courts; for example: (1) Do they grant the courts jurisdiction to afford an adequate remedy in all possible situations? (2) When a proceeding has been brought under one of the several statutes does the court thereafter have exclusive jurisdiction of all litigation relating to the custody of the child? (3) Do the several statutes conflict or are they inconsistent as to whether the court awarding custody under them has continuing jurisdiction to modify its award?

(1) There appear to be at least two situations in which the only remedy of a parent seeking custody of a child is through a guardianship proceeding under Probate Code Section 1440. One is when a party to a marriage obtains an ex parte divorce in California against the other party who has custody over the children and resides with them in another state. If the second party later brings the children to California and becomes a resident of a county other than the county in which the divorce was obtained, the only procedure by which the first party can raise the question of custody would seem to be a guardianship proceeding under Probate Code Section 1440 in the county where the children reside. Although the divorce action remains pending as a custody proceeding under Civil Code Section 138, the court cannot enter a custody order because the children are residents of another county. A custody proceeding cannot be brought under either Section 199 or Section 214 of the Civil Code because the parents are no longer husband and wife. Another situation in which a guardianship proceeding may be the only available remedy is

when a foreign divorce decree is silent as to who shall have custody of the children. If the parties later come within the jurisdiction of the California courts, it is not clear whether the courts can modify the foreign decree to provide for custody and, if so, in what type of proceeding this can be done. It would appear desirable that some type of custody proceeding other than guardianship be authorized by statute for these and any other situations in which a guardianship proceeding is now the only available remedy to a parent seeking custody of his child.

(2) The various kinds of statutory proceedings relating to custody also create the problem whether, after one of these proceedings has been brought in one court, another proceeding under the same statute or under a different statute may be brought in a different court or whether the first court's jurisdiction is exclusive. This question can be presented in various ways, such as the following: (a) If a divorce court has entered a custody order pursuant to Civil Code Section 138, may a court in another county modify that order or entertain a guardianship proceeding under Probate Code Section 1440 or-- assuming the divorce was denied but jurisdiction of the action retained--entertain a custody proceeding under Civil Code Sections 199 or 214? (b) If a court has awarded custody under Civil Code Sections 199 or 214 while the parties are still married, may another court later reconsider the question in a divorce proceeding under Civil Code Section 138 or a guardianship proceeding under Probate Code Section 1440? (c) If a guardian has been appointed under Probate Code Section 1440, may a divorce court or a court acting pursuant to Civil Code Sections 199 or 214 later award custody to the parent who is not the guardian?

A few of these matters were clarified by the decision of the California Supreme Court in Greene v. Superior Court, holding that a divorce court which had awarded custody pursuant to Civil Code Section 138 has continuing jurisdiction and a court in another county has no jurisdiction to appoint a guardian of the children under Probate Code Section 1440. The Supreme Court stated that the general objective should be to avoid "unseemly conflict between courts" and indicated that a proper procedure would be to apply to the divorce court for a change of venue to the county where the children reside.

It is not clear whether the exclusive jurisdiction principle of the Greene case either will or should be applied in all of the situations in which the question may arise. An exception should perhaps be provided at least in the case where a divorce action is brought after a custody or guardianship award has been made pursuant to Civil Code Sections 199 or 214 or Probate Code Section 1440, on the ground that it may be desirable to allow the divorce court to consider and decide all matters of domestic relations incidental to the divorce.

(3) There appear to be at least two additional problems of jurisdiction arising under the statutory provisions relating to

custody of children. One is whether a court awarding custody under Civil Code Section 214 has continuing jurisdiction to modify its order. Although both Sections 138 and 199 provide that the court may later modify or amend a custody order made thereunder, Section 214 contains no such provisions. Another problem is the apparent conflict between Section 199 and Section 214 in cases where the parents are separated. Section 199 presumably can be used to obtain custody by any married person, whether separated or not, while Section 214 is limited to those persons living "in a state of separation." The two sections differ with respect to the power of the court to modify its order and also with respect to whether someone other than a parent may be awarded custody.

Study No. 34(L): A study to determine whether the law of evidence should be revised to conform to the Uniform Rules of Evidence drafted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and approved by it at its 1953 annual conference.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature upon the recommendation of the Commission).

Study No. 35(L): A study to determine whether the law respecting habeas corpus proceedings, in the trial and appellate courts, should, for the purpose of simplification of procedure to the end of more expeditious and final determination of the legal questions presented, be revised.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature upon the recommendation of the Commission).

Study No. 36(L): A study to determine whether the law and procedure relating to condemnation should be revised in order to safeguard the property rights of private citizens.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature upon the recommendation of the Commission).

