

#34

9/2/64

Memorandum 64-68

Subject: Study No. 34(L) - Uniform Rules of Evidence (Evidence Code--
Amendments, Repeals)

There is attached to this memorandum two copies of comments relating to the proposed revisions of statutes other than the Evidence Code that will be contained in our proposed bill. For the most part, the revisions commented upon are contained in the amendments and repeals portion of your folder containing the proposed Evidence Code. You will receive in the near future the galleys for the preprinted bill, and they will contain any sections that do not appear in the materials you now have. Please mark one copy of the comments and return it to the staff.

The revisions indicated reflect, for the most part, actions taken by the Commission. A few adjustments have been made to correct references, etc., in sections not considered by the Commission. In addition, a few substantive revisions or repeals had to be made without Commission action in order to have the bill printed.

The following matters should be noted:

Insignificant adjustments.

We can find no record of Commission action on the following sections. The adjustments are minor, however, and we believe no policy questions are involved.

Bus. & Prof. C. § 25009, C.C.P. §§ 1, 125, 2009, and Govt. C. § 19580.

There is an incorrect reference on page 1523. The Section 447 appearing in the margin should be Section 446.

Policy questions.

In addition to the foregoing, we can find no record of Commission action on the following sections where some policy considerations may be present:

C.C.P. § 1947. This section was presented at the last meeting; but at the

time there were only four Commissioners present and the matter was passed without action.

Professor Degnan recommends repeal of the section. See Study pp. 192-193. The section appears to have been enacted originally to meet the requirement of the "shop-book" rule that an entry be an original entry. The business-records exception does not require originality of entry so long as the entry was made at or near the time of the fact recorded.

The section might be considered an exception to the best evidence rule, but it is difficult to conceive of a case to which it might be applied. If the entry is sought to be proved under the business records exception, the best evidence rule merely requires the production of the particular entry that is sought to be proved under the business records exception whether or not that entry is an original. If the entry is sought to be proved because it is itself material, then the best evidence rule requires the introduction of the particular entry that is material--whether or not that entry is an original.

Accordingly, we think that the section may be repealed without harm. If it is retained, however, we suggest that it be compiled in the best evidence article.

C.C.P. § 2066. This section is discussed at pp. 159-160 of Professor Degnan's study. He recommends that the section be retained; but he recommends that it be left in the Code of Civil Procedure along with the surrounding sections relating to witnesses. See Study, p. 161, and this memo, below. We deleted the section on the ground that it covers the method of interrogation, which is also covered by Section 765.

Penal C. § 939.6. We can find no record of Commission action on the amendment proposed. The revision seems necessary, however, to make sense out of the section.

Unrepealed sections.

In Part VI of Professor Degnan's study, several sections are discussed. Most of these have been considered, but we can find no record of Commission action upon a few of them that are listed below.

C.C.P. § 1878. A witness is a person whose declaration under oath is received as evidence for any purpose, whether such declaration be made on oral examination, or by deposition or affidavit.

Professor Degnan's recommendation is to compile the section in Division 2 of Evidence Code. The section is unnecessary; and Professor Degnan indicates that if there were no such section in existence, it would be unnecessary to create one. The section, therefore, could be repealed without harm. All the remaining sections in the chapter in which it appears have been repealed because they are superseded by the Evidence Code. We left the section in the Code of Civil Procedure because there are some remaining provisions in that code relating to witnesses. See §§ 1985-1997.

C.C.P. §§ 2002-2005. Although it is not altogether clear, apparently Professor Degnan recommends the repeal of all of these sections. Section 2002 states but a truism. Section 2003 should be moved to the affidavit article immediately following. Section 2004 is unnecessary in light of the Discovery Act; and Section 2005 is unnecessary in the light of C.C.P. Section 1846, which has been recodified in Evidence Code Sections 710 and 711.

Professor Degnan also suggests, however, that there are no essential changes to be made in this article. Hence, we left it unmodified.

C.C.P. §§ 2009-2015.6. Professor Degnan recommends that these sections, which comprise an article on affidavits, be left unchanged in the Code of Civil Procedure. (He recommends a minor adjustment in Section 2009 which has been made in our proposed bill.)

C.C.P. §§ 1985-1997. The sections prescribe the procedure for compelling

witnesses to attend and testify. Professor Degnan recommends that they be left in the Code of Civil Procedure because they relate to many proceedings other than judicial proceedings. He recommends the addition of a section to the Evidence Code, however, reading:

The provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure governing the attendance and testimony of witnesses and the production of books, documents, or things under their control shall apply to proceedings subject to this code.

We think, however, that such an addition is unnecessary. Nothing in the Evidence Code implies that the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure are not applicable to everything they may be applied to.

C.C.P. §§ 2064-2070. Professor Degnan recommends the retention of these sections, except Section 2065, in the Code of Civil Procedure. He recommends repeal of Section 2065. We have followed his recommendations except insofar as Section 2066 is concerned. See above.

Respectfully submitted,

Joseph B. Harvey
Assistant Executive Secretary

BUSINESS AND PROFESSIONS CODE

Section 2904 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2904 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1010-1026.

Section 5012 (Amended)

Comment. The deleted language in Section 5012 is inconsistent with Evidence Code Section 1452. See the Comment to that section.

Section 25009 (Amended)

Comment. This amendment merely changes the obsolete references in the section.

CIVIL CODE

Section 53 (Amended)

Comment. This revision of Section 53 provides, in effect, that the judge may take judicial notice of the matter specified in subdivision (c) and is required to take such judicial notice if he is requested to do so and the parties supply him with sufficient information. See Evidence Code Sections 452 and 453 and the Comments thereto.

Section 164.5 (Added)

Comment. Section 164.5, which is a new section added to the Civil Code, states existing decisional and statutory law. The presumption stated in the first sentence of Section 164.5 is established by a number of California cases. It places upon the person asserting that any property is separate property the burden of proving that it was acquired by gift, devise, or descent, or that the consideration given for it was separate property, or that it is personal injury damages, or that for some other reason the property is not community property. *E.g., Rozan v. Rozan*, 49 Cal. 2d 322, 317 P.2d 11 (1957); *Meyer v. Kinzer*, 12 Cal. 247 (1859). See THE CALIFORNIA FAMILY LAWYER § 4.8 (Cal. Cont. Ed. Bar 1961).

The second sentence of Section 164.5 also states existing case law. *E.g., Estate of Rolls*, 193 Cal. 594, 226 Pac. 608 (1924); *Meyer v. Kinzer*, *supra*.

The third sentence of Section 164.5 states the apparent effect of subdivision 40 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1963. The meaning of subdivision 40, however, is not clear. See 4 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, *Community Property* § 26 (7th ed. 1960); Note, 43 CAL. L. REV. 687, 690-691 (1955).

Sections 193, 194, and 195 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 193, 194, and 195 are superseded by the more accurate statement of the presumption in Evidence Code Section 661. See the Comment to that section.

Sections 3544-3548 (Added)

Comment. Sections 3544-3548 are new sections added to the Civil Code and are compiled among the maxims of jurisprudence. Sections 3544-3548 restate the provisions of subdivisions 3, 19, 28, 32, and 33 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1963 and supersede those subdivisions. The maxims are not intended to qualify any substantive provisions of law, but to aid in their just application. CIVIL CODE § 3509.

Section 1747 (Amended)

Comment. Section 1747 has been amended merely to substitute a reference to the pertinent section of the Evidence Code for the reference to the superseded Code of Civil Procedure section:

Title of Part IV of Code of Civil Procedure (Amended)

Comment. The title of Part IV has been changed to reflect the fact that the evidence provisions contained therein have been superseded by the Evidence Code.

