

Memorandum 75-37

Subject: Study 36.25 - Condemnation Law and Procedure (Byroads and Utility Easements)

At the April 1975 meeting, the Commission requested the staff to redraft as Civil Code Section 1001 a section permitting private condemnation for byroads and utility connections. Attached as Exhibit I (green) is a letter from Mr. Huxtable presenting a draft of such a section which would be acceptable to the members of the State Bar Condemnation Committee who were present at the April meeting.

The staff redraft (Exhibit II--yellow) makes several changes designed to satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use": (1) The declaration of legislative policy in Section 2 is added to present the courts with a finding of public use by the Legislature which the courts will accord great weight. (2) A requirement of "great necessity" is made prerequisite to the right to condemn. As the Comment notes, Linggi v. Garovotti requires a stronger showing of necessity than if the plaintiff were a public or quasi-public entity. The alternative test of "strict necessity" embodied in the original Carrell bill is unduly stringent--the staff believes that, if we are to confer the right of condemnation in these cases, we should make it a real and viable right, or not bother with it at all. Also, if the private person is able to demonstrate strict necessity, he may be entitled to a way of necessity without having to condemn and pay just compensation. (3) The staff has, at the Commission's direction, removed the sentence, "The public shall be entitled, as of right, to use and enjoy the easement which is taken." However, the staff believes that this provision is required to make the statute constitutional. See the discussion of Sherman v. Buick in the byroad study attached as Exhibit III (white).

Respectfully submitted,

Nathaniel Sterling
Assistant Executive Secretary

EXHIBIT I

LAW OFFICES OF

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FRANCIS H. O'NEILL
RICHARD L. HUXTABLE
LEROY A. ABELSON

April 8, 1975

California Law Revision Commission
Stanford Law School
Stanford, California 94305

Attention: John H. DeMouilly
Executive Secretary

Re: Proposed Companion Bill re Civil Code Section 1001

Gentlemen:


It is my understanding that at your meeting at your meeting in Los Angeles on April 4, 1975, you decided that the commission was willing to go along with the State Bar Committee in an effort to preserve the concept of "private condemnation" where utility easements and byroads are involved. Although the commission does not want to make the preservation of that concept a part of its conforming revisions bill, it is willing to offer a separate bill for that purpose.

The members of the State Bar Condemnation Committee attending their own meeting on the morning of April 4, 1975, expressed dissatisfaction with the concept of assigning a new Code Section Number and using language so completely different from that of the existing section, especially language of a bill that has already been rejected by the legislature on several occasions. In short, the bill should appear to be a reduction of the powers already existing rather than the creation of new powers.

The form preferred by the members of the Condemnation Committee attending the April 4th meeting is attached.

Your consideration will be appreciated.

Very truly yours,


RICHARD L. HUXTABLE

RLH:cd
Encls.
cc: James. E. Jefferis, Esq.
Roger Sullivan, Esq.

An act to add Section 1001 to the Civil Code, relating to eminent domain.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section 1001 is added to the Civil Code to read:

1001.(a) Any owner of real property may, without further legislative action, acquire private property to provide appurtenant easements for utility service to, or access to a public road from such property, either by consent of the owner or by proceedings had under the provisions of Title 7, Part 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure. The easement that may be taken shall afford the most reasonable service or access to the property for which the easement is taken consistent with other uses of the burdened land and the location of already established utility service and roads. The public shall be entitled, as of right, to use and enjoy the easement which is taken. The owner of the property for which the easement is taken shall maintain any such easement.

1001.(b) This section does not apply to lands of the State Park System as to which Section 5003.5 of the Public Resources Code applies.

1001.(c) This section shall not be utilized for the acquisition of a private or farm crossing over a railroad track, the exclusive remedy of an owner of a land locked parcel to acquire a private or farm crossing over such track being that provided in Section 7537 of the Public Utilities Code.

SECTION 2. This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill Number 278 is chaptered and becomes effective January 1, 1977, and in such case, shall become operative at the same time as Assembly Bill Number 278.