Study No. 39: A study to determine whether the law relating to attachment, garnishment, and property exempt from execution should be revised.

The Commission has received several communications bringing to its attention anachronisms, ambiguities, and other defects in the law of this State relating to attachment, garnishment, and property exempt from execution. These communications have raised such questions as: (1) whether the law with respect to farmers' property exempt from execution should be modernized; (2) whether a procedure should be established to determine disputes as to whether particular earnings of judgment debtors are exempt from execution; (3) whether Code of Civil Procedure Section 690.26 should be amended to conform to the

1955 amendments of Sections 682, 688 and 690.11, thus making it clear that one-half, rather than only one-quarter, of a judgment debtor's earnings are subject to execution; (4) whether an attaching officer should be required or empowered to release an attachment when the plaintiff appeals but does not put up a bond to continue the attachment in effect; and (5) whether a provision should be enacted empowering a defendant against whom a writ of attachment may be issued or has been issued to prevent service of the writ by depositing in court the amount demanded in the complaint plus 10% or 15% to cover possible costs.

The State Bar has had various related problems under consideration from time to time. In a report to the Board of Governors of the State Bar on 1955 Conference Resolution No. 28, the Bankruptcy Committee of the State Bar recommended that a complete study be made of attachment, garnishment, and property exempt from execution, preferably by the Law Revision Commission. In a communication to the Commission dated June 4, 1956 the Board of Governors reported that it approved this recommendation and requested the Commission to include this subject on its calendar of topics selected for study.

Study No. 41: A study to determine whether the Small Claims Court Law should be revised.

In 1955 the Commission reported to the Legislature that it had received communications from several judges in various parts of the State relating to defects and gaps in the Small Claims Court Law. These suggestions concerned such matters as whether fees and mileage may be charged in connection with the service of various papers, whether witnesses may be subpoenaed and are entitled to fees and mileage, whether the monetary jurisdiction of the small claims courts should be increased, whether sureties on appeal bonds should be required to justify in all cases, and whether the plaintiff should have the right to appeal from an adverse judgment. The Commission stated that the number and variety of these communications suggested that the Small Claims Court Law merited study.

The 1955 Session of the Legislature declined to authorize the Commission to study the Small Claims Court Law at that time. No comprehensive study of the Small Claims Court Law has since been made. Meanwhile, the Commission has received communications making additional suggestions for revision of the Small Claims Court Law: e.g., that the small claims court should be empowered to set aside the judgment and reopen the case when it is just to do so; that the plaintiff should be permitted to appeal when the defendant prevails on a counterclaim; and that the small claims form should be amended to (1) advise the defendant that he has a right to counterclaim and that failure to do so on a claim arising out of the same transaction will bar his right to sue on the claim later and (2) require a statement as to where the act occurred in a negligence case.

This continued interest in revision of the Small Claims Court Law induced the Commission again to request authority to make a study of it.

Study No. 42: A study to determine whether the law relating to the rights of a good faith improver of property belonging to another should be revised.

The common law rule, codified in Civil Code Section 1013, is that when a person affixes improvements to the land of another in the good faith belief that the land is his, the thing affixed belongs to the owner of the land in the absence of an agreement to the contrary. The common law denies the innocent improver any compensation for the improvement he has constructed except that when the owner has knowingly permitted or encouraged the improver to spend money on the land without revealing his claim of title the improver can recover the value of the improvement, and when the owner sues for damages for the improver's use and occupation of the land the improver can set off the value of the improvement.

About three-fourths of the states have ameliorated the common law rule by the enactment of "betterment statutes" which make payment of compensation for the full value of the improvement a condition of the owner's ability to recover the land. The owner generally is given the option either to pay for the improvement and recover possession or to sell the land to the improver at its value excluding improvements. Usually no independent action is given the improver in possession, although in some states he may sue directly if he first gives up the land.

California, on the other hand, grants the improver only the limited relief of set-off when the owner sues for damages and the right to remove the improvement when this can be done. It would seem to be unjust to take a valuable improvement from one who built it in the good faith belief that the land was his and give it to the owner as a complete windfall. Provision should be made for a more equitable adjustment between the two innocent parties.

Study No. 43: A study to determine whether the separate trial on the issue of insanity in criminal cases should be abolished or whether, if it is retained, evidence of the defendant's mental condition should be admissible on the issue of specific intent in the trial on the other pleas.