Section 1823 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1823 is superseded by the definition of "evidence" in Evidence Code Section 140:

Section 1824 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1824 is substantially recodified as Evidence Code Section 140.

Section 1825 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1825, which merely states in general terms the content of Part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure, serves no useful purpose. No case has been found where the section was pertinent to the decision.

Section 1826 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1826 contains an inaccurate description of the normal burden of proof: It is superseded by Division 5 (commencing with Section 500) of the Evidence Code:

Section 1827 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1827 is superseded by the definition of "evidence" in Evidence Code Section 140. Although judicial notice is not included in the

definition of "evidence" in Section 140, the subject is covered in Division 4 (commencing with Section 450) of the Evidence Code. See also EVIDENCE CODE § 145.

Section 1828 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1828 attempts to classify evidence into a number of different categories, each of which in turn is defined by the sections that follow, i.e., Sections 1829-1837. This very elaborate classification system represents the analysis of evidence law of a century ago. Writers, courts, and lawyers today use different classifications and different terminology. Accordingly, Section 1828 is repealed. To the extent that the terms defined in Sections 1829 through 1837 should be retained, those terms are defined in the Evidence Code. See, e.g., EVIDENCE CODE § 410, defining "direct evidence."

Section 1829 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1829 and 1830 serve no definitional purpose in the existing statutes and appear to state a "best evidence rule" that is inconsistent with both the Evidence Code and previously existing law. See EVIDENCE CODE §§ 1500-1510.

Section 1830 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1829.

Section 1831 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1831 is substantially recodified as Evidence Code Section 410. The term "direct evidence", which is defined in Section 1831 is not used in part IV of the Code of Civil Procedure except in Section 1844. Section 1844 is also repealed and its substance is contained in Evidence Code Section 411.

Section 1832 (Repealed)

Comment. "Indirect evidence" as defined in Section 1832 is more commonly known as circumstantial evidence. The defined term has no substantive significance insofar as either the Code of Civil Procedure or the Evidence Code is concerned, for under either statutory scheme circumstantial evidence, when relevant, is as admissible as direct evidence. The defined term is used in the Code of Civil Procedure only in Section 1957 (also repealed), which merely classifies indirect evidence as either inferences or presumptions.

The repeal of Section 1832 will not affect the instructions that are to be given to the jury in appropriate cases as to the difference between direct and circumstantial evidence. Nor will the repeal of this section affect the case law or other statutes relating to what evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict or finding.

Section 1833 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1833 is inconsistent with Evidence Code Section 602.

Section 1834 (Repealed)

Comment. The substance of Section 1834 is stated as a rule of law, rather than as a definition, in Evidence Code Section 403 (b).

Section 1836 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1836 serves no useful purpose. The defined term is not used in either the Evidence Code or in the existing statutes.

Section 1837 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1837 is unnecessary. The defined term is not used in the Evidence Code or in existing statutes.

Section 1838 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1838 is unnecessary. The defined term is not used in the Evidence Code or in existing statutes. The repeal of Section 1838 will have no effect on the principle that cumulative evidence may be excluded, for that principle is expressed in Evidence Code Section 352--without, however, using the term "cumulative evidence".

Section 1839 (Repealed)

Comment. The definition of "corroborative evidence" in Section 1839 (which requires corroborative evidence to be evidence "of a different character") is inconsistent with the case law that has developed in California which has not required that corroborating evidence be of a "different character". The repeal of Section 1839, therefore, will have no effect on the interpretation of the sections in various codes that require corroborating evidence; the case law that has developed under these sections will continue to determine what constitutes corroborating evidence for the purposes of the particular sections.

One out-dated case indicates that an instruction on what constitutes corroborating evidence is adequate if given in the words of Section 1839. People v. Sternberg, 111 Cal. 11, 43 Pac. 201 (1896). See also People v. Monteverde, 11 Cal. App.2d 156, 244 P.2d 447 (1952). On the other hand, recent cases do not cite or rely on Section 1839 in defining what constitutes corroborating evidence, and California Jury Instructions, Criminal, provides definitions of corroborating evidence derived from the case law rather than from Section 1839. See, e.g., CALJIC (2d ed. 1958) Nos. 203 (Rev.) (possession of stolen property), 235 (Rev.) (possession of stolen property), 592-C (Rev.) (abortion), 766 (perjury), and 822 (Rev.) (corroboration of testimony of accomplices). See CONTINUING EDUCATION OF THE BAR, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL LAW PRACTICE 473-477 (1964);

Tentative Recommendation and a Study Relating to the Uniform Rules of Evidence
(Article I. General Provisions), 6 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP. REC. & STUDIES
1, 56-57 (1964).

Section 1844 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1844 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 411.

Section 1845 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1845 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 702, 800-801,
and 1200.

Section 1845.5 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1845.5 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 830.

Section 1846 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1846 is recodified in substance in Evidence Code Sections
710 and 711.

Section 1847 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1847 is inconsistent with the definition of a presumption
in Evidence Code Section 600. The right of a party to attack the credibility of
a witness by any evidence relevant to that issue is assured by Evidence Code
Sections 351, 780, and 785.

Section 1848 (Repealed)

Comment. Insofar as Section 1848 deals with hearsay it is superseded by the
hearsay rule, stated in Evidence Code Section 1200, and the numerous exceptions
thereto. If Section 1848 has a broader application, its meaning is not clear
and its possible applications are undesirable; hence, there is no justification
for retaining the section.

Section 1849 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1849 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 1226.

Section 1850 (Repealed)

Comment. Insofar as Section 1850 relates to hearsay, it is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1240 and 1241, which provide exceptions to the hearsay rule for contemporaneous and spontaneous declarations. Insofar as Section 1850 relates to declarations that are themselves material, the section is unnecessary; for inasmuch as Evidence Code Sections 225 and 1200 make clear that such declarations are not hearsay, they are admissible under the general principle that relevant evidence is admissible. See EVIDENCE CODE §§ 210, 351.

Section 1851 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1851 is superseded by the exceptions to the hearsay rule stated in Evidence Code Sections 1225 and 1302.

Section 1852 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1852 is superseded by the exceptions to the hearsay rule stated in Article 11 (commencing with Section 1310) of Chapter 2 of Division 10 of the Evidence Code.

Section 1853 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1853 is an imperfect statement of the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule and is superseded by Evidence Code Section 1230. See the Comment to that section.

Section 1854 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1854 is substantially recodified as Evidence Code Section 390.

Section 1855 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1855 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1500-1510.

Section 1855a (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1855a is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1601.

Section 1863 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1863 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 753.

Section 1867 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1867 is based on the obsolete theory that some allegations are necessary that are not material, i.e., essential to the claim or defense. CODE CIV. PROC. § 463. Section 1867 provides that only the material allegations need be proved. Since the section is obsolete, it is repealed.

Section 1868 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1868 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 210, 351, and 352.

Section 1869 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1869 is inconsistent with and superseded by Evidence Code Sections 500 and 510. Moreover, it is an inaccurate statement of the manner in which the burden of proof is allocated under existing law.