EXHIBIT II

An act to amend Section 1001 of the Civil Code, relating to eminent domain.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:

SECTION 1. Section 1001 of the Civil Code is amended to read:

1001. (a) Any person owner of real property may, without further legislative action, acquire private property by eminent domain for any use specified in Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure either by consent of the owner or by proceedings had under the provisions of Title 7, Part 3, of the Code of Civil Procedure; and any person seeking to acquire property for any of the uses mentioned in such Title is "an-agent of the State," or a "person in charge of such use," within the meaning of these terms as used in such Title. This section shall be in force from and after the fourth day of April, eighteen hundred and seventy-two. an appurtenant easement for which there is a great necessity to provide utility service to, or access to a public road from, such property. The easement that may be taken shall afford the most reasonable service or access to the property for which the easement is taken consistent with other uses of the burdened land and the location of already established utility service and roads. The owner of the property for which the easement is taken shall maintain any such easement unless and until the responsibility for maintenance of the easement is assumed by a public entity or public utility.

(b) This section does not apply to lands of the state park system as to which Section 5003.5 of the Public Resources Code applies.

(c) This section shall not be utilized for the acquisition of a private or farm crossing over a railroad track, the exclusive remedy of an owner of a landlocked parcel to acquire a private or farm crossing over such track being that provided in Section 7537 of the Public Utilities Code.

Comment. Section 1001 is amended to provide the right of eminent domain to private persons for the limited purposes of establishing byroads and making utility connections. Compare Code Civ. Proc. § 1240.350 (substitute condemnation by public entities to provide utility service or access to public road). The exercise of eminent domain authority under Section 1001 is subject to the provisions of the Eminent Domain Law. See Code Civ. Proc. § 1230.020 (law governing exercise of eminent domain power). Under the Eminent Domain Law, there must be "public necessity" for the acquisition (Code Civ. Proc. § 1240.030), and any necessary interest in property may be acquired (Code Civ. Proc. § 1240.110); under Section 1001, however, there must be "great necessity" for the acquisition and only an easement may be acquired. See also Linggi v. Garovotti, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955)(condemnation by private person for sewer connection a public use, but a "stronger showing" of necessity required than if plaintiff were a public or quasi-public entity). It should be noted that public utilities within the meaning of Section 1001 include sewers. See Pub. Util. Code §§ 230.5 (sewer system), 230.6 (sewer system corporation).

The provisions of Section 1001 prior to this amendment, and former Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 to which it referred, are superseded by Code of Civil Procedure Sections 1240.010 (public use limitation) and 1240.020 (statutory delegation of condemnation authority required) and by specific

statements of the condemnation authority of particular persons for particular public uses which are found in the various codes. See Comment to Code Civ. Proc. § 1240.020 and the Comment to former Code Civ. Proc. § 1238.

SEC. 2. The Legislature hereby declares its policy to eliminate landlocked parcels of property and to restore to useful life property cut off from utility service in order to facilitate public safety and to enable the beneficial use of all land in this state.

SEC. 3. This act shall become operative only if Assembly Bill No. 278 is chaptered and becomes effective January 1, 1977, and, in such case, shall become operative at the same time as Assembly Bill No. 278.

EXHIBIT III

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12/12/68

THE USE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN TO ACQUIRE BYROADS*

*This study was prepared for the California Law Revision Commission by the Commission's legal staff. No part of this study may be published without prior written consent of the Commission.

The Commission assumes no responsibility for any statement made in this study, and no statement in this study is to be attributed to the Commission. The Commission's action will be reflected in its own recommendation which will be separate and distinct from this study. The Commission should not be considered as having made a recommendation on a particular subject until the final recommendation of the Commission on that subject has been submitted to the Legislature.

Copies of this study are furnished to interested persons solely for the purpose of giving the Commission the benefit of the views of such persons, and the study should not be used for any other purpose at this time.