Section 1026 of the Penal Code provides that when a defendant pleads not guilty by reason of insanity and also enters another plea or pleas he shall be tried first on the other plea or pleas and in such trial shall be conclusively presumed to have been sane at the time the crime was committed. This provision was originally interpreted by the Supreme Court to require exclusion of all evidence of mental condition in the first trial, even though offered to show that the defendant lacked the mental capacity to form the specific intent required for the crime charged--e.g., first degree murder. This interpretation was criticized on the ground that a defendant might be so mentally defective as to be unable to form the specific

intent required in certain crimes and yet not be so insane as to prevail in the second trial on the defense of insanity. In 1949 the Supreme Court purported to modify somewhat its view of the matter in People v. Wells. The court's opinion states that evidence of the defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime may be introduced in the first trial to show that the defendant did not have the specific intent required for the crime charged but not to show that he could not have had such intent. This distinction does not seem to be a very meaningful or workable one or to meet adequately the criticisms made of the earlier interpretation adopted by the court. A study should now be made to determine (1) whether the separate trial on the defense of insanity should be abolished, with all issues in the case being tried in a single proceeding or (2) if separate trials are to be continued, whether Section 1026 should be revised to provide that any competent evidence of the defendant's mental condition shall be admissible on the first trial, the jury being instructed to consider it only on the issue of criminal intent.

Study No. 44: A study to determine whether partnerships and unincorporated associations should be permitted to sue in their common names and whether the law relating to the use of fictitious names should be revised.

Code of Civil Procedure Section 388 provides that when two or more persons associated in any business transact such business under a common name they may be sued by such common name. However, such associates may not bring suit in the common name. In the case of a partnership or association composed of many individuals this results in an inordinately long caption on the complaint and in extra expense in filing fees, neither of which appears to be necessary or justified.

Sections 2466 to 2471 of the Civil Code also have a bearing on the right of partnerships and unincorporated associations to sue. These sections provide, inter alia, that a partnership doing business under a fictitious name cannot maintain suit on certain causes of action unless it has filed a certificate naming the members of the partnership, and that a new certificate must be filed when there is a change in the membership. These provisions, which have been held to be applicable to unincorporated associations, impose a burden on partnerships and associations.

Study No. 45: A study to determine whether the law relating to the doctrine of mutuality of remedy in suits for specific performance should be revised.

Civil Code Section 3386 provides:

§ 3386. Neither party to an obligation can be compelled specifically to perform it, unless the

other party thereto has performed, or is compellable specifically to perform, everything to which the former is entitled under the same obligation, either completely or nearly so, together with full compensation for any want of entire performance.

Section 3386 states substantially the doctrine of mutuality of remedy in suits for specific performance as it was originally developed by the Court of Chancery. The doctrine has been considerably modified in most American jurisdictions in more recent times. Today it is not generally necessary, to obtain a decree of specific performance, to show that the plaintiff's obligation is specifically enforceable, so long as there is reasonable assurance that plaintiff's performance will be forthcoming when due. Such assurance may be provided by the plaintiff's past conduct, or his economic interest in performing, or by granting a conditional decree or requiring the plaintiff to give security for his performance.

Civil Code Section 3386 states a much more rigid rule. It is true that Section 3386 is considerably ameliorated by Civil Code Sections 3388, 3392, 3394 and 3423(5) and by court decisions granting specific performance in cases which would fall within a strict application of the doctrine of mutuality of remedy. On the other hand, the mutuality requirement has in some cases been applied strictly, with harsh results.

On the whole, the California decisions in terms of results may not be far out of line with the more modern and enlightened view as to mutuality of remedy. But insofar as they have reached sensible results it has often been with difficulty and the result has been inconsistent with a literal reading of Section 3386. And not infrequently poor decisions have resulted. A study of the requirement of mutuality of remedy in suits for specific performance would, therefore, appear to be desirable.

Study No. 46: A study to determine whether the provisions of the Penal Code relating to arson should be revised.

Definition of Arson. Chapter 1 of Title 13 of the Penal Code (Sections 447a to 451a) is entitled "Arson." Section 447a makes the burning of a dwelling-house or a related building punishable by a prison sentence of two to twenty years. Section 448a makes the burning of any other building punishable by a prison sentence of one to ten years. Section 449a makes the burning of personal property, including a streetcar, railway car, ship, boat or other water craft, automobile or other motor vehicle, punishable by a sentence of one to three years. Thus, in general, California follows the historical approach in defining arson, in which the burning of a dwelling-house was made the most serious offense, presumably because a greater risk to human life was thought to be involved. Yet in modern times the burning of other buildings, such as a school, a theatre, or a church, or the burning of such

personal property as a ship or a railway car often constitutes a far graver threat to human life than the burning of a dwelling-house. Some other states have, therefore, revised their arson laws to correlate the penalty not with the type of building or property burned but with the risk to human life and with the amount of property damage involved in a burning. A study should be made to determine whether California should similarly revise Chapter 1 of Title 13 of the Penal Code.