Section 1870 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1870 is superseded by the provisions of the Evidence Code indicated below:

<u>Section 1870</u> <u>(subdivision)</u>	<u>Evidence Code</u> <u>(section)</u>
1	210, 351
2	1220
3	1221
4 (first clause)	1310, 1311

Section 1870
(subdivision)

Evidence Code
(section)

4 (second clause)	1230
4 (third clause)	1242
5 (first sentence)	1222, 1224
5 (second sentence)	1225, 1226, 1230
6	1223
7	1240, 1241 (See also the Comment to CODE CIV. PRCC. § 1850)
8	1290-1292
9 (first clause)	720, 721, 800, 801, 1416
9 (second clause)	720, 721, 801
10	870
11	1314, 1320-1322
12	Unnecessary (See CODE CIV. PROC. § 1861 and CIV. CODE §§ 1644, 1645. See also CCM. CODE § 2208.)
13	1312, 1313, 1320
14	1500-1510
15	210, 351
16	210, 780, 785

Section 1871 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1871 is recodified as Evidence Code Sections 724 and 730-733.

Section 1872 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1872 is recodified in Evidence Code Sections 722 and 802.

Section 1875 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1875 is superseded by the provisions of the Evidence Code indicated below:

<u>Section 1875 (subdivision)</u>	<u>Evidence Code (section)</u>
1	451(e)
2	451(a)-(d), 452(a)-(f)
3	451(a)-(d), 452(a)-(c), (e)
4	452(f), 453
5	1452
6, 7, and 8	1452-1454 (official signatures and seals); 451(f), 452(g)(h) (remainder of subdivisions)
9	451(f), 452(g)(h)
Next to last paragraph	454, 455
Last paragraph	311

Section 1879 (Repealed)

Comment. Insofar as Section 1879 declares all persons to be competent witnesses, it is superseded by Evidence Code Section 700; insofar as it requires perception and recollection on the part of the witness, it is superseded in part by Evidence Code Sections 701 and 702. Insofar as it is not superseded by the Evidence Code, Section 1879 treats matters of credibility as matters of competency and is, therefore, disapproved.

Section 1880 (Repealed)

Comment. Subdivisions 1 and 2 of Section 1880 are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 700-702.

Subdivision 3 of Section 1880 is the California version of the so-called Dead Man Statute. Dead Man Statutes provide that one engaged in litigation with a decedent's estate cannot be a witness as to any matter or fact occurring before the decedent's death. These statutes appear to rest on the belief that to permit the survivor to testify in the proceeding would be unfair because the other party to the transaction is not available to testify and, hence, only a part of the whole story can be developed. Because the dead cannot speak, the living are also silenced out of a desire to treat both sides equally. See generally *Moul v. McVey*, 49 Cal. App.2d 101, 121 P.2d 83 (1942); *Recommendation and Study Relating to the Dead Man Statute*, 1 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES, Recommendation and Study at D-1 (1957).

Subdivision 3, which is part of a statute containing the rules relating to the incompetency of infants and insane persons, would appear to be a provision relating to competency. But this subdivision has, in effect, become a rule of privilege, for the courts have permitted the executor or administrator to waive the benefit of the subdivision. See, e.g., *McClenahan v. Keyes*, 188 Cal. 574, 206 Pac. 454 (1922).

In 1957, the Commission recommended the repeal of the Dead Man Statute and the enactment of a statute providing that in certain specified types of actions written or oral statements of a deceased person made upon his personal knowledge were not to be excluded as hearsay. See *Recommendation and Study Relating to The Dead Man Statute*, 1 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES, Recommendation and Study at D-1 (1957). The 1957 recommendation has not been enacted as law. For the legislative history of this measure, see 1 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES IX (1957).

Although the Dead Man Statute undoubtedly cuts off some fictitious claims, it results in the denial of just claims in a substantial number of cases. As the Commission's 1957 recommendation and study demonstrates, the statute balances the scales of justice unfairly in favor of decedents' estates. See 1 CAL. LAW REVISION COMM'N, REP., REC. & STUDIES, pp. D-6, D-43 to D-45 (1957). Moreover, it has been productive of much litigation; yet, many questions as to its meaning and effect are still unanswered. For these reasons, the Commission again recommends that the Dead Man Statute be repealed.

However, repeal of the Dead Man Statute alone would tip the scales unfairly against decedents' estates by subjecting them to claims which could have been defeated, wholly or in part, if the decedent had lived to tell his story. If the living are to be permitted to testify, some steps ought to be taken to permit the decedent to testify, so to speak, from the grave. This can be done by relaxing the hearsay rule to permit ~~the~~ statement of a deceased person made upon his personal knowledge ~~in any action or proceeding against an executor or administrator upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person.~~ This hearsay exception is more limited than that recommended in 1957 and will, it is believed, meet most of the objections made to the 1957 recommendation.

person

offered

is accomplished

in Evidence Code section 1261 to provide a limited hearsay exception for a

Section 1881 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1881 is superseded by the provisions of the Evidence Code indicated below.

Subdivision 1. Subdivision 1 of Section 1881 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 970-973 and 980-987. Under subdivision 1 of

Section 1881 ~~and Section 1322~~ and Section 1322 of the Penal Code, a married person has a privilege, subject to certain exceptions, to prevent his spouse from testifying for or against him in a civil or criminal action to which he is a party. Section 1322 of the Penal Code also gives his spouse a privilege not to testify for or against him in a criminal action to which he is a party.

The "for" privilege. The Commission has concluded that the marital testimonial privilege provided by existing law as to testimony by one spouse for the other should be abolished in both civil and criminal actions. There would appear to be no need for this privilege, now given to a party to an action, not to call his spouse to testify in his favor. If a case can be imagined in which a party would wish to avail himself of this privilege, he could achieve the same result by simply not calling his spouse to the stand. Nor does it seem desirable to continue the present privilege of the nonparty spouse not to testify in favor of the party spouse in a criminal action. It is difficult to imagine a case in which this privilege would be claimed for other than mercenary or spiteful motives, and it precludes access to evidence which might save an innocent person from conviction.

The "against" privilege. Under existing law, either spouse may claim the privilege to prevent one spouse from testifying against the other in a criminal action, and the party spouse may claim the privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying against him in a civil action. The privilege under ~~Section 1881~~ is given exclusively to the witness spouse because he instead of the party spouse is more likely to make the determination of whether to claim the privilege on the basis of its probable effect on the marital relationship. For example, because of his interest in the outcome of the action, a party spouse would be under considerable temptation to claim the privilege even if the marriage were already hopelessly disrupted, whereas a witness spouse probably would not. Illustrative of the possible misuse of the existing privilege is the recent case of *People v. Ward*, 50 Cal.2d 702, 828 P.2d 777 (1958), involving a defendant who murdered his wife's mother and 13-year-old sister. He had threatened to murder his wife—and it seems likely that he would have done so had she not fled. The marital relationship was as thoroughly shattered as it could have been; yet, the defendant was entitled to invoke the privilege to prevent his wife from testifying. In such a situation, the privilege does not serve at all its true purpose of preserving a marital relationship from disruption; it serves only as an obstacle to the administration of justice.

Evidence Code
Section 970 and 971 are

Subdivisions 2-6.

Subdivisions 2-6 of 1881 are superseded by provisions of the Evidence Code indicated below:

<u>Section 1881</u> <u>(subdivision)</u>	<u>Evidence Code</u> <u>(section)</u>
2	950-962
3	1030-1034
4	990-1006, 1010-1026
5	1040-1042
6	1070-1072

Section 1883 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1883 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 703 and 704.

Section 1884 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1884 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 752.

Section 1885 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1885 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 754.

Section 1893 (Amended)

Comment. The language deleted from Section 1893 is unnecessary in view of Evidence Code Sections 1506 and 1530.

Section 1901 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1901 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 1530.