A STUDY
relating to
THE USE OF THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN
TO ACQUIRE BYROADS

As enacted in 1872, Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 authorized takings for "byroads" in subdivision (4) and for "byroads leading from highways to residences and farms" in subdivision (6). Subdivision (6) was amended in 1895¹ to cover "byroads leading from highways to residences, farms, mines, mills, factories and buildings for operating machinery, or necessary to reach any property used for public purposes."²

The need for resort to eminent domain to provide byroads is partially alleviated by the common law doctrine of "ways of necessity." When the facts that give rise to a common law way of necessity are established, the right will be recognized; there is no need to institute eminent domain proceedings or to compensate the owner of the land over which the way of necessity is located.³ Nevertheless, subdivision (6) and the "byroad" provision of subdivision (4) are not merely statutory substitutes for the common law way of necessity. A way of necessity arises when a grantor conveys land shut off from access to a road by the grantor's remaining land or by his land and the land of a stranger or where a similar situation is created by a partition, either voluntary or involuntary.⁴ Situations, therefore, exist where a landowner lacks access to an established road and does not have a common law way of necessity.⁵ The right to take property by eminent domain for a "byroad" may provide a solution to this problem where the owner's efforts to purchase a right of access across his neighbor's land fail.

In the leading California decision, Sherman v. Buick,⁶ the taking of private property for a byroad was held proper where the road was in fact to be a public road, open to all who desired to use it, even though the road was designed to provide access for the land of a private person and he bore the cost of establishing and maintaining the road. In Sherman, the court held constitutional an 1861 act⁷ that authorized the county board of supervisors to take private property to establish "public" and "private" roads. The court held that the term "private road" was used merely to designate a particular kind of public road,⁸ and that, notwithstanding the somewhat inaccurate language, the use was public:⁹

Roads, leading from the main road, which run through the county to the residences or farms of individuals, are of public concern and under the control of the Government. Taking private property for the purposes of such roads is not a taking for private use. They are open to everyone who may have occasion to use them, and are therefore public. Their character as public roads is unaffected by the circumstances, that in view of their situation, they are but little used, and are mainly convenient for the use of a few individuals, and such as may have occasion to visit them socially or on matters of business, nor by the circumstance that in view of such conditions the Legislature may deem it just to open and maintain them at the cost of those most immediately concerned instead of the public at large. The object for which they are established is none the less of a public character, and therefore within the supervision of the Government. To call them "private roads" is simply a legislative misnomer, which does not affect or change their real character. By-roads is a better name for them and one which is less calculated to mislead the uninitiated.

In drafting subdivision (6) of Section 1238, which superseded a part of the 1861 act referred to in the Sherman case, the 1872 Code Commissioners adopted the court's suggestion that roads used primarily for the convenience of a few individuals be described as "byroads."¹ The pertinent portion of the remainder of the 1861 act was compiled in Section 2711 of the 1872 Political Code, which read:

Private or by-roads may be opened for the convenience of one or more residents of any road district in the same manner as public roads are opened, whenever the Board of Supervisors may for like cause order the same to be viewed and opened, the person for whose benefit the same is required paying the damages awarded to the landowners, and keeping the same in repair.

In 1883, Section 2711 was repealed and substantially reenacted as Political Code Section 2692.¹¹ Section 2692 was amended in 1913¹² to include coverage for ways for "a canal" and in 1919¹³ the words "irrigation, seepage, or drainage" were inserted before "canal." The section was repealed in 1943,¹⁴ the portion relating to canals being compiled in Water Code Sections 7020-7026 and the portion relating to private or byroads not being continued. In 1949, Political Code Section 2692 was again repealed,¹⁵ and Streets and Highways Code Sections 1128-1133 were enacted by the same act¹⁶ to permit "private or by-roads" to be opened, laid out, or altered for "timber access purposes." A 1955 amendment¹⁷ made these sections applicable to any private or byroad but the sections were repealed in 1961.¹⁸ No special statutory procedure now exists¹⁹ whereby an individual or public entity may condemn to provide the "byroads" described in subdivision (6).