Use of Term "Arson" in Statutes. When the term "arson" is used in a penal or other statute, the question arises whether that term includes only a violation of Penal Code Section 447a, which alone labels the conduct which it proscribes as "arson," or whether it is also applicable to violations of Penal Code Sections 448a, 449a, 450a and 451a, which define other felonies related to the burning of property. For example, Penal Code Section 189, defining degrees of murder, states that murder committed during the perpetration of arson, or during attempted arson, is murder in the first degree. There is nothing in that section which makes it clear what is meant by "arson." On the other hand, Penal Code Section 644, concerning habitual criminals, refers specifically to "arson as defined in Section 447a of this code." On the basis of these enactments it could be argued that "arson" is only that conduct which is proscribed by Section 447a. Yet in In re Bramble the court held that a violation of Section 448a was "arson." Thus, there is considerable doubt as to the exact meaning of the term "arson" in relation to the conduct proscribed by Penal Code Sections 448a, 449a, 450a, and 451a.

Study No. 47: A study to determine whether Civil Code Section 1698 should be repealed or revised (modification of contracts).

Section 1698 of the Civil Code, which provides that a contract in writing may be altered by a contract in writing or by an executed oral agreement and not otherwise, might be repealed. It frequently frustrates contractual intent. Moreover, two avoidance techniques have been developed by the courts which considerably limit its effectiveness. One technique is to hold that a subsequent oral agreement modifying a written contract is effective because it is executed, and performance by one party only has been held sufficient to render the agreement executed. The second technique is to hold that the subsequent oral agreement rescinded the original obligations and substituted a new contract, that this is not an "alteration" of the written contract and, therefore, that Section 1698 is not applicable. These techniques are not a satisfactory method of ameliorating the rule, however, because it is necessary to have a lawsuit to determine whether Section 1698 applies in a particular case.

If Section 1698 is to be retained, the question arises whether it should apply to all contracts in writing, whether or not required to be written by the statute of frauds or some other statute. It

is presently held to apply to all contracts in writing and is thus contrary to the common law rule and probably contrary to the rule in all other states. This interpretation has been criticized by both Williston and Corbin who suggest that the language is the result of an inaccurate attempt to codify the common law rule that contracts required to be in writing can only be modified by a writing.

Study No. 49: A study to determine whether Section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code, which precludes an unlicensed contractor from bringing an action to recover for work done, should be revised.

Section 7031 of the Business and Professions Code provides:

§ 7031. No person engaged in the business or acting in the capacity of a contractor, may bring or maintain any action in any court of this State for the collection of compensation for the performance of any act or contract for which a license is required by this chapter without alleging and proving that he was a duly licensed contractor at all times during the performance of such act or contract.

The effect of Section 7031 is to bar the affirmative assertion of any right to compensation by an unlicensed contractor, whether in an action on the illegal contract, for restitution, to foreclose a mechanics' lien, or to enforce an arbitration award unless he can show that he was duly licensed.

The courts have generally taken the position that Section 7031 requires a forfeiture and should be strictly construed. In fact, in the majority of reported cases forfeiture appears to have been avoided. One technique has been to find that the artisan is not a "contractor" within the statute, but is merely an "employee." But this device is restricted by detailed regulations of the Contractor's State License Board governing qualifications for licenses and the scope of the statutory requirements. Another way around the statute has been to say that there was "substantial" compliance with its requirements. In addition, Section 7031 has been held not to apply to a suit by an unlicensed subcontractor against an unlicensed general contractor on the ground that the act is aimed at the protection of the public, not of one contractor against a subcontractor. Similarly, the statute does not bar a suit by an unlicensed contractor against a supplier of construction material. And the statute has been held not to apply when the contractor is the defendant in the action.

But with all of these qualifications Section 7031 has a wide area of application in which it operates to visit a forfeiture upon the contractor and to give the other party a windfall.

Many jurisdictions, taking into account such factors as moral turpitude on both sides, statutory policy, public importance, subservience of economic position, and the possible forfeiture involved, allow restitution to an unlicensed person. But in California, Section 7031 expressly forbids "any action" and this prohibition of course includes restitution. The court can weigh equities in the contractor's favor only where the contractor is the defendant. If the contractor is asserting a claim, equities generally recognized in other jurisdictions cannot be recognized because of Section 7031.

Study No. 50: A study to determine whether the law respecting the rights of a lessor of property when it is abandoned by the lessee should be revised.

Under the older common law, a lessor was regarded as having conveyed away the entire term of years, and his only remedy upon the lessee's abandonment of the premises was to leave the property vacant and sue for the rent as it became due or to re-enter for the limited purpose of preventing waste. If the lessor repossessed the premises, the lease and the lessor's rights against the lessee thereunder were held to be terminated on the theory that the tenant had offered to surrender the premises and the lessor had accepted.