Section 1903 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1903 is unnecessary to support the validity of statutes, for the California courts have said that statutes are "presumed" to be constitutional. In re Cregler, 56 Cal.2d 308, 311, 363 P.2d 305, 307, 14 Cal. Rptr. 289, 291

(1961). If Section 1903 is deemed to have an evidentiary effect, it is undesirable to the extent that it indicates that the Legislature may exercise the judicial power of making findings on controverted facts and that such findings are conclusive. As the section is unnecessary to accomplish its essential purpose, it is repealed. This repeal will not change the law of California relating to the construction or validity of statutes because the courts have not placed that law upon the footing of this section.

Section 1905 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1905, 1906, 1907, 1918, and 1919 relate to hearsay, authentication of official records, and the best evidence rule. They are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1270-1272; 1280-1284, 1452-1454, 1506-1507, 1530, 1532, and 1600.

Subdivision 4 of Section 1918 provides for the authentication of a published foreign official journal by evidence that it was commonly received in the foreign country as published by the requisite authority. Although no similar provision appears in the Evidence Code, this and other evidence of authenticity not mentioned explicitly in the Evidence Code may be used to authenticate official writings under the general language of Section 1410, which provides that the requirement of authentication may be met by "evidence sufficient to sustain a finding of the authenticity of the writing." See also EVIDENCE CODE §§ 1400 and 1530.

Section 1906 (Repealed)

Comment. See Comment to Section 1905.

Section 1907 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1905.

Section 1908.5 (Added)

Comment. Section 1908.5 recodifies the rule of pleading stated in subdivision 6 of Section 1962 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See the Comment to Section 1962.

Section 1918 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1905.

Section 1919 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1905.

Section 1919a (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1919a and 1919b are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1315 and 1316.

Section 1919b (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1919a.

Section 1920 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1920 is superseded by the business records exception contained in Evidence Code Sections 1270 and 1271, by the exception to the hearsay rule for official records and other official writings contained in Evidence Code Sections 1280-1284, and by various specific exceptions to the hearsay rule that will continue to exist under various sections of the Evidence Code and other codes.

Section 1920a (Repealed)

Comment: Section 1920a is unnecessary in view of Evidence Code Sections

1506 and 1530.

Section 1920b (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1920b is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1551.

Section 1921 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1921 and 1922 are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1270-1272, 1280, and Sections 1400-1530.

Section 1922 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1921.

Section 1923 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1923 is substantially recodified in Evidence Code Section 1531.

Section 1924 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1924 is unnecessary because the sections to which it relates are repealed.

Section 1925 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1925 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1604.

Section 1926 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1926 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1270-1271 and 1280-1284.

Section 1927 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1927 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1602.

Section 1927.5 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1927.5 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1605.

Section 1928 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1928 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1603.

Sections 1928.1-1928.4 (Repealed)

Comment. Article 2.1 of Chapter 3, Title 2, Part 4 of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of Sections 1928.1-1928.4. The sections are discussed individually below.

Section 1928.1 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1928.1 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1282.

Section 1928.2 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1928.2 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1283.

Section 1928.3 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1928.3 is unnecessary in view of Evidence Codes Sections 1452, 1453, and 1530.

Section 1928.4 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1928.4 is unnecessary in view of Evidence Code Section 3.

Section 1936 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1936 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1341.

Section 1936.1 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1936.1 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1156.

Section 1937 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1937, 1938, and 1939 relate to the best evidence rule and are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1500-1510.

Section 1938 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1937.

Section 1939 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1937.

Section 1940 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1940 is recodified as Evidence Code Sections 1413 and 1415.

Section 1941 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1941 is recodified in substance as Evidence Code Section 1412.

Section 1942 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1942 is recodified in substance as Evidence Code Section 1414.

Section 1943 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1943 is recodified in substance in Evidence Code Section 1416.

Section 1944 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1944 is recodified in substance as Evidence Code Section 1417.

Section 1945 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1945 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1418.

Section 1946 (Repealed)

Comment. The first subdivision of Section 1946 is superseded by the declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule contained in Evidence Code Section 1230; the second subdivision is superseded by the business records exception contained in Evidence Code Sections 1270 and 1271; and the third subdivision is superseded by the business records exception contained in

Evidence Code Sections 1270-1271, the official records exceptions contained in Evidence Code Sections 1280-1284, and the various other exceptions to the hearsay rule contained elsewhere in the Evidence Code and in other codes.

Section 1947 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1947 was a necessary provision when the only hearsay exception for business records was the common law "shop-book" rule. That rule required that an entry be an original entry in order to qualify for admission in evidence. The business records exception to the hearsay rule contained in Evidence Code Sections 1270 and 1271 does not require that the entry be an original entry so long as it was made in the regular course of the business at or near the time of the act, condition, or event recorded. As the section no longer has any significant meaning, it is repealed.

Section 1948 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1948 is recodified in substance as Evidence Code Section 1451.

Section 1951 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1951 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1451, 1532, and 1600.

Section 1953e-1953h (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1953e-1953h, which constitute the Uniform Business Records as Evidence Act, are recodified as Evidence Code Sections 1270-1272.

Sections 1953i-1953L (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1953i-1953L, which comprise the Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as Evidence Act, are recodified as Evidence Code Section 1550.

Section 1954 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1954 is recodified as Evidence Code 391.

Sections 1957-1963 (Repealed)

Comment. Chapter 5 of Title 2, Part IV, of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of Sections 1957 through 1963. The sections are commented upon individually below.

Section 1957 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1957, 1958, and 1960 are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 140 (defining "evidence") and 210 (defining "relevant evidence"). See the Comments to EVIDENCE CODE §§ 140 and 210. See also the Comment to CODE CIV. PROC. § 1832.

Section 1958 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1957.

Section 1959 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1959 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 600.

Section 1960 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1957.

Section 1961 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1961 is superseded by Chapter 3 (commencing with Section 600) of Division 5 of the Evidence Code, which prescribes the nature and effect of presumptions.

Section 1962 (Repealed)

Comment. Subdivision 1 of Section 1962 is repealed because it "has little meaning, either as a rule of substantive law or as a rule of evidence . . ." *People v. Gorshon*, 51 Cal.2d 710, 731, 336 P.2d 492, 501 (1959).

Subdivisions 2, 3, 4, and 5 are superseded by Evidence Code Sections 621-624.

The first clause of subdivision 6 states the meaningless truism that judgments are conclusive when declared by law to be conclusive. The pleading rule in the next two clauses has been recodified as Section 1908.5 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

Subdivision 7 is merely a cross-reference section to all other presumptions declared by law to be conclusive. This subdivision is unnecessary.

Section 1963 (Repealed)

Comment. Many of the presumptions listed in Section 1963 are classified and restated in the Evidence Code. A few have been recodified as maxims of jurisprudence in Part 4 of Division 4 of the Civil Code. Others are not continued at all. The disposition of each subdivision of Section 1963 is given in the table below. Following the table are comments indicating the reasons for repealing those provisions of Section 1963 that are not continued in California law.