In City of Los Angeles v. Leavis,²⁰ it was held that a city could condemn property for a public street relying solely on Civil Code Section 1001 and Section 1238. Hence, although no appellate decision on this question has been found, it seems fairly clear that subdivision (6) of Section 1238 is itself authority for a public entity to exercise the power of eminent domain to provide "byroads."²¹ However, many cities and counties are reluctant to institute condemnation proceedings to provide a "byroad" even though the benefited person is willing to bear the cost of acquiring and maintaining the road.²²

Appellate courts in California have not decided whether a private person may maintain an action under Civil Code Section 1001 to acquire private property for the sort of byroad described in subdivision (6).²³ Nevertheless, a series of cases has established the proposition that such a byroad is a public use,²⁴ and the California Supreme Court held in Linggi v. Garovotti²⁵ that a private individual may maintain an eminent domain proceeding to provide a sewer connection for a single residence. Although landlocked property does not present the health hazard present in the Linggi case, it is likely that California would follow the holdings in numerous other states²⁶ and permit a private person to acquire a byroad in an appropriate case.

Private corporations have sought unsuccessfully in two cases to condemn access to land. In General Petroleum Corporation v. Hobson²⁷ the holder of an oil and gas prospecting permit granted by the state under a 1921 act²⁸ brought an eminent domain proceeding in the federal court to acquire an easement over private property from the highway

to the place where it planned to prospect for oil. A demurrer to the corporation's complaint was sustained. The corporation contended that the taking was a public use authorized both under the 1921 act and under the Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238. The 1921 act included a provision giving the right of eminent domain to permittees to acquire a right of way over private property, but the court held this provision void as not embraced within the title of the act. An alternative ground for the holding was that the complaint did not show that the taking was for a public purpose:

Nor can section 1238, subd. 5, C.C.P. of California, authorize the taking of private property for "roads * * * for working mines." Subdivision 6: "By-roads leading from highways to residences, farms, mines, mills, factories and buildings for operating machinery, or necessary to reach any property used for public purposes." The plaintiff has no working mines, nor any active industry, nor is it in any sense within any of the provisions of this section, nor is the property covered by the permit used or contemplated to be used for a public purpose, nor can the court assume a public use or purpose where none is claimed, or none can be reasonably deduced from conceded or established facts. *Sherman v. Buick*, 32 Cal. 241, 91 Am. Dec. 577, is not elucidating, nor is *Monterey County v. Cushing*, 83 Cal. 507, 23 P. 700; nor was this issue before the court in *County of Madera v. Raymond Granite Co.*, 139 Cal. 128, 72 P. 915. These cases are cited because particularly relied upon by the plaintiff. All cases cited have been examined, but have not [sic] application.

Eminent domain can only be invoked because the interest of the public is greater than the interest of the private individual, and may not be invoked by a private person for private gain or advantage. The plaintiff's permit prospecting for oil enterprise by reason thereof is speculative and wholly private, and the private property may not be taken for a private purpose. Clearly the complaint does not state a cause of action; complainant does not show that it has legal capacity to maintain the action, nor that the taking is for a public purpose. [Emphasis in original.]

The meaning of this language is not entirely clear. It is clear, however, that the court concluded that the use for which the property was sought to be acquired--prospecting for oil--was not one within any of the provisions of Section 1238. The court may have overlooked the general authorization to condemn for "byroads" in subdivision (4). Some of the language indicates that the court also may have had in mind the well-established proposition that the mere fact that a particular use is listed in Section 1238 does not mean that the use is a public use under the facts of a particular case.³⁰ The court also seems to take the position that the residence, farm, mine, mill, factory or buildings for operating machinery referred to in subdivision (6) must already be in existence at the time access is sought to be condemned. This line of reasoning would not apply to subdivision (4) which authorizes exercise of the power of eminent domain for "byroads" without any

limitation or description such as that found in subdivision (6), but the court did not refer to subdivision (4). The opinion does not appear absolutely to preclude a private person from taking private property for a byroad described in subdivision (6). At the same time, the holding in the case would permit no significant application of the "byroad" authorization in subdivision (4).