In California the landlord can leave the premises vacant upon abandonment and hold the lessee for the rent. The older rule in California was, however, that if he repossessed the premises, there was a surrender by operation of law and the landlord lost any right to rent or damages against the lessee. More recently it has been held by our courts that if the lessor re-enters or re-lets, he can sue at the end of the term for damages measured by the difference between the rent due under the original lease and the amount recouped under the new lease.

Should the landlord not be given, however, the right to re-enter and sue for damages at the time of abandonment? In some states this has been allowed, with certain restrictions, even in the absence of a clause in the lease. And it has been held in many states that the landlord may enter as agent of the tenant and re-lease for a period not longer than the original lease at the best rent available. In this case, the courts have said, the landlord has not accepted a surrender and may therefore sue for damages. But this doctrine was repudiated in California and it is doubtful that it can be made available to the lessor without legislative enactment.

Civil Code Section 3308 provides that the parties to a lease may provide therein that if the lessee breaches any term of the lease,

the lessor shall thereupon be entitled to recover from the lessee the worth at the time of such termination, of the excess, if any, of the amount of rent and charges equivalent to rent reserved in the lease for the balance of the stated term or any shorter period of time over the then reasonable rental value of the premises for the same period.

The rights of the lessor under such agreement shall be cumulative to all other rights or remedies. . . .

Thus the landlord is well protected in California if the lease so provides. The question is whether he should be similarly protected by statute when the lease does not so provide.

Study No. 51: A study to determine whether a former wife, divorced in an action in which the court did not have personal jurisdiction over both parties, should be permitted to maintain an action for support.

The California Supreme Court, after this study was authorized, held that an ex parte divorce does not terminate the husband's obligation to support his former wife. Hence, this study now primarily involves the question of the procedure to be followed to maintain an action for support after an ex parte divorce.

Study No. 52(L): A study to determine whether the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be modified.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature on recommendation of the Commission).

The doctrine of governmental immunity--that a governmental entity is not liable for injuries inflicted on other persons--has long been generally accepted in this State. The constitutional provision that suits may be brought against the State "as shall be directed by law," does not authorize suit against the State save where the Legislature has expressly so provided. Moreover, a statute permitting suit against the State merely waives immunity from suit; it will not be construed to admit liability nor waive any legal defense which the State may have unless it contains express language to that effect.

The general rule in this State is that a governmental entity is liable for damages resulting from negligence in its "proprietary" activities. But such an entity is not liable for damages resulting from negligence in its "governmental" activities unless a statute assumes liability. An example of a statute assuming liability for damages for "governmental" as well as "proprietary" activities is the Vehicle Code which imposes liability for negligent operation of motor vehicles on governmental units.

The doctrine of sovereign immunity has been widely criticized.

The distinction between "proprietary" and "governmental" functions is uncertain as to its application in particular cases with the consequence that it is productive of much litigation.

At the 1953 Conference of State Bar Delegates a resolution was adopted favoring the abrogation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity and appointing a committee to study the problem. The committee's report, dated August 5, 1954, presents an excellent preliminary analysis of the problem and recommends that the study be carried forward.

Study No. 53(L): A study to determine whether personal injury damages should be separate property.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature on recommendation of the Commission).

The study involves a consideration of Civil Code Section 163.5, enacted in 1957. This statute contains a number of defects. The general problem will require a consideration of the rule imputing the negligence of one spouse to the other.

In this State the negligence of one spouse is imputed to the other in any action when the judgment would be community property. A judgment recovered by a spouse in a personal injury action until the enactment of C.C. § 163.5 in 1957 was community property. Thus, when one spouse sued for an injury caused by the combined negligence of a third party and the other spouse, the contributory negligence of the latter was imputed to the plaintiff, barring recovery. The reason for the rule was said to be that it prevented the negligent spouse from profiting, through his community interest in the judgment, from his own wrong.

The State Bar has considered a number of proposals to change or modify the former rule. These have included proposals that a recovery for personal injury be made separate property (this was the solution adopted in 1957 in C.C. § 163.5); that the recovery not include damages for the loss of services by the negligent spouse nor for expenses that would ordinarily be payable out of community property; and that the elements of damage considered personal to each spouse be made separate property.

Study No. 55(L): A study as to whether a trial court should have the power to require, as a condition for denying a motion for a new trial, that the party opposing the motion stipulate to the entry of judgment for damages in excess of the damages awarded by the jury.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature upon the recommendation of the Commission).