Section 1963 (subdivision)	Superseded by
1	Evidence Code Section 520
2	Not continued
3	Civil Code Section 3544 (added in this recommendation)
4	Evidence Code Section 521
5	Not continued
6	Not continued
7	Evidence Code Section 631
8	Evidence Code Section 632
9	Evidence Code Section 633
10	Evidence Code Section 636
11	Evidence Code Section 637
12	Evidence Code Section 638
13	Evidence Code Section 634
14	Not continued
15	Evidence Code Section 604
16	Evidence Code Section 666
17	Evidence Code Section 650
18	Not continued
19	Civil Code Section 3545 (added in this recommendation)
20	Not continued
21	Commercial Code Sections 3306, 3307, and 3408
22	Not continued
23	Evidence Code Section 640
24	Evidence Code Section 611
25	Not continued
26	Evidence Code Section 637
27	Not continued
28	Civil Code Section 3546 (added in this recommendation)
29	Not continued
30	Not continued
31	Evidence Code Section 611
32	Civil Code Section 3547 (added in this recommendation)
33	Civil Code Section 3548 (added in this recommendation)
34	Evidence Code Section 643
35	Evidence Code Section 644
36	Evidence Code Section 645
37	Evidence Code Section 642
38	Not continued
39	Unnecessary (duplicates Civil Code Section 1614)
40	Civil Code Section 161.5 (added in this recommendation)

Subdivision 2 is not continued because it has been a source of error and confusion in the cases. An instruction based upon it is error whenever specific intent is in issue. *People v. Snyder*, 15 Cal.2d 706, 104, P.2d 639 (1940); *People v. Maciel*, 71 Cal. App. 213, 234 Pac. 877 (1925). A person's intent may be inferred from his actions and the surrounding circumstances, and an instruction to that effect may be given. *People v. Bebold*, 154 Cal. 363, 97 Pac. 871 (1908).

Subdivisions 5 and 6 are not continued because, despite Section 1963, there is no presumption of the sort stated. The "presumptions" merely indicate that a party's evidence should be viewed with distrust if he could produce better evidence and that unfavorable inferences should be drawn from the evidence offered against him if he fails to deny or explain it. A party's failure to produce evidence cannot be turned into evidence against him by reliance on these presumptions. *Hampton v. Rose*, 8 Cal. App.2d 447, 56 P.2d 1242 (1925); *Girvetz v. Boys' Market, Inc.*, 91 Cal. App. 2d 827, 830, 206 P.2d 6, 8-9 (1949). The substantive effect of these "presumptions" is stated more accurately in ~~Section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in this recommendation.~~

Evidence
Case
Section
447 (jur
FACTS)

Subdivision 14. The presumption stated in subdivision 14 is not continued, for it is inaccurate and misleading. The cases have used this presumption to sustain the validity of the official acts of a person acting in a public office when there has been no evidence to show that such person had the right to hold office. See, e.g., *City of Monterey v. Jacks*, 139 Cal. 542, 73 Pac. 436 (1903); *Delphi School Dist. v. Murray*, 53 Cal. 29 (1878); *People v. Beal*, 108 Cal. App.2d 200, 239 P. 2d 84 (1951). The presumption is unnecessary for this purpose, for it is well settled that the "acts of an officer de facto, so far as the rights of third persons are concerned, are, if done within the scope and by the apparent authority of office, as valid and binding as if he were the officer legally elected and qualified for the office and in full possession of it." *In re Redevelopment Plan for Bunker Hill*, 61 Cal.2d, ---, ---, 37 Cal. Rptr. 74, 88, 389 P.2d 538, 552 (1964); *Oakland Paving Co. v. Donovan*, 13 Cal. App. 488, 494, 126 Pac. 388, 390 (1912). Under the de facto doctrine, the validity of the official acts taken is conclusively established. *Town of Susanville v. Long*, 144 Cal. 362, 77 Pac. 987 (1904); *People v. Hecht*, 105 Cal. 621, 38 Pac. 941 (1895); *People v. Sassovich*, 29 Cal. 480 (1866). Thus, the cases applying subdivision 14 are erroneous in indicating that the official acts of a person acting in a public office may be attacked by evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption of a valid appointment. These cases can be explained only on the ground that they have overlooked the de facto doctrine.

In cases where the presumption might have some significance—cases where the party occupying the office is asserting some right of the officeholder—the presumption has been held inapplicable. *Burke v. Edgar*, 67 Cal. 182, 7 Pac. 488 (1885).

Subdivision 18. No case has been found where subdivision 18 has had any effect. The doctrine of res judicata determines the issues concluded between the parties without regard to this presumption. *Parnell v. Hahn*, 61 Cal. 131, 132 (1882) ("And the judgment as rendered . . . is conclusive upon all questions involved in the action and upon which it depends, or upon matters which, under the issues, might have been litigated and decided in the case . . .").

Subdivision 20. The cases have used this "presumption" merely as a justification for holding that evidence of a business custom will sustain a finding that the custom was followed on a particular occasion. E.g., *Robinson v. Puls*, 28 Cal.2d 664, 171 P.2d 490 (1946); *American Car Co. v. Agricultural Insur. Co.*, 27 Cal. App. 647, 150 Pac. 996 (1915). ~~Section 1963 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended in this recommendation provides for the admissibility of business custom evidence to prove that the custom was followed on a particular occasion. *Fennell v. Fennell*, 10 Cal. App. 2d 100, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 167, 168, 169, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 201, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 260, 261, 262, 263, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274, 275, 276, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285, 286, 287, 288, 289, 290, 291, 292, 293, 294, 295, 296, 297, 298, 299, 300, 301, 302, 303, 304, 305, 306, 307, 308, 309, 310, 311, 312, 313, 314, 315, 316, 317, 318, 319, 320, 321, 322, 323, 324, 325, 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 331, 332, 333, 334, 335, 336, 337, 338, 339, 340, 341, 342, 343, 344, 345, 346, 347, 348, 349, 350, 351, 352, 353, 354, 355, 356, 357, 358, 359, 360, 361, 362, 363, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 371, 372, 373, 374, 375, 376, 377, 378, 379, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 387, 388, 389, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399, 400, 401, 402, 403, 404, 405, 406, 407, 408, 409, 410, 411, 412, 413, 414, 415, 416, 417, 418, 419, 420, 421, 422, 423, 424, 425, 426, 427, 428, 429, 430, 431, 432, 433, 434, 435, 436, 437, 438, 439, 440, 441, 442, 443, 444, 445, 446, 447, 448, 449, 450, 451, 452, 453, 454, 455, 456, 457, 458, 459, 460, 461, 462, 463, 464, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470, 471, 472, 473, 474, 475, 476, 477, 478, 479, 480, 481, 482, 483, 484, 485, 486, 487, 488, 489, 490, 491, 492, 493, 494, 495, 496, 497, 498, 499, 500, 501, 502, 503, 504, 505, 506, 507, 508, 509, 510, 511, 512, 513, 514, 515, 516, 517, 518, 519, 520, 521, 522, 523, 524, 525, 526, 527, 528, 529, 530, 531, 532, 533, 534, 535, 536, 537, 538, 539, 540, 541, 542, 543, 544, 545, 546, 547, 548, 549, 550, 551, 552, 553, 554, 555, 556, 557, 558, 559, 560, 561, 562, 563, 564, 565, 566, 567, 568, 569, 570, 571, 572, 573, 574, 575, 576, 577, 578, 579, 580, 581, 582, 583, 584, 585, 586, 587, 588, 589, 590, 591, 592, 593, 594, 595, 596, 597, 598, 599, 600, 601, 602, 603, 604, 605, 606, 607, 608, 609, 610, 611, 612, 613, 614, 615, 616, 617, 618, 619, 620, 621, 622, 623, 624, 625, 626, 627, 628, 629, 630, 631, 632, 633, 634, 635, 636, 637, 638, 639, 640, 641, 642, 643, 644, 645, 646, 647, 648, 649, 650, 651, 652, 653, 654, 655, 656, 657, 658, 659, 660, 661, 662, 663, 664, 665, 666, 667, 668, 669, 670, 671, 672, 673, 674, 675, 676, 677, 678, 679, 680, 681, 682, 683, 684, 685, 686, 687, 688, 689, 690, 691, 692, 693, 694, 695, 696, 697, 698, 699, 700, 701, 702, 703, 704, 705, 706, 707, 708, 709, 710, 711, 712, 713, 714, 715, 716, 717, 718, 719, 720, 721, 722, 723, 724, 725, 726, 727, 728, 729, 730, 731, 732, 733, 734, 735, 736, 737, 738, 739, 740, 741, 742, 743, 744, 745, 746, 747, 748, 749, 750, 751, 752, 753, 754, 755, 756, 757, 758, 759, 760, 761, 762, 763, 764, 765, 766, 767, 768, 769, 770, 771, 772, 773, 774, 775, 776, 777, 778, 779, 780, 781, 782, 783, 784, 785, 786, 787, 788, 789, 790, 791, 792, 793, 794, 795, 796, 797, 798, 799, 800, 801, 802, 803, 804, 805, 806, 807, 808, 809, 810, 811, 812, 813, 814, 815, 816, 817, 818, 819, 820, 821, 822, 823, 824, 825, 826, 827, 828, 829, 830, 831, 832, 833, 834, 835, 836, 837, 838, 839, 840, 841, 842, 843, 844, 845, 846, 847, 848, 849, 850, 851, 852, 853, 854, 855, 856, 857, 858, 859, 860, 861, 862, 863, 864, 865, 866, 867, 868, 869, 870, 871, 872, 873, 874, 875, 876, 877, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 885, 886, 887, 888, 889, 890, 891, 892, 893, 894, 895, 896, 897, 898, 899, 900, 901, 902, 903, 904, 905, 906, 907, 908, 909, 910, 911, 912, 913, 914, 915, 916, 917, 918, 919, 920, 921, 922, 923, 924, 925, 926, 927, 928, 929, 930, 931, 932, 933, 934, 935, 936, 937, 938, 939, 940, 941, 942, 943, 944, 945, 946, 947, 948, 949, 950, 951, 952, 953, 954, 955, 956, 957, 958, 959, 960, 961, 962, 963, 964, 965, 966, 967, 968, 969, 970, 971, 972, 973, 974, 975, 976, 977, 978, 979, 980, 981, 982, 983, 984, 985, 986, 987, 988, 989, 990, 991, 992, 993, 994, 995, 996, 997, 998, 999, 1000.~~ There is no reason to compel the trier of fact to find that the custom was followed by applying a presumption. The evidence of the custom may be strong or weak, and the trier of fact should be free to decide whether the custom was followed or not. No case has been found giving a presumptive effect to evidence of a business custom under subdivision 20.