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In City of Sierra Madre v. Superior Court, a land developer sought to maintain a proceeding in the name of the city to acquire an access road to a planned subdivision in order to meet the requirements for subdivision approval. As the city had not authorized the proceeding, prohibition issued to prevent its prosecution. The opinion does not indicate whether the proceeding would have been permitted had the developer brought the suit in its own name.

In addition to establishing that the byroad would be a "public use" under the circumstances of the particular case, the condemnor would also have to show that the proposed taking is "necessary."³² Reasoning from the common law way of necessity cases³³ and the Linggi decision,³⁴ it seems safe to predict that the courts would not allow condemnation if there were any other reasonable alternative to the taking.

This survey demonstrates the uncertainty that now exists as to whether property may be taken to provide an access road from an established highway to the land of a private person. This uncertainty

should be eliminated in any revision of the law of eminent domain. The following recommendations are made in this connection:

1. The provision in subdivision (4) of Section 1238 of the Code of Civil Procedure relating to "byroads" and subdivision (6) of the same section should be eliminated. These provisions should be superseded by more explicit statutory provisions.

2. A statutory provision should be enacted to provide expressly that any public condemnor that acquires property for a public use may acquire by eminent domain such additional property as is necessary to provide access to property not taken which would otherwise become landlocked by the taking. It is fairly clear that the taking of property to provide access in this situation

would be held to be a public use.³⁵ Although such a statute might be limited to takings for limited access highways, such a limitation is not recommended. Since it is the taking by the condemnor that creates the need for the access road, the condemnor should have authority to provide access where this would be the appropriate method of mitigating the adverse consequences of the taking. Any attempted abuse could be prevented by finding that the taking for the access road is not a public use under the facts of the parti-

cular case.³⁶ The California Supreme Court has recently taken a very liberal position toward "excess condemnation"³⁷ and a significant benefit of the recommended statutory provision would be elimination of the need for excess condemnation in some situations.

3. A procedure similar in substance to that provided by former Streets and Highways Code Sections 1128-1133 should be reenacted. These sections were repealed in 1951. They permitted the county board of supervisors to take property for a road, open to all who desired to use it, but required that the cost of acquisition, establishment, and maintaining the road be imposed on the person or persons primarily benefited. This procedure places the board of supervisors in the position of determining whether the access road should be established. On the other hand, it imposes the costs on the benefited persons. If this type of procedure were adopted, the statute should permit cities and other public entities concerned with road work to utilize the procedure.

A convenient means of accomplishing this recommendation would be to amend the Street Opening Act of 1903 (Street and Highways Code Sections 4000-4043) to make clear that byroads may be provided pursuant to that act. The act appears to be the one most readily adaptable for the opening of byroads since it provides a complete and satisfactory procedure covering notice, legislative and judicial review, compensation and assessment.

4. As an alternative to the preceding recommendation, private persons might be authorized to condemn easements that would be dedicated to public use, be open to the public, and provide ingress and egress from private property to established roads. Such a taking should be permitted only upon a showing of strict necessity and not where the person has another method of access, even though the latter is inconvenient. The burden of maintaining the access

road should be imposed on the person seeking access. Many of the other states authorize the use of the power of eminent domain to acquire property for such purposes. As maximum utilization of land is important, and as a strict showing of necessity might adequately protect the condemnee, this may be one of the few instances in which "private condemnation" would be justified. It is possible that this alternative would merely restate existing California law.