Study No. 57(L): A study to determine whether the laws relating to bail should be revised.

This is a legislative assignment (not authorized by the Legislature upon recommendation of the Commission).

Study No. 59: A study to determine whether California statutes relating to service of process by publication should be revised in light of recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court.

Two recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court have placed new and substantial constitutional limitations on service of process by publication in judicial proceedings. Theretofore, it had generally been assumed that, at least in the case of proceedings relating to real property, service by publication meets the minimum standards of procedural due process prescribed by the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., decided in 1950, the Supreme Court held unconstitutional a New York statute which authorized service on interested parties by publication in connection with an accounting by the trustee of a common trust fund under a procedure established by Section 100-c(12) of the New York Banking Law. The Court stated that there is no justification for a statute authorizing resort to means less likely than the mails to apprise persons whose names and addresses are known of a pending action. Any doubt whether the rationale of the Mullane decision would be applied by the Supreme Court to cases involving real property was settled by Walker v. City of Hutchinson, decided in 1956, which held that notice by publication of an eminent domain proceeding to a land owner whose name was known to the condemning city was a violation of due process.

The practical consequence of the Mullane and Walker decisions is that every state must now review its statutory provisions for notice by publication to determine whether any of them fail to measure up to the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. A preliminary study indicates that few, if any, California statutes are questionable under these decisions, inasmuch as our statutes generally provide for notice by mail to persons whose interests and whereabouts are known. However, a comprehensive and detailed study should be undertaken to be certain that all California statutory provisions which may be affected by the Mullane and Walker decisions are brought to light and that recommendations are made to the Legislature for such changes, if any, as may be necessary to bring the law of this State into conformity with the requirements of the United States Constitution.

Study No. 60: A study to determine whether Section 1974 of the Code of Civil Procedure should be repealed or revised.

Section 1974 of the Code of Civil Procedure, enacted in 1872, provides that no evidence is admissible to charge a person upon a representation as to the credit of a third person unless the representation, or some memorandum thereof, be in writing and either subscribed by or in the handwriting of the party to be charged. Section 1974 is open to the criticism commonly leveled at statutes of frauds, that they shelter more frauds than they

prevent. This result has been avoided by the courts to a considerable extent with respect to the original Statute of Frauds by liberal construction of the Statute and by creating numerous exceptions to it. However, Section 1974 has been applied strictly in California. For example, in Baron v. Lange an action in deceit failed for want of a memorandum against a father who had deliberately misrepresented that his son was the beneficiary of a large trust and that part of the principal would be paid to him, thus inducing the plaintiff to transfer a one-third interest in his business on the son's note.

Only a few states have statutes similar to Section 1974. The courts of some of these states have been more restrictive in applying the statute than has California. Thus, some courts have held or said that the statute does not apply to misrepresentations made with intention to defraud but fraudulent intent will not avoid Section 1974. Again, some states hold the statute inapplicable when the defendant had an interest in the action induced, but this interpretation was rejected in Bank of America v. Western Constructors, Inc. And in Carr v. Tatum the California court failed to apply two limitations to Section 1974 which have been applied to similar statutes elsewhere: (1) construing a particular statement to be a misrepresentation concerning the value of property rather than one as to the credit of a third person; (2) refusing to apply the statute where there is a confidential relationship imposing a duty of disclosure on the defendant. Indeed, the only reported case in which Section 1974 has been held inapplicable was one where the defendant had made the representation about a corporation which was his alter ego, the court holding that the representation was not one concerning a third person.

Section 1974 was repealed as a part of an omnibus revision of the Code of Civil Procedure in 1901 but this act was held void for unconstitutional defects in form.

Study No. 61: A study to determine whether the doctrine of election of remedies should be abolished in cases where relief is sought against different defendants.

Under the common law doctrine of election of remedies the choice of one among two or more inconsistent remedies bars recourse to the others. The doctrine is an aspect of the principle of res judicata, its purpose being to effect economy of litigation and to prevent harassment of a defendant through a series of actions, based on different theories of liability, to obtain relief for a single wrong. The common law doctrine has been applied in cases where the injured party seeks relief first against one person and then against another, although one of its principal justifications, avoidance of successive actions against a single defendant, is inapplicable to such a situation.

The doctrine of election of remedies has frequently been criticized. In 1939 New York abolished the doctrine as applied to cases involving different defendants, on the recommendation of its Law Revision Commission.