Evidence
Case Section
1105

Subdivision 22. The purpose of subdivision 22 appears to have been to compel an accommodation endorser to prove that he endorsed in accommodation of a subsequent party to the instrument and not in accommodation of the maker. See, e.g., *Pacific Portland Cement Co. v. Reinecke*, 30 Cal. App. 501, 158 Pac. 1041 (1916). The liability of accommodation endorsers is now fully covered by the Commercial Code. Accommodation is a defense which must be established by the defendant. COM. CODE §§ 3307, 3415(5). Hence, subdivision 22 is no longer necessary.

Subdivision 25. Despite subdivision 25, the California courts have refused to apply the presumption of identity of person from identity of the name when the name is common. E.g., *People v. Wong Sang Lung*, 3 Cal. App. 221, 224, 84 Pac. 843, 845 (1906). The matter should be left to inference, for the strength of the inference will depend in particular cases on whether the name is common or unusual.

Subdivision 27 has been rarely cited in the reported cases since it was enacted in 1872. It has been applied to situations where a statement has been made in the presence of a person who has failed to protest to the representations in the statement. The apparent acquiescence in the statement has been held to be proof of belief in the truth of the statement. *Estate of Flood*, 217 Cal. 763, 21 P.2d 579 (1933); *Estate of Clark*, 13 Cal. App. 786, 110 Pac. 528 (1910).

Although it may be appropriate under some circumstances to infer from the lack of protest that a person believes in the truth of a statement made in his presence, it is undesirable to require such a conclusion. The surrounding circumstances may vary greatly from case to case, and the trier of fact should be free to decide whether acquiescence resulted from belief or from some other cause. Cf. *Matt. 27:13-14* (Revised Standard Version) ("Then Pilate said to him, 'Do you not hear how many things they testify against you?' But he gave him no answer, not even to a single charge . . .").

Subdivision 29 has been cited in but one appellate decision in its 92-year history. It is unnecessary in light of the doctrine of ostensible authority. See 1 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, *Agency and Employment* §§ 49-51 (7th ed. 1960).

Subdivision 30, in effect, declares that a marriage will be presumed from proof of cohabitation and repute. *Pulos v. Pulos*, 140 Cal. App.2d 913, 295 P.2d 907 (1956). Because reputation evidence may sometimes strongly indicate the existence of a marriage and at other times fail to do so, requiring a finding of a marriage from proof of such reputation is unwarranted. The cases have sometimes refused to apply the presumption because of the weakness of the reputation evidence relied on. *Estate of Baldwin*, 162 Cal. 471, 123 Pac. 267 (1912); *Cacioppo v. Triangle Co.*, 120 Cal. App.2d 281, 260 P.2d 985 (1953). Discontinuance of the presumption will not affect the rule that the existence of a marriage may be inferred from proof of reputation. *White v. White*, 82 Cal. 427, 430, 23 Pac. 276, 277 (1890) ("cohabitation and repute do not make marriage; they are merely items of evidence from which it may be inferred that a marriage had been entered into") (italics in original).

Subdivision 38 has not been applied in any reported case in its 92-year history. The substantive law relating to implied dedication and dedication by prescription makes the presumption unnecessary. See 2 WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, *Real Property* §§ 27-29 (7th ed. 1960).

Section 1967 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1967 has no substantive meaning and is unnecessary.

Section 1968 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1968 unnecessarily duplicates the provisions of Penal Code Sections 1103 and 1103a.

Section 1973 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1973 is unnecessary. It merely describes in evidentiary terms the Statute of Frauds contained in Civil Code Section 1624.

Section 1974 (Amended)

Comment. The amendment to Section 1974 makes no substantive change in the law; the amendment merely makes clear that Section 1974 is a substantive rule of law, not a rule of evidence.

Section 1978 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1978 incorrectly states the existing law of California. Certain things are declared to be "conclusive evidence" in other codes. See, e.g., COM. CODE § 1201(6), (45). Moreover, the California courts have recognized that some evidence may be conclusive in the absence of statute. for a court, "in reviewing the evidence, is bound to exercise its intelligence, and in doing so must recognize that certain facts are controlled by immutable physical laws. It cannot permit the verdict of a jury to change such facts, because . . . to do so would, in effect, destroy the intelligence of the court." Austin v. Newton, 46 Cal. App. 493, 497, 189 Pac. 471, 472 (1920); Neilson v. Houle, 200 Cal. 726, 729, 254 Pac. 891, 892 (1927). Nonetheless, the California courts have also relied upon this section to sustain a finding of paternity despite

undisputed blood-test evidence showing that the defendant could not have been the father of the child. Arais v. Kalensnikoff, 10 Cal.2d 428, 74 P.2d 1043 (1937). The Legislature subsequently rejected this decision by enacting the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity. Repeal of Section 1978 will remove the statutory basis for a similar decision in the rare case where such certainty is attainable.

Sections 1980.1-1980.7 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1980.1-1980.7, which comprise the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity, are recodified as Evidence Code Sections 890-896.