Senate Bill No. 18, introduced at the 1968 session of the California Legislature but not enacted, dealt with this problem and would have enacted the substance of items 1, 3, and 4 above.³⁸

THE DECLARED PUBLIC USES
BYROADS AND WAYS OF NECESSITY
FOOTNOTES

1. Cal. Stats. 1895, Ch. 98, §.1, p. 89.
2. It is interesting to trace the historical development of "byroads." In colonial times, statutes permitted individuals to condemn private property for access roads for their private use. As additional areas of the country were opened to settlement, similar statutes were enacted. It was generally assumed that these statutes were valid until the 1840's and 1850's when a narrowing of the concept of public use occurred; in all but a few states, the use of eminent domain to acquire land for private roads for the exclusive use of a few persons was held a private use. In California and some other states, the statutes were either construed or revised to permit the taking of lands for access roads only if the roads were open to public use. In a substantial number of states, constitutional provisions were adopted to permit the taking of private property by eminent domain for access roads. E.g., Ala. Const., Art. I, § 23 (1901); Ariz. Const., Art. II, § 17 (1910); Colo. Const., Art. II, § 14 (1876); Ga. Const., Art. I, § 2-301, para 1 (1877); Ill. Const., Art. IV, § 30 (1870); Kan. Const., Art. 12, § 4 (1859); La. Const., Art. III, § 37 (1921); Miss. Const., Art. 4, § 110 (1890); Mo. Const. of 1945, Art. I, § 28 (1875); N.Y. Const., Art. I, § 7, subd. (c) (1846); Okla. Const., Art. II, § 23 (1907); Wash. Const., Art. I, § 16 (1889); Wyo. Const., Art. 1, § 32 (1889). See also Fla. Const., Art. XVI, § 29 (1885); Ore. Const., Art. I, § 18 (1857). The California Constitutional Convention did not consider such a provision; only a passing reference was made in the debates to this problem. II Debates and Proceedings of the Constitutional

Convention of the State of California 1028 (1881) [1878-1879]
(Remarks of Mr. Shafter).

It has been recognized in California and elsewhere that the taking of property for use as a public road is a taking for a public use, even though the road is used primarily to provide access to the land of a single individual. E.g., *Sherman v. Buick*, 32 Cal. 241 (1867). 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 34 (1965) ("[T]he principle to be deduced from the cases bearing on the question seems to be that if the road, when laid out, is in fact a public road, open to all who may desire to use it, it is a public use, and valid, although the road is primarily designed for the benefit of an individual, and although the cost of laying out and maintaining such road is borne in whole or in part by the petitioners therefor." {footnotes omitted}). Compare 26 Am. Jur.2d Eminent Domain § 47 (1966).

The historical development is traced in Nichols, The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 Boston U. L. Rev. 615, 617-626 (1940). For an historical account in a particular state, see Notes, 11 Ala. L. Rev. 182 (1958)(Alabama); 33 Ky. L. J. 129 (1944) (Kentucky).

3. *Taylor v. Warnaky*, 55 Cal. 350 (1880); *Blum v. Weston*, 102 Cal. 362, 369, 36 Pac. 778, 780 (1894); *Reese v. Borghi*, 216 Cal. App.2d 324, 30 Cal. Rptr. 868 (1963).
4. E.g., *Mesmer v. Uharriet*, 174 Cal. 110, 162 Pac. 104 (1916) (partition); *Reese v. Borghi*, 216 Cal. App.2d 324, 332-333, 30 Cal. Rptr. 868, 873 (1963); *Tarr v. Watkins*, 180 Cal. App.2d 362, 4 Cal. Rptr. 293 (1960). See also *Daywalt v. Walker*, 217 Cal. App.2d 669, 675, 31 Cal. Rptr. 899, 902 (1963). A way of necessity continues only

so long as the necessity exists. See generally *Martinelli v. Luis*, 213 Cal. 183, 1 Pac. 980 (1931); *Cassin v. Cole*, 153 Cal. 677, 679, 96 Pac. 277, 278 (1908).