The law of California with respect to the application of the doctrine of election of remedies to different defendants is not clear. Our courts have tended, in general, to apply the doctrine only in estoppel situations--i.e., where the person asserting it as a defense can show that he has been prejudiced by the way in which the plaintiff has proceeded--and this limitation has been recently applied in cases involving different defendants. In other cases, application of the doctrine has been avoided by holding that the remedies pursued against the different defendants were not inconsistent. In still other cases which do not appear to be distinguishable, however, the doctrine has been applied to preclude a plaintiff from suing one person merely because he had previously sued another. Since it is difficult to predict the outcome of any particular case in this State today, legislation to clarify and modernize our law on this subject would appear to be desirable.

EXHIBIT III  
STATUS

Study No. :	Subject :	Year Authorized :	Completed Research Report Received? :	Comments :
12	Taking Instructions to Jury Room	1955	Need a new study- have not retained a research con- sultant	Commission made recommendation in 1957. Bill not pushed by Commission because of various mechanical problems involved in getting a copy of the instructions to jury which were not taken care of in bill or considered in previous study. Commission determined in 1958 to carry this study forward and has reaffirmed that decision several times since then. However, pressure of other work has not permitted staff or Commission to devote any atten- tion to this study.
21	Confirmation of Partition Sales	1956-study expanded in 1959	Need a new study- have not retained a research con- sultant	Staff study was prepared on this topic. It was submitted to several practitioners and at their suggestion the topic was broadened in 1959 (by legislative action) to include the entire subject of partit' y actions.
26	Escheat -- What Law Governs	1956	Need a new study- have not retained a research con- sultant	This topic involves a rather narrow point and perhaps the staff could prepare the necessary study if time permits.
27	Putative Spouse	1956	Research con- sultant has not completed study	Professor J. Keith Mann of Stanford Law School is our research consultant on this study. Because of other work, he has

			STATUS		
Study:		Year	Completed	Research	
No. :	Subject	:Authorized:	Report	Received?	Comments
:		:			
27	Putative Spouse (Continued)				not been working on the study. He does not plan to work on it in the near future. He is unable to give us any specific date when it will be completed. He does not believe that he will recommend any legislative action in this field. If he decides not to prepare the study, we will need to get another research consultant.
29	Post-Conviction Sanity Hearings	1956	Yes		We have encumbered funds in a prior year to print the recommendation on this topic. We decided to defer action on this study because the Governor's Commission on Problems of Insanity Relating to Criminal Offenders will consider this matter.
30	Custody Jurisdiction	1956	We have an inadequate study		We paid for the study on this topic because the funds would no longer have been available for payment in the ordinary course after June 30, 1959. Payment was made with the understanding that the research consultant, Dean Kingsley of U.S.C. Law School, would continue to work with the Commission on the study.
34(L)	Uniform Rules of Evidence	1956-A	Study complete legislative assignment except for few minor matters		Commission is now working on the tentative recommendation on the article on hearsay. We have encumbered funds in prior fiscal years to print the following portions of this study: Hearsay (\$3,450); Privilege (\$3,200); Rules 67-72 (\$600).

		STATUS		
Study:		Year	Completed	
No. :	Subject	Authorized:	Research	Comments
:		:	Report	
:		:	Received?	
35(L)	Post-Conviction Procedure	1956-A We have retained a legislative consultant but do assignment not have his study		The Commission received a study from Mr. Paul Selvin recommending that the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedures Act <u>not</u> be adopted in California. The Commission concurred in that recommendation and is now awaiting a study concerning improvements in the details of the existing California law. Professor Herbert L. Packer of Stanford is our consultant on the second study. However, there has been a misunderstanding as to the scope of the study he is to make and we may have to retain another consultant to prepare this research study.
36(L)	Condemnation Law and Procedure	1956-A Legislative assignment completed	Portions completed	We will receive the balance of this research study prior to the 1963 legislative session. We have encumbered funds in prior fiscal years to print the following portions of this study (not printed for 1961 Legislature): Pretrial Conferences and Discovery (\$1,220); Allocation of Award (\$1,220) and Incidental Business Losses (approximately \$500).
39	Attachment, Garnishment and Property Exempt from Execution	1957	Research consultant retained	The Commission anticipates that this will be its major study during the 1963-65 period and will be the subject of a recommendation in 1965. We may find it necessary to submit several recommendations covering various portions of this topic.

STATUS

Study No.	Subject	Year	Authorized:	Completed Research Report Received?	Comments
41	Small Claims Court Law	1957		We have a staff research study that needs some revision	When time permits the staff may be able to complete this study.
42	Trespassing Improvers	1957		We have research study set in type	The staff will need to do quite a bit of research on the rights of various persons who may have security interests in property improved by another before this study will be ready to be considered by the Commission. The funds to print this study will become unavailable in June 1961. However, we have already expended the major portion of these funds.
43	Separate Trial on Issue of Insanity	1957		Yes	We have decided to defer this study. The Governor has appointed a special commission that will consider this matter. (See comment to Study No. 29)
44	Suit in Common Name	1957		We have an inadequate study	When time permits the staff may be able to put this study in a form that will provide a sound basis for Commission action. The study will need considerable work.
45	Mutuality re Specific Performance	1957		We have retained a research consultant	We have not yet received a research report on this topic. We have not set a deadline for our research consultant (Professor Orrin B. Evans of U.S.C.). We have written to him to determine when he will submit the study, but he has not set any time for delivery of the research report.