Sections 1981-1983 (Repealed)

Comment. Chapter 1 of Title 3, Part IV, of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of Sections 1981 through 1983. These sections are discussed individually below.

Section 1981 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1981 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 500 and 510.

Section 1982 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1982 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 1402.

Section 1983 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1983 was held unconstitutional as applied under the Alien Land Law. Morrison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). It has been applied but once by an appellate court since the Morrison case was decided. People v. Cordero, 50 Cal. App.2d 146, 122 P.2d 648 (1942). Section 1983 appears to have been designed principally to facilitate the enforcement of the Alien Land Law. Since that law has been held unconstitutional

(Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952)) and has been repealed (Cal. Stats. 1955, Ch. 316 § 1, p. 767), Section 1983 should no longer be retained in the law of California.

Section 1998 (Repealed)

Comment. Sections 1998-1998.5 provide a special exception to the best evidence rule for hospital records. These sections are recodified as Evidence Code Sections 1560-1566.

Section 1998.1 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1998.

Section 1998.2 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1998.

Section 1998.3 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1998.

Section 1998.4 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1998.

Section 1998.5 (Repealed)

Comment. See the Comment to Section 1998.

Section 2009 (Amended)

Comment. Section 2009 has been amended to reflect the fact that statutes in other codes may also authorize the use of affidavits. See, e.g., PROBATE CODE §§ 630, 705.

Section 2016 (Amended)

Comment. The amendment of Section 2016 merely substitutes the general definition of "unavailable as a witness" used in the Evidence Code for the substantially similar language in Section 2016.

Sections 2042-2056 (Repealed)

Comment. Article 6 of Chapter 3, Title 3, Part IV, of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of Sections 2042 through 2056. These sections are discussed individually below.

Section 2042 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2042 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 320 and 321.

Section 2043 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2043 is substantially recodified in Evidence Code Section 777.

Section 2044 (Repealed)

Comment. The first sentence of Section 2044 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 765. The second sentence is superseded by Evidence Code 352.

Section 2045 (Repealed)

Comment. The first sentence of Section 2045 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 760, 761, and 772. The second sentence of Section 2045 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 773.

Section 2046 (Repealed)

Comment. The first sentence of Section 2046 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 762. The second sentence of Section 2046 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 767.

Section 2047 (Repealed)

Comment. The last sentence of Section 2047 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 1237. The remainder of Section 2047 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 771.

Section 2048 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2048 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 767 and 772.

Section 2049 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2049 is inconsistent with and superseded by Evidence Code Section 785. See the Comment to Section 785.

Section 2050 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2050 is recodified as Evidence Code Sections 774 and 778.

Section 2051 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2051 is inconsistent with Evidence Code Sections 780 and 785-788. The provision of Section 2051 excluding evidence of particular wrongful acts is continued in Evidence Code Section 787. The principle of excluding criminal convictions where there has been a subsequent pardon has been broadened to cover analogous situations in Evidence Code Section 788.

Section 2052 (Repealed)

Comment. The first clause of Section 2052 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 780(h). The remainder of Section 2052 is inconsistent with Evidence Code Sections 768-770. See the Comments to those sections.

Section 2053 (Repealed)

Comment. Insofar as Section 2053 deals with the inability to support a witness' credibility until it has been impeached, it is superseded by Evidence Code Section 790. Insofar as Section 2053 deals with the inadmissibility of character evidence in a civil action, it is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1100-1104.

Section 2054 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2054 recodified in substance as Evidence Code Section 768(b).

Section 2055 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2055 is recodified as Evidence Code Section 776.

Section 2056 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2056 is recodified in substance as Evidence Code Section 766.

Section 2061 (Repealed)

Comment. The first sentence of Section 2061 is recodified in Evidence Code Section 312. The remainder of Section 2061 is superseded by Chapter 6 (commencing with Section 430) of Division 3 of the Evidence Code.

Section 2065 (Repealed)

Comment. The first clause of Section 2065 is superseded by Evidence

Code Sections 351 and 911. ~~Section 2065~~

Insofar as ~~the~~ ²⁰⁶⁵ Section permits a witness to refuse to give an answer having a tendency to subject him to punishment for a felony, it is superseded by ~~Section 2065 and 2066~~ dealing with the self-incrimination privilege.

Evidence Code Sections 949 ~~and 950~~

Section 2065

The language relating to an answer which would have a tendency to degrade the character of the witness is unnecessary. The meaning of this language seems to be ~~that~~ A witness must testify to non-incriminating but degrading matter that is relevant to the merits of the case.⁶

follows:

⁶ Clark v. Reese, 35 Cal. 80 (1869) (breach of promise to marry; defense that plaintiff had immoral relations with X; *held*, X must answer to such relations, though answer degrading); Sanchez v. Superior Court, 153 Cal. App.2d 162, 314 P.2d 135 (1957) (separate maintenance on ground of cruelty; defendant required to answer as to cruelty, albeit degrading).

Nevertheless the witness is privileged to refuse to testify to such matter when the matter is relevant only for the purpose of impeachment. However, this privilege seems to be largely—if not entirely—superfluous. ~~Section 2065~~ provides that a witness may not be impeached by evidence of ~~such specific instances of~~

Evidence Code Section 787 (Specific instances of conduct)

Manifestly, to the extent that the degrading matter referred to in Section 2065 ~~is~~ makes this portion of Section 2065 unnecessary. ~~Section 2065~~

Evidence Code Section 787

Moreover, since the witness is protected against impeachment by evidence of ~~such specific instances of~~ acts, though relevant, and against matter which is degrading but is irrelevant (as to which no special rule is needed), there seems to be little, if any, scope left to the "degrading matter" privilege. For criticisms of this privilege, see 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE §§ 2215, 2255 (McNaughton rev. 1961); 3 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 954 (3d ed. 1940); McGovney, *Self-Criminating and Self-Disgracing Testimony*, 5 IOWA LAW BULL. 174 (1920). This privilege seems to be seldom invoked in California opinions and, when invoked, it arises in cases in which the evidence in question could be excluded merely by virtue of its irrelevancy, or by virtue of Section 2051, or by virtue of both. See, for example, the following cases: *People v. Watson*, 46 Cal.2d 819, 299 P.2d 243 (1956) (homicide case involving cross-examination as to defendant's efforts to evade military service; *held*, irrelevant and violative of Section 2065); *People v. T. Wah Ting*, 15 Cal. App. 195, 203, 114 Pac. 416, 419 (1911) (abortion case in which the prosecuting witness was asked on cross-examination who was father of child; *held*, immaterial—and, if asked to degrade, "equally inadmissible"); *People v. Fong Chung*, 5 Cal. App. 587, 91 Pac. 195 (1907) (defendant's witness in statutory rape case asked whether the witness was seller of lottery tickets and operator of poker game; *held*, improper, *inter alia*, on ground of Section 2065. Note, however, the additional grounds for exclusion, *viz.*, immateriality and Section 2051. Thus, Section 2065 was not at all necessary for the decision.). Hence this portion of Section 2065 is superfluous ~~under~~

pertinent portion continued as Evidence Code Section 787,

~~Section 2065~~ Evidence Code ~~Section 787~~ Section ~~2065~~ The remainder of ~~the~~ Section is superseded by ~~Section 2065~~ dealing ~~with~~ the ~~subject~~

Evidence Code Section 788.

admissibility of criminal convictions for impeachment purposes.

2065

Section 2066 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2066 is unnecessary in the light of Evidence Code Section 765, which restates the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure Section 2044.

Section 2078 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2078 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 1152-1154.