5. In addition, the showing of "necessity" required to acquire a byroad by eminent domain may not be the same as that required to establish a common law way of necessity. The common law right exists only in cases of extreme necessity and not where the landowner has another means of access even though inconvenient. *Marin County Hosp. Dist. v. Cicurel*, 154 Cal. App. 2d 294, 302, 316 P.2d 32, 37 (1957). See also *Smith v. Shrbek*, 71 Cal. App.2d 351, 360, 162 P.2d 674, 678 (1945).
6. 32 Cal. 242 (1867).
7. Cal. Stats. 1861, Ch. 380, § 7, p. 392.
8. "[T]he legislature of this state . . . [i]n the plan devised by them . . . have for the purpose of classification divided roads into 'public and private,' and provided how they may be laid out and established and how maintained. The former are to be laid out and maintained at the expense of the county or road district at large, and are therefore called 'public.' The latter at the expense of such persons as are more especially and directly interested in them, and therefore called 'private.' But the latter are as much public as the former, for any one can travel them who has occasion--and no more can be said of the former." 32 Cal. at 253. See also 45 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 98 (1965). Cf. *Brick v. Keim*, 208 Cal. App.2d 499, 503-504, 25 Cal. Rptr. 321, 323-324 (1962).
9. 32 Cal. at 255-256.
10. See Code Commissioners' Note to subdivision (6): "Subdivision 6 supersedes part of § 7 (Stats. 1861, p. 392), which prescribes the mode for laying out private roads. This clause has been drawn to make it conformable to the decision in *Sherman v. Buick*, 32 Cal.

241, 91 Am. Dec. 597." The same word--"byroad"--was also used in subdivision (4) of Section 1238.

11. Cal. Stats. 1883, Ch. 10, p. 5. Section 2692 was held constitutional. *Monterey County v. Cushing*, 83 Cal. 507, 23 Pac. 700 (1890); *Los Angeles County v. Reyes*, 3 Cal. Unrep. 775, 32 Pac. 233 (1893); *Lake County v. Allman*, 102 Cal. 432, 36 Pac. 767 (1895); *County of Madera v. Raymond G. Co.*, 139 Cal. 128, 72 Pac. 915 (1903).
12. Cal. Stats. 1913, Ch. 61, § 1, p. 62.
13. Cal. Stats. 1919, Ch. 73, § 1, p. 117.
14. Cal. Water Code § 15002, Cal. Stats. 1943, Ch. 368, p. 1895.
15. Cal. Stats. 1949, Ch. 883, § 6, p. 1652.
16. Cal. Stats. 1949, Ch. 883, §§ 1-5, p. 1652.
17. Cal. Stats. 1955, Ch. 1308, § 1, p. 2374.
18. Cal. Stats. 1961, Ch. 1354, § 1, p. 3133.
19. Streets and Highways Code Sections 969.5 and 1160-1197 provide a procedure for the improvement of a private easement or roadway not accepted or acceptable into the county highway system but upon which a permanent public easement is offered or a privately owned road where a right of way has been granted or leased to the county for its own use or for the use of the state or other public agency for public purposes, but these sections do not authorize condemnation. As to expenditure of public funds to maintain roads not accepted as county roads, see 45 Ops. Cal. Atty. Gen. 98 (1965)..Cf. *City of Oakland v. Parker*, 70 Cal. App. 295, 233 Pac. 68 (1924).
20. 119 Cal. 164, 51 Pac. 34 (1897):

21. The mere fact that individuals have subscribed money or given a bond to a public entity to contribute toward the expense of establishing a public road would not make the taking one for "private" use. E.g., *Santa Ana v. Harlin*, 99 Cal. 538, 541, 34 Pac. 224, 226 (1893); *City of Oakland v. Parker*, 70 Cal. App. 295, 233 Pac. 68 (1924).
22. But see *City of Oakland v. Parker*, 70 Cal. App. 295, 233 Pac. 68 (1924).
23. *People v. Superior Court*, 68 Cal.2d , 65 Cal. Rptr. 342, 436 P.2d 342 (1968), the leading California case on "excess condemnation," the Brief of Amicus Curiae in the Court of Appeal contended that the condemnor's rationale for the excess condemnation--that the remainder would be "landlocked"--was unsound:

The condemnor's theory contains a fatal legal flaw. That flaw is the failure to recognize that in California, as a matter of law, there is no such thing as a "landlocked" parcel.