		STATUS			
Study:		Year	Completed		
No. :	Subject	:Authorized:	Report	Received?	Comments
46	Arson	1957	Yes		We have encumbered funds from a prior fiscal year to print our report on this topic. We plan to submit a recommendation to the 1963 Legislature on this subject.
47	Modification of Contracts	1957	We do not have a research consultant		
49	Rights of Unlicensed Contractor	1957	We have an inadequate study		This study will require considerable work by the staff before it is ready to be considered by the Commission.
50	Rights of Lessor Upon Abandonment by Lessee	1957	We have retained a research consultant		We have not yet received a research study on this topic.
51	Right of Wife to Sue for Support After Ex Parte Divorce	1957	See comment		We received a good research report on this topic but the Supreme Court subsequently reversed its prior decisions and made the research study obsolete. We should either abandon this topic or secure a new research report containing recommendations as to the procedures to be followed in obtaining support after an ex parte divorce.
52(L)	Sovereign Immunity	1957 - A Legislative assignment	We have retained a research consultant and have received a portion of his study.		We have made this study our top priority for the 1963 Session.

			STATUS	
Study No.	Subject	Year Authorized:	Completed Research Report Received?	Comments
53(L)	Whether Personal Injury Damages Should Be Separate Property	1957 - A legislative assignment	Yes	We plan to make this a topic for a recommendation in 1963.
55(L)	Power To Deny New Trial on Condition that Damages Be Increased	1957 - A legislative assignment	Yes	We have some concern as to the quality of this study.
57(L)	Law Relating to Bail	1957	Yes	
59	Service of Process by Publication	1958	Yes-study not yet available in mimeographed form	This study was prepared free of charge by the Harvard Student Legislative Research Bureau. It will require considerable work by the staff before it will be in a form suitable for consideration by the Commission.
60	Representation Relating to Credit of Third Person	1958	We do not have a research consultant	
61	Election of Remedies Where Different Defendants Involved	1958	We have retained a research consultant	Our research consultant advises us that we cannot count on this as a topic on which we can make a recommendation in 1963.

EXHIBIT IV

REPORT ON STATUTES REPEALED BY IMPLICATION  
OR HELD UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Section 10331 of the Government Code provides:

The commission shall recommend the express repeal of all statutes repealed by implication, or held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of the State or the Supreme Court of the United States.

Pursuant to this directive the Commission has made a study of the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States and of the Supreme Court of California handed down since the Commission's 1961 Report was prepared.<sup>52</sup> It has the following to report:

(1) No decision of the Supreme Court of the United States holding a statute of the State unconstitutional or repealed by implication has been found.

(2) No decision of the Supreme Court of California holding a statute of the State repealed by implication has been found.

(3) Two decisions of the Supreme Court of California holding statutes of the State unconstitutional have been found.

In City of Los Angeles v. Offner,<sup>53</sup> the Supreme Court in a four to three decision held unconstitutional former subdivision (i) of

52. This study has been carried through 57 Adv. Cal. 102 (1961) and 68 U.S. 19 (1961).

53. 55 Cal.2d 103, 10 Cal. Rptr. 470, 358 P.2d 926 (1961).

Section 5024 of the Streets and Highways Code<sup>54</sup> because it purported to authorize an assessment in an amount greater than the cost of the local improvement in violation of Section 1 of Article XIII of the California Constitution.

In American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education,<sup>55</sup> the Supreme Court in a four to three decision held unconstitutional the first paragraph of Section 16564 of the Education Code and all of Section 16565 of the same code because these sections require an unconstitutional disclosure and attempt to create an unconstitutional power of prior restraint upon the rights of free assembly and free speech in violation of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and in violation of Sections 9 and 10 of Article I of the California Constitution.

---

54. Section 5024 of the Streets and Highways Code was amended in 1961 to remove the constitutional objections raised in this decision. Stats. 1961, Ch. 276, p. 1310.

55. 55 Cal.2d 167, 10 Cal. Rptr. 647, 359 P.2d 45 (1961); accord, American Civil Liberties Union v. Board of Education, 55 Cal.2d 906, 10 Cal. Rptr. 659, 359 P.2d 57 (1961).