Section 2079 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2079 is unnecessary because it repeats what is said in Civil Code Section 130. Moreover, it is misleading to the extent that it suggests that adultery is the only ground for divorce which requires corroboration of the testimony of the spouses.

Sections 2101-2103 (Repealed)

Comment. Chapter 4 of Title 5, Part IV, of the Code of Civil Procedure consists of Sections 2101 through 2103. These sections are discussed individually below.

Section 2101 (Repealed).

Comment. Section 2101 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 312.

Section 2102 (Repealed)

Comment. The first sentence of Section 2102 is recodified in Evidence Code Section 310. The second sentence of Section 2102 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 457.

Section 2103 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 2103 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 300.

CORPORATIONS CODE

Section 6602 (Amended)

Comment. This revision of Section 6602 provides, in effect, that the judge may take judicial notice of the matters listed in amended Section 6602, and he is required to take such judicial notice if he is requested to do so and the party supplies him with sufficient information. See EVIDENCE CODE §§ 452 and 453 and the Comments thereto.

The portion of Section 6602 which has been deleted is either unnecessary because it duplicates the provisions of Evidence Code Sections 451 and 452 or undesirable because it conflicts with Evidence Code 1452.

Section 25310 (Amended)

Comment. The deleted language is inconsistent with Evidence Code Section 1452. See the Comment to that section.

GOVERNMENT CODE

Section 11513 (Amended)

Comment. The revision of the last sentence of Section 11513 is necessary because, under Division 8 (commencing with Section 900) of the Evidence Code, the privileges applicable in some administrative proceedings are at times different from those applicable in civil actions.

The substitution of of "other" for "direct" in the third sentence of subdivision (c) of Section 11513 makes no significant substantive change, but is desirable because "direct evidence" is not defined for the purposes of Section 11513. See the Comment to CODE CIV. PROC. § 1831.

Section 19580 (Amended)

Comment. The amendment merely substitutes a reference to the correct Evidence Code section for the reference to the superseded Code of Civil Procedure section.

Section 34330 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 34330 is unnecessary. The matters to be noticed under Section 34330 may be noticed under Division 4 (commencing with Section 450) of the Evidence Code, and that division provides the applicable procedures for taking judicial notice.

HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE

Section 3197 (Amended)

Comment. The revision of Section 3197 merely substitutes references to the pertinent Evidence Code sections that supersede subdivisions 1 and 4 of Code of Civil Procedure Section 1881.

PENAL CODE

Section 270 e (Amended)

Comment. The revision of Section 270e merely inserts a reference to the pertinent sections of the Evidence Code.

Section 686 (Amended)

Comment. Section 686 sets forth three exceptions to the right of a defendant in a criminal trial to confront the witnesses against him. These exceptions purport to state the conditions under which the court may admit testimony taken at the preliminary hearing, testimony taken in a former trial of the action and testimony in a deposition that is admissible under Penal Code Section 882. The section inaccurately sets forth the existing law, for it fails to provide for the admission of hearsay evidence generally or for the admission of testimony in a deposition that is admissible under Penal Code Sections 1345 and 1362, and its reference to the conditions under which depositions may be admitted under Penal Code Section 882 is not accurate. As ~~Section 686~~ covers the situations in which testimony in another action or proceeding and testimony at the preliminary hearing is admissible as exceptions to the hearsay rule, Section 686 ~~is being~~ revised by eliminating the specific exceptions for these situations and by substituting for them a general cross reference to admissible hearsay. The ~~present~~ statement of the conditions under which a deposition may be admitted ~~is also~~ deleted, and in lieu of the deleted language there ~~is~~ substituted language that accurately provides for the admission of depositions under Penal Code Sections 882, 1345 and 1362. ~~Section 686~~

Evidence Code
Sections ~~1290-1292~~

has been

has been

is

Section 688 (Amended)

Comment. The language deleted from Section 688 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 930 and 940.

Section 939.6 (Amended)

Comment. The revision of Section 939.6 makes no substantive change. The amendment, however, states more clearly and precisely the meaning that has been given the section by the California courts. See, e.g., People v. Freudenberg, 121 Cal. App.2d 564. 263 P.2d 875 (1953). See also WITKIN, CALIFORNIA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE §§ 175, 228 (1963).

Section 961 (Amended)

Comment. This revision of Section 961 makes clear that matters that will be judicially noticed, whether such notice is mandatory or discretionary, need not be stated in an accusatory pleading. See EVIDENCE CODE §§ 451 and 452.

Section 963 (Amended)

Comment. This revision of Section 963 makes the procedure provided in Evidence Code Sections 454-458 applicable when judicial notice is taken of the matter listed in Section 963. Note that, notwithstanding Evidence Code Section 453, notice is mandatory if the private statute or ordinance is pleaded by reference to its title and the day of its passage.

Section 1120 (Amended)

Comment. Section 1120 requires a juror who discovers that he has personal knowledge of a fact in controversy in the case to disclose the same in open court. If he reveals such personal knowledge during the jury's retirement, the jury must return into court. The section then requires that the juror be sworn

as a witness and examined in the presence of the parties.

The section does not make clear whether this examination in the presence of the parties is for the purpose of determining if "good cause" exists for the juror's discharge in accordance with Penal Code Section 1123 or whether this examination is for the purpose of obtaining the juror's knowledge as evidence in the case. The circumstances under which a juror may testify in a criminal case are fully covered in Evidence Code Section 704. Therefore, Section 1120 has been amended to eliminate the ambiguity in its provisions and to provide assurance the juror's examination is to be used solely to determine whether "good cause" exists for his discharge.

Section 1322 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1322 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 970-973 and 980-987. See the Comment to subdivision 1 of Section 1881 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which also is superseded by the same Evidence Code sections.

Section 1323 (Repealed)

Comment. The first clause of the first sentence of Section 1323 is superseded by Evidence Code Sections 930 and 940. The second clause is recodified as Evidence Code Section 772(b). The last sentence of Section 1323 is unnecessary because it merely duplicates the provisions of Article I, Section 13, of the California Constitution. The last sentence is unnecessary also in the light of Evidence Code Section 446.

Section 1323.5 (Repealed)

Comment. Section 1323.5 is superseded by Evidence Code Section 930, which retains the only effect the section has ever been given--to prevent the prosecution from calling the defendant in a criminal action as a witness. See People v. Talle, 111 Cal. App.2d 650, 245 P2d 633 (1952). Whether Section 1323.5

provides a broader privilege than Evidence Code Section 930 is not clear, for the meaning of the phrase "persons accused or charged" is uncertain. For example, a witness before the grand jury or at a coroner's inquest is not technically a person "accused or charged," and Section 1323.5 would appear not to apply to such proceedings. A person who claims the privilege against self-incrimination before the grand jury, at a coroner's inquest, or in some other proceeding is provided with sufficient protection under Evidence Code Section 913, for his claim of privilege cannot be shown to impeach him or to provide a basis for inferences against him in a subsequent civil or criminal proceeding.

Section 1345 (Amended)

Comment. Section 1345 has been revised so that the conditions for admitting the deposition of a witness that has been taken in the same action are consistent with the conditions for admitting the testimony of a witness in another action or proceeding under Evidence Codes Sections 1290-1292.

Section 1362 (Amended)

Comment. Section 1362 has been revised so that the conditions for admitting the deposition of a witness that has been taken in the same action are consistent with the conditions for admitting the testimony of a witness in another action or proceeding under Evidence Code Sections 1290-1292.

PUBLIC UTILITIES CODE

Section 306 (Amended)

Comment. The deleted language is inconsistent with Evidence Code Section 1452. See the Comment to that section.