Civil Code § 1001 provides that any person may exercise the power of eminent domain without further legislative action. C.C.P. § 1238 lists the various purposes for which such power may be used, including the acquisition of access to a highway.

An application of the above principle may be found in *Linggi v. Garovotti* (1955) 45 Cal.2d 20 where a private individual was permitted to condemn a sewer easement across his neighbor's land. . . .

It is, therefore, plain that just as Mr. Linggi did, the Rodonis [owners of remainder] can condemn an easement of access to Parcel 9 [the remainder], across neighboring land. The condemnor's "landlocked and therefore worthless" parcel theory therefore lacks merit. [Brief of Amicus Curiae in Court of Appeal at 7-8.]

The Department of Public Works did not dispute the possibility that the private owner could condemn a byroad,

but pointed out that no "jury would be favorably inclined towards the condemnor were it to leave a property owner in such a predicament." [Reply of Petitioner to Memorandum in Opposition of Real Parties in Interest and Amicus Curiae Brief, Court of Appeal, at 4.]

24. See cases cited in note 11 supra.
25. 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 Pac. 15 (1955).
26. E.g., *Komposh v. Powers*, 75 Mont. 493, 244 Pac. 298 (1926), *Derryberry v. Beck*, 153 Tenn. 220, 280 S.W. 1014 (1926), *State v. Superior Court*, 145 Wash. 307, 260 Pac. 527 (1927). See also note 2 supra.
27. 23 F.2d 349 (1927).
28. Cal. Stats. 1921, Ch. 303, p. 404.
29. 23 F.2d at 350.
30. See discussion, supra, at p. _____.
31. 191 Cal. App.2d 587, 12 Cal. Rptr. 836 (1961).
32. See discussion supra, at p. _____.
33. See note 5, supra.
34. *Linggi v. Garovotti*, 45 Cal.2d 20, 286 P.2d 15 (1955).
35. *Department of Public Works v. Farina*, 29 Ill.2d 474, 194 N.E.2d 209 (1963); *Luke v. Mass. Turnpike Auth.*, 337 Mass. 304, 149 N.E.2d 225 (1958); *May v. Ohio Turnpike Comm.*, 172 Ohio St. 555, 178 N.E.2d 920 (1962); *Tracy v. Preston, Director of Highways*, 172 Ohio St. 567, 178 N.E.2d 923 (1962).

36. See People v. Superior Court, 68 Cal.2d , 65 Cal. Rptr. 342.
436 P.2d 342 (1968).

37. Id.

38. The bill was amended after its introduction so that it would have amended Code of Civil Procedure Section 1238 to delete "byroad" from subdivision (4) and to delete subdivision (6) and would have added two new sections to the Code of Civil Procedure to read:

1238.8. Subject to the provisions of this title, the right of eminent domain may be exercised in behalf of the following public uses:

The acquisition of an easement by the owner of private property for which there is a strict necessity for an easement for access to a public road from such property. The easement which may be taken shall afford the most reasonable access to the property for which the easement is taken consistent with other uses of the burdened land and the location of already established roads, and shall include the right to install or have installed utility facilities therein. The public shall be entitled, as of right, to use and enjoy the easement which is taken. The owner of the property for which the easement is taken shall maintain any such easement.

This section does not apply to lands of the state park system as to which Section 5003.5 of the Public Resources Code applies.

This section shall not be utilized for the acquisition of a private or farm crossing over a railroad track, the exclusive remedy of an owner of a landlocked parcel to acquire a private or farm crossing over such track being that provided in Section 7537 of the Public Utilities Code.

1238.9. In any case in which the state, a county, city, public district or other public agency in this state exercises the right of eminent domain, additional property may be taken in an amount reasonably necessary to provide access to a public road from any property which is not taken and for which there is a strict necessity for an easement of access to a public road from such property. The easement which may be taken shall afford the most reasonable access to the property, consistent with other uses of the burdened land and the location of already established roads. The public shall be entitled, as of right, to use and enjoy the easement which is taken. The owner of the property for which the easement is taken shall maintain any such easement.